Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In February 2017, Caleb Zweig died after a brief but tragic interaction with his college fraternity brother, appellant Brady DiStefano. Appellant initially was charged with aggravated assault and criminal homicide due to this encounter; however, the criminal homicide charge later was dismissed as the Commonwealth failed to produce prima facie evidence to support it. In response to Appellant’s subsequent pretrial motion, the trial court entered an order precluding the Commonwealth from presenting at Appellant’s trial any evidence suggesting that Appellant caused Zweig’s death. The Commonwealth appealed that order to the Superior Court, which reversed the trial court’s order. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to determine whether the Superior Court misapplied the appellate court standard for reviewing trial court evidentiary rulings. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court misapplied the relevant standard of review in reversing the trial court’s order. Thus, it vacated the Superior Court’s judgment, reinstated the trial court’s order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Distefano" on Justia Law

Some time between mid-January and the early part of February 2018, K.S., a 14- year-old student at West Side Career and Technology Center (“WSCTS”), a vocational high school, heard appellant, a 15-year-old student at the school, say he “doesn’t think people deserve to live and everyone should just die.” Appellant’s second statement was made on February 20, 2018, six days after 17 high school students at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida were fatally shot. M.W., a 15-year-old classmate of appellant’s, overheard appellant say “[h]e wanted to beat the record of 19.” M.W. heard this statement from only two or three feet away while in the hallway between classes. Although appellant’s remark was not directed at her, M.W. was unsure whether he was “talking to someone [else], or [if] he just said it” aloud. K.S.,after learning of appellant’s “beat the record” statement secondhand, followed suit and reported what she had heard. The Commonwealth later charged appellant with terroristic threats pursuant to Section 2706(a)(1) and (3) of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, and disorderly conduct. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed it “remains an open question” whether the First Amendment to the United States Constitution permitted States to criminalize threats made in reckless disregard of the risk of causing fear. In this opinion, the Court resolved that issue, holding that the First Amendment tolerates a conviction — in this case, under Pennsylvania’s terroristic threats statute, for making a threatening statement even where the speaker did not intend to cause terror. However, after its de novo review of the record, the Court felt constrained to conclude the statements underlying appellant's adjudication, "though perhaps concerning to some because they were uttered in a school hallway only days after a deadly high school shooting," did not cross the constitutional threshold from protected speech to an unprotected true threat. The Court therefore vacated appellant’s adjudication of delinquency. View "In the Interest of: J.J.M." on Justia Law

