Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Through Pennsylvania’s Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act, ("Act 2"), the General Assembly created a scheme for establishing “cleanup standards” applicable to voluntary efforts to remediate environmental contamination for which a person or entity may bear legal responsibility. Appellant EQT Production Company (“EPC”), owned and operated natural gas wells in the Commonwealth. In May 2012, the company notified Appellee, the Department of Environmental Protection (the “Department” or “DEP”), that it had discovered leaks in one of its subsurface impoundments containing water that had been contaminated during hydraulic fracturing operations. Subsequently, EPC cleared the site of impaired water and sludge and commenced a formal cleanup process pursuant to Act 2. In May 2014, the agency tendered to EPC a proposed “Consent Assessment of Civil Penalty,” seeking to settle the penalty question via a payment demand of $1,270,871, subsuming approximately $900,000 attending asserted ongoing violations. EPC disputed the Department’s assessment, maintaining that: penalties could not exceed those accruing during the time period in which contaminants actually were discharged from the company’s impoundment; all such actual discharges ended in June 2012; and the Act 2 regime controlled the extent of the essential remediation efforts. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether ECT had the right to immediately seek a judicial declaration that the DEP's interpretation of the Act was erroneous. The Court held that the impact of the Department’s threat of multi-million dollar assessments against EPC was sufficiently direct, immediate, and substantial to create a case or controversy justifying pre-enforcement judicial review via a declaratory judgment proceeding, and that exhaustion of administrative remedies relative to the issues of statutory interpretation that the company has presented was unnecessary. View "EQT Production Co. v. DEP" on Justia Law

In this appeal by allowance, we consider the breadth of the authority of an interest arbitration panel acting pursuant to the Policemen and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act. In 2009, the contract between appellee City of Philadelphia and appellant the Michael G. Lutz Lodge No. 5 of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) expired, and the parties failed to negotiate a new one. The matter went to binding interest arbitration. An arbitration panel put a new collective bargaining agreement in place effective July 2009 to June 2013. One issue before the panel concerned advance notification and premium overtime for police officers for court appearances. The panel's authority came into question when it made decisions on the notification and overtime issues. The Supreme Court found that the interest arbitration panel's authority was limited to addressing issues properly submitted to the panel, or those questions reasonably subsumed within those issues. Here, the panel exceeded its authority by speaking to an issue that was neither bargained over, raised in prior related proceedings before the panel, nor reasonably subsumed within the issue that was properly before the panel. Accordingly, the Court reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court which affirmed the underlying interest arbitration award. View "Michael G. Lutz Lodge v. City of Phila." on Justia Law

Appellant Lower Merion Township was a township of the first class. Article IV of its municipal code required every person engaging in a business, trade, occupation, or profession in the Township to pay an annual business privilege tax calculated as a percentage of gross receipts. Appellees Fish, Hrabrick, and Briskin (“Lessors”) each own one or more parcels of real estate in the Township that they rent to tenants pursuant to lease agreements. The Township notified Lessors that, for every such parcel, they were obligated to purchase a separate business registration certificate and pay the business privilege tax based on all rental proceeds. Lessors sought a declaratory judgment stating that, pursuant to the Local Tax Enabling Act (the “LTEA”), the Township’s business privilege tax could not be applied to rental proceeds from leases and lease transactions. Lessors did not challenge the validity of Article IV generally. Rather, they observed that the LTEA’s general grant of power in this regard is subject to an exception stating that such local authorities lack the ability to “levy, assess, or collect . . . any tax on . . . leases or lease transactions[.]” Lessors argued their real property rental activities fell within the scope of this exception. The trial court granted the Township's motion, denied the Lessors' motion and dismissed the complaint. A divided Commonwealth Court reversed, but the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's judgment, reversed the Commonwealth Court and reinstated the trial court's order dismissing the complaint. View "Fish v. Twp of Lower Merion" on Justia Law

