Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Scott Simons, Matthew Senger and Joshua Sellers (decedent) met at the home of a mutual friend in Abington Township. Simons had been drinking all day prior to this engagement, but testified that he did not drink at the residence. In the early morning hours of December 24, 2006, Senger and the decedent asked Simons for a ride home. None of the men fastened their seatbelts. Simons testified that he was, in fact, drunk when he left the party, and admitted that this was not the first time he had driven his friends home drunk. Simons testified that the police car made a U-turn and began following Simons with its lights and siren activated. Simons admitted that instead of pulling over, he fled, as he was “scared of getting a DUI.” Senger testified that when Simons initially “floored his car,” he was not aware that police were pursuing the car. Senger estimated that Simons was driving “well over 100” miles per hour. Senger testified that both he and decedent then asked Simons to slow down, as they were aware of a dip in the road ahead. Simons continued at a high rate of speed and ultimately hit the dip in the road. The car was sent airborne and crashed into trees and a parked pickup truck. Simons and Senger suffered minor injuries, while decedent was ejected from the vehicle and thrown 20 feet away, suffering a catastrophic brain injury, along with other injuries. Appellants Celeste and Richard Sellers, parents of the decedent, filed a wrongful death and survival action against appellees the Township of Abington, Officer Edward Howley, and Lieutenant Karl Knott asserting claims for negligence and punitive damages. Appellants alleged that appellees caused the death of decedent when Officer Howley negligently, recklessly, and willfully initiated and failed to terminate a high speed pursuit of Simons’ vehicle. After the completion of discovery, Appellees moved for summary judgment based upon governmental immunity. The central issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a local agency owed a common law or statutory duty of care to a passenger of a fleeing vehicle, whose existence or relationship to the fleeing driver was unknown to the pursuing police officer. The Commonwealth Court concluded that appellees did not owe a duty of care to fleeing suspects. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's decision. View "Sellers v. Twp. of Abington" on Justia Law

In 2003, appellant Fred Moran was an elected member of the Board of Commissioners of Haverford Township, Delaware County. The board decided to sell a 209-acre parcel of land on which the former Haverford State Mental Hospital was located. On December 19, 2005, the board held a special public meeting to address a looming revenue shortfall for the upcoming year. During the meeting, as Commissioner Andrew Lewis recalled in his trial testimony, appellant proposed accelerating the collection of real estate taxes as a way to raise revenue; particularly, he suggested having a consultant purchasing the a portion of the parcel, Goldenberg-Pohlig (GP) pre-pay $500,000 of the 2006 realty taxes on the parcel. The next day, Lewis and appellant had a phone conversation with Michael Lawry, a principal with GP. Lewis informed Lawry the board was addressing a budgetary shortfall and told him appellant had a proposal. Appellant then said to Lawry, “[C]all it extortion, call it what you will. We need $500,000, and we’ll accelerate the zoning. We’ll get you the zoning approvals you need and accelerate the process.” Lewis recalled Lawry asked whether the $500,000 was included in the $17.5 million, and appellant indicated it would be added to the purchase price. Lawry responded he was not in a position to answer but would discuss the matter with others at GP and get back in touch with appellant and Lewis. A few minutes later, Lewis called Lawry back and told him, “I want no part of that conversation. Haverford Township is not in the business of selling zoning.” Lewis testified he called appellant the next day and essentially told him the same thing. Appellant was charged with and later convicted for bribery in official and political matters. On appeal of that conviction, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him, and also raised the question of whether bribery (as charged) was a strict liability crime. The Supreme Court concluded after review that bribery in official and political matters was not a strict liability crime, and that there was sufficient evidence to support appellant's conviction. View "Pennsylvania v. Moran" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Department of Health (DOH) announced that, pursuant to an extensive reorganization of public health services referenced in Governor Tom Corbett’s 2013-2014 budget, twenty-six State Health Centers would be closed and approximately twenty-six nurse consultants would be furloughed. In response, a lawsuit was filed in Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction by Appellants SEIU Healthcare Pennsylvania, an unincorporated labor organization, five nurses employed by the Centers and represented by SEIU, and five Pennsylvania state legislators (collectively referred to as “SEIU”), seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Specifically, SEIU sought to prevent Appellees, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Governor Corbett, the DOH, and DOH Secretary, Michael Wolf, from closing the Centers and furloughing the nurse consultants. The Commonwealth Court denied the union's request. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found no reasonable ground for the denial of injunctive relief, and, accordingly, reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court. View "SEIU Healthcare, et al v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

