Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Two electors, Faith Genser and Frank Matis, submitted mail-in ballots for the 2024 Primary Election without the required Secrecy Envelopes. The Butler County Board of Elections identified the defect and notified the electors that their mail-in ballots would not be counted. The electors then cast provisional ballots on Election Day. The Board did not count these provisional ballots, leading the electors to file a petition in the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County.The trial court dismissed the petition, upholding the Board's decision. It concluded that the Election Code did not support counting provisional ballots when a defective mail-in ballot had been submitted. The court emphasized that the Election Code's requirements for mail-in ballots were mandatory and that the Board's role was to ensure compliance with these requirements during canvassing.The Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the electors' provisional ballots should be counted. It found ambiguity in the Election Code's language regarding when a ballot is considered "cast" or "voted." The court interpreted the provisions to mean that a ballot must be valid and counted to preclude the counting of a provisional ballot. It concluded that the General Assembly intended to allow voters to remedy their circumstances when their initial mail-in ballot was invalid or incomplete.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Commonwealth Court's decision. It held that the Election Code required the Board to count the electors' provisional ballots because their mail-in ballots were void due to the lack of Secrecy Envelopes. The Court emphasized that a void ballot has no legal effect and that the Election Code's provisions aim to prevent double voting while ensuring that every qualified voter has the opportunity to cast a vote. View "Genser v. Butler County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

Jamie Walsh and Mike Cabell competed in the April 23, 2024, primary election for the Republican nomination to represent the 117th District in Pennsylvania’s House of Representatives. Several provisional ballots were returned, and Walsh led Cabell by three votes before counting them. The Luzerne County Board of Elections held hearings to review the provisional ballots. Cabell challenged a ballot submitted by Timothy Wagner because the envelope was unsigned, and Walsh challenged a ballot submitted by Shane O’Donnell, who was registered to vote in a different county. The Board decided to count Wagner’s ballot but not O’Donnell’s.Cabell appealed to the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, which held a hearing where Wagner and O’Donnell testified. Wagner could not remember if he signed the envelope, but the court affirmed the Board’s decision to count his ballot due to no evidence of fraud and clear intent to vote. O’Donnell testified he moved to a new home less than 30 days before the election, and the court affirmed the Board’s decision not to count his vote, as he could have voted in his new district.The Commonwealth Court reversed both rulings. It held that Wagner’s unsigned ballot should not be counted based on the Election Code’s clear language. It also held that O’Donnell’s ballot should be counted because he moved within 30 days before the election, allowing him to vote in his old district.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision. It held that Wagner’s unsigned ballot should not be counted due to the clear statutory requirement for a signature. It also held that O’Donnell’s ballot should be counted because he moved within 30 days before the election, allowing him to vote in his previous district. View "IN RE: CANVASS OF PROVISIONAL BALLOTS IN THE 2024 PRIMARY ELECTION" on Justia Law

In a case involving the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (PLCB), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was asked to determine whether the PLCB is a "person" under Section 8303 of the Judicial Code and, if so, whether sovereign immunity bars mandamus damages sought under that provision. The case arose from the PLCB's failure to implement procedures to facilitate the direct shipment of special orders to customers, as required by law. The Commonwealth Court had issued a declaratory judgment to that effect and a writ of mandamus compelling the PLCB to comply. The Wine Vendors and Log Cabin subsequently applied for mandamus damages under Section 8303, which the PLCB contested, arguing that it was not a "person" under the statute and that sovereign immunity barred such damages.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the PLCB is a "person" within the meaning of Section 8303 and that sovereign immunity does not bar mandamus damages available under that provision. The court also held that attorneys’ fees awarded in relation to Section 8303 are not barred by sovereign immunity. The court affirmed the holdings of the Commonwealth Court and remanded for further proceedings. View "MFW WINE CO., LLC v. PENNSYLVANIA LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Beverly Ferraro, slipped and fell at a Burger King restaurant in Butler County, Pennsylvania, and filed a negligence lawsuit against the restaurant's operators. Ferraro filed her complaint within the two-year statute of limitations for negligence actions. However, she encountered difficulties in serving the complaint to the defendants, Patterson-Erie Corporation D/B/A Burger King and Burger King Corporation, due to issues with the Sheriff's service and the COVID-19 pandemic. Ferraro eventually served the complaint through a private process server and later reinstated the complaint and served it through the Sheriff, but this occurred after the original statute of limitations period had elapsed.The defendants argued that the action was barred by the statute of limitations because Ferraro did not make a good faith effort to serve them in a timely manner. The trial court denied the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the Superior Court affirmed this decision. The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, arguing that the lower courts' conclusions conflicted with previous court rulings on the issue of timely service of process.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the order of the Superior Court. The court held that Ferraro failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that she made a good faith effort in diligently and timely serving process on the defendants. Therefore, the defendants' informal receipt of actual notice was irrelevant. The court emphasized that plaintiffs cannot opt out of the rules to give notice of the commencement of a lawsuit by informal means. If attempts at service of process are optional for giving such notice, then no plaintiff would be required to rely on the service of process rules to impart notice. View "Ferraro v. Patterson-Erie" on Justia Law