A series of cross-appeals involved tax credits and refunds for overpayments of the City of Philadelphia’s Business Privilege Tax (BPT). The City appealed the Commonwealth Court’s decision affirming the award of credits to Keystone Health Plan East, Inc., and QCC Insurance Company (collectively, Taxpayers), who appealed the same decision affirming the denial of their refund requests. The Philadelphia Department of Revenue agreed Taxpayers overpaid their taxes, but denied the refund requests as untimely. Taxpayers appealed to the Philadelphia Tax Review Board, arguing the net income corrections effectively reset the “due date” since they had 75 days from the completion of an IRS audit to file the amended returns. The Review Board rejected Taxpayers’ argument, determining “due date” referred to the date the returns were initially due (April 15, 2004 and 2005, respectively). Notwithstanding this denial of refunds, the Review Board, sua sponte, awarded Taxpayers credits for their overpayments. The trial court affirmed the Review Board’s decision. Both parties appealed, and a divided three-judge panel of the Commonwealth Court affirmed. The majority further held the trial court did not err in affirming the award of credits. Finding no reversible error in the Commonwealth Court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Phila. v. Tax Review Bd." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s review centered on review of a Commonwealth Court order Court interpreting a provision of a consent decree, negotiated by the Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania ("OAG") and approved by the Commonwealth Court, between Appellant UPMC, a nonprofit health care corporation, and Appellee Highmark, a nonprofit medical insurance corporation, which established the obligations of both parties with respect to certain health care plans serving vulnerable populations. Specifically, the Court considered whether the Commonwealth Court erroneously interpreted this "vulnerable populations" provision as creating a contractual obligation for UPMC to treat all participants in Highmark’s "Medicare Advantage Plans" (for which Highmark and UPMC currently have provider contracts which UPMC has indicated it will terminate) as "in-network" for purposes of determining the rates it is permitted to charge these individuals for physician, hospital, and other medical services during the duration of the consent decree. After careful review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s finding that the "vulnerable populations" clause of the consent decree required UPMC to "be in a contract" with Highmark for the duration of the consent decree, and, thus, that UPMC physicians, hospitals, and other services shall be treated as "in-network" for participants in Highmark Medicare Advantage plans which were subject to provider contracts between Highmark and UPMC set to be terminated by UPMC on December 31, 2015. The Court also affirmed the portion of the Commonwealth Court’s order requiring judicial approval for any further changes in business relationships between these parties which were governed by the consent decree, but quashed as not yet ripe for review the portion of the order which directed the OAG to file a request for supplemental relief to effectuate compliance with the consent decree. View "Pennsylvania v. UPMC" on Justia Law

At issue in these cross-appeals by Verizon Telephone Company of Pennsylvania and the Commonwealth was the taxability of Verizon’s gross receipts under the Pennsylvania Gross Receipts Act, for: (1) the installation of private phone lines; (2) the provision of directory assistance services; and (3) certain non-recurring charges levied on its customers for the installation of telephone lines; moves of, and changes to telephone lines and services; and from repairs of telephone lines. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded that revenue derived from all such activities constitutes gross receipts taxable under 72 P.S. 8101(a)(2), and, thus, affirmed the portion of the order of the Commonwealth Court which determined revenue from the first two above-enumerated activities were taxable. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the Commonwealth Court’s order finding revenue from the third activity was not. View "Verizon, PA, Inc. v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

On January 13, 2015, as his term was ending, out-going Governor Tom Corbett appointed appellee Erik Arneson as the Executive Director of the Office of Open Records (OOR) for a term of six years, with an optional reappointment for an additional six years. On January 20, 2015, the first day of Governor Wolf’s term, he terminated Appellee’s employment. Appellee filed a complaint for mandamus and declaratory relief in the Commonwealth Court, arguing that Governor Wolf’s termination of his employment violated the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Right to Know Law (RTKL). The Commonwealth Court accepted this argument and reinstated Appellee. The Governor appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, after review, adopted and supplemented the Commonwealth Court’s opinion, and affirmed. View "Arneson v. Wolf" on Justia Law