Appellant Ashley Zauflik sustained severe and permanent injuries when a school bus owned by, and operated by an employee of, appellee Pennsbury School District accelerated out of control onto a sidewalk and struck twenty students. The issue this case presented for review did not concern liability - it was a challenge to the constitutionality of the $500,000 statutory limit available in tort from a local agency such as Pennsbury. The lower courts, consistently with governing Pennsylvania law denied the challenges to the damages cap. Finding no reversible reason, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts. View "Zauflik v. Pennsbury School District" on Justia Law

In 2009, intervenor-requestor James Schneller of Eastern Pennsylvania Citizens Against Gambling, sent an email to Catherine Stetler, a press aide in the Office of Communications and Legislative Affairs of the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board (“GCB”), requesting copies of communications between the GCB and several applicants for gaming licenses, as well as copies of the financial data that each applicant provided to the GCB. He also asked for permission to speak at the GCB’s next public hearing, and copied his request to the GCB’s Director of Media Relations and Chief Enforcement Counsel. It was undisputed that requestor did not make mention of any open-records officer in his written request. The press aide responded to the written request by return email, wherein she apologized for having been out of the office and attached a public comment sign-up form with instructions to return the completed form for permission to comment at the GCB’s public hearing on the following day. The aide did not otherwise respond to the request for records, and did not forward the request to the GCB’s open-records officer. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the requirements for written Right-to-Know-Law (RTKL) requests for access to public records, the proper application of the provision which directs that all such requests “must be addressed to the open-records officer.” The Court held that in order to establish a valid RTKL request sufficient to trigger appellate rights from a nonresponse under the RTKL, the requestor must address his request to the respective open-records officer as mandated in Section 703. View "PA Gaming Control Brd. v. Office of Open Records" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether appellants waived the mental health records privilege provided under the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA) by filing a negligence suit to recover for physical injuries sustained by James Octave upon being struck by a tractor-trailer driven by appellee David Walker. The incident occurred in 2007; based on eyewitness reports, the state police concluded James attempted to commit suicide by jumping under the truck's trailer. Appellant Susan Octave, James's wife, filed a complaint in her own right and on behalf of James, an incapacitated person, against the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (DOT), Walker, and a number of other parties based upon their purported negligence. Because the state police concluded James was attempting to commit suicide, appellees sought discovery information regarding his mental health history and access to his mental health records, which Susan refused to provide. Appellees filed a motion for leave to access and copy sealed files pertaining to James's involuntary commitments pursuant to the MHPA and a motion to compel the execution of authorizations pertaining to his mental health and involuntary commitment records and full and complete answers to interrogatories. Thereafter, appellants filed an amended complaint, alleging James only suffered physical injuries as a result of the incident. The trial court issued denying appellees' motions, reasoning that because the amended complaint removed allegations pertaining to mental injuries, it did not place James's mental condition at issue. Appellees appealed to the Commonwealth Court, contending the trial court erred when it denied them access to James's mental health records specifically arguing the MHPA's confidentiality provisions were waived by Susan because she placed James's mental health at issue by filing the complaint. The Commonwealth Court reversed and remanded, finding "Susan Octave directly put James Octave's mental history, especially as it pertains to his previous suicide attempts, or considerations or contemplations of suicide at issue. The Supreme Court granted allocatur to address whether, given that petitioners amended their complaint to no longer raised a question of mental health, did the petitioners still put mental health at issue and impliedly waive the protections of 50 P.S. sec. 7111 though the act of filing the lawsuit. The Supreme Court held that a patient waives his confidentiality protections under the MHPA where, judged by an objective standard, he knew or reasonably should have known his mental health would be placed directly at issue by filing the lawsuit. View "Octave v. Walker" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on the viability of the historic police power of the state in validating and regulating riparian rights and remedies where it was alleged that a downstream landowner subject to federal rail-safety regulations obstructed a natural watercourse causing upstream flooding and significant damage as a result. Hotel owner David Miller and his hotel (appellants) sought to hold the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA") liable for water damage allegedly resulting from the negligent construction and/or maintenance of a nearby SEPTA-owned railroad bridge. Appellants purchased hotel property in 1996, and they claimed that the bridge thereafter obstructed the flow of a creek which ran under the bridge, causing the creek to flood appellants' upstream hotel on three separate occasions of extreme weather conditions. On each occasion, appellants experienced flooding that filled the hotel basement and first floor. In 2001, the hotel closed and appellants declared bankruptcy. "As this is an area of law that has been regulated by the Commonwealth for centuries," the Pennsylvania Court concluded that there was no clear and manifest federal congressional intention to preempt Pennsylvania law central issue of this case. The Court declined to "invalidate the rights and remedies afforded to appellants under the laws of this Commonwealth." The Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's order and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Miller v. SEPTA" on Justia Law

