Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In April 2015, Appellant James Byrd, a/k/a/ Al-Tariq Sharif Ali Byrd, moved in with Dana Heaps after being released on bail for charges filed in February, 2015 unrelated to this case. While residing with Heaps, Appellant learned she was taking Seroquel, a prescription anti-psychotic medication. Appellant told Heaps that he did not approve of her taking the medicine. He took the Seroquel away from her. Unbeknownst to Heaps, in mid-May 2015, Appellant apparently gave Heaps a larger dose than was prescribed, causing Heaps to become unconscious. Appellant later showed Heaps, and her friend, Carlos Dukes, a cell phone video of Heaps in her state of unconsciousness. Heaps testified the video showed Appellant removing her clothes, rubbing his penis on her face, inserting his penis in her mouth, and engaging in vaginal and anal intercourse with her, all while she remained unconscious. Heaps later told investigating officers that Appellant told her the video should serve as a warning to her on the dangers of taking Seroquel. A month later, Appellant was arrested on a parole violation warrant issued by the State of Ohio and recommitted to the Allegheny County Jail. Between June 2015 and February 2016, while incarcerated at the jail, Appellant received several visits from Heaps. At the time, all visits at the Allegheny County Jail were conducted over a closed-circuit system using telephone-like handsets. Before the parties were connected to speak, a verbal alert advised, “this call may be monitored or recorded.” Heaps, her boyfriend, and her family, contacted the the police to report that Appellant was threatening them through phone calls from the Allegheny County jail. In its investigation of these new allegations, the Commonwealth obtained the recordings of the conversations between Appellant and Heaps made during her jail visits. In one particular conversation, Appellant and Heaps discussed the May 2015 assault. The Commonwealth charged Appellant with one count of rape of an unconscious victim, two counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse of an unconscious victim, two counts of aggravated indecent assault of an unconscious victim, two counts of terroristic threats, and one count each of stalking, indecent assault of an unconscious person, invasion of privacy, and persons not to possess firearms. Appellant moved to suppress the recordings of the jail-visit conversations, contending they were made in violation of the Wiretap Act. After review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the recording warning Appellant he “may be monitored or recorded,” and Appellant’s conduct in speaking after the warning, satisfies the mutual consent exception to the Wiretap Act. View "Pennsylvania v. Byrd" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the Commonwealth challenged orders of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas relieving appellees, Claude Lacombe and Michael Witmayer, of their duty to comply with Subchapter I of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), based upon the court’s finding Subchapter I, as retroactively applied to appellees, was a punitive and unconstitutional ex post facto law. After review of the trial court records, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred, and found Subchapter I was nonpunitive and did not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. View "Pennsylvania v. Witmayer" on Justia Law

Appellant Darren Montgomery was charged with one count each of carrying a firearm on public streets in Philadelphia, and carrying a firearm without a license. The issue on appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court centered on whether the superior court erred in holding that a handgun partially tucked into one’s waistband, leaving the weapon’s handle visible, was “concealed” as a matter of law for purposes of Section 6106 of the Uniform Firearm’s Act, 18 Pa.C.S. 6106, which prohibited carrying a concealed firearm without a license. The Supreme Court rejected the superior court’s holding that any level of concealment of a firearm demonstrated concealment as a matter of law, and reaffirmed the well-settled principal that whether a defendant concealed a firearm pursuant to Section 6106 was an extremely fact-intensive question for a jury to determine based upon a consideration of the totality of the circumstances. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that a review of the totality of the circumstances established there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate a prima facie case of concealment under Section 6106. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior Court’s judgment, which reversed the trial court’s order dismissing the Section 6106 charge. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on the legality of Jimel King’s enhanced sentence for attempted murder resulting in serious bodily injury under 18 Pa.C.S. section 1102(c) when the Commonwealth failed to provide formal notice of its intent to seek the enhancement in the charging documents. Also for the Court's consideration was whether King’s consecutive sentences for the two inchoate crimes of attempted murder and conspiracy, arising out of the same incident, were precluded by 18 Pa.C.S. sections 903 and 906. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the sentence as to the enhanced murder sentence, but vacated the judgment of sentence at the conspiracy count. "The traditional merger test has no application here because the ... merger statute would never apply to the inchoate crimes of conspiracy and criminal attempt. The plain language of the specific statute governing this scenario precludes multiple sentences because there is no possibility that the conspiracy to commit aggravated assault existed independently of any conspiracy to kill, nor does the Commonwealth allege any kind of temporal separation or other circumstances to suggest that two conspiratorial agreements could have existed. By enacting Section 906, the General Assembly declared that where a defendant tries to achieve a result – in this case, murder – but fails to do so, he may only be punished once in the absence of distinct criminal objectives." The matter was remanded for resentencing. View "Pennsylvania v. King" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review in this case was whether a person subject to a bench warrant was a “fugitive from justice” such that he was a “person not to possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture” a firearm pursuant to Section 6105 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Court concluded the active bench warrant for appellant Brahim Smith rendered him a fugitive from justice prohibited from possessing a firearm, and he was properly convicted under that statute. View "Pennsylvania v. Smith" on Justia Law