Appellant Robert Wharton appealed an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dismissing his fourth petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). A jury convicted Appellant of two counts of first-degree murder, four counts of criminal conspiracy, four counts of burglary, and one count of robbery. The jury subsequently sentenced Appellant to death for each of the murder convictions, and the court sentenced him to a consecutive aggregate term of incarceration of 39 to 140 years for the remaining charges. On direct appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied guilt phase relief, but vacated the death sentence and remanded for resentencing based on a holding that the trial court’s failure to define the term torture for the jury was prejudicially deficient. Following a new sentencing hearing, a jury once again sentenced Appellant to death for each of the murder convictions, which the Supreme Court affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the PCRA court's dismissal of Appellant's fourth petition for post-conviction relief. View "Pennsylvania v. Wharton" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted certiorari review of this appeal to determine whether trial court orders that authorized the disclosure of Appellant David Pacheco’s real-time cell site location information (“CSLI”) were the functional equivalent of search warrants and satisfied the requisites of the Fourth Amendment pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018). In 2015, the Narcotics Enforcement Team of the Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office (“Commonwealth”), working with the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”), learned that a large Mexican drug-trafficking organization was smuggling heroin into the United States for distribution, and that Appellant, a resident of Norristown, Pennsylvania, played a significant role in the operation by retrieving the heroin in Atlanta, Georgia, and transporting it to wholesale buyers in New York City. At various times throughout the investigation, the Commonwealth applied for and obtained several orders pursuant to the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (“Wiretap Act”), 18 Pa.C.S. sections 5701-82. The orders at issue in this appeal were those entered pursuant to Subchapter E of the Wiretap Act, 18 Pa.C.S. sections 5771-75. After review, the Supreme Court held that the challenged orders were the functional equivalent of search warrants and complied with the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, it affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, which affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Pacheco" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the trial court erred by denying suppression of wireless internet network (WiFi) connection records obtained by police without a warrant from the Information Technology Department of Moravian College. At approximately 2:00 a.m. on February 2, 2017, two masked men posed as campus police to gain entry to the dorm room shared by Greg Farina and William Reilley in a dormitory building on the Moravian College Campus in Bethlehem. The men held Farina and Reilley at gunpoint and stole $1,000 and a jar of marijuana from Reilley’s footlocker. Reilley reported the robbery to campus officials around 11:00 a.m. and, thereafter, campus police requested that Moravian College’s Director of Systems Engineering, Christopher Laird, analyze its WiFi connection records to compile a list of students logged on to the WiFi in the dormitory building at the time of the robbery. Laird discovered only three Moravian College students were logged on to the campus WiFi at that location who did not reside in the building; two were females and the other was appellant, Alkiohn Dunkins. Campus police relayed this information to the Bethlehem Police Department. In the course of its investigation, detectives interviewed Reilley, appellant, and Colin Zarecki, another Moravian College student. Reilley told the detective he suspected appellant participated in the robbery because appellant previously stole from him by failing to pay for marijuana, while appellant denied being involved in the robbery and told police he had not entered the dormitory since October 2016. Zarecki told police that on the day after the robbery, appellant bragged to him about money he stole by posing as a campus police officer. Based on the above information, appellant was arrested and charged with robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, receiving stolen property, and simple assault. The Supreme Court concluded the search of the WiFi records was constitutionally permissible, and accordingly, affirmed the superior court. View "Pennsylvania v. Dunkins" on Justia Law

Appellant Aaron Bradley and Tanaya Nelson were involved in a romantic relationship. Nelson began attending a trade school, where she met Bruce Fox (“Victim”). The relationship between Nelson and Victim was friendly, but evidently, not romantic. The day before Victim’s murder, Appellant and Nelson went shopping. After about an hour after she was dropped off at a relative's house, Nelson realized she had missed approximately ten calls from Appellant. Nelson called Appellant back, and he began to question her about where she was and who she was with. Appellant took her phone, seeing a text from Victim that made him angry. When she retrieved her phone some time later, Nelson realized texts and call message logs had been deleted. The Commonwealth ultimately retrieved those deleted messages and logs, finding a number of messages and calls were sent from Nelson's phone when it was in Appellant's possession. Appellant was arrested and charged with first-degree murder, possessing an instrument of crime (“PIC”), and carrying a firearm on a public street in Philadelphia related to his involvement in the shooting death of Victim. A jury found Appellant guilty on all charges; he was sentenced to life and concurrent terms for the PIC and firearms offenses. Three PCRA petitions were dismissed, with the court concluding issues raised were without merit. With new counsel, Appellant attempted to move the Superior Court to remand his case to the PCRA court so that he could raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. This motion was denied, with the Superior Court explaining that Appellant waived his challenge to the adequacy of PCRA counsel's effectiveness under current law, and that he could not challenge PCRA counsel’s effectiveness on appeal. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the procedure for enforcing the right to effective counsel PCRA proceeding. "All parties before us acknowledge that the current approach is inadequate, and that revisions are in order, but have offered differing viewpoints." The Supreme Court determined that, "indeed, an overhaul of the procedure to vindicate a petitioner’s right to effective PCRA counsel is appropriate," and adopted the approach outlined in this opinion. View "Pennsylvania v. Bradley" on Justia Law

