Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In February 2015, Appellant Joshua Prince (“Prince”) submitted a Right to Know Law (RTKL) request to the City of Harrisburg seeking records related to the Protect Harrisburg Legal Defense Fund (the “Fund”), which the City created to defray legal costs associated with defending challenges to local firearms ordinances. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur to decide whether a spreadsheet created by the City to show the receipt of funds from donors to the Fund constituted a financial record as defined in the RTKL. The Supreme Court found that although records that would disclose the identity of individual donors were generally exempted from disclosure under the RTKL, if those records could be characterized as financial records, public access was statutorily required. The Court concluded the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that the donor spreadsheet was not a financial record and reversed. However, in light of its decision in Pennsylvania State Educ. Ass’n v. Commonwealth, Department of Community and Economic Development, 148 A.3d 142 (Pa. 2016) (“PSEA II”), the Court held that this case had to be remanded for the performance of a balancing test to determine whether any of the donors’ personal information may be protected from access under Article 1, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. View "City of Harrisburg v. Prince" on Justia Law

In a case of first impression, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether either the common law or the First Amendment conferred a qualified right of access to the press and the public to inspect certain search warrant materials issued in connection with a grand jury investigation. A Pittsburgh television station was investigating allegations of improper sexual relationships between faculty and students at a local high school. The station sough access to a search warrant issued to search the school Administrative Building, and an order sealing the affidavit of probable cause supporting that search warrant. The Supreme Court determined no such right existed where, as here, the request was made while the grand jury’s investigation is ongoing. View "2014 Allegheny County IGJ Apl of: WPXI" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Olson entered an open guilty plea to one count of driving under the influence of alcohol, general impairment (“DUI”) in September 2015. This was Olson’s third DUI offense, and, at the time, he was subject to a sentence enhancement due to his refusal to submit to blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) testing. In December 2015, the trial court sentenced Olson to a term of eighteen months’ to five years’ imprisonment, applying a then-applicable mandatory minimum sentencing provision. Olson did not file a direct appeal, and his sentence became final on January 20, 2016. On June 23, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (2016), which held, inter alia, that a state may not “impose criminal penalties on the refusal to submit” to a warrantless blood test. On August 17, 2016, Olson filed a timely, pro se petition for relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), challenging, amongst other things, the legality of his sentence in light of Birchfield. The PCRA court affirmed Olson's conviction and sentence, finding that because Olson's judgment of sentence was already final, he might be entitled to benefit from Birchfield if that decision were deemed to apply retroactively on collateral review. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that because Birchfield did not set forth a “categorical constitutional guarantee” that placed criminal punishment for blood test refusal “altogether beyond the State’s power to impose” but rather, established a procedural requirement that, once satisfied, authorized that punishment, the Birchfield rule was not substantive. Accordingly, Birchfield did not apply retroactively on post-conviction collateral review. View "Pennsylvania v. Olson" on Justia Law

In 2014, Pennsylvania State Police Troopers conducted a traffic stop after observing Appellant Kirk Hays fail to use his right turn signal and then twice cross over the white fog lines on the roadway. Upon interaction with Appellant, a Trooper smelled alcohol and suspected Appellant was driving under the influence of alcohol. Following two failed field sobriety tests, Appellant was taken into custody and transported to a DUI Center, whereupon Appellant acquiesced to a blood draw; testing revealed his BAC to be 0.192. Appellant was charged with three summary offenses and two counts of DUI. Appellant moved to suppress all evidence resulting from the traffic stop, arguing the Trooper lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle. The motion was denied, trial was held and Appellant was ultimately convicted and sentenced only to Count 1, DUI. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on September 1, 2016, alleging he was entitled to a new trial because of Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (2016). The Commonwealth filed an answer, asserting Appellant waived any challenge to the voluntariness of his consent by failing to raise the issue in his omnibus pre-trial motion. The Commonwealth conceded Appellant’s case was not yet final when Birchfield was decided, and that Appellant first raised his Birchfield issue in his timely filed post-sentence motion. However, the Commonwealth argued that retroactivity only applied in cases where the question was properly preserved at all stages. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur in this matter to determine whether Birchfield applied to all cases not yet final when the decision was rendered, and determined Appellant was not entitled to retroactive application of Birchfield based on his failure to preserve the issue below. View "Pennsylvania v. Hays" on Justia Law

At issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in this matter was whether a criminal defendant’s conviction of carrying a concealed firearm without a license could be sustained on a constructive-possession theory where the gun was physically held and used by another person during the alleged crime. Appellant Alanah Peters asked the victim, Jesse Hicks, for money to help her father evade eviction. At first Hicks promised to give the father money. He and appellant had an argument, and Hicks rescinded his offer. Two men and appellant arrived at Hicks’ apartment, one holding a handgun. The men forced their way into Hicks’ bedroom. Unable to find any cash, the unarmed man told the other to shoot. The shot pierced Hicks’ jaw, tongue, and shoulder, and dislodged some of his teeth. The assailants kicked Hicks in the face and left the room. Appellant, who had remained outside the room, suggested they check Hicks’ pockets. The men re-entered the room and, as Hicks lay bleeding on the floor, removed his pants, took his $700, and fled. The men were never identified or apprehended. Appellant was charged with numerous offenses including attempted murder, robbery, aggravated assault, and conspiracy. Most relevant to this appeal, she was charged with carrying a concealed firearm without a license. Under the facts of this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined constructive possession could not be used to support appellant’s conviction for carrying a concealed firearm without a license. View "Pennsylvania v. Peters" on Justia Law

Appellant Scott Bishop was a parolee. During a home visit in March 2015, a parole agent performed a drug test, which indicated that methamphetamine was present in Appellant’s urine. Appellant was handcuffed and asked whether the agent would find anything in the residence that would violate parole conditions. Appellant then admitted that he had a firearm in a hallway closet. The agent proceeded to the closet, where he found a revolver, marijuana, electronic scales, and packaging materials. Appellant argued that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should interpret the provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution conferring upon individuals a right against self-incrimination to provide greater protection than the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States. The Commonwealth countered that this claim was not properly preserved. In terms of efforts by criminal defendants to raise claims for departure from federal constitutional jurisprudence on independent state grounds, the the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth was correct that the precedent of the Pennsylvania Court required that some analysis explaining the grounds for departure was required. Because Appellant did not distinguish between the federal Fifth Amendment and Pennsylvania Constitution Article I, Section 9 before the suppression court, his claim favoring departure was waived. Furthermore, Appellant also waived the claim for additional protection under the state constitution in the Superior Court, since he did not develop any supportive reasoning before that court either. View "Pennsylvania v. Bishop" on Justia Law

Appellant Dynan Turpin was arrested and charged with, inter alia, three counts of possession of a controlled substance, and one count each of conspiracy to commit possession with the intent to deliver and receiving stolen property. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to determine whether a search warrant for an entire multi-bedroom residence shared by appellant and his roommate, Benjamin Irvin, was constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution even though the warrant was premised solely on the activity of Irvin. After review, the Supreme Court concluded police had probable cause to search the entire residence and therefore the warrant was constitutionally permissible. View "Pennsylvania v. Turpin" on Justia Law

