Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case was among a number of civil actions brought by state attorneys general against pharmaceutical companies challenging the propriety of prescription drug pricing, as it impacted third-party reimbursement for brand-name drug purchases subsidized by government social welfare programs. The Commonwealth focused its claims upon alleged overpayments tied to the use of an industry benchmark figure (average wholesale price, or "AWP") in government reimbursement formulas. While many issues of concern were raised about the Commonwealth’s approach to this litigation and the judgment it has obtained, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned the monetary component of that judgment grounded on the Commonwealth’s failure to offer a rational accounting for the billion dollars in rebate monies which Commonwealth agencies received from the drug manufacturers it sued. View "Pennsylvania v. TAP Pharmaceutical Products, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was the interpretation of the Commonwealth Charter School Law. Pursuant to the Charter School Law, the Walter D. Palmer Leadership Learning Partners Charter School was awarded a charter for a five-year term ending June 30, 2005. In late 2004, the Charter School filed a renewal application. On March 16, 2005, the School Reform Commission of the School District of Philadelphia (“SRC”) adopted a resolution that granted, “upon signing a new Charter Agreement,” the Charter School’s request for renewal of the charter for a second five-year period commencing on September 1, 2005. The SRC denied the Charter School's request for expansion of enrollment, and granted approval "to enroll a maximum of six hundred and seventy five (675) students and serve grades kindergarten through 8." The SRC and the Charter School then entered into, as of September 1, 2005, a legally binding agreement that incorporated the SRC Resolution in its entirety and extended the charter for five years ("the 2005 Charter"). The 2005 Charter explicitly referenced and incorporated the SRC Resolution, one provision of which capped student enrollment, explicitly mandated that the Charter School comply with the SRC Resolution; and explicitly constituted a legally binding, mutual agreement of five years duration, the terms of which could not be changed absent a written agreement signed by both parties. The legally binding nature of the terms of the 2005 Charter was mandated by a provision of the Charter School Law. Notwithstanding the terms of the 2005 Charter, the Charter School consistently enrolled more than the 675 students permitted by that Charter. For the 2007-2008 school year, the Charter School’s average daily enrollment was approximately 729 students; for 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, the average daily enrollment was approximately 732 and 765 students, respectively. In each school year, the School District of Philadelphia provided funding for 675 students based on the 2005 Charter. In July 2010, asserting that it had been underpaid by the School District, the Charter School requested that the Pennsylvania Department of Education withhold $1,678,579 from the School District's basic education subsidy allocation as payment to the Charter School for the students it had educated in addition to the 675 students permitted by the enrollment cap for school years 2007-2008, 2008-2009, and 2009–2010. The School District objected to the withholding and a hearing was held before the Department. The Secretary of Education determined that the Charter School had agreed and legally assented to the enrollment cap when it signed the 2005 Charter, and therefore, the Charter School was not entitled to payment for students enrolled above that cap in the 2007-2008 school year. However, with regard to the school years 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, the Secretary determined that the enrollment cap set forth in the 2005 Charter was no longer valid because of the enactment of an amendment to the Charter School Law which had become effective on July 1, 2008 (24 P.S. section 17-1723-A(d)). Based on his interpretation, the Secretary concluded that, to maintain the 2005 Charter’s enrollment cap subsequent to the effective date of the amendment, the School District was required to re-obtain the Charter School’s “legal assent” to the cap. Ultimately, the Secretary determined that the Charter School was entitled to payment by the School District for the education of all the students enrolled in the school for the years 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, including those enrolled beyond the cap. The School District appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which affirmed. The School District appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed: "based on the plain text of 24 P.S. section 17-1723-A(d), we conclude that an enrollment cap is valid if agreed to by the parties as part of a written charter." View "Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia v. Dept. of Education" on Justia Law

The Department of Public Welfare (DPW) appealed the Commonwealth Court's vacatur and remand of a denial of expungement of an indicated report of child abuse from the statewide ChildLine Registry. DPW challenged the determination that clear and convincing evidence, as opposed to substantial evidence, was required to maintain an indicated report of child abuse. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court erred in requiring a "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard of proof in child abuse expunction cases under the Child Protective Services Law, and that the proper standard of proof is the legislatively established substantial evidence standard. Thus, the Court reversed the Commonwealth Court and remanded this case for that court to review pursuant to the substantial evidence standard. View "G.V. v. Penna. Dept. of Public Welfare" on Justia Law

