Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On January 13, 2015, as his term was ending, out-going Governor Tom Corbett appointed appellee Erik Arneson as the Executive Director of the Office of Open Records (OOR) for a term of six years, with an optional reappointment for an additional six years. On January 20, 2015, the first day of Governor Wolf’s term, he terminated Appellee’s employment. Appellee filed a complaint for mandamus and declaratory relief in the Commonwealth Court, arguing that Governor Wolf’s termination of his employment violated the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Right to Know Law (RTKL). The Commonwealth Court accepted this argument and reinstated Appellee. The Governor appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, after review, adopted and supplemented the Commonwealth Court’s opinion, and affirmed. View "Arneson v. Wolf" on Justia Law

The issue the Supreme Court addressed in these consolidated appeals centered on the extent of the public’s statutory right of access to discrete information about the implementation of the Medical Assistance Program. In 2011, James Eiseman, Jr. and the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia (“Requesters”) tendered requests to the Department of Public Welfare (DPW) seeking records revealing, among other things, the rates that DPW paid to managed care organizations (MCOs) for dental services in the Southeast Zone (the “Capitation Rates”), and the amounts paid by MCOs to provide dental services (the “MCO Rates”). These were submitted per the Right-to-Know Law (RTKL). DPW denied the requests. Pertinent to the Supreme Court’s review of this case, with regard to the MCO Rates, the Department indicated that it had been informed by each of the MCOs that the rates were “trade secrets and/or confidential proprietary information” protected against disclosure. The Department did not deny that it possessed pertinent records; rather, it related that the MCOs had instructed that “DPW is not to disclose” the rates. The Office of Open Records (OOR), however, issued a final determination granting the relevant records requests. Initially, an appeals officer observed that records in the possession of a Commonwealth agency were presumed to be public, unless they qualified for an exemption under the RTKL or other law or are protected by a privilege, judicial order, or decree. In a divided opinion, the Commonwealth Court sustained the portion of the OOR’s determination concerning Capitation Rates, as the members of an en banc panel unanimously agreed that contracts between DPW and the MCOs were financial records under the Law. In the absence of a legislative evaluation, the Supreme Court could not conclude that records which must be submitted to a government agency for approval, were not records “dealing with” the agency’s monetary disbursements and services acquisitions. "[I]f the General Assembly wished for dissemination to be withheld, it would have been a straightforward matter to provide for redaction of trade-secrets information in Section 708(c) of the Law, as was done in relation to eight of the other openness exceptions which are otherwise withheld from financial records." The Court focused upon the conclusion that records which were required to be submitted to and approved by DPW, and which reflected the central means of implementing a core departmental function, were records “dealing with” DPW’s disbursement of public monies and its responsibility to afford access to healthcare services in furtherance of the public interest. The order of the Commonwealth Court holding to the contrary was reversed relative to the MCO Rates, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Dept. of Public Welfare v. Eiseman" on Justia Law

This matter concerned a parcel of commercial/industrial property located in Springettsbury Township, which was owned by appellee Harley-Davidson Motor Company. Approximately 110 acres of the parcel contained buildings and other improvements, and the remaining 119 acres were considered “excess” land. Previously, the United States Navy, from 1941 until 1964, and, later, a private firm, American Machinery and Foundry Company (“AMF”), with whom Harley-Davidson merged in 1969, used the parcel to operate a weapons manufacturing plant and, in the course of their business, buried numerous contaminants (as well as unexploded military ordnance) in the subsurface strata. This use caused significant environmental damage to the property. In 1993, Harley-Davidson repurposed a portion of the site to operate a motorcycle manufacturing plant. In 2003, the Assessment Office of York County notified Harley-Davidson that it intended to increase the parcel’s property tax assessment. Harley-Davidson filed an appeal with the York County Board of Assessment Appeals, which affirmed. Harley-Davidson then filed a de novo appeal with the trial court. Appellant Central York School District (“School District”) intervened, and the parties proceeded to a three-day bench trial to determine the parcel’s assessments for tax years 2004 through 2010, pursuant to the Second Class A and Third Class County Assessment Law. This appeal by allowance before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court involved the proper determination of the fair market value of Harley-Davidson's property for purposes of property tax assessment, including consideration of environmental contamination, remediation, and stigma, as well as the potential for future subdivision of the property. After review, the Supreme Court found: (1) hypothetical ways in which a property could be used by potential buyers are properly considered by an expert in evaluating what a willing buyer would pay for a property; (2) the potential effect of agreements concerning possible environmental remediation liability and ongoing environmental restrictions and maintenance is a relevant factor that must be taken into account when determining the fair market value of property, and (3) environmental stigma may be relevant to determining fair market value of real estate for tax purposes in appropriate circumstances. The Supreme concluded: (1) the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that the School District’s expert valued the subject property as already subdivided, and, thus, its determination in this regard was reversed; (2) the Commonwealth Court properly concluded that these agreements were not accounted for by the trial court; thus, the Commonwealth Court’s remand was affirmed; and (3) the trial court properly relied upon the School District’s expert’s opinion regarding a 5% environmental stigma devaluation for the property; thus, reversed the Commonwealth Court’s rejection of the trial court’s reliance upon such stigma in its valuation of the property. View "Harley-Davidson v. Central York Sch District et al" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to consider whether the Public School Code of 1949 mandated that a school district provide free transportation to a student from two different residences where the student’s parents share physical custody of the student and both parents reside within the school district. The Commonwealth Court held that the Manheim Township School District must provide transportation to both parents’ residences. After review, the Supreme Court agreed that the School District was required to provide free transportation to and from both parents’ residences in this case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court. View "Watts v. Manheim Twp. School District" on Justia Law

