Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A special complement of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania assembled to address multiple issues raised in this appeal. The underlying civil action was a defamation case arising out of a newspaper column written by defendant-appellee Karen Heller, and published in the Philadelphia Inquirer in November 2009. The column contained negative commentary about purported actions of plaintiff-appellant John Dougherty, who was the Business Manager of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 98 and a self-described public figure and a participant in numerous civic and philanthropic activities. When confronted with information demonstrating that the commentary concerning Appellant’s conduct was false, Appellee conceded the unfoundedness and publicly apologized. The misinformation, however, appeared on Appellee’s Facebook page for an indeterminate period of time after the apology and apparently remained available through third-party sources until several years later. Appellant’s attorneys expressed concern that video footage resulting from the deposition should not be displayed for any purpose beyond the litigation. Appellee’s attorney, for her part, repeatedly indicated that she intended to use the videotape solely for purposes of the litigation, and that she would abide by all of her obligations under the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Professional Conduct. She declined, however, to make a specific commitment that was asked of her by appellant's counsel. Appellee’s attorney then suggested an arrangement whereby the videotape deposition would proceed as planned, and she would agree not to give the tape to anyone for ten days, during which time Appellant could seek a protective order or other relief from the court. Appellant’s lawyers declined this proposal. The court of common pleas entered an order granting Appellee’s motion to compel and denying Appellant’s motion for protective relief. The court directed Appellant to appear for a videotape deposition within fifteen days. Although the court believed that the potential abuse of a videotape deposition was separable from the merits, it did not accept that the issue was so important as to justify as-of-right interlocutory appellate review. A divided en banc Superior Court affirmed. The issues raised by this appeal for the Supreme Court's review centered on a threshold objection to temporary judicial assignments to the Supreme Court and a challenge to a supplanted order that previously had dismissed the appeal. In addition, a jurisdictional question was raised concerning whether a common pleas court’s denial of a motion for a protective order of the videotaped deposition constituted a collateral order subject to as-of-right interlocutory appellate review. Finally, on the merits, the appeal of the common pleas court’s refusal to issue a protective order proscribing such dissemination. The application for relief challenging temporary judicial assignments made to the Supreme Court for purposes of resolving this appeal was denied. The Superior Court's order was vacated, this appeal quashed as an unauthorized interlocutory one, and the matter was remanded to the common pleas court. View "Dougherty v. Heller" on Justia Law

Appellant Ihor Malanchuk, a carpenter, fell from scaffolding at a residence where he was working and suffered injury. Initially, he brought a civil action against the owner of the premises, Ilya Sivchuk. Later, Appellant initiated a separate proceeding against another worker, Appellee Alex Tsimura. Sivchuk filed a motion requesting that the two actions be consolidated pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 213(a). After the completion of discovery, Appellee and Sivchuk pursued summary judgment. The common pleas court issued a single order granting Appellee’s motion in its entirety but awarding Sivchuk only partial relief. Accordingly, as against Sivchuk, the litigation ripened toward trial. Appellant filed a notice of appeal, proceeding under the Tsimura case caption, to challenge the summary relief Appellee had obtained. In an opinion per Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925, the common pleas court expressed its belief that this appeal was premature. The question presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether an order awarding summary judgment in one of two civil cases consolidated for purposes of discovery and trial was appealable immediately as of right. The Court "realize[d] that consolidation questions have generated a great deal of controversy at both the federal and state levels, as reflected in a persistent split of authority regarding whether, or to what extent, consolidation effects a merger of claims for purposes of immediate appealability and otherwise. [. . .] complete consolidation (or merger or fusion of actions) does not occur absent a complete identity of parties and claims; separate actions lacking such overlap retain their separate identities and require distinct judgments; these principles pertain equally to appealability determinations; and they continue to operate even in the face of an order purporting to consolidate the actions 'for all purposes.'" In this case, complete consolidation did not occur, the common pleas court’s order awarding summary judgment in favor of Appellee was a final one as to the Tsimura case. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Malanchuk. v. Sivchuk" on Justia Law