Appellant T.W. appealed a superior court order affirming a court of common pleas order denying his motion to suppress physical evidence and adjudicating Appellant delinquent for unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Appellant’s arrest for unlawful possession of a controlled substance arose from a vehicle stop and a subsequent Terry frisk. Upon frisking Appellant, a police officer of the Philadelphia Police Department felt a hard object in Appellant’s left pants pocket. Fearing that the unknown object could be a weapon, the officer reached into Appellant’s pocket and removed the object. Appellant was arrested for possessing the object and a subsequent search incident to arrest led to the discovery of a controlled substance on Appellant’s person. Before trial, Appellant made a motion to suppress the physical evidence recovered from his person, arguing that the police officer exceeded the scope of a permissible Terry frisk by reaching into Appellant’s pocket and removing an object during the frisk. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in this matter to address the standards by which a police officer may remove an object from within a suspect’s clothing during a Terry frisk. The Court previously addressed this issue in Pennsylvania v. Taylor, 771 A.2d 1261 (Pa. 2001) (plurality). The Court's review in that case resulted in a plurality decision whereby the opinion announcing the judgment of the Court held that a police officer conducting a lawful Terry frisk could remove an object from within a suspect’s clothing if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the object is a weapon. "In light of the fact that Taylor did not produce a majority opinion, we reexamine the issue anew." View "In the Interest of: T.W." on Justia Law

At some time in the early morning hours of December 27, 1996, Appellant entered his estranged wife Carla’s home and then shot Carla and her fourteen-year-old daughter D.M. in the head, killing both of them. The Commonwealth charged Appellant with one count of burglary and two counts of first-degree murder. A jury found Appellant guilty of those charges. After a penalty hearing, the jury sentenced Appellant to death on both of his murder convictions. On July 17, 2014, the PCRA court entered an order dismissing another handful of Appellant’s claims based upon the evidence presented in the initial evidentiary hearing. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed that order in all respects, save one. "Respectfully, the PCRA court did not provide its rationale for rejecting the fact-intensive issue relating to Appellant’s competency to proceed to trial and represent himself and prior counsels’ alleged ineffectiveness for failing to pursue the issue." Consequently, this matter was remanded to the PCRA court solely to issue a supplemental opinion addressing its reasons for denying relief on these claims. View "Pennsylvania v. Reid" on Justia Law

In October 2016, Kevin Jalbert (“Victim”) was shot seven times in Coatesville, Pennsylvania, and died as the result of the shooting. Several persons witnessed the incident, including Justin Griest and A.H. Appellant Sheron Purnell was identified as the shooter, and the Commonwealth charged him with first-degree murder, third-degree murder, and firearms not to be carried without a license. When police interviewed A.H. about the assault, she stated that she was afraid to speak about the group who committed the act because they were part of the gang that she saw when Victim was murdered. A.H. also shared that she did not want to testify about the assault because she feared that someone from the gang would shoot her. The Commonwealth requested that a “comfort dog” be present during A.H.’s trial testimony at trial. The motion explained that a sheriff’s deputy would transport the comfort dog, Melody, to the court and that the dog would enter the courtroom before the jury’s entrance. According to the motion, the comfort dog would be placed in the witness stand outside the presence of the jury and would exit the courtroom after the jury left the room. In response to the Commonwealth’s motion, Appellant’s counsel stated his concern that the jury would see the dog and feel sympathy for A.H. Defense counsel also feared that A.H. may comment on the presence of the dog given her alleged propensity to get distracted. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in this matter to consider the appropriate test to apply to a trial court’s determination concerning whether a witness in a criminal case may utilize a “comfort dog” for support during his or her trial testimony. The Supreme Court held that a trial court should balance the degree to which the accommodation will assist the witness in testifying in a truthful manner against any possible prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Here, the trial court allowed a witness to testify with the assistance of a comfort dog, and the Superior Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. The Supreme Court agreed with the Superior Court and, therefore, affirmed that court’s judgment. View "Pennsylvania v. Purnell" on Justia Law

In October 2006, Appellant Robert Flor entered a plea of guilty to the first-degree murder of Officer Brian Gregg, of the Newtown Borough Police Department. He further entered pleas nolo contendere to various other charges in connection with the events of September 29, 2005. A jury found: (1) the victim was a peace officer; (2) Appellant committed the murder during the perpetration of a felony; (3) in the commission of the offense, Appellant knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim; and (4) Appellant had a significant history of violent felony convictions. The jury found no mitigating circumstances. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s death sentence on July 22, 2010, and the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari on April 18, 2011. In May 2011, Appellant filed a timely pro se motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). In November 2018, the PCRA court denied the petition, and Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the PCRA court's denial of relief, and affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. Flor" on Justia Law