Appellant Collette Brown, a resident of Concord Township, Delaware County, appealed the Commonwealth Court's order affirming the trial court's dismissal of her petition to place on the November 2014 ballot, a referendum question seeking to change the Township's governmental status from second-class to first-class. Appellant's petition contained 994 signatures (8.5%) out of the Township’s 11,640 registered voters and claimed that as of the 2010 census, the Township had a population density of around 1,258 inhabitants per square mile (“IPSM”). As stated, both figures easily exceeded the statutory thresholds of 300 IPSM and 5% registered voter signatures, which Appellant believed operated as conjunctive preconditions. Seven named qualified electors (“Appellees”) filed objections and claimed the petition was substantively and procedurally defective under Pennsylvania law, which they argued was time-limited to the first municipal or general election occurring at least ninety days after the 2010 census. That same day, the Delaware County Bureau of Elections intervened and requested declaratory relief, claiming that in addition to not satisfying the statutory requirements, the petition should have been dismissed because a home rule study referendum question was already on the ballot (which voters later approved), and that if Appellant’s referendum question were successful, the subsequent change in Township government could violate the Pennsylvania Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that pursuant to 53 P.S. section 55207, second- to first-class township referendum questions shall be submitted to voters at the first general or municipal election occurring at least ninety days after fulfilling both the population density ascertainment and petition signature filing requirements as set forth in the statute. Accordingly, the Court reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In re: Ballot Quest to Concord Twp" on Justia Law

Penn Treaty Network America Insurance Company (“PTNA”) and its subsidiary, American Network Insurance Company (“ANIC”) (collectively, the “Companies”), were Pennsylvania life insurers specializing in long-term care insurance, covering skilled-nursing, nursing home, and assisted living and home health care for individuals with chronic illnesses or disabilities. In January 2009, the Commonwealth Court ordered the rehabilitation of the Companies, upon application of then-Insurance Commissioner Joel Ario, who cited the consent of both entities as the sole grounds for the orders of rehabilitation. Nine months after entry of the rehabilitation order, however, Commissioner Ario filed petitions to covert the Companies’ rehabilitations into liquidations. The Commonwealth Court, per a single-judge proceeding, conducted hearings spanning thirty days of testimony and encompassing the submission of thousands of pages of exhibits and documentary evidence. In May 2012, the Commonwealth Court entered an order denying the petitions to liquidate and directed the Commissioner to develop a plan of rehabilitation within ninety days. The Commonwealth Court concluded the Rehabilitator’s evidence did not show that a rehabilitation was tried and failed. "Rather, it showed that a rehabilitation plan was abandoned in its nascency. In short, the Rehabilitator did not prove that continued rehabilitation substantially increases the risk to policyholders, creditors and the public or is futile." A critical facet of the Commonwealth Court’s opinion concerned the degree of deference owing to a statutory rehabilitator on consideration of a conversion petition. The Commissioner challenged the Commonwealth Court’s decision in such regard, namely, that the court’s no-deference determination was, in fact, inconsistent with the case which it had referenced as being supportive. The Supreme Court affirmed: "In all events, deference does not require the courts to accede to a misuse of the process. In light of the above, and the former Commissioner’s accession at the outset of the rehabilitation proceedings that liquidations would be harmful to policyholders, as well as the Commonwealth Court’s supported finding that there is no present harm in moving forward in rehabilitation, we decline to impede that court’s review of the rehabilitation plan which it directed should be filed, and which has now been submitted. The judicial review, however, should proceed subject to a more deferential overlay relative to the new acting Commissioner." View "In Re: Penn Treaty Network" on Justia Law

Appellants The International Association of Firefighters, Local 22, AFL-CIO, and its named officers (collectively, the Union) was the collective bargaining unit representing the City of Philadelphia’s firefighters and paramedics. It appealed a Commonwealth Court order reversing the trial court’s grant of peremptory judgment in mandamus for the Union and against the City of Philadelphia, Mayor Michael Nutter, Richard Negrin, and Lloyd Ayers (collectively, the City), and required the City to fill vacancies immediately in the positions of Fire Captain and Fire Lieutenant. The Commonwealth Court held that neither the Home Rule Charter nor the Civil Service Regulations required vacancies to be filled immediately. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the Union did not establish a clear legal right to relief or a corresponding duty in the City, and that it was therefore not entitled to mandamus relief. View "Phila Firefighters' Union. v. City of Phila" on Justia Law

