Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue was whether the evidence presented against mother E.A. was sufficient to establish she was a perpetrator of child abuse under the Child Protective Services Law ("CPSL"). In 2016, Mother presented to a Philadelphia emergency room with her six year old daughter, N.B.-A. ("Child"). Mother reported that Child had been experiencing vaginal discharge for three days. In response to questions by hospital staff, Mother indicated that she had no concerns that Child may have been sexually abused. Lab testing of the vaginal swabs revealed that Child had chlamydia, a sexually-transmitted infection. Although Mother told hospital staff no males lived in the home, Child stated that she lived with Mother, Grandmother, and three adult male “uncles.” In actuality, the males were Mother’s husband and Mother’s two stepsons. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that the evidence in this case was insufficient to establish Mother abused her child: "Applying the Section 6381(d) presumption to cases such as the one before us, where DHS presented no evidence that Mother was or should have been aware that Stepbrother posed a risk to Child, or that he or anyone else was abusing Child, would essentially allow a parent to be deemed a perpetrator of child abuse by omission in every case where a child is abused, placing the burden on the parent to prove that they had no reason to believe that their child was at risk." View "In the Interest of: N.B.-A." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s consideration was a question of whether excerpts from the mental health treatment reports of Petitioner, a Roman Catholic diocesan priest, which were obtained by the investigating grand jury in this matter via subpoena, could be included in “Report 1” of the 40th Investigating Grand Jury. The subpoenas were issued as part of the grand jury’s investigation into allegations of acts of sexual abuse committed by priests and other church employees in six Catholic dioceses in Pennsylvania. This appeal concerned the last of the 32 challenges made by individuals named in Report 1 who requested redaction of their personal and/or identifying information from that report. After careful review, the Supreme Court concluded that, under the Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”), this information was not subject to public disclosure. Therefore, the Court reversed the supervising judge of the grand jury’s decision allowing inclusion of these matters in Report 1. View "In Re: 40th IGJ of: R.M.L." on Justia Law

In February 2018, a Pennsylvania Department of Corrections prison guard died after an inmate attacked him and kicked him in the head with Timberland boots. Later that month, the Department suspended commissary sales of such boots. Thereafter, prison officials issued a memorandum to all inmates stating that, effective immediately, Timberland and Rocky boots could no longer be purchased by prisoners. In this direct appeal, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the Department of Corrections acted permissibly in mandating that certain types of boots possessed by inmates be surrendered or sent home. The appellant alleged he owned a pair of Timberland boots, previously purchased through the prison’s commissary for approximately $99.00, which was deducted from his inmate account. He averred that, per the Memorandum’s requirements, his boots, and those of approximately 50,000 other inmates, would effectively be confiscated without a refund. Appellant characterized the killing of the prison guard as an isolated incident to which the Department overreacted, describing the seizure of his boots as constitutionally “arbitrary and irrational.” The Commonwealth Court determined Appellant failed to allege that the Department had engaged in any conduct prohibited by law, such as deceptive representation or the breach of a warranty; and the Department and its employees are protected by sovereign immunity from claims based on alleged intentional torts. The Supreme Court concurred with the Commonwealth Court and affirmed its order. View "Sutton v. Dept. of Corr." on Justia Law

In 2014, agents of the Office of Attorney General (“OAG”), as part of their investigation of the electronic dissemination of child pornography, discovered that a computer at an identified Internet Protocol (IP) address registered with Comcast Cable Communications, repeatedly utilized a peer-to-peer file-sharing network, eMule, to share child pornography. The OAG applied for, received, and executed a search warrant at Appellant Joseph Davis’s apartment. After being Mirandized, Appellant informed agents that he lived alone, that he was the sole user of the computer, and that he used hardwired Internet services which were password protected, and, thus, not accessible by the public, such as through Wifi. The agents arrested Appellant for the eMule distributions and seized his computer. Appellant was asked for the password to this computer and Appellant refused to give it. Appellant was charged with two counts of disseminating child pornography, and two counts of criminal use of a communication facility. The Commonwealth filed with the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas a pre-trial motion to compel Appellant to divulge the password to his HP 700 computer. Appellant responded by invoking his right against self-incrimination. The trial court focused on the question of whether the encryption was testimonial in nature, and, denied the motion as a violation of Appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights. The Superior Court disagreed and reversed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that such compulsion was indeed violative of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution’s prohibition against self-incrimination. Thus, it reversed the Superior Court. View "Pennsylvania v. Davis" on Justia Law

