Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Cromwell Township appealed a Commonwealth Court's order that sentenced its supervisors to three to six months' imprisonment for contempt. The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) had approved the Township's comprehensive plan for sewage services, but the Township decided the Plan was too expensive to implement. Despite requesting several extensions of time, the Township failed to implement its plan. At the time, the Orbisonia Rockhill Joint Municipal Authority (ORJMA) which operated public sewage systems including those within the Township, was experiencing an overload in its wastewater treatment plant. The Township Board of Supervisors approached ORJMA and proposed a joint venture that would increase the capacity of ORJMA's plant and simultaneously decrease the anticipated cost to the Township for sewage treatment. The Township submitted an amended Plan which was accepted by the DEP. But prior to implementing the Plan, the Township Board elected new members. New members who openly opposed the Plan repealed the ordinances required under the amended Plan. The Township then stopped cooperating. The DEP filed suit to enforce the Plan asking that fines be levied against Board members and to set a timeline to purge the contempt. The court, unsatisfied with the Township's efforts to purge the contempt sentenced its members to jail time. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Township's failing to timely appeal the Plan and its amendment when new supervisors took office meant that the DEP's act was final, and the Township was foreclosed from challenging the Plan. However, the Court found that the Commonwealth Court's failing to use less restrictive means prior to imposing prison sentences on Board members compelled reversal: "the Commonwealth Court had lesser alternatives available to it in its attempt to compel Township's compliance with the court's prior order… but the Commonwealth Court inexplicably refused." The Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's order sentencing Township Board members to imprisonment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Pa. Dept. of Environ. Prot. v. Cromwell Twp." on Justia Law

Appellant Francis Bauer Harris was found guilty by a jury of first-degree murder, and the Commonwealth sought the death penalty. During the penalty phase of his trial, Appellant sought to establish the statutory mitigating circumstance of extreme mental or emotional disturbance by presenting the testimony of a psychologist. The jury rejected Appellant’s claim of a mitigating circumstance, found one aggravating circumstance, and returned a verdict of death. Appellant filed a petition for post conviction relief asserting that trial counsel had been ineffective for presenting the psychologist's testimony even though counsel was aware that the doctor's evaluation had been deficient. The court of common pleas scheduled a hearing on the PCRA petition, and, to defend against Appellant’s allegations, the Commonwealth subpoenaed the psychologist to testify. The prosecution asked Appellant to waive psychologist-client privilege with respect to the doctor's testimony. When Appellant refused, the Commonwealth asked the PCRA court not only to declare the privilege waived, but also to permit it to hire the doctor as its expert for the PCRA proceedings. The PCRA court granted the motion, and Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court ordered briefing and oral argument on whether the court had jurisdiction over this appeal as a collateral appeal, and the Court concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction was proper. On the merits, the Court held that although the Commonwealth could subpoena the doctor to testify as a fact witness, it could not hire him as its expert for the PCRA proceedings. The case was remanded for a determination of the extent of the waiver of privilege. View "Pennsylvania v. Harris" on Justia Law

Appellant Freeman May appealed his death sentence imposed following his third penalty phase hearing. Appellant was convicted for the 1982 murder of Lynn Fair. After a penalty hearing, the jury found one aggravating circumstance, and one mitigating circumstance. The jury determined the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstance, and Appellant was sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, but reversed the sentence, concluding the jury could not properly consider whether appellant committed murder while in the perpetration of the felony (rape) due to an error in instructing the jury. At the second penalty phase, a new jury found one aggravating circumstance, a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person, and no mitigating circumstances. Accordingly, the sentence was death. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed both the conviction and death sentence. Appellant initiated PCRA proceedings by filing a pro se petition, motions for stay of execution, and appointment of counsel. The PCRA court denied relief on all of Appellant’s issues, but granted an evidentiary hearing for his contention that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, develop, and present mitigating evidence of Appellant’s allegedly traumatic childhood. On appeal, the Supreme Court determined trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s ruling concerning the introduction of mitigating evidence, and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claim on direct appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated appellant’s sentence and remanded the matter for a third penalty phase. With the Commonwealth’s agreement, appellant was granted permission to appeal his sentence, nunc pro tunc. Appellant raised multiple alleged errors in the subsequent rehearings, the sum of which warranted a fourth penalty phase hearing. After careful consideration of the lengthy appellate record in this case, the Supreme Court found sufficient evidence to support the juries' findings of aggravating circumstances to warrant the death sentence. The Court affirmed Appellant's sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. May" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted discretionary review of a superior court order that vacated a sentence imposed on Appellee Shawney Perry who was originally indicted for carrying a firearm without a license. The issue before the Court was whether the superior court misapplied the Supreme Court's directive set forth in "Commonwealth v. Walls," 926 A.2d 957 (2007) concerning the appellate review of sentences. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the superior court failed to give sufficient deference to the sentencing court's imposition of sentence. Accordingly, the Court vacated the superior court's order and remanded the case back to that court for a reexamination of Appellee's judgment of sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Perry" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether it was possible, as a matter of law, to be convicted as an accomplice to third-degree murder. The Commonwealth presented evidence that the victim was lured to an apartment complex, where he was ambushed, shot, and mortally wounded. Appellant Stanley Roebuck participated with others in orchestrating the events, but he did not shoot the victim. For his role, Appellant was charged with, among other offenses, third degree murder. On appeal, Appellant argued that there is no rational legal theory to support accomplice liability for third-degree murder. The Superior Court affirmed Appellant's sentence. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review, and concluded that a conviction for murder of the third degree is supportable under complicity theory where the Commonwealth proves the accomplice acted with the culpable mental state required of a principal actor, namely, malice. In other words, the Pennsylvania Crimes Code legally, logically, and rationally imposes accomplice liability for depraved heart murder. The Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Pennsylvania v. Roebuck" on Justia Law