Christian Ford was charged with DUI and drug possession charges stemming from three separate arrests. The first, Ford was arrested for DUI and one count of driving with a suspended license. Ford subsequently failed to appear for his preliminary hearing on those charges, and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. Six months after Ford’s failure to appear at his preliminary hearing on the DUI charges, two police officers spotted Ford at a grocery store. After confirming that Ford had an active bench warrant, the officers approached him in the parking lot, but he fled on foot. When the officers eventually caught Ford, he continued to resist, and substantial force was required to effectuate the arrest. A search incident to arrest revealed that Ford had 159 stamp bags of heroin and a digital scale in his possession. He was charged with possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (“PWID”), possession of drug paraphernalia, and resisting arrest. Ford posted bail ten days later and again was released from custody. A few weeks after posting bail, Ford went missing. A bail bondsman returned him to prison; the bondsman noticed that Ford was carrying a stamp bag of heroin and a syringe, leading to more drug possession charges. Ford entered into a negotiated guilty plea agreement, which disposed of all three of his criminal cases. The trial court accepted Ford’s guilty plea and sentenced him accordingly. In a petition for post-conviction relief, Ford alleged he could not pay the fines associated with his plea agreement, and that his inability to pay those fines would prevent him from being paroled. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the Sentencing Code mandated trial courts “shall not sentence a defendant to pay a fine unless it appears of record that the defendant is or will be able to pay” it. The question presented in Ford’s post-conviction appeal was whether the Sentencing Code’s ability-to-pay prerequisite was satisfied when a defendant agrees to pay a given fine as part of a negotiated guilty plea agreement. The Court held that it was not, and that a defendant’s mere agreement to pay a specific fine did not constitute evidence that he was or would be able to satisfy the financial obligation. Therefore, the case was remanded for the trial court to make findings on Ford’s ability to pay. The sentence was vacated in its entirety. View "Pennsylvania v. Ford" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Pennsylvania State Police and the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) set up a commercial vehicle inspection program authorized by Subsection 4704(a)(2) of the Vehicle Code. The inspection program was scheduled approximately one month in advance and occurred at a Clinton County landfill located in the Village of McElhatten. Appellant Jeffrey Maguire’s truck was stopped at the checkpoint by Pennsylvania State Police. The trooper conducted a “Level Two” inspection, which included a review of Appellant’s documents and a walk-around inspection of the truck, checking its lights, horn, wipers, tires, and wheels. During the course of this conversation, the trooper detected the smell of alcohol on Appellant’s breath. Following the inspection, the trooper had Appellant exit the truck, told him that he smelled of alcohol, and asked whether he had been drinking. Appellant stated that he drank one beer on his trip to the landfill. At that point, the trooper noticed a cooler on the floor of the truck near the gearshift, the contents of which were a yellow plastic bag that was wet from ice, three twelve-ounce cans of beer, and one or two bottles of water. Appellant failed field sobriety testing. Appellant was arrested, transported to the Jersey Shore Hospital for blood testing, and ultimately charged with several counts of driving under the influence (“DUI”), as well as five counts of unlawful activities. In Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 535 A.2d 1035 (Pa. 1987) (plurality), and Commonwealth v. Blouse, 611 A.2d 1177 (Pa. 1992), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted guidelines for assessing the constitutionality of government-conducted systematic vehicle checkpoints to which the entirety of the public are subjected. Before the Court in this case was the issue of whether the Tarbert/Blouse guidelines were applicable to statutorily authorized warrantless inspections of commercial vehicles. The Court determined they were not: such inspections should be scrutinized in accord with the test outlined by the United States Supreme Court in New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), adopted in Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Petroll, 738 A.2d 993 (Pa. 1999). Because a panel of the Superior Court, in a two-to-one majority decision, reached the correct result, the Supreme Court affirmed that court’s judgment, which reversed a trial court’s order granting appellant’s motion to suppress evidence. View "Pennsylvania v. Maguire" on Justia Law

In 2015, Appellant Darnell Foster entered a negotiated guilty plea to charges of possession of and possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced him to four years of probation. In 2016, Foster’s probation officer detained him because of several photographs posted on appellant’s social media accounts in the preceding three months. The photographs depicted guns, drugs, large amounts of money and his sentencing sheet from his plea agreement, along with captions that he posted with some of the pictures. The issue presented to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court by this case asked for a determination of what constituted a permissible basis for a court to find an individual in violation of probation (“VOP”). The pertinent language of the relevant statutes required orders of probation include “specific conditions” to help the defendant to achieve the general condition of leading a “law-abiding life,” and a finding that a defendant violated a “specified condition of the probation” to support its revocation. The Supreme Court concluded that the VOP court must find, based on the preponderance of the evidence, that the probationer violated a specific condition of probation or committed a new crime to be found in violation. Absent such evidence, a violation of probation does not occur solely because a judge believes the probationer’s conduct indicates that probation has been ineffective to rehabilitate or to deter against antisocial conduct. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the superior court, vacated to VOP court’s orders, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Foster" on Justia Law