Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2013, Rahiem Fant pled not guilty to various charges related to an incident during which he allegedly stabbed a man in the abdomen and arm. While waiting for trial, he was detained at the Clinton County Correctional Facility. In 2014, approximately one week before his scheduled trial, Fant’s counsel received from the Commonwealth a production of recordings made at the Facility. All but two of the recordings consisted of conversations that occurred between Fant and his visitors in the Facility’s visitation room. As a result of these recorded visit conversations, law enforcement personnel retrieved additional evidence they sought to use at trial. Fant filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude at trial the visit conversation recordings and the evidence discovered as a result of them. He argued that the recordings violated Pennsylvania's Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act. The Commonwealth countered that Section 5704(14) of the Act permitted these recordings because it authorized county correctional facilities to record “any telephone calls from or to an inmate,” as long as certain conditions were met. Following a hearing, the suppression court granted Fant’s motion to suppress, making several findings of fact before concluding that the visit conversations were not “telephone calls” because the “every day common sense use of the word telephone does not include this scenario.” The Commonwealth appealed, and the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the calls made on the "telephone" system for visit conversations were indeed "telephone calls." On this point, the Supreme Court affirmed the suppression court, finding that the "telephone" system as used by the prison system was not a telephone in its ordinary meaning under the Act, and therefore were not subject to an exception under the Act. View "Pennsylvania v. Fant" on Justia Law

In the three consolidated appeals, all of which originated in the Court of Common Pleas of York County before the same judge, the Superior Court applied its en banc decision in "Commonwealth v. Hainesworth," (82 A.3d 444 (2013) (en banc)), and concluded that Appellees were entitled to specific performance of their plea agreements, i.e., Appellees’ sexual offender registration requirements were governed by "Megan’s Law," which was in effect when Appellees entered their plea agreements, and not by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which superseded Megan’s Law. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine "Hainesworth" and its applicability to Appellees’ cases. Consistent with the Superior Court’s decision in Hainesworth, the Supreme Court held that Appellees are entitled to the benefit of the bargains struck with the Commonwealth when the trial court accepted the parties’ plea agreements. View "Pennsylvania v. Grace" on Justia Law

In his second collateral capital appeal, Jermont Cox challenged the denial of his Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition, contending that newly-discovered facts entitle him to a new trial. Following its thorough review, the Supreme Court agreed with the PCRA court’s determination that Cox’s petition was untimely and therefore affirmed its order. View "Pennsylvania v. Cox" on Justia Law

This case was a direct appeal of an interlocutory order precluding the Commonwealth from presenting victim impact evidence at a re-sentencing hearing of Appellee Joseph Kindler, who was convicted of first-degree murder in 1983 and previously was sentenced to death. The preliminary issue for the Supreme Court's review was whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. After review, the Court concluded that it did not: thus, it did reach the merits of the Commonwealth’s claim that the trial court erred by entering the order precluding the Commonwealth from presenting victim impact evidence at Appellee’s re-sentencing hearing. Instead, the case was transferred to the Superior Court. View "Pennsylvania v. Kindler" on Justia Law

Mount Airy #1, LLC operated a hotel and casino located in Mount Pocono. Mount Airy challenged the constitutionality of Section 1403(c) of the Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming Act. That section levied a “local share assessment” against all licensed casinos’ gross slot machine revenue. According to Mount Airy, the statutory provision violated the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution because it imposed grossly unequal local share assessments upon similarly situated slot machine licensees. After review of the parties' arguments, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the local share assessment was a non-uniform tax of the sort prohibited by Article 8, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Therefore, the Court severed Subsections 1403(c)(2) and (c)(3) from the Gaming Act. View "Mount Airy #1, LLC v. Pa. Dept. of Revenue, et al." on Justia Law

James Ball, III was charged with and tried for a summary offense before a Magisterial District Judge (“MDJ”). The MDJ convicted Ball of a lesser included offense, implicitly acquitting him of the greater charged offense. Ball appealed his conviction to the court of common pleas (“the trial court”) for a de novo trial, whereupon the Commonwealth sought to re-try him on the greater offense. The trial court allowed the Commonwealth to try Ball on the original charge, notwithstanding Ball’s objection that reinstating that charge violated the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Ball was convicted of the greater offense, and he appealed to the Superior Court. Finding merit in Ball’s double jeopardy claim, the Superior Court reversed the trial court and discharged Ball. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur to determine whether the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy barred the Commonwealth from reinstating Ball’s implicitly-acquitted greater offense. The Court held that the Commonwealth could not prosecute a defendant for the greater offense under these circumstances. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court on this issue. Furthermore, the Court granted allocatur to decide whether the Superior Court erred when it discharged Ball after having found that the prohibition on double jeopardy precluded his retrial on the greater summary offense. On this issue, the Court concluded that the Superior Court did err. "A MDJ has the authority, sua sponte, to convict a defendant of an uncharged, lesser included offense, and the defendant has a right to have that conviction reviewed by a court of record." The case was remanded back to the trial court for a trial de novo limited only to the lesser included offense. View "Pennsylvania v. Ball III" on Justia Law