Appellants Dawn Pyeritz sued the Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania State police and several of its police officers for the destruction of her personal property, speficially "a black nylon tree stand safety harness, or belt, that allegedly was crucial evidence in a separate civil action." The police seized this item during a criminal investigation of a suspicious death. A trooper agreed to retain the belt in the custody of the police, apparently for a longer time than permitted by internal police regulations. The belt was destroyed before Appellants' counsel asked for its return. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Appellees, which the Commonwealth Court affirmed. The Commonwealth Court held that no cause of action exists against a third party – someone other than the original alleged tortfeasor – for negligent spoliation of evidence. The Supreme Court granted review, and now holds that Pennsylvania law does not recognize a cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence. View "Pyeritz v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether acceptance into an Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program following a second charge of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) constituted a DUI violation and thus triggers the requirement for installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of restoring a revoked driver's license. In 1998, Appellee John Whalen was convicted of DUI in Florida. Nine years later, Appellee was again arrested for DUI, this time in Pennsylvania. The trial court admitted Appellee into an ARD program after expressly making a determination that Appellee’s 1998 Florida DUI conviction did not present a bar to his entry into this program. Appellee successfully completed his ARD program. Pursuant to one provision of the ARD program, Appellee’s driver’s license was suspended for a period of sixty days, with the added condition that the ignition interlock be installed on his vehicle. Appellee appealed the ignition interlock requirement to the court of common pleas, arguing that the Department had no authority to impose this requirement in his case because ARD was not an adjudication of guilt. The Commonweath Court affirmed the DOT's decision. Upon reivew, the Supreme Court determined that the Commonwealth Court erred in its interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions when it concluded that acceptance into ARD did not establish a DUI violation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Whalen v. Penna. Dept. of Trans." on Justia Law

Appellant David Chmiel challenged the dismissal of his petition for post conviction relief (pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 'PCRA'). Appellant was convicted on three counts of first-degree murder in 2002 and sentenced to death. Following his unsuccessful post-sentence motion that asserted forty alleged errors and eight claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA court denied Appellant’s request for PCRA relief in a detailed and extensive memorandum opinion and order filed in early 2009. This appeal followed, wherein Appellant stated twelve issues for review. In its own extensive opinion, the Supreme Court found that none of Appellant's assertions had any "arguable merit." The Court affirmed the PCRA court's order dismissing his claims. View "Pennsylvania v. Chmiel" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth appealed a portion of a superior court order that reversed Appellee Daniel Sinnott's conviction for ethnic intimidation baed in insufficient evidence. Appellee got into a heated argument with his landlord/employer, hurling epithets and throwing things at the landlord and members of his family. Appellee was charged with simple assault, terroristic threats, ethnic intimidation, and possession of instruments of crime. He waived his right to a jury, and the trial court convicted him of all offenses, sentencing him to four to 23 months imprisonment for simple assault and a consecutive four years probation for terroristic threats; no further penalty was imposed. Appellee appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his terroristic threats and ethnic intimidation convictions. The superior court affirmed the terroristic threats conviction, but reversed the conviction for ethnic intimidation, concluding the record failed to establish the landlord's ethnicity was the "primary basis" for appellee's behavior. In crediting appellee's contention that his conduct was solely motivated by anger with the landlord, the Supreme Court found that the superior court not only imposed a non-existing requirement that racial animus be the sole or primary motivator, but also failed to view the evidence of Appellee's repeated derogatory ethnic slurs in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the portion of the superior court's order reversing appellee's ethnic intimidation conviction, and reinstate the judgment of sentence for that offense. In all other aspects, the order was affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. Sinnott" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was whether expert testimony is required to convict a defendant of driving under the influence of a drug or combination of drugs when the drugs in question are prescription medications. Appellee Michelle Griffith was charged with DUI following an eyewitness' account of her driving in a "reckless and dangerous manner." Appellee failed field sobriety tests administered by law enforcement. Diazepam, Nordiazepam and "Soma 350" were detected in her blood which Appellee admitted to taking on the morning of the incident. At trial, two individuals testified: the eyewitness and the responding police officer. The trial court convicted Appellee and sentenced her to three months' imprisonment and a fine. Appellee appealed the conviction, arguing the evidence was not sufficient without testimony of an expert to establish the medications impaired her ability to drive safely. The superior court agreed an expert was needed and vacated Appellee's conviction. The Commonwealth appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court, finding the evidence was sufficient to establish Appellee was under the influence of drugs to a degree that impaired her ability to drive. View "Pennsylvania v. Griffith" on Justia Law