Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
by
Appellant Jakeem Towles appealed the dismissal of his second petition for post conviction relief (PCRA). Towles was convicted for the 2010 homicide of Cornell Stewart, Jr. and the attempted homicide of John Wright following an altercation at a rap performance in Columbia, Pennsylvania. The Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County (PCRA court) concluded that Towles’ petition was untimely filed and, alternatively, without merit. Towles claimed that the Commonwealth had made threats and promises to a witness to induce him to testify against Towles at trial. In apparent recognition of the facial untimeliness of his second PCRA petition, Towles asserted that his petition met the so-called “governmental interference” and “newly discovered facts” timeliness exceptions in the Post Conviction Relief Act. Towles further claimed that he acted with due diligence in asserting his claim within the one-year time limit. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concurred with the PCRA court's finding that Towles' petition was untimely, and affirmed dismissal. View "Pennsylvania v. Towles" on Justia Law

by
In April 2018, Florencia Mainetto (Florencia) recorded cellphone videos of her daughter (G.R.) and her niece (C.P.), both minors at the time, accusing Appellant Jonathan Rivera (Rivera) of sexual abuse. After sharing these videos with Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Higdon, Florencia and her sister, Katherin Mainetto (Katherin - C.P.’s mother), brought G.R. and C.P. to the Children’s Advocacy Center of Towanda (Advocacy Center) for formal forensic interviews. Trooper Higdon observed these interviews through a window. A nurse at the Advocacy Center then examined G.R. and C.P. but did not find any physical evidence of abuse. Later, two more minors, S.C. and S.M., made similar allegations against Rivera. Combined, the victims alleged that Rivera abused them between the years of 2009 and 2018. On June 26, 2018, Trooper Higdon filed a criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause against Rivera, alleging, inter alia, rape of a child. In this discretionary appeal before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the issue presented involved harmless error in the context of post-arrest silence. At trial, the prosecutor case asked the arresting officer a series of questions about the defendant’s post-arrest behavior, particularly whether the defendant denied the charges against him. Over a defense objection, the officer told the jury, four separate times, that the defendant, upon his arrest, stood mute and denied none of the charges. The Superior Court ruled that this testimony was admitted in error but, relying on authorities discussing pre-arrest silence, found it harmless. The Supreme Court reiterated that different harmless error standards apply when evaluating testimonial references to a defendant’s post-arrest versus pre-arrest silence. "Oriented correctly, we conclude that the testimony in this case was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we must award the defendant a new trial." View "Pennsylvania v. Rivera" on Justia Law

by
In 2015, Appellee Keith Rosario pleaded guilty to carrying a firearm without a license, delivering crack cocaine, and delivering marijuana. The trial court sentenced him to two and a half to five years’ imprisonment for the gun conviction, a consecutive term of five years’ probation for the crack cocaine offense, and one year of probation for the marijuana conviction to run concurrently with the five-year probation. In 2017, Rosario was paroled. Four months later while Rosario was still on parole for his gun conviction but before his probation sentences for his drug crimes began, he kidnapped a man and shot him in the back of the head. In connection with these new crimes, the Commonwealth charged him with attempted homicide and related offenses, and he was held for court. Based on the new charges against him, in 2018, the trial court revoked Rosario’s parole and probations in the present cases. Thereafter, in 2019, the trial court resentenced him to consecutive terms of the balance of his two and a half to five-year sentence for carrying a firearm without a license, five to ten years’ imprisonment for delivering crack cocaine, and five years’ probation for delivering marijuana. In 2020, however, the superior court vacated the judgment of sentence and remanded for resentencing. On remand, the trial court imposed the same consecutive sentences for the gun and crack cocaine convictions but increased the sentence for delivering marijuana to a consecutive term of two to five years’ imprisonment. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to consider the legality of the practice of anticipatory revocation of probation, which involved the cancellation of a probation sentence before it begins. The Court held the plain language of the statute governing probation revocation prohibited this practice. View "Pennsylvania v. Rosario" on Justia Law

by
This case was not about probation; it was about parole. Purporting to rely on certain passages from Commonwealth v. Foster, 214 A.3d 1240 (Pa. 2019) and the statutes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court examined in that decision, the trial court held “a sentencing court may not delegate its statutorily pr[e]scribed duties” but must instead personally “communicate any conditions of probation or parole as a prerequisite to violating any such condition.” The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the Commonwealth’s petition for allowance of appeal to consider whether the trial court improperly expanded Foster in this regard. As the Supreme Court concluded it did, judgment was reversed in part. "[T]here is no dispute the parole conditions appellee violated were imposed by the county probation office rather than the state Parole Board. ... there was nothing improper about that, and the Superior Court erred in concluding otherwise. We therefore reverse its decision in that respect and remand for further proceedings." View "Pennsylvania v. Koger" on Justia Law

