Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Collette Brown, a resident of Concord Township, Delaware County, appealed the Commonwealth Court's order affirming the trial court's dismissal of her petition to place on the November 2014 ballot, a referendum question seeking to change the Township's governmental status from second-class to first-class. Appellant's petition contained 994 signatures (8.5%) out of the Township’s 11,640 registered voters and claimed that as of the 2010 census, the Township had a population density of around 1,258 inhabitants per square mile (“IPSM”). As stated, both figures easily exceeded the statutory thresholds of 300 IPSM and 5% registered voter signatures, which Appellant believed operated as conjunctive preconditions. Seven named qualified electors (“Appellees”) filed objections and claimed the petition was substantively and procedurally defective under Pennsylvania law, which they argued was time-limited to the first municipal or general election occurring at least ninety days after the 2010 census. That same day, the Delaware County Bureau of Elections intervened and requested declaratory relief, claiming that in addition to not satisfying the statutory requirements, the petition should have been dismissed because a home rule study referendum question was already on the ballot (which voters later approved), and that if Appellant’s referendum question were successful, the subsequent change in Township government could violate the Pennsylvania Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that pursuant to 53 P.S. section 55207, second- to first-class township referendum questions shall be submitted to voters at the first general or municipal election occurring at least ninety days after fulfilling both the population density ascertainment and petition signature filing requirements as set forth in the statute. Accordingly, the Court reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In re: Ballot Quest to Concord Twp" on Justia Law

Penn Treaty Network America Insurance Company (“PTNA”) and its subsidiary, American Network Insurance Company (“ANIC”) (collectively, the “Companies”), were Pennsylvania life insurers specializing in long-term care insurance, covering skilled-nursing, nursing home, and assisted living and home health care for individuals with chronic illnesses or disabilities. In January 2009, the Commonwealth Court ordered the rehabilitation of the Companies, upon application of then-Insurance Commissioner Joel Ario, who cited the consent of both entities as the sole grounds for the orders of rehabilitation. Nine months after entry of the rehabilitation order, however, Commissioner Ario filed petitions to covert the Companies’ rehabilitations into liquidations. The Commonwealth Court, per a single-judge proceeding, conducted hearings spanning thirty days of testimony and encompassing the submission of thousands of pages of exhibits and documentary evidence. In May 2012, the Commonwealth Court entered an order denying the petitions to liquidate and directed the Commissioner to develop a plan of rehabilitation within ninety days. The Commonwealth Court concluded the Rehabilitator’s evidence did not show that a rehabilitation was tried and failed. "Rather, it showed that a rehabilitation plan was abandoned in its nascency. In short, the Rehabilitator did not prove that continued rehabilitation substantially increases the risk to policyholders, creditors and the public or is futile." A critical facet of the Commonwealth Court’s opinion concerned the degree of deference owing to a statutory rehabilitator on consideration of a conversion petition. The Commissioner challenged the Commonwealth Court’s decision in such regard, namely, that the court’s no-deference determination was, in fact, inconsistent with the case which it had referenced as being supportive. The Supreme Court affirmed: "In all events, deference does not require the courts to accede to a misuse of the process. In light of the above, and the former Commissioner’s accession at the outset of the rehabilitation proceedings that liquidations would be harmful to policyholders, as well as the Commonwealth Court’s supported finding that there is no present harm in moving forward in rehabilitation, we decline to impede that court’s review of the rehabilitation plan which it directed should be filed, and which has now been submitted. The judicial review, however, should proceed subject to a more deferential overlay relative to the new acting Commissioner." View "In Re: Penn Treaty Network" on Justia Law

Appellants The International Association of Firefighters, Local 22, AFL-CIO, and its named officers (collectively, the Union) was the collective bargaining unit representing the City of Philadelphia’s firefighters and paramedics. It appealed a Commonwealth Court order reversing the trial court’s grant of peremptory judgment in mandamus for the Union and against the City of Philadelphia, Mayor Michael Nutter, Richard Negrin, and Lloyd Ayers (collectively, the City), and required the City to fill vacancies immediately in the positions of Fire Captain and Fire Lieutenant. The Commonwealth Court held that neither the Home Rule Charter nor the Civil Service Regulations required vacancies to be filled immediately. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the Union did not establish a clear legal right to relief or a corresponding duty in the City, and that it was therefore not entitled to mandamus relief. View "Phila Firefighters' Union. v. City of Phila" on Justia Law

