Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2005, appellee was charged with two counts of criminal use of a communication facility, as well as single counts of delivery of cocaine, possession with intent to deliver cocaine, and simple possession of cocaine. Represented by retained private counsel, appellee proceeded to a jury trial in 2006, and was found guilty of all charges except one of the counts of criminal use of a communication facility. The trial court sentenced appellee to three to six years of imprisonment on the delivery charge and a concurrent sentence of two to four years on the criminal use of a communication facility conviction, both with credit for time served. The other drug convictions were merged for sentencing purposes. In 2007, appellee motioned for appointment of counsel in the trial court, which the trial court granted, appointing the Centre County Public Defender’s Office. Then, through counsel, appellee filed a PCRA petition seeking reinstatement of his appeal rights due to trial counsel’s failure to file a requested direct appeal. In 2008, following an earlier evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court reinstated appellee’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc, without addressing the substantive ineffectiveness claims. Appellee subsequently filed a notice of appeal and a statement, identifying eleven issues of ineffectiveness of trial counsel. The the PCRA court issued its opinion briefly addressing the merits of those ineffectiveness claims. In his Superior Court brief, appellee pursued only three of the eleven claims of ineffectiveness; he raised no preserved, direct review claims. The Superior Court panel determined that appellee’s merits arguments were “misguided” because he should have argued that the PCRA court, in its opinion reinstating appellee’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc, had erred by failing to consider the effect of appellee’s amended PCRA petition raising trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. Following “Pennsylvania v. Liston,” (941 A.2d 1279 (Pa. Super.2008) (en banc)), the Superior Court remanded to the PCRA court with instructions to permit appellee to file post-sentence motions nunc pro tunc in which he could raise his ineffectiveness claims. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the reviewability of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on post-verdict motions and direct appeal under “Pennsylvania v. Bomar,” (826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1115 (2004)), and “Pennsylvania v. Grant,” (813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002)), including the question of whether ineffectiveness claims may be considered if accompanied by a waiver of review as of right under the Post Conviction Relief Act. The Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Holmes" on Justia Law

In 2010, Philadelphia Police Officers were on patrol in their marked car in the area of North 58th Street and Florence Avenue when they observed appellee Sheim Gary driving an SUV with heavily tinted windows. Appellee would later be arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession with intent to deliver. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on the requirements in the Commonwealth for a warrantless search of a motor vehicle. After consideration of relevant federal and state law, the Court held that with respect to a warrantless search of a motor vehicle that was supported by probable cause, Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution affords no greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Accordingly, the Court adopted the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement, which allows police officers to search a motor vehicle when there is probable cause to do so and does not require any exigency beyond the inherent mobility of a motor vehicle. View "Commonwealth v. Gary" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Appellant of one count of first-degree murder and one count of burglary. The jury concluded, with respect to imposition of sentence, that the aggravating circumstances (committing murder to prevent testimony in a possible criminal proceeding regarding a felony and committing a killing in perpetration of a felony) outweighed the mitigating circumstance (character and record). Upon review, and finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction. View "Pennsylvania v. Morales" on Justia Law

Appellant Maurice "Boo" Patterson appealed his death sentence after he was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, and criminal solicitation. The charges against Appellant arose from the fatal shooting of Eric "Bop" Sawyer by Sean "Raydar" Durrant. Durrant confessed to shooting the victim, but claimed he did so at the behest of Appellant, who had been incarcerated in the Lycoming County Prison. Appellant filed post-sentence motions on in 2010 and 2011; the motions were denied in 2012. However, upon discovering that Appellant's sentence for criminal conspiracy was an illegal sentence, in that it exceeded the maximum sentence for the crime, the trial court vacated that portion of Appellant's sentence and resentenced him to 10 to 20 years, to be served concurrently with his death sentence for the murder conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction.View "Pennsylvania v. Patterson" on Justia Law

