Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was first convicted of possession of child pornography in 2001. That conviction resulted in a sentence of five years’ intermediate punishment which Appellant completed in September 2006. In January 2007, the police received a cyber-tip from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children that Appellant had sent and received images of child pornography by computer. Appellant was arrested and arraigned on child pornography charges for a second time. The Commonwealth, although not required to do so at that point in the proceedings, informed Appellant that if convicted, he would be subject to a 25-year mandatory minimum sentence under the provisions of the Sentencing Code. At issue in this discretionary appeal before the Supreme Court was whether the 25-year mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment imposed for Appellant’s second conviction of possessing child pornography was grossly disproportionate to the crime and, therefore, unconstitutional. The Court determined that the punishment was not grossly disproportionate to the crime and, accordingly, affirmed.View "Pennsylvania v. Baker" on Justia Law

In 2005, appellee was charged with two counts of criminal use of a communication facility, as well as single counts of delivery of cocaine, possession with intent to deliver cocaine, and simple possession of cocaine. Represented by retained private counsel, appellee proceeded to a jury trial in 2006, and was found guilty of all charges except one of the counts of criminal use of a communication facility. The trial court sentenced appellee to three to six years of imprisonment on the delivery charge and a concurrent sentence of two to four years on the criminal use of a communication facility conviction, both with credit for time served. The other drug convictions were merged for sentencing purposes. In 2007, appellee motioned for appointment of counsel in the trial court, which the trial court granted, appointing the Centre County Public Defender’s Office. Then, through counsel, appellee filed a PCRA petition seeking reinstatement of his appeal rights due to trial counsel’s failure to file a requested direct appeal. In 2008, following an earlier evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court reinstated appellee’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc, without addressing the substantive ineffectiveness claims. Appellee subsequently filed a notice of appeal and a statement, identifying eleven issues of ineffectiveness of trial counsel. The the PCRA court issued its opinion briefly addressing the merits of those ineffectiveness claims. In his Superior Court brief, appellee pursued only three of the eleven claims of ineffectiveness; he raised no preserved, direct review claims. The Superior Court panel determined that appellee’s merits arguments were “misguided” because he should have argued that the PCRA court, in its opinion reinstating appellee’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc, had erred by failing to consider the effect of appellee’s amended PCRA petition raising trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. Following “Pennsylvania v. Liston,” (941 A.2d 1279 (Pa. Super.2008) (en banc)), the Superior Court remanded to the PCRA court with instructions to permit appellee to file post-sentence motions nunc pro tunc in which he could raise his ineffectiveness claims. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the reviewability of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on post-verdict motions and direct appeal under “Pennsylvania v. Bomar,” (826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1115 (2004)), and “Pennsylvania v. Grant,” (813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002)), including the question of whether ineffectiveness claims may be considered if accompanied by a waiver of review as of right under the Post Conviction Relief Act. The Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Holmes" on Justia Law

In 2010, Philadelphia Police Officers were on patrol in their marked car in the area of North 58th Street and Florence Avenue when they observed appellee Sheim Gary driving an SUV with heavily tinted windows. Appellee would later be arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession with intent to deliver. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on the requirements in the Commonwealth for a warrantless search of a motor vehicle. After consideration of relevant federal and state law, the Court held that with respect to a warrantless search of a motor vehicle that was supported by probable cause, Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution affords no greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Accordingly, the Court adopted the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement, which allows police officers to search a motor vehicle when there is probable cause to do so and does not require any exigency beyond the inherent mobility of a motor vehicle. View "Commonwealth v. Gary" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Appellant of one count of first-degree murder and one count of burglary. The jury concluded, with respect to imposition of sentence, that the aggravating circumstances (committing murder to prevent testimony in a possible criminal proceeding regarding a felony and committing a killing in perpetration of a felony) outweighed the mitigating circumstance (character and record). Upon review, and finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction. View "Pennsylvania v. Morales" on Justia Law

Appellant Maurice "Boo" Patterson appealed his death sentence after he was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, and criminal solicitation. The charges against Appellant arose from the fatal shooting of Eric "Bop" Sawyer by Sean "Raydar" Durrant. Durrant confessed to shooting the victim, but claimed he did so at the behest of Appellant, who had been incarcerated in the Lycoming County Prison. Appellant filed post-sentence motions on in 2010 and 2011; the motions were denied in 2012. However, upon discovering that Appellant's sentence for criminal conspiracy was an illegal sentence, in that it exceeded the maximum sentence for the crime, the trial court vacated that portion of Appellant's sentence and resentenced him to 10 to 20 years, to be served concurrently with his death sentence for the murder conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction.View "Pennsylvania v. Patterson" on Justia Law

In 2008, the dismembered body of Deanna Null was discovered in seven garbage bags strewn along Pennsylvania Routes 80 and 380. After receiving information that Null was last seen riding with appellee, police interviewed him. He admitted smoking crack cocaine with Null in the past and giving her money and drugs in exchange for sex. Appellee was arrested and charged with criminal homicide, aggravated assault, tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, and abuse of a corpse. The Commonwealth sought the death penalty. Prior to trial, the Commonwealth provided notice under Pa.R.E. 404(b)2 of its intent to present evidence of "prior bad acts" through several named witnesses. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on Pa.R.E. 403 and 404(b). The trial court ruled pre-trial that certain Commonwealth witnesses identified pursuant to Rule 404 would be cumulative, rendering their testimony inadmissible under Rule 403. The Court concluded this was error, reversed the Superior Court's order, and remanded to the trial court. View "Pennsylvania v. Hicks" on Justia Law