by
In March 2016, Appellant Jose Vellon was arrested for DUI of alcohol pursuant to Subsection 3802(a)(1) of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) (general impairment). A violation of this statute constituted an “ungraded misdemeanor.” Vellon was accepted into the Accelerated Rehabilitation Disposition (“ARD”) Program. Several months later, police charged Vellon with another DUI. As a result of the Second DUI, the trial court entered an order removing Vellon from ARD. Vellon pleaded guilty to the First and Second DUIs, and in October 2017, he was sentenced on both DUI violations. Appellee Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (“PennDOT”) informed Vellon that it would be suspending his driving privileges as a collateral consequence of his DUI convictions pursuant to Section 3804 of the Vehicle Code. Vellon appealed only his license suspension for the First DUI. In this appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was asked whether the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that, in drafting Section 3806, the General Assembly intended to mandate that, when a defendant is sentenced for two driving-under- the-influence (“DUI”) offenses on the same day, both offenses had be considered prior offenses to each other with each warranting civil recidivist collateral consequences, despite the facts that the defendant committed the DUI violations at different points in time and had never previously been convicted of DUI. To this, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Commonwealth Court and reversed that court’s order. View "Vellon v. Dept of Transportation" on Justia Law

by
In Commonwealth v. Eid, 249 A.3d 1030 (Pa. 2021), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found Section 1543(b)(1.1)(i) of the Vehicle Code unconstitutionally vague in contravention of state and federal due process principles because it failed to specify a maximum term of imprisonment. The Court granted allowance of appeal in this case to determine whether another subsection of that same statute, Section 1543(b)(1)(iii), was unconstitutional for similarly failing to specify a maximum term of imprisonment. The Court declined to find this provision unconstitutional and therefore affirmed the Superior Court’s order. View "Pennsylvania v. Rollins" on Justia Law

by
Appellant Damien Green appealed a superior court order which quashed his appeal of a Court of Common Pleas order. The superior court concluded the trial court’s order, granting decertification to a juvenile who was to be tried as an adult for murder, constituted a legal nullity because the decertification order was not filed within the time constraints set forth in Section 6322(b) of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa. C.S. § 6322(b), and Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 597 (Rule 597). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted review in this case to consider, as a matter of first impression, whether a transfer order filed after the 20-day limitation in Section 6322 of the Juvenile Act and Rule 597 was a legal nullity or should exceptions created by Pennsylvania jurisprudence under similar rules and statutes be applicable. Following oral argument, the Supreme Court entered a per curiam order October 28, 2022, affirming the Superior Court’s order quashing the appeal. The order also remanded the matter to the trial court for immediate entry of an order by the clerk of courts pursuant to Rule 597(D). View "Pennsylvania v. Green" on Justia Law

by
In 2010, Appellant Dontez Perrin was convicted after a non-jury trial of conspiracy, aggravated assault, robbery, possessing instruments of crime, simple assault, recklessly endangering another person, receiving stolen property, firearms not to be carried without a license, and possession of firearm by minor for his role in the robbery and assault of victim Rodney Thompson when Thompson arrived at an apartment to deliver a pizza. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of five to ten years’ imprisonment. In an appeal by allowance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether the trial court erred in refusing to accept a proposed stipulation as to witness credibility in the context of a post-sentence motion for a new trial. As the Supreme Court determined the trial court was well within its right to reject the proposed stipulation, it affirmed its denial of Appellant’s motion. View "Pennsylvania v. Perrin" on Justia Law

by
The U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The question centered on the single issue of whether Pennsylvania’s first-degree aggravated assault provision, codified at 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1), required some use of physical force. Appellant Marc Harris pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania sentenced Appellant pursuant to the federal Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Notably, the ACCA defines the term “violent felony” as including any crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year that, inter alia: (1) “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” (“element of force clause”). The Supreme Court answered this inquiry in the negative, holding that the offense of aggravated assault under Section 2702(a)(1) did not require the actor to exercise physical force when inflicting or attempting to inflict serious bodily injury upon the victim. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

by
This case arose from the April 2008 murder of D.B., a two-year-old child living with her mother and appellant Harve Johnson, mother’s boyfriend. Johnson appealed a Court of Common Pleas denying his first, timely petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). Johnson raised twenty-two claims; following a comprehensive review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded none entitled him to relief and affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. View "Pennsylvania v. Johnson" on Justia Law