Greenwood Gaming and Entertainment appealed the Commonwealth Court's en banc decision overruling exceptions and affirming a panel decision of that court, which likewise affirmed the order of the Board of Finance and Review regarding calculation of a slot machine tax. Greenwood petitioned the Supreme Court to reverse the decision and hold that the relevant section of the Gaming Act (4 Pa.C.S. sections 1101-1904) allowed for the cost of promotional awards given away by the gaming facility to be subtracted prior to calculation of the "gross terminal revenue" for purposes of slot machine taxes. Upon review of the arguments of the parties, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings: "to be deductible, the promotional awards must result from playing slot machines, and Greenwood is obligated to prove as much. After review of the Stipulation, we conclude that questions of fact remain concerning whether the specific awards claimed are a 'result of playing a slot machine.'" View "Greenwood Gaming v. PA Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether county commissioners could place an ordinance-generated referendum question on the primary election ballot seeking to amend a home rule charter without first seeking election of a commissioned study when the question adopted by the ordinance attempted to abolish certain row offices. In 2013, the Lackawanna County Board of Commissioners sought to direct that a referendum question be placed on the May 21, 2013, municipal primary election ballot proposing to abolish the elected offices of Sheriff, Clerk of Judicial Records, Recorder of Deeds and Register of Wills, and to redefine the duties that had been assigned to those positions as legislative powers under its Charter. Appellant Joseph Pilchesky filed a pro se petition requesting that the trial court strike the ballot question or, in the alternative, that the Board of Elections separate the single ballot question into four queries, one for each of the offices to be abolished. In his petition, Pilchesky also asserted that Ordinance 224 directed a ballot question that proposed a change in the form of government rather than an amendment to the Charter and that such a change can be effected only by petition or ordinance seeking election of a government study commission under 53 Pa.C.S. 2911. The trial court denied the challenge seeking to bar Ordinance 224 from appearing on the primary ballot, and rejeted Pilchesky's argument that the changes to the existing form of government proffered by Ordinance 224 could be accomplished by the statutorily mandated government study commission. In an unpublished memorandum opinion, the Commonwealth Court unanimously affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that in light of the plain language of the Home Rule Law and the considerations Pilchesky raised, the amendment proposed by the Commissioners constituted a change in the form of government that could have been accomplished only by following the procedure outlined in Subchapter B of the Home Rule Law. The decision of the Commonwealth Court was Reversed. View "Pilchesky v. Lackawanna County" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether certain property in Cumberland County, which was owned by the City of Philadelphia as trustee of the Stephen Girard Trust and leased by the Board of Directors of City Trusts to the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, was subject to local real estate taxation in Cumberland County. The trial court held that the property was both immune and exempt from local real estate taxation. The Commonwealth Court reversed. After its review, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court and reinstated the trial court’s order on grounds of tax immunity. View "City of Philadelphia v. Cumberland Cty Brd Assess Appeals" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to determine whether: (1) the repeal of an ordinance mooted any challenges to that ordinance; (2) whether the Commonwealth Court may issue an opinion on the merits of certain issues where it subsequently remands the case for a determination of mootness on another issue; and (3) whether parties to a hearing can continue a challenge to a zoning ordinance once the original challenger has withdrawn. Because “parties to a hearing” are distinct from “party appellants,” unless the former have taken steps to become party appellants, the Supreme Court found they cannot continue the challenge. Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court’s decision permitting parties to the hearing to continue the challenge brought by the original party appellant was reversed, and the attempted challenge was dismissed. View "Stuckley v. ZHB of Newtown Twp." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the limits of the Public Utility Commission's (PUC) authority to allocate costs associated with a rail-highway crossing project. The Commonwealth Court held that the Commission could not allocate costs to a transportation utility that regularly uses a railroad-crossing site and does not own real estate or properties there. The Commission and Intervenors argued that the PUC has broad discretion not only to determine the allocation of costs to "concerned parties," but also to determine which parties are "concerned" in the first instance. Counterbalancing the Commission's and Intervenors' remarks about equities, Norfolk Southern Railway questioned why it should contribute to the remediation of deteriorating infrastructure over which it had no control. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a transportation utility need not own facilities at a rail-highway crossing to be a concerned party for purposes of the PUC's cost-allocation jurisdiction and authority, at least where the utility conducts regular operations at the crossing and may enforce an easement-based right of way. View "Norfolk Southern Railway v. PUC" on Justia Law

In a direct appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the constitutionality of legislation mandating a one-time transfer of money from the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Fund to Pennsylvania's General Fund. The Commonwealth faced a budget impasse for the 2009-10 fiscal year that lasted approximately 100 days. An interim budget was passed, and impasse was resolved when the Governor approved a supplemental appropriations bill, as well as implementing legislation making amendments to Pennsylvania's Fiscal Code. One of Act provisions designed to balance the budget directed that $100 million be transferred from the MCARE Fund to the General Fund. Appellees sought a declaration that: (1) the transfer of $100 million from the MCARE Fund to the General Fund extinguished vested rights or constituted an illegal taking in violation of the due process guarantees contained the Commonwealth and federal constitutions; and (2) the transfer violated the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Concerned that the Commonwealth might effectuate the transfer and dissipate the funds, Appellees filed an application for preliminary injunctive relief (a temporary restraining order). After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the October 2009 amendment to the Fiscal Code transferring $100 million from the MCARE Fund to the General Fund implicated the providers' due process rights, but that the question of whether the legislation was finally unconstitutional requires further factual development. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's order granting summary relief. View "Geisinger Health System, et al v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

Mother and Appellant/Cross-Appellee Lisa Kinney Lindstrom sought a ruling as to the number of "occurrences" for which the MCARE Fund is liable based on allegations that her physician failed to diagnose discrete in utero infections suffered by her twins, which caused severe injuries to both children. The Commonwealth Court granted summary judgment in favor of the MCARE Fund, holding that the physician's failure to diagnose Mother's infection constituted the single cause of the children's injuries, and, therefore, there was a single occurrence, limiting MCARE coverage to the statutory limit of one payment of $1 million. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commonwealth Court erred by granting summary judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the children's injuries arose from the physician's failure to diagnose a single infection, or whether the children's injuries resulted from the physician's failure to diagnose multiple infections from different organisms that infected each child in utero at different times. View "Kinney-Lindstrom v. MCARE Fund" on Justia Law