Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2008, the dismembered body of Deanna Null was discovered in seven garbage bags strewn along Pennsylvania Routes 80 and 380. After receiving information that Null was last seen riding with appellee, police interviewed him. He admitted smoking crack cocaine with Null in the past and giving her money and drugs in exchange for sex. Appellee was arrested and charged with criminal homicide, aggravated assault, tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, and abuse of a corpse. The Commonwealth sought the death penalty. Prior to trial, the Commonwealth provided notice under Pa.R.E. 404(b)2 of its intent to present evidence of "prior bad acts" through several named witnesses. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on Pa.R.E. 403 and 404(b). The trial court ruled pre-trial that certain Commonwealth witnesses identified pursuant to Rule 404 would be cumulative, rendering their testimony inadmissible under Rule 403. The Court concluded this was error, reversed the Superior Court's order, and remanded to the trial court. View "Pennsylvania v. Hicks" on Justia Law

In 2008, a high school student was involved in a traffic stop and was subsequently arrested for illegal possession of prescription drugs. Later that evening, Pennsylvania State Trooper Scott Miscannon met with the student, who quickly agreed to become a confidential informant. The trooper proposed that the student engage in a controlled buy in order to inculpate the arrestee's drug supplier. The student agreed to participate and identified Appellee as his dealer named "Wes," provided a description of Wes's appearance and his automobile, and indicated he could contact Wes via cell phone. The Commonwealth charged Appellee with three counts each of possession of a controlled substance, possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Appellee filed a motion to suppress the entirety of the evidence against him based upon alleged violation of the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress, and the Commonwealth appealed to Superior Court. In a unanimous, unpublished memorandum opinion, the Superior Court affirmed the suppression of the evidence. Reviewing the Act's definitions of "intercept[ion]" and "device," the court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that the cell phone did not fall within the definition of a "device" under the Act. While the court agreed that the cell phone was not a device with respect to the student, it opined that the phone was nevertheless a device with respect to Trooper Miscannon because the service provider had not furnished it to him. Accordingly, the court concluded that Trooper Miscannon's dialing, direction to place the call on speaker mode, and listening to the conversation constituted his use of the student's cell phone, and, because the trooper was not a furnished "subscriber or user" of the cell phone, this use was an unlawful interception under the provisions of the Act. Analyzing the statutory language employed by the General Assembly in the definitional portion of the Wiretap Act, the Supreme Court saw "no basis upon which to categorize the [student's] cell phone as a device with respect to him, but not as a device with respect to the Commonwealth." Accordingly the Superior Court's order was reversed.View "Pennsylvania v. Spence" on Justia Law

Appellant Lance Arrington appealed the death sentence he received after a jury convicted him of first-degree murder and for violating the Uniform Firearms Act. While appellant raised numerous claims of error to challenge the sentence, the Supreme Court found none and affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Arrington" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Superior Court erred in affirming the trial court's suppression of physical evidence seized incident to arrest based on an expired arrest warrant where the arresting officer reasonably believed the warrant was valid. Upon review of the particular circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court was correct in suppressing the evidence in question here. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court. View "Pennsylvania v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Appellant Michelle Sue Tharp was convicted of first degree murder and related offenses after she deliberately starved her seven-year-old daughter to death. After her judgment of sentence was affirmed on appeal, Appellant filed a petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). Following several evidentiary hearings, the Court of Common Pleas (PCRA court) dismissed Appellant’s petition. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA court’s denial of relief on Appellant’s guilt phase claims, and reversed on the PCRA court’s denial of relief on the claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present mental health mitigation evidence during the penalty phase of trial. Accordingly, the case was remanded for a new penalty hearing. View "Pennsylvania v. Tharp" on Justia Law