The issue the Supreme Court addressed in these consolidated appeals centered on the extent of the public’s statutory right of access to discrete information about the implementation of the Medical Assistance Program. In 2011, James Eiseman, Jr. and the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia (“Requesters”) tendered requests to the Department of Public Welfare (DPW) seeking records revealing, among other things, the rates that DPW paid to managed care organizations (MCOs) for dental services in the Southeast Zone (the “Capitation Rates”), and the amounts paid by MCOs to provide dental services (the “MCO Rates”). These were submitted per the Right-to-Know Law (RTKL). DPW denied the requests. Pertinent to the Supreme Court’s review of this case, with regard to the MCO Rates, the Department indicated that it had been informed by each of the MCOs that the rates were “trade secrets and/or confidential proprietary information” protected against disclosure. The Department did not deny that it possessed pertinent records; rather, it related that the MCOs had instructed that “DPW is not to disclose” the rates. The Office of Open Records (OOR), however, issued a final determination granting the relevant records requests. Initially, an appeals officer observed that records in the possession of a Commonwealth agency were presumed to be public, unless they qualified for an exemption under the RTKL or other law or are protected by a privilege, judicial order, or decree. In a divided opinion, the Commonwealth Court sustained the portion of the OOR’s determination concerning Capitation Rates, as the members of an en banc panel unanimously agreed that contracts between DPW and the MCOs were financial records under the Law. In the absence of a legislative evaluation, the Supreme Court could not conclude that records which must be submitted to a government agency for approval, were not records “dealing with” the agency’s monetary disbursements and services acquisitions. "[I]f the General Assembly wished for dissemination to be withheld, it would have been a straightforward matter to provide for redaction of trade-secrets information in Section 708(c) of the Law, as was done in relation to eight of the other openness exceptions which are otherwise withheld from financial records." The Court focused upon the conclusion that records which were required to be submitted to and approved by DPW, and which reflected the central means of implementing a core departmental function, were records “dealing with” DPW’s disbursement of public monies and its responsibility to afford access to healthcare services in furtherance of the public interest. The order of the Commonwealth Court holding to the contrary was reversed relative to the MCO Rates, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Dept. of Public Welfare v. Eiseman" on Justia Law

This matter concerned a parcel of commercial/industrial property located in Springettsbury Township, which was owned by appellee Harley-Davidson Motor Company. Approximately 110 acres of the parcel contained buildings and other improvements, and the remaining 119 acres were considered “excess” land. Previously, the United States Navy, from 1941 until 1964, and, later, a private firm, American Machinery and Foundry Company (“AMF”), with whom Harley-Davidson merged in 1969, used the parcel to operate a weapons manufacturing plant and, in the course of their business, buried numerous contaminants (as well as unexploded military ordnance) in the subsurface strata. This use caused significant environmental damage to the property. In 1993, Harley-Davidson repurposed a portion of the site to operate a motorcycle manufacturing plant. In 2003, the Assessment Office of York County notified Harley-Davidson that it intended to increase the parcel’s property tax assessment. Harley-Davidson filed an appeal with the York County Board of Assessment Appeals, which affirmed. Harley-Davidson then filed a de novo appeal with the trial court. Appellant Central York School District (“School District”) intervened, and the parties proceeded to a three-day bench trial to determine the parcel’s assessments for tax years 2004 through 2010, pursuant to the Second Class A and Third Class County Assessment Law. This appeal by allowance before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court involved the proper determination of the fair market value of Harley-Davidson's property for purposes of property tax assessment, including consideration of environmental contamination, remediation, and stigma, as well as the potential for future subdivision of the property. After review, the Supreme Court found: (1) hypothetical ways in which a property could be used by potential buyers are properly considered by an expert in evaluating what a willing buyer would pay for a property; (2) the potential effect of agreements concerning possible environmental remediation liability and ongoing environmental restrictions and maintenance is a relevant factor that must be taken into account when determining the fair market value of property, and (3) environmental stigma may be relevant to determining fair market value of real estate for tax purposes in appropriate circumstances. The Supreme concluded: (1) the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that the School District’s expert valued the subject property as already subdivided, and, thus, its determination in this regard was reversed; (2) the Commonwealth Court properly concluded that these agreements were not accounted for by the trial court; thus, the Commonwealth Court’s remand was affirmed; and (3) the trial court properly relied upon the School District’s expert’s opinion regarding a 5% environmental stigma devaluation for the property; thus, reversed the Commonwealth Court’s rejection of the trial court’s reliance upon such stigma in its valuation of the property. View "Harley-Davidson v. Central York Sch District et al" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to consider whether the Public School Code of 1949 mandated that a school district provide free transportation to a student from two different residences where the student’s parents share physical custody of the student and both parents reside within the school district. The Commonwealth Court held that the Manheim Township School District must provide transportation to both parents’ residences. After review, the Supreme Court agreed that the School District was required to provide free transportation to and from both parents’ residences in this case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court. View "Watts v. Manheim Twp. School District" on Justia Law