The question this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was whether a cause of action existed under Pennsylvania law entitling a class of indigent criminal defendants to allege prospective, systemic violations of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel due to underfunding, and to seek and obtain an injunction forcing a county to provide adequate funding to a public defender’s office. In early 2012, a number of attorneys resigned from the Office of the Public Defender (OPD) of Luzerne County. Because the County implemented a hiring freeze in February of that year, Chief Public Defender Al Flora could not fill the positions. By April, the OPD staff consisted of only four full-time attorneys, thirteen part-time attorneys, three investigators, four secretaries, one receptionist, and one office administrator. The OPD continued to operate with five unfilled attorney positions, three full-time and two part-time. Most of the attorneys who worked for the OPD did not have their own desks, telephones, or computers. One part-time attorney informed Flora that he could not accept any more cases because, due to his current caseload, he could not satisfy his ethical duties to any additional defendants. Despite Flora’s efforts, no additional funding was forthcoming, and none appeared likely, Flora, along with plaintiffs Samantha Volciak, Yolanda Holman, Charles Hammonds (collectively, plaintiffs), and on behalf of unnamed but similarly situated individuals, filed a class action lawsuit against Luzerne County and Robert Lawton, its County Manager (collectively, Appellees). Simultaneously, plaintiffs brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim, and a claim under Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, seeking an injunction against Appellees requiring the immediate appointment of private counsel to assist them in their defenses and requiring additional funding to satisfy the OPD’s obligation to ensure that all qualified applicants receive competent legal representation. Two days later, plaintiffs moved for a peremptory writ of mandamus and a preliminary injunction. Pursuant to "Gideon v. Wainwright," (372 U.S. 335 (1963)) and its progeny, and because remedies for Sixth Amendment violations need not await conviction and sentencing, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that such a cause of action existed, so long as the class action plaintiffs demonstrate “the likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law.” View "Kuren, et al v. Luzerne County" on Justia Law

In February 2012, the Pennsylvania General Assembly passed Act 13, a "sweeping" law regulating the oil and gas industry, which, inter alia, repealed parts of the existing Oil and Gas Act of 1984 codified in Title 58 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, and created six new chapters therein. The specific provisions of two of which, Chapters 32 and 33, were at issue in this appeal. The questions raised in this appeal involved Sections 3218.1, 3222.1, and 3241 of Chapter 32, and Sections 3305 through 3309 of Chapter 33. This appeal was consolidated from the decision of the Commonwealth Court following the Supreme Court's remand to that court to resolve open issues pursuant to a mandate in "Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania," (83 A.3d 901 (2013) (“Robinson II”)). In that case, the Supreme Court struck the entirety of Sections 3215(b), 3215(d), 3303, and 3304 of Act 13 of Feb. 14, 2012, P.L. 87 (“Act 13”), as violative of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and the Court enjoined the application and enforcement of Section 3215(c) and (e) and Sections 3305 through 3309, to the extent that they implemented or enforced the provisions of Act 13 which was invalidated. The Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the order the Commonwealth Court issued on remand, “Robinson III”, holding that Sections 3305 through 3309 were not severable from Sections 3303 and 3304, and the Court also upheld its conclusion that the passage of Act 13 did not violate Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (the “single subject rule”). However, because the Supreme Court concluded that Sections 3218.1, 3222.1(b)(10) and 3222.1(b)(11) contravened Article III, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, due to the Court's determination that they constituted special legislation, the Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s order upholding these sections, and enjoined their further application and enforcement. In that regard, the Supreme Court stayed its mandate with respect to Section 3218.1 for 180 days in order to give the General Assembly sufficient time to enact remedial legislation. Further, because the Court determined that Section 3241 was unconstitutional on its face, it reversed the Commonwealth Court’s order and directed this provision be stricken as well, and enjoined from further application and enforcement. View "Robinson Twp, et al v. Public Utility Commission" on Justia Law

This was a direct appeal from a common pleas court order invalidating a statutory provision giving grandparents standing to seek custody of their minor grandchildren. The question this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was whether the parents’ fundamental rights were violated by the conferral of standing based solely on a parental separation lasting at least six months. Appellees G.J.P. and A.P. (“Parents”) married in 2006 and had three children. Parents separated in October 2012, albeit they did not initiate divorce proceedings. Because they were in agreement as to custody matters while living separately, Parents never sought court involvement and no custody order was issued prior to this litigation. In December 2012, Parents mutually agreed that all contact between the children and their paternal grandparents, appellants D.P. and B.P. (“Grandparents”), should have been discontinued. The grandparents filed suit seeking partial custody of the minor children. Grandparents did not suggest that Parents were unfit or that the children were in any danger. As their basis for standing, they relied on Section 5325 of the Domestic Relations Code (the “Code”). "Section 5325 cannot survive strict scrutiny and, as such, it violates the fundamental rights of parents safeguarded by the Due Process Clause." Upon review, the Supreme Court "salvag[ed the] statute to the extent possible without judicially rewriting it" by severing the first half of paragraph (2) from the remainder of paragraph (2) and the remainder of Section 5325 generally. The Court then affirmed dismissal of the grandparents' petition. View "D.P. v. G.J.P." on Justia Law

In 2002, a jury convicted Manuel Sepulveda of two counts of first-degree murder and related charges for the deaths of John Mendez and Ricardo Lopez. The jury sentenced Sepulveda to death for each of the murders. At issue in this appeal was whether, following remand from an appellate court with specific instructions, a Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) court may treat new claims raised by the petitioner, which were outside the scope of the remand order, as amending the petitioner’s first, timely PCRA petition. After review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that because the PCRA petition had been fully adjudicated, and because the PCRA court was required to proceed in conformance with the remand order, the PCRA court was without authority to permit amendment. View "Pennsylvania v. Sepulveda" on Justia Law