Morrison Informatics, Inc. (the “Company”) filed a petition for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy relief in September 2009. In May 2011, the Company and two shareholders, who also were officers of the corporation, commenced a civil action in the court of common pleas against Members 1st Federal Credit Union, Mark Zampelli, and Scott Douglass. In the ensuing complaint, the Company and the Shareholders asserted that, beginning sometime after January 2005 and continuing into 2009, the Company’s finance manager, Zampelli, had colluded with a Credit Union relationships officer, Douglass, to embezzle Company funds. The complaint advanced claims against the Credit Union, Zampelli, and Douglass variously sounding in fraud, conversion, civil conspiracy, and negligence. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review concerned whether a federal bankruptcy trustee could be substituted as a plaintiff in a civil action previously commenced by the debtor in bankruptcy in a Pennsylvania state court, although the statutory limitations period expired prior to the attempted substitution. "Although we recognize that the interests of a debtor and a trustee may diverge in some respects, we find it most important that trustees’ interests are derivative, and accordingly, they generally cannot assert any greater rights as against defendants than debtors could have in the first instance." The Supreme Court departed from the Superior Court’s focus on the continued “existence” of the Company after the initiation of insolvency proceedings, and the Court rejected a strict rule foreclosing a relation-back approach to substitution of a bankruptcy trustee for a debtor. Instead, the Court held that relation back in favor of a federal bankruptcy trustee was appropriate, at least where the trustee has acted in a reasonably diligent fashion to secure his or her substitution, and there is no demonstrable prejudice to defendants. View "Morrison Info. v. Members 1st FCU" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was the validity of a workers’ compensation judge’s decision to reject opinion testimony from an independent medical witness presented by an employer and insurer, in the absence of any contrary evidence adduced by the claimant. In 2005, the appellant, Jeffrey Rhodes (“Claimant”) suffered injuries in a car accident, while in the course of his employment with the employer-appellee, IA Construction Corporation. In 2007, a workers’ compensation judge granted Rhodes' petition and awarded total disability benefits. Several years later, the employer filed a specialized notice under governing administrative regulations designed to initiate the impairment rating process. The Department of Labor and Industry’s Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (the “Bureau”), in turn, designated M. Bud Lateef, M.D., to conduct an IRE. Subsequently, based on the results of the ensuing examination, and given that the IRE had been requested outside the period associated with a rating accorded automatic effect, Employer filed a petition seeking to modify the workers’ compensation benefits payable to Claimant. The WCJ denied Employer’s modification petition, rejecting Dr. Lateef’s impairment rating opinion. In her estimation, Dr. Lateef’s assessment of cognition was an unduly limited one, since he performed only a cursory examination and otherwise relied upon only a limited range of medical records. In the circumstances, and particularly since Dr. Lateef specialized in physical medicine and pain management, not neurology, the WCJ indicated that she was unpersuaded by his opinion. On Employer’s appeal, the WCAB affirmed in a divided opinion. On further appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed this appeal to address the issue, as framed by Claimant, of “[w]hether the Commonwealth Court overstepped its appellate function in making credibility judgments which is the sole function of the Workers’ Compensation Judge.” The Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth Court erred in its conclusions that the WCJ lacked authority to reject the uncontradicted testimony of the IRE physician. The case was reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the WCJ's adjudication, as affimed by the WCAB. View "IA Construction v. WCAB" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether state legislators have standing to intervene in a challenge to the issuance of an executive order concerning direct care health workers. In early 2015, Governor Tom Wolf issued Executive Order 2015-05, “Participant-Directed Home Care Services,” which focused on individuals who received, and workers who provided, in-home medical and personal care. The Executive Order established, inter alia, an advisory group to ensure the quality of long-term personal assistance services to seniors and persons with disabilities, and a process by which workers who provide such care, and who were employed by the individuals they serve, could obtain a designated representative for discussions with the Secretary of Human Resources regarding various matters (namely wages, and health and retirement benefits). Petitioners filed suit arguing that Executive Order 2015-05 established organizational labor rights for domestic home care workers, but was issued without authorization and conflicted with existing Commonwealth labor laws, specifically the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act, and the Public Employe Relations Act. The Commonwealth Court conducted a hearing on Petitioners’ request for a preliminary injunction, initially rejecting rejected Appellants’ attempt to directly intervene at the preliminary injunction stage. However, the court issued an order enjoining Governor Wolf from entering into any memorandum of understanding pursuant to Executive Order 2015-05 until disposition of the matter on the merits, establishing an expedited schedule for the filing of briefs on preliminary objections and cross-motions for summary relief, and listing the matter for en banc argument. Appellants' Application to Intervene was denied, giving rise to this appeal. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that in these circumstances, Appellants did not have standing to intervene because the legislators’ interests purportedly impacted by the executive order did not involve unique legislative prerogatives, but, rather, were interests common to the general citizenry which only remotely impact the legislators’ right to act as legislators. Thus, the Court affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court denying the legislators’ request to intervene. View "Markham v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

