Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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The case involves a facial constitutional challenge to Section 3755 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, which authorizes warrantless blood draws from individuals requiring emergency medical treatment after a motor vehicle accident if there is probable cause to suspect DUI. Larry Wardell Hunte was involved in a serious car accident, and while unconscious at the hospital, a state trooper requested a blood draw under Section 3755, which revealed the presence of alcohol and controlled substances. Hunte was charged with multiple offenses, including homicide by vehicle while DUI.The Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas found Section 3755 unconstitutional, holding that it violated the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court reasoned that the statute authorized warrantless searches without any recognized exception to the warrant requirement, such as exigent circumstances or voluntary consent.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Section 3755 is facially unconstitutional because it mandates warrantless blood draws based solely on probable cause, without requiring a search warrant or demonstrating any exception to the warrant requirement. The court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for such searches unless a valid exception applies, and statutory "implied consent" does not constitute such an exception. The court also rejected arguments that the statute could be applied constitutionally in certain circumstances, such as when a warrant is later obtained or exigent circumstances are present, noting that these scenarios do not involve actual applications of the statute. The court concluded that Section 3755 violates both the Fourth Amendment and the Pennsylvania Constitution. View "Commonwealth v. Hunte" on Justia Law

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In this case, the appellant, Brendan Linton, was riding his bicycle on a heavily trafficked state highway in Butler Township, Pennsylvania. The highway had one lane of travel in each direction, with a speed limit varying from 45 to 55 mph. Pennsylvania State Trooper Joshua Osche observed Linton riding his bicycle at speeds significantly lower than the posted speed limits, causing a buildup of traffic behind him. Despite multiple vehicles successfully passing Linton, Trooper Osche eventually initiated a traffic stop, citing Linton for impeding the normal and reasonable movement of traffic under Section 3364(b)(2) of the Vehicle Code.The Court of Common Pleas of Butler County found Linton guilty of violating Section 3364(b)(2), concluding that he should have moved to the berm area to allow faster-moving traffic to pass. The court imposed a $25 fine. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the judgment, agreeing that Linton's failure to use the berm constituted a violation of the statute.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case to determine whether Section 3364(b)(2) requires pedalcyclists to leave the roadway whenever faster-moving traffic approaches. The Court concluded that the statute calls for a fact-bound assessment of reasonableness, taking all relevant considerations into account. The Court held that there may be circumstances under which a factfinder could determine that the "reasonable efforts" a pedalcycle operator must exert include temporarily leaving the roadway. However, the Court rejected the rigid interpretations of both the appellant and the lower courts, emphasizing that the statute does not mandate pedalcyclists to always vacate the roadway for faster-moving traffic.The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, instructing the lower court to reconsider the sufficiency of the evidence using the proper legal standard. View "Commonwealth v. Linton" on Justia Law

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In this case, the appellant, Willie James Hardy, was convicted of first-degree murder in 1993 and again in 1996 after being granted a new trial. Hardy has consistently maintained his innocence. In 2020, Hardy filed a petition for post-conviction DNA testing under Pennsylvania's Section 9543.1, seeking to test evidence from his case using modern DNA technology that was not available at the time of his trials. The evidence against Hardy was circumstantial, and previous DNA testing excluded him as a contributor.The Court of Common Pleas of Erie County denied Hardy's petition, reasoning that the request was untimely based on the precedent set by Commonwealth v. Edmiston, and that further testing would not provide substantially more accurate or probative results. The Superior Court affirmed this decision, emphasizing the delay in Hardy's request and the strength of the circumstantial evidence against him.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case, focusing on three main issues: the timeliness of Hardy's request, the applicability of Section 9543.1(a)(2) regarding previously tested and untested evidence, and whether Hardy presented a prima facie case that DNA testing would establish his actual innocence. The court noted that the 2018 amendments to Section 9543.1 allow for DNA testing "at any time" and authorize retesting with newer technology.The Supreme Court held that Hardy's petition was timely, as the statute permits requests for DNA testing at any time and there was no indication that Hardy's request was intended to cause delay. The court also found that the lower courts erred in their interpretation of Section 9543.1(a)(2), as the statute allows for retesting with newer technology and does not preclude testing of previously untested evidence. Finally, the court concluded that Hardy met the prima facie burden by demonstrating a reasonable possibility that DNA testing could produce exculpatory evidence establishing his actual innocence.The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Commonwealth v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In 1908, the Bradford County Commissioners sold an unseated tract of land, known as the Haines Warrant, to Calvin H. McCauley, Jr. at a tax sale. Over a century later, the Pennsylvania Game Commission, a successor in interest to McCauley, initiated litigation to determine ownership of various tracts of land in central Pennsylvania. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court whether the 1908 tax sale constituted a title wash, thereby divesting the owners of the Haines Warrant’s subsurface estate of their interest.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania found that McCauley was acting as an agent for Central Pennsylvania Lumber Company (CPLC) when he purchased the Haines Warrant at the tax sale. The District Court determined that CPLC had a duty to pay the delinquent 1907 taxes, which led to the 1908 tax sale, and thus was barred under the Powell Rule from purchasing more than its prior interest in the Haines Warrant’s surface estate. The court concluded that McCauley’s purchase acted only as a redemption of CPLC’s prior surface interest, leaving the Proctor heirs’ interest in the subsurface estate intact.The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the 1908 tax sale did not constitute a title wash. The Court determined that owners of unseated land had a duty to pay taxes levied on their property, and McCauley’s purchase, as an agent of CPLC, operated merely as a payment of the taxes owed, not as a title wash. Therefore, the purchase did not divest the Proctor heirs of their interest in the Haines Warrant’s subsurface estate. The Court answered the certified question in the negative, affirming that the Proctor heirs retained their subsurface rights. View "Commonwealth v. Proctor" on Justia Law