In 2008, the dismembered body of Deanna Null was discovered in seven garbage bags strewn along Pennsylvania Routes 80 and 380. After receiving information that Null was last seen riding with appellee, police interviewed him. He admitted smoking crack cocaine with Null in the past and giving her money and drugs in exchange for sex. Appellee was arrested and charged with criminal homicide, aggravated assault, tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, and abuse of a corpse. The Commonwealth sought the death penalty. Prior to trial, the Commonwealth provided notice under Pa.R.E. 404(b)2 of its intent to present evidence of "prior bad acts" through several named witnesses. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on Pa.R.E. 403 and 404(b). The trial court ruled pre-trial that certain Commonwealth witnesses identified pursuant to Rule 404 would be cumulative, rendering their testimony inadmissible under Rule 403. The Court concluded this was error, reversed the Superior Court's order, and remanded to the trial court. View "Pennsylvania v. Hicks" on Justia Law

In 2008, a high school student was involved in a traffic stop and was subsequently arrested for illegal possession of prescription drugs. Later that evening, Pennsylvania State Trooper Scott Miscannon met with the student, who quickly agreed to become a confidential informant. The trooper proposed that the student engage in a controlled buy in order to inculpate the arrestee's drug supplier. The student agreed to participate and identified Appellee as his dealer named "Wes," provided a description of Wes's appearance and his automobile, and indicated he could contact Wes via cell phone. The Commonwealth charged Appellee with three counts each of possession of a controlled substance, possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Appellee filed a motion to suppress the entirety of the evidence against him based upon alleged violation of the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress, and the Commonwealth appealed to Superior Court. In a unanimous, unpublished memorandum opinion, the Superior Court affirmed the suppression of the evidence. Reviewing the Act's definitions of "intercept[ion]" and "device," the court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that the cell phone did not fall within the definition of a "device" under the Act. While the court agreed that the cell phone was not a device with respect to the student, it opined that the phone was nevertheless a device with respect to Trooper Miscannon because the service provider had not furnished it to him. Accordingly, the court concluded that Trooper Miscannon's dialing, direction to place the call on speaker mode, and listening to the conversation constituted his use of the student's cell phone, and, because the trooper was not a furnished "subscriber or user" of the cell phone, this use was an unlawful interception under the provisions of the Act. Analyzing the statutory language employed by the General Assembly in the definitional portion of the Wiretap Act, the Supreme Court saw "no basis upon which to categorize the [student's] cell phone as a device with respect to him, but not as a device with respect to the Commonwealth." Accordingly the Superior Court's order was reversed.View "Pennsylvania v. Spence" on Justia Law

Appellant Lance Arrington appealed the death sentence he received after a jury convicted him of first-degree murder and for violating the Uniform Firearms Act. While appellant raised numerous claims of error to challenge the sentence, the Supreme Court found none and affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Arrington" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Superior Court erred in affirming the trial court's suppression of physical evidence seized incident to arrest based on an expired arrest warrant where the arresting officer reasonably believed the warrant was valid. Upon review of the particular circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court was correct in suppressing the evidence in question here. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court. View "Pennsylvania v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Appellant Michelle Sue Tharp was convicted of first degree murder and related offenses after she deliberately starved her seven-year-old daughter to death. After her judgment of sentence was affirmed on appeal, Appellant filed a petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). Following several evidentiary hearings, the Court of Common Pleas (PCRA court) dismissed Appellant’s petition. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA court’s denial of relief on Appellant’s guilt phase claims, and reversed on the PCRA court’s denial of relief on the claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present mental health mitigation evidence during the penalty phase of trial. Accordingly, the case was remanded for a new penalty hearing. View "Pennsylvania v. Tharp" on Justia Law

This case was a direct appeal of a death sentence imposed after a jury convicted Appellant Jeffrey Martin of one count of first-degree murder and other charges arising from the strangulation death of a twelve-year-old girl. The jury concluded, with respect to the circumstances of the murder, that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances, and imposed the death sentence. The primary issues raised by Appellant on appeal centered on whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdicts for the additional charges of rape, sexual assault, and statutory sexual assault. Appellant argued that because there was insufficient evidence to prove that the killings had been committed during the perpetration of these felonies, the jury considered non-existing aggravating circumstances when it imposed the sentence of death. Appellant also challenged the ruling of the suppression court that allowed certain evidence to be presented against him at trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. Martin" on Justia Law