Consolidated direct appeals to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court centered on appellees' efforts to resurrect a defunct state-run health insurance program. Appellees were recipients of state-subsidized, low-cost health insurance via the "adultBasic" program, which was previously administered by the Department of Insurance and made available to certain qualifying adults in Pennsylvania. The program received the bulk of its funding from the proceeds of a 1998 multi-state master settlement agreement between forty-seven states and several major U.S. tobacco product manufacturers. The allocation and distribution of funds received annually by the Commonwealth under this settlement was initially administered outside of the Fiscal Code, via the Tobacco Settlement Act (TSA). As relevant here, for purposes of fiscal years 2010-2011 and 2011-2012, the General Assembly used modifications to the Fiscal Code to override the TSA’s requirements for tobacco settlement monies. One effect of the amendments was to divert tobacco settlement funds more generally to other fiscal priorities of the Commonwealth. In March 2011, Appellees Cheryl Sears and seventy-four other former recipients of adultBasic filed an original-jurisdiction petition for review at the Commonwealth Court, styled as a class action. As amended, the petition contended, inter alia, that the redirection of tobacco settlement monies under Acts 46 and 26 violated the TSA’s requirements for appropriation and allocation of tobacco settlement funds. The petition also asserted that these enactments offended various provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution governing legislative processes, including the general requirement that no bill shall be passed containing more than a single subject. Appellees sought declaratory, mandamus, and injunctive relief retroactively reestablishing the adultBasic program and reimbursing the program over two hundred million dollars. Appellee Eric Weisblatt commenced a separate action, also styled as a class action, proffering materially similar allegations and claims for relief, in the relevant respects, only naming executive-branch officials and agencies as defendants. Appellees in both proceedings moved for a preliminary injunction to preclude the Treasury from disbursing the tobacco settlement monies which were due to be received that month as appropriated per Act 46. Relief was denied by the court, however, upon its finding that the harm asserted by Appellees was neither immediate nor irreparable. Several weeks after the Commonwealth Court’s issuance of its opinion in Sears, the court issued a divided decision in "Weisblatt." During the pendency of the appeals, additional omnibus amendments to the Fiscal Code were enacted into law, which, inter alia, effectuated a repeal of the allocation formula provided in the TSA; the result formally displaced adultBasic funding within the terms of the TSA itself. In light of these amendments, Appellees renewed their request for relief from the supersedeas, which was again denied. Upon review of both sides' arguments appealing the Commonwealth Court's decision, the Supreme Court held that Appellees lacked standing to pursue the relief requested in their petitions for review. View "Sears v. Wolf" on Justia Law

In the Spring of 2014, the supervising judge for the Thirty-Fifth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that an investigation should be conducted into allegations that grand jury secrecy had been compromised. The work of a Special Prosecutor culminated in a grand jury presentment recommending the filing of criminal charges against Pennsylvania Attorney General Kathleen Kane. Through the filing of an action in quo warranto, Attorney General Kane asked the Supreme Court to quash the appointment of a special prosecutor investigating violations of grand jury secrecy requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the supervising judge acted within his authority and sound prerogative in appointing the Special Prosecutor: "although we recognize that there are legitimate concerns arising out of a judicial appointment of a special prosecutor, we follow the approach of the United States Supreme Court and the many other jurisdictions which have found such appointments proper as an essential means to vindicate the courts' own authority." The request for quo warranto relief was denied. View "In Re: 35th Statewide Inv Grand Jury" on Justia Law

