Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue central to this case was whether Appellee George Banks was competent to be executed. Appellee used a semi-automatic rifle to murder thirteen people and seriously wounded a fourteenth in an early morning shooting spree in 1982. Five of the victims were Appellee's children, and four were Appellee's former or then-current girlfriends. In 2004, the Supreme Court ordered the trial court to determine whether Appellee had the capacity to initiate clemency proceedings or to designate someone to initiate them on his behalf. "To say that [the Court's] direction for expedition went unheeded by [the trial court judge] would be an understatement." Clemency proceedings were delayed by federal counsel seeking to burden the Commonwealth's ability to have its mental health experts examine Appellee in order to prepare a case in rebuttal against counsel's claim that Appellee had become insane. The Court concluded that "the competency question [was] important, but narrow, and it should have been resolved sooner." Following the Court's review of the competency determination rendered by the trial court, the Court concluded that Appellee was incompetent to be executed under the standards set forth in Pennsylvania case law. "It appear[ed] that [Appellee was] in a different place mentally than he was nearly thirty years ago when he committed his crimes and when he was tried." View "Pennsylvania v. Banks" on Justia Law

In 1999, a jury convicted Appellant Steven Hutchinson of first-degree murder and other crimes for the shooting death of one of his girlfriends. Appellant unsuccessfully filed a petition for post-conviction relief raising numerous guilt and penalty phase claims. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant appealed the denial of his guilt phase claims, raising ten issues for the Court’s review. Taking each in turn, the Supreme Court found sufficient evidence in the trial court and PCRA court records to support his conviction. Accordingly, the Court affirmed his conviction. View "Pennsylvania v. Hutchinson" on Justia Law

In 2008, a Pennsylvania Game Commission Officer found Appellant Mark Clegg in possession of two rifles during a hunting incident. Appellant had a prior conviction of attempted burglary. In addition to various summary violations under the Game and Wildlife Code, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with violation of the Uniform Firearms Act. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether attempted burglary is a "qualifying offense" that prohibits an individual from possessing a firearm under the Act. Upon review of the plain meaning of the Act, the Supreme Court found that attempted burglary is not one of the enumerated offenses under the Act, and as such, was not a "qualifying" offense for which Appellant could be charged in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss Appellant's charge under the Act. View "Pennsylvania v. Clegg" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether the trial court in Defendant Omar Johnson's case properly calculated the total weight of heroin for the purpose of imposing a mandatory minimum sentence. Upon review of the trial court's record, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in finding that a single purchase of one bundle of packets of heroin from a third person who retrieved the bundle from a parked car, coupled with Defendant's immediate resale of that bundle to an undercover offer, formed an adequate basis for its conclusion that Defendant was in constructive possession of a second bundle stored in the car which was discovered following a police search. Because the amount of heroin seized from the car was erroneously included by the trial court in the calculation of the total amount of heroin Defendant was found to have possessed with the intent to deliver, the Supreme Court concluded Defendant received an improperly-calculated sentence. The Court reversed the trial court's calculation and remanded the case for resentencing. View "Pennsylvania v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Appellee United States Organizations for Bankruptcy Alternatives, Inc. (USOBA) and Appellant Department of Banking challenged different aspects of the Commonwealth Court's decision that the Pennsylvania Debt Management Services Act (Act 117) was unconstitutional in part. At the request of the Supreme Court, the parties addressed whether the lower court's disposition was a final order appealable pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Procedure. The General Assembly adopted Act 117 in October 2008 to regulate, in relevant part, providers of debt settlement services (“DSS”). A DSS provider negotiates with creditors on behalf of a consumer “for the purpose of the creditor forgiving part or all of the principal of the debt incurred or credit extended to that consumer.” Pursuant to Section 3(b) of Act 117, DSS providers are prohibited from operating in Pennsylvania without a license from the Banking Department, and are required to comply with the Department’s regulations. Other sections of Act 117 list licensing fees, describe the initial licensing, license renewal, revocation, and reinstatement processes, and create penalties for violations of the statute. USOBA claimed that Act 117 violates the non-delegation, equal protection, and due process provisions of the Pennsylvania and U.S. Constitutions, and requested a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and compensation for attorneys’ fees and costs. The Department denied the allegations, and filed an Application for Summary Relief, claiming that the contentions in the complaint were insufficient as a matter of law to state a claim. Following a hearing, the Commonwealth Court denied the Department’s application in an unpublished opinion. Upon review of the Act, the applicable legal authority and the trial record, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court's order was not appealable and quashed the parties' appeals. View "United States Org. for Bankruptcy Alt. v. Dept. of Banking" on Justia Law