In this appeal by allowance, the issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether an order denying a petition to intervene in a custody action was appealable as a collateral order as of right pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313. Child ("L.A.") was born on in late 2011 to L.A. (“Mother”) and Q.M. (“Father”). Several months later, Northampton County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) filed an emergency application for protective custody over Child. The trial court adjudicated Child dependent and granted CYS legal custody. CYS subsequently removed Child from Mother’s home and placed her in the care of Appellant D.M. (“Maternal Aunt”), and Appellant L.N., a friend with whom Maternal Aunt resided (collectively “Appellants”). Child lived with Appellants from February 10, 2012 to September 20, 2012, at which time the trial court granted Appellants and Father shared legal and physical custody over Child. The trial court later vacated its adjudication of dependency on April 4, 2013, awarded sole legal custody and primary physical custody to Father, and awarded partial physical custody to Appellants every other weekend. Throughout the entire period during which he exercised custody over Child, Father resided with his mother and stepfather, Appellees V.C. and K.C. (“Paternal Grandparents”). Nearly two months after he had been awarded primary custody, Father suddenly passed away. Paternal Grandparents began caring for Child, and, on June 13, 2013, they filed a complaint for custody against Mother, seeking sole legal and physical custody over Child so as to “preserve and maintain the status quo.” Mother did not contest the matter; however, Appellants filed a petition for intervention, wherein they asserted that they stood in loco parentis to Child and sought primary legal and physical custody. In response, Paternal Grandparents filed an answer and new matter in which they alleged that Appellants lacked standing to seek legal or physical custody over Child, claiming they were only temporary foster parents. Appellants appealed the order denying intervention to the Superior Court, which directed them to show cause why the appeal should not be quashed in light of the fact that the order did not appear to be final or appealable. In response, Appellants argued that the trial court’s order was final and appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 341, and, alternatively, that the order was a collateral order subject to an appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 313. After review, the Supreme Court held that such an order is a collateral order appealable under Rule 313, and reversed the Superior Court’s order quashing the appeal and remand to that court for consideration of the issues raised therein. View "K.C. v. L.A." on Justia Law

In a defamation action, appellants Randall Castellani and Joseph Corcoran brought suit against The Scranton Times and its former reporter, Jennifer L. Henn (collectively, the Newspaper) regarding the Newspaper’s publication of three articles concerning Appellants’ testimony before the Twentieth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury. The trial court denied Appellants’ pretrial motion to admit two judicial opinions at trial as evidence of the Newspaper’s state of mind, and the Superior Court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed. Because the judicial opinions are admissible as evidence of the Newspaper’s state of mind, the trial court should have permitted Appellants to introduce them in their action against the Newspaper. View "Castellani v. Scranton Times" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the Commonwealth Court applied the proper legal principles and level of deference in its appellate review of the decision of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB), which found Lancaster County (the County) engaged in unfair labor practices under Sections 1201(a)(1) and (3) of the Public Employee Relations Act (PERA), when it terminated the employment of Adam Medina and Tommy Epps. During a 2010 organizing effort, Medina attended meetings held by a Union, reported back to the third shift staff members, and successfully encouraged other employees to attend meetings, as well as vote in favor of unionizing. Epps supported the Union’s efforts and talked to other staff members about how the Union could benefit them. A fellow employee reported to supervisors that accused someone of stealing foodstuffs from her open workplace mailbox. An internal investigation revealed Media taking a snack-sized bag of potato chips on one day; Epps took a similarly-sized bag of cookies from the box. Though no one had previously been disciplined for incidents like these, Media and Epps were fired for taking items from the mailbox. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Court indeed applied the wrong standards in reversing the Board. The case was remanded for further consideration of issues raised by the parties on appeal but not previously addressed by the Commonwealth Court. View "Lancaster Co v. PA Labor Relations Board -" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the Third Circuit's petition for certification in a defamation case. Robert Schanne taught physics at Lower Merion High School in Ardmore, Pennsylvania. Jenna Addis was his student during her junior and senior years, from 2001 until her graduation in 2003. After Addis graduated, she attended Tulane University in New Orleans. In late November 2010, Addis (then age 26) was visiting Pennsylvania for the Thanksgiving weekend. During her visit, Addis spoke to Susan O'Bannon, a friend who was employed by Lower Merion High School. Addis told O'Bannon that she and Schanne had been romantically involved while Addis was a high school senior and during the summer after she graduated. O'Bannon reported Addis' allegation to school officials. Addis testified in her deposition that she discussed the matter with O'Bannon as a friend and not