While driving a vehicle in December 2014, Appellant Kaitlyn Wolfel struck two pedestrians, killing one and injuring the other. She was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence, and police transported her to a local health center for blood testing. Prior to the blood draw, police advised Appellant that, if she refused to submit to the test, she would be subject to enhanced criminal penalties pursuant to the Implied Consent Law. Appellant consented to the procedure, and the test yielded a blood alcohol content of .178 percent. Appellant was charged with numerous criminal offenses, including homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence. In 2016, while the case remained at the pretrial stage, the federal Supreme Court issued its decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016). Birchfield held, among other things, that consent to a warrantless blood draw was vitiated when such assent follows the administration by police of a warning of enhanced criminal penalties upon refusal of the testing. Appellant then lodged a motion contending, in very general terms, that Birchfield required suppression of the blood evidence. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined the Commonwealth waived its challenge to Appellant’s failure to raise a claim under Pa. Const. Article I, Section 8, by failing to challenge the suppression court’s explicit invocation of that provision before the superior court. The superior court order was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Wolfel" on Justia Law

In 2016, Appellant James Hamlett, Jr. was convicted of numerous crimes deriving from a sexual assault upon a minor, and lengthy concurrent terms of incarceration were imposed at sentencing. On appeal, the superior court found that the trial court had erred in admitting a video of a forensic interview of the victim into evidence. Nevertheless, the intermediate court invoked the harmless-error doctrine to deny Appellant’s request for a new trial, reasoning that the video was merely cumulative of properly-admitted evidence in the form of the victim's testimony. The Commonwealth hadn't argued harmlessness. Nonetheless, the superior court invoked the precept that an appellate court could affirm a valid verdict based on any reason appearing in the record, regardless of whether the rationale was raised by the appellee. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to determine whether it should prohibit Pennsylvania appellate courts from exercising their discretion to apply the harmless-error doctrine when deemed warranted, in criminal cases where advocacy from the Commonwealth on the subject was lacking. Appellant's core position on appeal was that the practice of appellate courts exercising their discretion like this should have been disapproved and discarded: that application of the right-for-any-reason doctrine to support sua sponte harmless-error review inappropriately relieved the government from meeting its burden of proof of harmlessness, upon an appellate court's discernment of trial error. To this, the Supreme Court disagreed, affirming the superior court judgment. View "Pennsylvania v. Hamlett" on Justia Law

In Pennsylvania ex rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 581 A.2d 172 (Pa. 1990), a five-Justice majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held hearsay evidence alone was insufficient to establish a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing. In this case, a divided superior court recognized the Verbonitz holding, but did not follow it, despite acknowledging “the facts of Verbonitz are virtually indistinguishable from the case sub judice.” The Superior Court articulated five reasons for its departure from Verbonitz: (1) the Verbonitz Court did not agree on a single rationale to support its holding; (2) the Superior Court, in Pennsylvania v. Ricker, 120 A.3d 349 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“Ricker I”), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 170 A.3d 494 (Pa. 2017) (per curiam) (“Ricker II”), rejected the position of the three-Justice Verbonitz plurality, opining hearsay violated confrontation rights; (3) the Verbonitz minority relied on a substantive due process analysis contradicted by Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994); (4) Verbonitz was decided before the 2013 amendments to Pa.R.Crim.P. 542(E); and (5) there was no procedural due process violation here. Upon careful review, the Supreme Court held the superior court erred to the extent it concluded hearsay evidence alone was sufficient to establish a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision in this matter and disapproved that court's prior decision in Ricker I, which similarly concluded hearsay evidence alone was sufficient to establish a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing. View "Pennsylvania v. McClelland" on Justia Law

On April 1, 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a per curiam order reversing the judgment of sentence of Appellant Jerome McIntyre who had been convicted for failing to register as a convicted sex offender. Appellant’s challenge to his sentence was raised in proceedings under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). Because the Supreme Court found his challenge to be meritorious, but because his prison sentence expired on April 7, 2020, thus terminating the Court's jurisdiction to grant relief as of that date, the Court took the unusual action of issuing its April 1, 2020 order, with an opinion to follow. The Court set forth its reasons in support of that order. Appellant argued that, after the Court’s decision in "Neiman," the registration statute, Section 4915, became null and void dating back to its inception, and, thus, it was as if this statute never existed. Consequently, he maintained it would violate due process to uphold his conviction and to permit his incarceration thereunder. Appellant highlighted that the Court recognized the principle that a statute which was stricken for constitutional infirmity had to be regarded as void ab initio and treated as if it never existed. To this, the Supreme Court concurred and held Appellant was entitled to reversal of his sentence and discharge from his conviction. View "Pennsylvania v. McIntyre" on Justia Law

Appellee James Williams, a Pennsylvania state inmate, filed a petition for mandamus relief in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction. He alleged he was subjected to a search upon leaving his employment post in the prison kitchen, and an officer discovered several pounds of sugar concealed in his boots. The petition further asserted that, after a unit manager conducted a support team hearing at his cell door, Appellee was removed from his position of employment in the kitchen. Appellee claimed the Department’s failure to follow procedures pertaining to misconducts set forth in its prison regulations resulted in a denial of due process. The Commonwealth Court granted summary declaratory and injunctive relief and directed the Department of Corrections to comply with the regulations’ procedural requirements. The dissent to the Commonwealth Court's decision opined the majority's decision went against the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Bronson v. Central Office Review Committee, 721 A.2d 357 (1998), which held that the Commonwealth Court lacked original jurisdiction to entertain a prisoner’s due process challenge to the actions of prison officials, where the inmate failed to assert a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest. The dissent maintained inmates had no constitutionally-protected interest in maintaining prison employment. The Supreme Court found Appellee has never advanced a colorable defense on the merits: he repeatedly confirmed he tried to leave the kitchen with half pounds of sugar secreted in his boots. As such, the Supreme Court revered the Commonwealth Court, and remanded for dismissal of Appellee's petition for review. View "Williams v. Wetzel" on Justia Law