In 2016, Pennsylvania State Police troopers initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by Appellant Shane Smith based on their observation that the license plate was not illuminated, a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code. The troopers requested Appellant’s license and registration, at which point either Appellant or his passenger opened the glovebox. When the glovebox was opened, the troopers observed a plastic vial containing marijuana. A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed a firearm, ammunition, and a clip under the driver’s seat. The manufacturer’s number on the firearm appeared to have been scratched, but was still legible. Appellant was arrested and charged with, inter alia, possession of a firearm with an altered manufacturer’s number. In this appeal by allowance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether the possession of a firearm with a scratched, but still legible, manufacturer’s number was sufficient to sustain a conviction for possession of a firearm with an “altered” manufacturer’s number. The Court held that, in order to establish that a manufacturer’s number was “altered” for purposes of 18 Pa.C.S Section 6110.2, the Commonwealth must establish that the number was changed in a material way, such as by making it look like a different number, or that it was rendered illegible, in whole or in part, to the naked eye. As the original manufacturer’s number on Appellant’s firearm was, notwithstanding the scratch marks, still legible to the naked eye, it reversed the Superior Court, vacated Appellant’s conviction and judgment of sentence for violating Section 6110.2, and remanded the matter for resentencing. View "Pennsylvania v. Smith" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael Mock was convicted for a 2006 DUI on March 27, 2007. More than ten years after committing this offense, but roughly nine years following his conviction, Appellant committed another DUI on July 10, 2016. He was later charged with DUI ?highest rate of alcohol; the Commonwealth deemed Appellant’s DUI a second offense and graded it as a misdemeanor of the first degree subject to increased penalties. Before proceeding to trial, Appellant filed a motion to quash the information, asserting that the Commonwealth improperly characterized the 2016 DUI as a second offense because his earlier offense did not constitute a prior offense under 75 Pa.C.S Section 3806. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur in this matter to address the relevant date for determining whether an earlier offense constitutes a prior offense. The Court agreed with the Superior Court that the ten-year lookback period ran from the occurrence date of the present offense to the conviction date of the earlier offense, rather than the occurrence date of the earlier offense. View "Pennsylvania v. Mock" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Olson entered an open guilty plea to one count of driving under the influence of alcohol, general impairment (“DUI”) in September 2015. This was Olson’s third DUI offense, and, at the time, he was subject to a sentence enhancement due to his refusal to submit to blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) testing. In December 2015, the trial court sentenced Olson to a term of eighteen months’ to five years’ imprisonment, applying a then-applicable mandatory minimum sentencing provision. Olson did not file a direct appeal, and his sentence became final on January 20, 2016. On June 23, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (2016), which held, inter alia, that a state may not “impose criminal penalties on the refusal to submit” to a warrantless blood test. On August 17, 2016, Olson filed a timely, pro se petition for relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), challenging, amongst other things, the legality of his sentence in light of Birchfield. The PCRA court affirmed Olson's conviction and sentence, finding that because Olson's judgment of sentence was already final, he might be entitled to benefit from Birchfield if that decision were deemed to apply retroactively on collateral review. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that because Birchfield did not set forth a “categorical constitutional guarantee” that placed criminal punishment for blood test refusal “altogether beyond the State’s power to impose” but rather, established a procedural requirement that, once satisfied, authorized that punishment, the Birchfield rule was not substantive. Accordingly, Birchfield did not apply retroactively on post-conviction collateral review. View "Pennsylvania v. Olson" on Justia Law