This case was a direct appeal of a death sentence imposed after a jury convicted Appellant Jeffrey Martin of one count of first-degree murder and other charges arising from the strangulation death of a twelve-year-old girl. The jury concluded, with respect to the circumstances of the murder, that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances, and imposed the death sentence. The primary issues raised by Appellant on appeal centered on whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdicts for the additional charges of rape, sexual assault, and statutory sexual assault. Appellant argued that because there was insufficient evidence to prove that the killings had been committed during the perpetration of these felonies, the jury considered non-existing aggravating circumstances when it imposed the sentence of death. Appellant also challenged the ruling of the suppression court that allowed certain evidence to be presented against him at trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. Martin" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the Superior Court erred in reversing a trial court’s bail forfeiture order. In 2010, police arrested Ricky Hann for assaulting his then-girlfriend. Following an initial bail hearing, he was released on his own recognizance. The girlfriend obtained a protection-from-abuse order contemporaneous with Hann’s release. A month later, police arrested Hann for violating the PA order. He was found guilty, but remained free. A few months later, the girlfriend reported to police that she had been kidnapped and kept against her will for about 24 hours before she could escape. Based on this statement, police arrested Hann. Hann was arraigned, and bail set. Hann executed a surety agreement with a bail bondsman whereby he acknowledged his heirs or assigns could be responsible for forfeiting the bail should Hann fail to appear for court proceedings. Hann was again released on bail. Police were dispatched to the girlfriend’s residence; upon arrival, officers found the dead bodies of Hann and the girlfriend, both shot in a homicide/suicide. The Commonwealth filed a petition for bail forfeiture, contending that by murdering his girlfriend and killing himself, Hann violated the terms of his bail bond, and that the bail bondsman was subject to forfeiture of the bail. The bail bondsman opposed the petition, arguing that “justice did not require the full enforcement” of the order. The Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s order: “[w]e do not portend to render bail bondsmen, or any surety for that matter, the guarantors of a defendant’s conduct while the defendant is released on bail. However, the express language of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure concerning bail, bail bonds, and forfeiture . . . permit forfeiture for any breach of a bail condition. Were we to accept the Superior Court’s holding, however, that ‘justice only require[d]’ forfeiture in circumstances where the Commonwealth has expended money in recapturing or retrying the defendant, the rule-based requirements of non-absconding related conditions and the potential for forfeiture for breaching those conditions would become nullities. To the extent the Superior Court so held, we respectfully find that it erred.” View "Pennsylvania v. Hann (Weachter-Bail Bondsman)" on Justia Law

In 1999, Appellant, his codefendant, and two accomplices robbed the occupants of a vehicle at gunpoint. In the course of the robbery, Appellant shot and killed the victim. At the time, Appellant was seventeen years of age. In 2002, Appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and related offenses. He received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, plus a term of imprisonment. On direct appeal, the Superior Court affirmed; the Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal; and Appellant did not seek discretionary review in the United States Supreme Court. Appellant then timely filed a post-conviction petition claiming, inter alia, that the life-without-parole sentence violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as extended to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in this case was whether “Miller v. Alabama,” (132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)) applied retroactively to Appellant’s 2002 judgment of sentence, which became final in 2005. The United States Supreme Court issued the Miller decision in June 2012, rendering Pennsylvania’s mandatory scheme of life imprisonment for first- and second-degree murder unconstitutional, as applied to offenders under the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes. Significantly, as pertaining to this case, the Miller majority did not specifically address the question of whether its holding applied to judgments of sentence for prisoners, such as Appellant, which already were final as of the time of the decision. The Pennsylvania Court applied settled principles of appellate review, and found nothing in Appellant’s arguments persuaded it that Miller’s proscription of the imposition of mandatory life-without-parole sentences upon offenders under the age of eighteen at the time their crimes were committed must be extended to those whose judgments of sentence were final as of the time of Miller’s announcement. View "Pennsylvania v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

Appellant was found guilty of sexual abuse of children, invasion of privacy, and criminal use of a communications facility for videotaping his 13-year-old step-daughter undressing in the bathroom. Although appellant admitted to the videotaping, he contended his motivation was to embarrass her and correct her behavior for having twice entered his bedroom while he was naked. The trial court did not credit appellant’s testimony concerning his motivation and found him guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to a probationary term of three and one-half years and ordered to undergo a sex offender evaluation and follow all treatment recommendations as a specific condition of his probation. One such recommendation was a sex offender treatment program. Appellant would later be discharged from the program. Concluding appellant’s discharge from the program was a violation of his probation conditions, appellant’s probation officer filed a petition with the trial court; the trial court found appellant violated his probation requirements, and it revoked his probation. Appellant was sentenced to another probationary term of three years and ordered to complete the sex offender program, including polygraph examinations administered to monitor his compliance. Appellant appealed to the Superior Court, claiming there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion he violated his probation, and that the trial court erred in admitting the results of his therapeutic polygraph examination into evidence at his VOP hearing. The Supreme Court found no error in the trial or Superior Courts’ decisions, and affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. A.R. " on Justia Law

Appellant George Yohe, II, appealed a Superior Court order that reversed the trial court’s order awarding a new trial on the ground that his constitutional right of confrontation was violated. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Superior Court that appellant’s constitutional right of confrontation was not violated at trial because the testifying witness was not a “surrogate witness,” as Appellant argued. Rather, the witness was the author of the testimonial statement offered into evidence and, therefore, was an appropriate witness under the Confrontation Clause. Accordingly, Appellant’s confrontation rights were protected by this testimony. View "Pennsylvania v. Yohe, II" on Justia Law