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In 2017, Tower Health, a non-profit corporation, acquired Pottstown Hospital, an acute care facility in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. Tower Health created a non-profit LLC, Pottstown Hospital, LLC, to manage the hospital. The hospital provides various health services, including emergency care, inpatient and outpatient services, and community outreach. The hospital applied for a charitable real estate tax exemption for three properties, which was initially granted by the Montgomery County Board of Assessment Appeals.The Pottstown School District appealed the exemption to the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, arguing that the hospital did not operate entirely free from a profit motive due to high executive compensation and the relationship with Tower Health. The trial court found that the hospital met the criteria for a purely public charity under the HUP test, including operating free from a private profit motive, and upheld the tax exemption. The court noted that the hospital provided substantial uncompensated care and that executive compensation was reasonable and within market value.The Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court's decision, focusing on the compensation of Tower Health's executives and the management fees charged to the hospital. The court concluded that the hospital did not operate free from a private profit motive, as a substantial portion of executive compensation was tied to financial performance.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and held that the compensation of Tower Health's executives and the management fees were not relevant to the hospital's tax exemption status. The court emphasized that only the hospital's operations and executive compensation should be considered. The court found that the hospital's executive compensation was reasonable and within market value, thus meeting the HUP test. The Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision and reinstated the trial court's order granting the tax exemption. View "Pottstown SD v. Mont Co Bd" on Justia Law

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In 2012, George Thomas Shifflett was charged with driving under the influence (DUI) and accepted into an Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program. In 2022, Shifflett was involved in another DUI incident and was charged as a second-time offender based on his previous ARD acceptance. Shifflett pled guilty to the 2022 DUI but contested the use of his 2012 ARD as a prior offense for sentencing purposes, arguing it was unconstitutional under Alleyne v. United States.The Adams County Court of Common Pleas granted Shifflett's motion to exclude evidence of his 2012 ARD and sentenced him as a first-time offender. The Commonwealth appealed, and the Superior Court vacated the sentence, remanding for resentencing as a second-time offender, citing recent Superior Court decisions that overruled Commonwealth v. Chichkin, which had held that using ARD as a prior offense for sentencing was unconstitutional.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case to determine if considering Shifflett's ARD as a prior offense for sentencing violated Alleyne. The Court held that ARD does not equate to a conviction because it lacks the procedural safeguards of a criminal trial, such as the right to a jury trial and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, using ARD as a prior offense for sentencing enhancement is unconstitutional under Alleyne.The Court concluded that Section 3806 of the Motor Vehicle Code, which includes ARD in the definition of a prior offense, is facially unconstitutional to the extent it allows ARD to be used for sentencing enhancement. The Court reversed the Superior Court's order and remanded the case for reinstatement of Shifflett's original sentence as a first-time offender. View "Commonwealth v. Shifflett" on Justia Law

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Kristina Steets was severely injured in 2017 while working for Celebration Fireworks, Inc. The employer accepted liability for her total disability under the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) in 2018. In 2019, Steets filed petitions to amend the description of her injuries and sought specific loss benefits. The Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) granted her petitions, and the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) and the Commonwealth Court affirmed. However, Steets died from her injuries while the Commonwealth Court's decision was pending.Steets' estate filed petitions seeking payment of the specific loss benefits awarded to her, which were still under appellate review at the time of her death. The WCJ denied the Estate's claims beyond funeral expenses, and the WCAB affirmed. The Commonwealth Court, in a split decision, also affirmed, ruling that specific loss benefits did not survive Steets' work-related death based on the precedent set by Estate of Harris v. WCAB (Sunoco, Inc.).The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and overruled Estate of Harris and Burns International Security Services, Inc. v. WCAB (Crist), which had held that Section 306(g) of the WCA was the exclusive means by which specific loss benefits survive the death of a worker. The Court held that Section 410 of the WCA applies, which states that if a claimant dies before the final adjudication of their claim, the compensation due to the claimant up to the date of death shall be paid to the dependents or, if there are no dependents, to the estate. Since Steets died before the final adjudication of her specific loss benefits claim, the employer was required to pay those benefits to her estate. The case was remanded to the WCJ to determine the amount of specific loss benefits due to the Estate. View "Steets v. Celebration Fireworks" on Justia Law