In 2014, Pennsylvania State Police Troopers conducted a traffic stop after observing Appellant Kirk Hays fail to use his right turn signal and then twice cross over the white fog lines on the roadway. Upon interaction with Appellant, a Trooper smelled alcohol and suspected Appellant was driving under the influence of alcohol. Following two failed field sobriety tests, Appellant was taken into custody and transported to a DUI Center, whereupon Appellant acquiesced to a blood draw; testing revealed his BAC to be 0.192. Appellant was charged with three summary offenses and two counts of DUI. Appellant moved to suppress all evidence resulting from the traffic stop, arguing the Trooper lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle. The motion was denied, trial was held and Appellant was ultimately convicted and sentenced only to Count 1, DUI. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on September 1, 2016, alleging he was entitled to a new trial because of Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (2016). The Commonwealth filed an answer, asserting Appellant waived any challenge to the voluntariness of his consent by failing to raise the issue in his omnibus pre-trial motion. The Commonwealth conceded Appellant’s case was not yet final when Birchfield was decided, and that Appellant first raised his Birchfield issue in his timely filed post-sentence motion. However, the Commonwealth argued that retroactivity only applied in cases where the question was properly preserved at all stages. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur in this matter to determine whether Birchfield applied to all cases not yet final when the decision was rendered, and determined Appellant was not entitled to retroactive application of Birchfield based on his failure to preserve the issue below. View "Pennsylvania v. Hays" on Justia Law

At issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in this matter was whether a criminal defendant’s conviction of carrying a concealed firearm without a license could be sustained on a constructive-possession theory where the gun was physically held and used by another person during the alleged crime. Appellant Alanah Peters asked the victim, Jesse Hicks, for money to help her father evade eviction. At first Hicks promised to give the father money. He and appellant had an argument, and Hicks rescinded his offer. Two men and appellant arrived at Hicks’ apartment, one holding a handgun. The men forced their way into Hicks’ bedroom. Unable to find any cash, the unarmed man told the other to shoot. The shot pierced Hicks’ jaw, tongue, and shoulder, and dislodged some of his teeth. The assailants kicked Hicks in the face and left the room. Appellant, who had remained outside the room, suggested they check Hicks’ pockets. The men re-entered the room and, as Hicks lay bleeding on the floor, removed his pants, took his $700, and fled. The men were never identified or apprehended. Appellant was charged with numerous offenses including attempted murder, robbery, aggravated assault, and conspiracy. Most relevant to this appeal, she was charged with carrying a concealed firearm without a license. Under the facts of this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined constructive possession could not be used to support appellant’s conviction for carrying a concealed firearm without a license. View "Pennsylvania v. Peters" on Justia Law

Appellant Scott Bishop was a parolee. During a home visit in March 2015, a parole agent performed a drug test, which indicated that methamphetamine was present in Appellant’s urine. Appellant was handcuffed and asked whether the agent would find anything in the residence that would violate parole conditions. Appellant then admitted that he had a firearm in a hallway closet. The agent proceeded to the closet, where he found a revolver, marijuana, electronic scales, and packaging materials. Appellant argued that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should interpret the provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution conferring upon individuals a right against self-incrimination to provide greater protection than the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States. The Commonwealth countered that this claim was not properly preserved. In terms of efforts by criminal defendants to raise claims for departure from federal constitutional jurisprudence on independent state grounds, the the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth was correct that the precedent of the Pennsylvania Court required that some analysis explaining the grounds for departure was required. Because Appellant did not distinguish between the federal Fifth Amendment and Pennsylvania Constitution Article I, Section 9 before the suppression court, his claim favoring departure was waived. Furthermore, Appellant also waived the claim for additional protection under the state constitution in the Superior Court, since he did not develop any supportive reasoning before that court either. View "Pennsylvania v. Bishop" on Justia Law