as an agent of the school. Addis stated, moreover, that she did not intend for O'Bannon to report the information to the school, that she was not aware O'Bannon would feel obligated to make such a report, and that she was surprised to learn that O'Bannon had done so. Based on Addis's statement, school officials provided Schanne with a pre-termination "Loudermill" hearing, and ultimately terminated his employment. Schanne filed a defamation action against Addis pursuant to the federal court's diversity jurisdiction. In his amended complaint, Schanne alleged that his romantic involvement with Addis did not begin until after she graduated from high school, and that any contrary assertions by Addis were false and made with malice due to Addis' jealousy over Schanne's relationship with another woman. Schanne averred that Addis' statements were not judicially privileged because: they were not made during a school board meeting, hearing, or other judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding; no judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding regarding Schanne was "convened or contemplated" at the time Addis made her allegations; and no other privilege applied to the statements. Addis moved for summary judgment which the federal court granted on the basis that all of her assertions were protected by the judicial privilege. On appeal, Schanne argued that Addis's statement to O'Bannon was not made in the regular course of a judicial action, because Addis had gone to O'Bannon as a friend and did not contemplate possible judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. The Third Circuit certified the question of whether, under Pennsylvania law, absolute judicial privilege applied to the allegation made prior to the commencement of any quasi-judicial proceeding and without an intent that the allegation lead to a quasi-judicial proceeding. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that judicial privilege was not limited to statements made in open court, but encompassed pleadings too. "Perhaps the most salient aspect of the issue as framed is that, not only was the allegation made before the commencement of proceedings, it was made 'without an intent that [it] lead to a quasi-judicial proceeding.' [. . .] Where a declarant has no intention of initiating proceedings or otherwise obtaining a remedy, clothing his or her statement with immunity cannot serve this goal. Assuming the declaration is otherwise actionable, then, protecting it under the cloak of the judicial privilege would do little to advance the privilege's objectives, while undermining the plaintiff's right to obtain recompense for any injury to his or her reputation." View "Schanne v. Addis" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to consider an issue of first impression regarding whether an insured forfeits insurance coverage by settling a tort claim without the consent of its insurer, when the insurer defends the insured subject to a reservation of rights, asserting that the claims may not be covered by the policy. In 1994, a class action lawsuit was filed against Appellant-Insureds Babcock & Wilcox Company (B&W) and Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) (collectively, Insureds) brought by plaintiffs claiming to have suffered bodily injury and property damage caused by emissions from nuclear facilities owned by Insureds. Over time, the class action grew to include over 500 named plaintiffs, who lived near the nuclear facilities. Insureds denied that the facilities released any emissions or that the harm suffered by plaintiffs resulted from the facilities. While the underlying tort action was pending in federal court, disputes arose between Insureds and their insurers, Appellees American Nuclear Insurers and Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters (collectively ANI or Insurer). At the outset of the litigation, Insurer acknowledged that it would defend Insureds but contested whether the policy covered aspects of the claims, and thus defended subject to a reservation of rights. While staying various claims for future determination, including the breach of the duty to cooperate claim, the court decided issues regarding the trigger of coverage and held that B&W and ARCO were entitled to separate counsel. During the course of the litigation, Insurer refused consent to any settlement offers presented to it due to its conclusion that the case had a strong likelihood of a defense verdict given the lack of medical and scientific support for plaintiffs’ claims and decisions by the federal trial court regarding procedural and evidentiary issues in the pending retrial, which Insurer viewed as highly favorable to Insureds’ ultimate outcome. After presenting the settlement offers to Insurer and being denied consent, Insureds ARCO and B&W, respectively in 2008 and 2009, settled with the class action plaintiffs for a total of $80 million, which was substantially less than the $320 million of potential coverage. Insureds then sought reimbursement of the settlement amount from Insurer. The Supreme Court found that after an extensive trial where the jury was presented with voluminous evidence relating to the strength of the underlying action and the settlement offer, the jury determined that the settlement was “fair and reasonable from the perspective of a reasonably prudent person in the same position of [Insureds] and in light of the totality of the circumstances,” a standard which the Court adopted as the proper standard to apply in a reservation of rights case where an insured settles following the insurers’ refusal to consent to settlement. The Court concluded that the Superior Court erred by requiring an insured to demonstrate bad faith when the insured accepts a settlement offer in a reservation of rights case. Accordingly, the Superior Court's decision was reversed and the trial court's judgment reinstated. View "Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. American Nuclear Insurers & Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters" on Justia Law