The case involves Earl John and Christine Dwyer, who sued Ameriprise Financial, Inc. for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation. In 1985, Ameriprise fraudulently and negligently induced the Dwyers to purchase a universal whole life insurance policy by misrepresenting that their quarterly premium payments would remain the same for the life of the policy. The Dwyers surrendered life insurance policies they had purchased from other companies to facilitate this purchase. In reality, if the Dwyers’ premium payment had remained the same, the policy would have lapsed for insufficient funds in 2020.The trial court found Ameriprise guilty of violating Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (CPL) and awarded the Dwyers compensatory damages. However, the court declined to award treble damages under the CPL, reasoning that they would be duplicative of the punitive damages awarded by the jury on the common-law claims. The Superior Court affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court held that treble damages under the CPL are a separate remedy available to the Dwyers and must be considered by the trial court without regard to a punitive damages award on related common-law claims. The court concluded that nullifying the availability of a statutory award because of a common-law award is not a permissible exercise of discretion. Therefore, the court reversed the order of the Superior Court and remanded the case for reconsideration of damages under the CPL. View "Dwyer v. Ameriprise Financial" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Pennsylvania State Education Association (PSEA) challenged a resolution issued by the Public School Employees’ Retirement Board (PSERB), which addressed how it intended to apply a statute related to the withdrawal of public school employees from a multi-employer pension system. The Commonwealth Court dismissed PSEA’s action for lack of standing. The court held that PSEA had not shown a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in PSERB’s action or inaction, as PSEA's true dispute was with school district employers over subcontracting, not with PSERB.However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed this decision, finding that PSEA did have standing to challenge the resolution. The Supreme Court held that PSEA’s interest in the issue was substantial as it far exceeded the interest of the public at large in the correct application of the statute. The court also found that PSEA’s interest was direct because the resolution was causally connected to the harm PSEA alleged in its ability to effectively negotiate over subcontracting decisions. Additionally, the court found that PSEA’s interest was immediate because the causal connection was real and concrete, not remote or speculative. The court noted that PSEA's averments established a substantial, direct, and immediate interest sufficient to warrant a request for the sort of remedy that a declaratory judgment action seeks—a clarification of the law to resolve a dispute between interested parties over its meaning. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Commonwealth Court’s order and remanded the matter to allow PSEA’s action to proceed. View "PSEA v. PSERB" on Justia Law

The case involves KEM Resources, LP and Ryvamat, Inc., who both own a fifty percent interest in the oil, gas, and mineral rights of a property located in Wyoming County. Ryvamat entered into a gas lease covering the entirety of the property’s oil and gas rights, including the half owned by KEM, receiving a substantial monetary payment. KEM's predecessors in interest filed a claim for an accounting, requesting Ryvamat account for the portion of the lease payment it received attributable to KEM’s fifty percent interest. Ryvamat argued that KEM’s action was barred by the statute of limitations. The Superior Court disagreed and found that the applicable statute of limitations for KEM’s accounting claim is six years, and the original complaint was timely filed. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed with the Superior Court, affirming its holding. The court ruled that KEM's accounting claim is properly considered a statutory claim for an accounting between co-tenants under Section 101. The court further found that the statute of limitations for such a claim is six years. Therefore, KEM filed its accounting claim within the statute of limitations for a claim under Section 101. View "KEM Resources, LP v. Ryvamat, Inc." on Justia Law

In the case at hand, a group of reproductive health centers and Planned Parenthood affiliates in Pennsylvania challenged the constitutionality of sections of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act and corresponding regulations which prohibit the use of state Medicaid funds for abortions except in cases of rape, incest, or to avert the death of the mother. The petitioners argued that the exclusion of abortion from Medicaid coverage violated the Equal Rights Amendment and equal protection provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the health centers had standing to bring the lawsuit on behalf of their patients who are enrolled in or eligible for aid under Pennsylvania's Medical Assistance program but whose abortions are not covered because of the exclusion. The court further held that the Commonwealth Court erred in permitting individual members of the Pennsylvania Senate and House of Representatives to intervene in the case.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Commonwealth Court's order dismissing the petition for review. The court concluded that the providers' petition for review was legally sufficient to survive demurrer. The court noted that its precedent may have misstated the breadth of the exclusion and remanded the case to the Commonwealth Court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court did not rule on the constitutionality of the challenged provisions. View "Allegheny Reprod. Health v. PA DHS" on Justia Law

In a case brought before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Michael and Melissa Sullivan sued Werner Company and Lowe's Companies, Inc. over a mobile scaffold that collapsed and caused serious injury to Michael Sullivan. The Sullivans claimed the scaffold was defectively designed because it was possible for a user to inadvertently rotate the deck pins off the platform during normal use.Before trial, the Sullivans filed a motion to preclude Werner and Lowe’s from admitting into evidence any industry or government standards, which the trial court granted. The jury ultimately found Werner and Lowe’s liable for the design defect and awarded the Sullivans $2.5 million in damages.Werner and Lowe's appealed, arguing that they should have been allowed to present evidence that the mobile scaffold complied with industry and governmental safety standards. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower courts' decisions, ruling that such compliance evidence remained inadmissible in products liability cases.The court applied the risk-utility test, which asserts that a product is in a defective condition if a ‘reasonable person’ would conclude that the probability and seriousness of harm caused by the product outweigh the burden or costs of taking precautions. The court concluded that evidence of a product’s compliance with governmental regulations or industry standards is inadmissible in design defect cases to show a product is not defective under the risk-utility theory because such evidence goes to the reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct in making its design choice, not to whether the product was defectively designed. View "Sullivan v. Werner Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) had violated the procedural due process rights of an inmate, Thomas Washington. The DOC had increased the rate at which it garnished Washington’s prison account to pay for his court-ordered financial obligations, without giving him prior notice or an opportunity to challenge this increase. The court rejected the DOC's argument that the increase was mandated by a legislative amendment and that no discretion was available for the DOC to alter the rate. The court held that the amendment to the law did not remove the obligation for the DOC to follow due process requirements before increasing the rate of deductions from inmates' accounts. The court reversed the lower court's decision, which had dismissed Washington's complaint, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court noted that even if Washington was not ultimately entitled to a return of the additional funds, he had a right to make his case before the increased deductions occurred. View "Washington v. PA Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law