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A group of appellants, including Firearms Owners Against Crime and two firearms dealers, filed a case against the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Commissioner, alleging that PSP was not complying with the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act. The appellants claimed that PSP was intentionally understaffing its Pennsylvania Instant Check System (PICS) Operations Section, leading to significant delays in background checks for firearm purchases, sometimes exceeding seven hours. They argued that these delays violated the statutory requirement for "instantaneous" or "immediate" background checks and caused financial harm to firearms dealers due to canceled transactions.The Commonwealth Court initially issued a preliminary injunction, finding that PSP had a statutory duty to employ sufficient personnel to ensure compliance with the Act and that the delays were causing financial harm to the dealers. However, the court later sustained PSP's preliminary objections, ruling that the statute did not specify a mandatory timeframe for background checks and that the operational decisions regarding staffing were discretionary. The court also dismissed the appellants' request for a refund of the $2.00 background check fee, as the statute did not provide for such refunds.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and held that while the statute did not require "instantaneous" responses, it did mandate that PSP provide results as quickly as possible with available resources. The court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's denial of injunctive and mandamus relief, as these would compel affirmative action barred by sovereign immunity. However, the court reversed the denial of declaratory relief, allowing the appellants to seek a judicial declaration of PSP's duties under the Act. The court also vacated the order denying leave to amend the petition, allowing the appellants to include new allegations regarding PSP's response to the preliminary injunction. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Firearms Owners v. Comm'r of PSP" on Justia Law

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On December 18, 2018, police responded to a report of check fraud at a bank involving two suspects. One suspect exited the bank and approached a Kia Soul before returning inside. Police located the vehicle with Rasheed Muhammad in the driver’s seat. Upon approaching, the officer detected marijuana and observed Muhammad searching the car’s center console and other areas. Muhammad provided a rental agreement for the car, which was in his name. After backup arrived, Muhammad was asked to exit the vehicle, and a search revealed a loaded firearm in the center console. Muhammad did not have a license to carry a firearm and was arrested after attempting to flee.The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas convicted Muhammad of carrying a firearm without a license and resisting arrest. Muhammad’s motion for acquittal was denied, and he was sentenced to 3 ½ to 7 years in prison for the firearm charge, followed by 2 years of probation for resisting arrest. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment, finding sufficient evidence to support the conviction based on the circumstances, including Muhammad’s proximity to the firearm and his behavior indicating knowledge and intent to conceal it.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the jury’s negative answer to a special interrogatory about Muhammad’s possession and control of the firearm rendered the evidence insufficient for his conviction. The court found no conflict between the jury’s answer and the conviction, noting that the interrogatory’s conjunctive phrasing did not negate the elements required for carrying a firearm without a license. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s order, upholding Muhammad’s judgment of sentence. View "Commonwealth v. Muhammad" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In this case, the appellant, Christopher Lynn Johnson, was convicted of first-degree murder and related offenses for the shooting death of Officer David Grove, a Deputy Wildlife Conservation Officer. On the night of November 11, 2010, Officer Grove encountered Johnson and his friend Ryan Laumann spotlighting deer near Gettysburg National Military Park. After stopping Johnson's vehicle, a confrontation ensued, during which Johnson shot Officer Grove multiple times, resulting in his death. Johnson fled the scene but was apprehended the following morning.The Court of Common Pleas of Adams County denied Johnson's petition for relief from his death sentence under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). Johnson raised multiple claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel, Brady violations, and improper victim impact evidence. The PCRA court held a five-day evidentiary hearing and ultimately found no merit in Johnson's claims. The court determined that Johnson failed to demonstrate prejudice from his counsel's actions and that there was no evidence of an agreement between the Commonwealth and Laumann regarding his testimony.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and affirmed the PCRA court's decision. The court found that Johnson's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel lacked merit, as his counsel conducted a thorough investigation and presented a robust mitigation defense during the penalty phase. The court also concluded that Johnson failed to prove any Brady or Napue violations, as there was no agreement between the Commonwealth and Laumann. Additionally, the court held that the victim impact evidence presented was permissible and did not violate Johnson's constitutional rights. Finally, the court determined that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors did not warrant relief. View "Commonwealth v. Johnson" on Justia Law