In an appeal by allowance, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was, inter alia, the scope of the authority of the Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) to issue administrative orders under the Bituminous Coal Mine Safety Act. The Court found that the DEP acted within its authority with respect to the orders it issued regarding certain failures to report accidents, but that it improperly issued other orders with respect to requiring fire extinguishers on certain mining vehicles. Thus, the Court reversed in part, and affirmed in part, the order of the Commonwealth Court. The case was thereafter remanded for further proceedings. View "DEP, Aplt. v. Emerald Coal Resources, et al" on Justia Law

Appellant Friends of Pennsylvania Leadership Charter School appealed an order of the Commonwealth Court which held that the retroactive real estate tax exemption provided in Section 1722-A(e)(3) of the Public School Code, 24 P.S. 17-1722-A(e)(3), was unconstitutional. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed (though by different reasoning), concluding that retroactive application of the real estate tax exemption of Section 1722-A(e)(3) was unconstitutional under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it violated the separation of powers doctrine. View "Friends of PaLCS v. Chester Cty Bd of Assess" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Newtown Township Board of Supervisors enacted a Planned Residential Development Ordinance. This appeal centered on challenges to the validity of that ordinance and to the approval of a Tentative PRD Plan pursuant to it. Intervenors BPG Real Estate Investors (BPG) submitted an application under the anticipated PRD Ordinance for approval of a Tentative PRD Plan, proposing multi-use development of an approximately 218-acre tract of land that it owned. The Township Board orally approved BPG's Tentative PRD Plan, and later issued a written decision granting approval. Newtown Square East, L.P. (NSE), which owned a two-acre tract of land adjacent to BPG's tract, filed a challenge to the validity of the PRD Ordinance with the Newtown Township Zoning Hearing Board, and filed an appeal of the Township Board's approval of BPG's Tentative PRD Plan with the court of common pleas. With regard to its validity challenge before the Zoning Board, NSE argued, inter alia, that the PRD Ordinance violated Article VII of the MPC by, allegedly, failing to require that a tentative plan identify the uses of buildings and other structures, and permitting the location of buildings to be subject to free modification between the time of tentative plan approval and final plan approval. Following several hearings, the Zoning Board upheld the validity of the PRD Ordinance, finding that its minor textual variations from the relevant provisions of the MPC, Article VII, did not create an inconsistency or conflict with the enabling legislation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the ordinance. View "Newtown Square East v. Twp. of Newtown" on Justia Law