Consolidated direct appeals to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court centered on appellees' efforts to resurrect a defunct state-run health insurance program. Appellees were recipients of state-subsidized, low-cost health insurance via the "adultBasic" program, which was previously administered by the Department of Insurance and made available to certain qualifying adults in Pennsylvania. The program received the bulk of its funding from the proceeds of a 1998 multi-state master settlement agreement between forty-seven states and several major U.S. tobacco product manufacturers. The allocation and distribution of funds received annually by the Commonwealth under this settlement was initially administered outside of the Fiscal Code, via the Tobacco Settlement Act (TSA). As relevant here, for purposes of fiscal years 2010-2011 and 2011-2012, the General Assembly used modifications to the Fiscal Code to override the TSA’s requirements for tobacco settlement monies. One effect of the amendments was to divert tobacco settlement funds more generally to other fiscal priorities of the Commonwealth. In March 2011, Appellees Cheryl Sears and seventy-four other former recipients of adultBasic filed an original-jurisdiction petition for review at the Commonwealth Court, styled as a class action. As amended, the petition contended, inter alia, that the redirection of tobacco settlement monies under Acts 46 and 26 violated the TSA’s requirements for appropriation and allocation of tobacco settlement funds. The petition also asserted that these enactments offended various provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution governing legislative processes, including the general requirement that no bill shall be passed containing more than a single subject. Appellees sought declaratory, mandamus, and injunctive relief retroactively reestablishing the adultBasic program and reimbursing the program over two hundred million dollars. Appellee Eric Weisblatt commenced a separate action, also styled as a class action, proffering materially similar allegations and claims for relief, in the relevant respects, only naming executive-branch officials and agencies as defendants. Appellees in both proceedings moved for a preliminary injunction to preclude the Treasury from disbursing the tobacco settlement monies which were due to be received that month as appropriated per Act 46. Relief was denied by the court, however, upon its finding that the harm asserted by Appellees was neither immediate nor irreparable. Several weeks after the Commonwealth Court’s issuance of its opinion in Sears, the court issued a divided decision in "Weisblatt." During the pendency of the appeals, additional omnibus amendments to the Fiscal Code were enacted into law, which, inter alia, effectuated a repeal of the allocation formula provided in the TSA; the result formally displaced adultBasic funding within the terms of the TSA itself. In light of these amendments, Appellees renewed their request for relief from the supersedeas, which was again denied. Upon review of both sides' arguments appealing the Commonwealth Court's decision, the Supreme Court held that Appellees lacked standing to pursue the relief requested in their petitions for review. View "Sears v. Wolf" on Justia Law

In the Spring of 2014, the supervising judge for the Thirty-Fifth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that an investigation should be conducted into allegations that grand jury secrecy had been compromised. The work of a Special Prosecutor culminated in a grand jury presentment recommending the filing of criminal charges against Pennsylvania Attorney General Kathleen Kane. Through the filing of an action in quo warranto, Attorney General Kane asked the Supreme Court to quash the appointment of a special prosecutor investigating violations of grand jury secrecy requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the supervising judge acted within his authority and sound prerogative in appointing the Special Prosecutor: "although we recognize that there are legitimate concerns arising out of a judicial appointment of a special prosecutor, we follow the approach of the United States Supreme Court and the many other jurisdictions which have found such appointments proper as an essential means to vindicate the courts' own authority." The request for quo warranto relief was denied. View "In Re: 35th Statewide Inv Grand Jury" on Justia Law

Appellants, twenty-four Pennsylvania voters, filed this action in 2006 in the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction to challenge the certification of six direct-recording electronic voting systems (DREs) models in use in Pennsylvania. Seeking declaratory, mandamus, and injunctive relief, Appellants claimed the Secretary of the Commonwealth should have been ordered to decertify the DREs which did not comply with the Election Code and compelled to adopt more rigorous testing standards. In this appeal, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Commonwealth Court erred in upholding the decision of the Secretary to certify certain DREs for use in Pennsylvania elections. The Commonwealth Court found that the DREs satisfied the certification requirements set forth in the Election Code and did not infringe on the fundamental right to vote as protected by the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Supreme Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court did not err in granting the Secretary's petition for summary relief. In particular, the Court found the Secretary exercised proper discretion in determining that the certified DREs satisfied the requirements for electronic voting systems set forth in the Election Code and the use of the DREs did not violate Appellants' fundamental right to vote as embodied within Article I, Section 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution or the uniformity requirement in Article VII, Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. View "Banfield v. Sec'y of Commonwealth" on Justia Law