The issue in this case centers around whether an inoperable handgun is considered a "firearm" for sentencing purposes. In 2006, Appellant Sue Zortman and her boyfriend were the subject of a grand jury investigation regarding suspected drug activity. Appellant allowed state narcotics agents to search her home and purse. The agents found various amounts of marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a bank deposit bag and a loaded .357 Magnum handgun. Appellant would eventually be sentenced to five years' imprisonment with three years' probation. Appellant argued on appeal that the mandatory minimum sentence should not have been imposed upon her since at the time of her arrest, the handgun was "inoperable" due to the absence of a firing pin. The State argued that the applicable sentencing statute does not require that the gun be functional for the mandatory minimum sentence to be applicable. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that it did not matter whether the gun was operational, it was still a gun. The Court affirmed Appellant's sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Zortman " on Justia Law

Following a bench trial in October 2001, Appellee Jules Jette was found guilty of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, endangering the welfare of a child and corruption of minors charges. Appellee was sentenced to ten to twenty years' imprisonment, with consecutive terms of probation for seven and five years. The post-conviction-relief court (PCRA) found no merit to Appellee's claims for relief. Appellee's counsel strategically chose not to challenge all issues addressed by the PCRA court in its opinion that dismissed the case. Appellee appeared pro se to appeal to the Superior Court. The Superior Court found that Appellee was entitled to new counsel and remanded the case back to the PCRA court. The Commonwealth appealed the Superior Court's order to the Supreme Court. After a careful review of the Superior Court's opinion, the applicable law and the briefs of the parties, the Supreme Court found that the Superior Court misread the applicable legal standard which was the basis of its opinion. As a result, the Commonwealth found itself in the "unusual position" of advocating in defense of the "honor, independence and professionalism of the criminal defense bar" in its appeal of the Superior Court's order. The Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's order and remanded the case back to the PCRA for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Jette" on Justia Law

In 2005, Robert Sample was found face down on a Philadelphia city sidewalk, dead from multiple gunshot wounds to his head and neck. In canvassing the area for witnesses, detectives knocked on the door of a third-floor apartment in a nearby high-rise. Jamilla and Dominique Everett opened the door. After obtaining permission to enter the apartment, detectives found Jamilla's children, Dominique's boyfriend Khalif Alston and Appellee Ernest Cannon asleep inside. Everyone inside the apartment denied any knowledge of the shooting but agreed to accompany the police to the station for further questioning. Later on the day of the murder, the Everetts consented to a search of their apartment. Police recovered a semiautomatic handgun from inside the toilet tank. Everyone inside the apartment that day was questioned again. When detectives interviewed Mr. Alston, he confessed to his role in the crime and implicated Appellee. Following the consolidation of their cases, a jury tried both men. Since Appellee and Mr. Alston were being tried together, the statement that Mr. Alston gave to the police on the day of the murder was redacted by substituting the phrase "the other guy" for any reference to Appellee by name. The prosecution "slipped" and named Appellee in his opening statement as he recounted the events on the date of the murder. At the conclusion of the prosecutor's opening, Appellee objected and moved for a mistrial, claiming that the prosecutor "broke the redaction." The trial court gave the jury an immediate cautionary instruction. The jury returned a verdict against Appellee, convicting him of first-degree murder, robbery, conspiracy and carrying a firearm. The trial court then sentenced Appellee to life in prison for the murder conviction, with concurrent sentences for the other charges. On appeal to the Superior Court, Appellee successfully argued that he was entitled to a new trial because of the prosecutor's slip up during his opening statement. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that the trial judge's cautionary instruction was sufficient to support Appellee's conviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court gave "direct, unequivocal and strong" cautionary instructions, repeatedly detailing the proper manner of weighing the evidence. "The trial court, which is in the best position to assess whether any prejudice can be cured, determined that the prosecutor's comment did not justify a mistrial." Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Superior Court and reinstated the verdict and sentences of the trial court. View "Pennsylvania. v. Cannon" on Justia Law

Defendant Ralph Birdsong unsuccessfully appealed his sentence for murder, rape and assault. He was sentenced to death. In his appeal to the Supreme Court, he argued that the appellate court improperly denied his petition for post conviction relief. Defendant cited multiple errors at trial that entitled him to a reduction in his sentence or complete dismissal of the charges against him. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and found that Defendant was not entitled to relief. The Court affirmed the order of the lower courts denying Defendant's petition for post conviction relief.

The State appealed a Superior Court order that allowed Defendant Vincent Moto to expunge his criminal record. In 1987, Defendant was convicted of rape, deviate intercourse and conspiracy charges and was sentenced to a maximum twenty-four year sentence. Ten years into his sentence, DNA testing exonerated the Defendant. The State "nolle prossed" his case. In 2007, Defendant petitioned the court to expunge all records of his arrest, trial, conviction and sentence. The attorney who originally prosecuted the case opined that the DNA evidence did not necessarily exculpate Defendant because he was still present at the scene. Furthermore, the State would have retried Defendant except that the victim had moved out of state. The trial court ultimately denied Defendant's request to expunge his record. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that it was unable to agree with neither Defendant's assertions nor the Superior Court's determinations of trial court error. The trial court denied Defendant's petition to expunge based primarily on the strength of the original 1987 case against him, and the inability of DNA evidence to exonerate him. The Court therefore reversed the Superior Court, and reinstated the trial court's decision.