In 2008, a high school student was involved in a traffic stop and was subsequently arrested for illegal possession of prescription drugs. Later that evening, Pennsylvania State Trooper Scott Miscannon met with the student, who quickly agreed to become a confidential informant. The trooper proposed that the student engage in a controlled buy in order to inculpate the arrestee's drug supplier. The student agreed to participate and identified Appellee as his dealer named "Wes," provided a description of Wes's appearance and his automobile, and indicated he could contact Wes via cell phone. The Commonwealth charged Appellee with three counts each of possession of a controlled substance, possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Appellee filed a motion to suppress the entirety of the evidence against him based upon alleged violation of the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress, and the Commonwealth appealed to Superior Court. In a unanimous, unpublished memorandum opinion, the Superior Court affirmed the suppression of the evidence. Reviewing the Act's definitions of "intercept[ion]" and "device," the court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that the cell phone did not fall within the definition of a "device" under the Act. While the court agreed that the cell phone was not a device with respect to the student, it opined that the phone was nevertheless a device with respect to Trooper Miscannon because the service provider had not furnished it to him. Accordingly, the court concluded that Trooper Miscannon's dialing, direction to place the call on speaker mode, and listening to the conversation constituted his use of the student's cell phone, and, because the trooper was not a furnished "subscriber or user" of the cell phone, this use was an unlawful interception under the provisions of the Act. Analyzing the statutory language employed by the General Assembly in the definitional portion of the Wiretap Act, the Supreme Court saw "no basis upon which to categorize the [student's] cell phone as a device with respect to him, but not as a device with respect to the Commonwealth." Accordingly the Superior Court's order was reversed.View "Pennsylvania v. Spence" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether county commissioners could place an ordinance-generated referendum question on the primary election ballot seeking to amend a home rule charter without first seeking election of a commissioned study when the question adopted by the ordinance attempted to abolish certain row offices. In 2013, the Lackawanna County Board of Commissioners sought to direct that a referendum question be placed on the May 21, 2013, municipal primary election ballot proposing to abolish the elected offices of Sheriff, Clerk of Judicial Records, Recorder of Deeds and Register of Wills, and to redefine the duties that had been assigned to those positions as legislative powers under its Charter. Appellant Joseph Pilchesky filed a pro se petition requesting that the trial court strike the ballot question or, in the alternative, that the Board of Elections separate the single ballot question into four queries, one for each of the offices to be abolished. In his petition, Pilchesky also asserted that Ordinance 224 directed a ballot question that proposed a change in the form of government rather than an amendment to the Charter and that such a change can be effected only by petition or ordinance seeking election of a government study commission under 53 Pa.C.S. 2911. The trial court denied the challenge seeking to bar Ordinance 224 from appearing on the primary ballot, and rejeted Pilchesky's argument that the changes to the existing form of government proffered by Ordinance 224 could be accomplished by the statutorily mandated government study commission. In an unpublished memorandum opinion, the Commonwealth Court unanimously affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that in light of the plain language of the Home Rule Law and the considerations Pilchesky raised, the amendment proposed by the Commissioners constituted a change in the form of government that could have been accomplished only by following the procedure outlined in Subchapter B of the Home Rule Law. The decision of the Commonwealth Court was Reversed. View "Pilchesky v. Lackawanna County" on Justia Law

In this case, the trial and intermediate courts determined that a general contractor was not a statutory employer relative to an employee of its subcontractor. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on the tension between such rulings and the Supreme Court’s longstanding jurisprudence that conventional subcontract scenarios serve as paradigm instances in which the statutory-employment concept applies. Appellant Worthington Associates, Inc., was hired as the general contractor for an addition to a Levittown church. Worthington, in turn, entered into a standard-form subcontract with Patton Construction, Inc., of which Appellee Earl Patton was the sole shareholder and an employee, to perform carpentry. While working at the construction site, Mr. Patton fell and sustained injuries to his back. Subsequently, the Pattons commenced a civil action against Worthington contending that the company failed to maintain safe conditions at the jobsite. Worthington moved for summary judgment on the basis that it was Mr. Patton’s statutory employer and, accordingly, was immune from suit. After the motion was denied, trial proceeded during which Worthington reasserted its claim to immunity in unsuccessful motions for a nonsuit and a directed verdict. "Having set up an errant dichotomy for the jurors, the [trial] court proceeded to instruct them concerning the differences between independent contractors and employees at common law. In doing so, the trial court compounded the underlying conceptual difficulties it had engendered, because [the Supreme] Court has long held that, for the salient purposes under Sections 203 and 302(b) of the WCA, the term 'independent contractor' carries a narrower meaning than it does at common law." The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Pattons in the amount of $1.5 million in the aggregate. Post-trial motions were denied, and Worthington appealed. A Superior Court panel affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Mr. Patton’s relationship with the owner here was undeniably a derivative one, arising per a conventional subcontract with a general contractor (Worthington). "[U]nder longstanding precedent, neither Patton Construction, Inc., nor Mr. Patton was an 'independent contractor' relative to Worthington." View "Patton v. Worthington Associates" on Justia Law

Appellant Lance Arrington appealed the death sentence he received after a jury convicted him of first-degree murder and for violating the Uniform Firearms Act. While appellant raised numerous claims of error to challenge the sentence, the Supreme Court found none and affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Arrington" on Justia Law