Appellants, twenty-four Pennsylvania voters, filed this action in 2006 in the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction to challenge the certification of six direct-recording electronic voting systems (DREs) models in use in Pennsylvania. Seeking declaratory, mandamus, and injunctive relief, Appellants claimed the Secretary of the Commonwealth should have been ordered to decertify the DREs which did not comply with the Election Code and compelled to adopt more rigorous testing standards. In this appeal, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Commonwealth Court erred in upholding the decision of the Secretary to certify certain DREs for use in Pennsylvania elections. The Commonwealth Court found that the DREs satisfied the certification requirements set forth in the Election Code and did not infringe on the fundamental right to vote as protected by the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Supreme Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court did not err in granting the Secretary's petition for summary relief. In particular, the Court found the Secretary exercised proper discretion in determining that the certified DREs satisfied the requirements for electronic voting systems set forth in the Election Code and the use of the DREs did not violate Appellants' fundamental right to vote as embodied within Article I, Section 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution or the uniformity requirement in Article VII, Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. View "Banfield v. Sec'y of Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2006, Scott Simons, Matthew Senger and Joshua Sellers (decedent) met at the home of a mutual friend in Abington Township. Simons had been drinking all day prior to this engagement, but testified that he did not drink at the residence. In the early morning hours of December 24, 2006, Senger and the decedent asked Simons for a ride home. None of the men fastened their seatbelts. Simons testified that he was, in fact, drunk when he left the party, and admitted that this was not the first time he had driven his friends home drunk. Simons testified that the police car made a U-turn and began following Simons with its lights and siren activated. Simons admitted that instead of pulling over, he fled, as he was “scared of getting a DUI.” Senger testified that when Simons initially “floored his car,” he was not aware that police were pursuing the car. Senger estimated that Simons was driving “well over 100” miles per hour. Senger testified that both he and decedent then asked Simons to slow down, as they were aware of a dip in the road ahead. Simons continued at a high rate of speed and ultimately hit the dip in the road. The car was sent airborne and crashed into trees and a parked pickup truck. Simons and Senger suffered minor injuries, while decedent was ejected from the vehicle and thrown 20 feet away, suffering a catastrophic brain injury, along with other injuries. Appellants Celeste and Richard Sellers, parents of the decedent, filed a wrongful death and survival action against appellees the Township of Abington, Officer Edward Howley, and Lieutenant Karl Knott asserting claims for negligence and punitive damages. Appellants alleged that appellees caused the death of decedent when Officer Howley negligently, recklessly, and willfully initiated and failed to terminate a high speed pursuit of Simons’ vehicle. After the completion of discovery, Appellees moved for summary judgment based upon governmental immunity. The central issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a local agency owed a common law or statutory duty of care to a passenger of a fleeing vehicle, whose existence or relationship to the fleeing driver was unknown to the pursuing police officer. The Commonwealth Court concluded that appellees did not owe a duty of care to fleeing suspects. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's decision. View "Sellers v. Twp. of Abington" on Justia Law

In 2003, appellant Fred Moran was an elected member of the Board of Commissioners of Haverford Township, Delaware County. The board decided to sell a 209-acre parcel of land on which the former Haverford State Mental Hospital was located. On December 19, 2005, the board held a special public meeting to address a looming revenue shortfall for the upcoming year. During the meeting, as Commissioner Andrew Lewis recalled in his trial testimony, appellant proposed accelerating the collection of real estate taxes as a way to raise revenue; particularly, he suggested having a consultant purchasing the a portion of the parcel, Goldenberg-Pohlig (GP) pre-pay $500,000 of the 2006 realty taxes on the parcel. The next day, Lewis and appellant had a phone conversation with Michael Lawry, a principal with GP. Lewis informed Lawry the board was addressing a budgetary shortfall and told him appellant had a proposal. Appellant then said to Lawry, “[C]all it extortion, call it what you will. We need $500,000, and we’ll accelerate the zoning. We’ll get you the zoning approvals you need and accelerate the process.” Lewis recalled Lawry asked whether the $500,000 was included in the $17.5 million, and appellant indicated it would be added to the purchase price. Lawry responded he was not in a position to answer but would discuss the matter with others at GP and get back in touch with appellant and Lewis. A few minutes later, Lewis called Lawry back and told him, “I want no part of that conversation. Haverford Township is not in the business of selling zoning.” Lewis testified he called appellant the next day and essentially told him the same thing. Appellant was charged with and later convicted for bribery in official and political matters. On appeal of that conviction, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him, and also raised the question of whether bribery (as charged) was a strict liability crime. The Supreme Court concluded after review that bribery in official and political matters was not a strict liability crime, and that there was sufficient evidence to support appellant's conviction. View "Pennsylvania v. Moran" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Department of Health (DOH) announced that, pursuant to an extensive reorganization of public health services referenced in Governor Tom Corbett’s 2013-2014 budget, twenty-six State Health Centers would be closed and approximately twenty-six nurse consultants would be furloughed. In response, a lawsuit was filed in Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction by Appellants SEIU Healthcare Pennsylvania, an unincorporated labor organization, five nurses employed by the Centers and represented by SEIU, and five Pennsylvania state legislators (collectively referred to as “SEIU”), seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Specifically, SEIU sought to prevent Appellees, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Governor Corbett, the DOH, and DOH Secretary, Michael Wolf, from closing the Centers and furloughing the nurse consultants. The Commonwealth Court denied the union's request. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found no reasonable ground for the denial of injunctive relief, and, accordingly, reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court. View "SEIU Healthcare, et al v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

Appellant Ashley Zauflik sustained severe and permanent injuries when a school bus owned by, and operated by an employee of, appellee Pennsbury School District accelerated out of control onto a sidewalk and struck twenty students. The issue this case presented for review did not concern liability - it was a challenge to the constitutionality of the $500,000 statutory limit available in tort from a local agency such as Pennsbury. The lower courts, consistently with governing Pennsylvania law denied the challenges to the damages cap. Finding no reversible reason, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts. View "Zauflik v. Pennsbury School District" on Justia Law