Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court was the proper method of calculating an hourly-wage claimant's average weekly wage under Section 309 of the Workers’ Compensation Act where the specific loss claimant suffered an initial incident, changed employers, and later suffered a work-related injury caused by the initial incident. Claimant Janice Weber-Brown worked for Appellant Lancaster General Hospital as a licensed practical nurse. In 1980, while cleaning the tracheotomy of a patient who was infected with the herpes simplex virus (HSV), the patient coughed, causing sputum to spray in Claimant’s left eye. Approximately two weeks after the incident, Claimant’s eye became swollen and infected, and Claimant believed she contracted HSV. Claimant left the employ of Lancaster General in 1985 for reasons unrelated to the eye incident. At that time, she earned $8 per hour and worked full-time. In the years following her departure from the hospital, Claimant’s eye became infected several more times. Each time, her symptoms subsided with treatment, and Claimant did not miss any work with her other employers due to her eye infections. In October 2006, however, Claimant’s eye again became infected and, this time, her infection did not respond to treatment. By February 2007, Claimant lost the vision in her left eye, and, in May 2007, she underwent a cornea transplant. The transplant did not improve her vision, and, as a result of her blindness, she was not able to return to work. At that time, Claimant earned $21 per hour. Lancaster General denied Claimant's allegations that she contracted HSV while working for the hospital, and challenged her claim that she be paid based on her then-current wage with her new employer. The WCJ determined Claimant suffered a work-related injury and held that the hospital pay Claimant's wage set at $21 per hour. Lancaster General appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the WCJ correctly held that the Claimant's weekly wage should have been based on her 2007 wages with her new employer, as those wages were earned with that employer at the time Claimant suffered her work-related injury. View "Lancaster Gen. Hospital v. WCAB" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted allocatur in this case to consider the Superior Court's application of the standard of review and to evaluate the relevance of a parent's incarceration to a trial court's decision to terminate a father's parental rights. G.P. (Father), then nineteen, and B.D. (Mother), then approximately seventeen, were involved in an intimate relationship prior to Father's incarceration in December 2004 for the shooting death of his stepfather. While Father was incarcerated, S.P. (Child) was born in May 2005. After Child’s birth, Mother took her to visit Father several times while he was incarcerated at the county prison awaiting trial. In December 2005, Child was declared dependent, when Mother tested positive for THC, a chemical found in marijuana, and was involved in a domestic assault in the presence of Child. Following the declaration of Child’s dependency, Mother and Child apparently moved between several foster homes and Child’s grandmother’s home. In 2007, Child and Youth Services (CYS) filed an emergency shelter petition on behalf of Child when it could not ensure Child's safety. In 2008, Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to Child. At a hearing, testimony was presented that revealed Child suffered from developmental delays and was possibly autistic. A year later at another hearing, CYS moved to terminate Father's parental rights. As applied to this case, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court erred in reversing the trial court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights: "the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that “the conditions and causes of the incapacity . . . [could not] or [would] not be remedied” by Father." View "In Re: Adoption of S.P." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned the validity of a single unified tax assessment of both a tract of land, and the buildings of a shopping center, movie theater, and restaurant located on the land. The land was owned by Appellant Tech One Associates, and the buildings and surrounding improvements to the land were constructed and owned by a second entity, "Terra Century Associates" (Lessee). Upon review, Appellees the Board of Property Assessment Appeals and Review of Allegheny County, the Borough of West Mifflin, and the West Mifflin Area School District correctly treated the land, the buildings, and the improvements to the land as real estate subject to taxation under Section 201(a) of the Commonwealth's General County Assessment Law. Further, the Court upheld the rulings of the lower courts that its previous decision in "In re Appeal of Marple Springfield Center, Inc," (607 A.2d 708 (1992)) did not preclude the valuation of real estate owned as a leasehold interest, and that the market value for the land, buildings, and improvements determined at trial accurately reflected the "economic reality" of the impact of the long-term lease between Appellant and its lessee. View "Tech One Assoc. v. Bd. of Prop. Assessment Appeal & Review" on Justia Law

Appellant Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov, Inc., a not-for-profit religious entity related to the Bobov Orthodox Jewish community in Brooklyn, appealed a Commonwealth Court ruling, asking that the Supreme Court find it is an "institution of a purely public charity" under Article VIII, sec. 2(a)(v) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and entitled to exemption from real estate taxes. Appellant operated a summer camp in Pike County, Pennsylvania. Pike County denied Appellant's exemption request, finding that occasional use of Appellant's recreational and dining facilities by Pike County residents was insufficient to prove Appellant was a purely public charity. The Court allowed this appeal to determine if it must defer to the General Assembly's statutory definition of that term. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding its prior jurisprudence set the constitutional minimum for exemption from taxes; the legislation may codify what was intended to be exempted, but it cannot lessen the constitutional minimums by broadening the definition of "purely public charity" in the statute. View "Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov, Inc. v. Pike Co. Bd. of Assessment Appeals" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court assumed plenary jurisdiction over this matter as a sua sponte exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction to determine the proper forum for adjudicating appeals from the suspension of the certification of an official emission inspection mechanic under section 4726(c) of the Vehicle Code. Appellant Maher Ahmed Mohamed was a certified emission inspector by the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (PennDOT). In 2007, a Quality Assurance Officer for PennDOT (Auditor), conducted a records audit at Keystone. The Auditor’s report concluded that Appellant performed faulty emission inspections on four vehicles by connecting the emission equipment to a vehicle other than the one being tested in order to obtain a passing result. The report further indicated that two of the vehicles tested and the vehicle used to obtain the passing results were owned by taxicab companies partly owned by Appellant. The Auditor also found that Appellant falsified the records of the four tested vehicles. Appellant failed to appear at a subsequent agency hearing to answer the charges against him, and the Auditor provided the only testimony by presenting the findings of his report. PennDOT sent Appellant an order notifying him that his certification as an official emission inspector was suspended. Instead of following the directions in the order regarding the filing of an appeal, Appellant filed a petition for review from PennDOT's suspension order in the Commonwealth Court. The Commonwealth Court affirmed PennDOT's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court: "it may be the established practice to file appeals under section 4726(c) in the courts of common pleas; however, such practice remains inconsistent with . . . statutory language. While the Commonwealth Court potentially may have been correct in concluding that the General Assembly intended to enact something different from the actual text of section 933 [of the Administrative Agency Law], the Commonwealth Court was without authority to correct an omission and, therefore, violated established legal principles by disregarding the clear statutory language." Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for PennDOT to conduct an administrative hearing on the question of Appellant's suspension in accordance with the terms of the Administrative Agency Law. View "Mohamed v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court addressed an Application for Relief in an Election Code matter, over which it retained limited jurisdiction following a remand on October 4, 2010. The issue involved the effect of the District Court's decision in "Morrill v. Weaver," (224 F.Supp.2d 882 (E.D. Pa. 2002)). In "Morrill," Section 2911(d) of the Election Code (25 P.S. 2600 et seq.), which the federal court construed as imposing a district residency requirement for affiants circulating nomination papers violated the First Amendment. The district court permanently enjoined the Commonwealth from enforcing the statutory provision, and the Commonwealth did not appeal that decision. The question of the constitutionality of Section 2911(d) and the effect of Morrill arose in connection with a challenge to the nomination paper submitted by Carl Stevenson as an independent candidate for the office of State Representative in Pennsylvania’s 134th Legislative District in the 2010 general election. Michael Gibson and Robert Mader filed a petition to set aside in the Commonwealth Court, raising both signature challenges and a global challenge to Stevenson’s nomination paper. The objectors' global challenge alleged that signatures on three pages of the nomination paper were invalid because the circulator of those pages resided outside the 134th Legislative District, in supposed violation of Section 2911(d). Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth and the Secretary are bound by the district court decision in "Morrill" and may not enforce Section 2911(d) as written. View "In Re: Nomination Petitions and Papers of Carl Stevenson" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court considered whether deputy sheriffs of second class counties were "police officers" for collective barganing purposes under "Act 111." The Commonwealth Court determined they are not after hearing the Allegheny County Deputy Sheriffs' Association filed a petition with the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB) seeking to represent the deputies employed by Allegheny County. The Association twice before had attempted to attain this same objective, only to fail before the PLRB and the Commonwealth Court. However, following those decisions, the General Assembly amended the Crimes Code in 1995, and then the Municipal Police Education and Training Law (MPETL) in 1996, to define deputy sheriffs in a second-class county (i.e., the Deputy Sheriffs) as police officers. Concluding that the aforesaid legislative action was not dispositive of the issue, the PLRB hearing examiner here determined that the Deputy Sheriffs were not "police officers" as contemplated by Act 111 because he found that their primary duties were not those of typical police officers, but rather were those directly related to the operation of the courts. "[The Supreme Court's] inquiry with respect to the question accepted for review ends with the recognition that the General Assembly expressly defined -- and thus authorized -- deputy sheriffs of counties of the second class to be police officers. . . . Thus, the PLRB’s and Commonwealth Court’s application of a judicially and administratively created test to examine whether the Deputy Sheriffs are police officers, after they have been defined as such by the General Assembly, was erroneous." View "Allegheny Cty Sheriffs' Ass'n v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

The central issue in this case focused on whether the term "compensation" as used in Section 314(a) of the Workers' Compensation Act, includes medical benefits as well as wage loss benefits. Claimant Quila Givner suffered a work-related injury in 1998 while working for Appellant Giant Eagle, Inc. She received workers' compensation benefits that were calculated for partial disability. In 2007, Giant Eagle filed a suspension petition pursuant to Section 314(a), alleging that Claimant had failed to attend a physical examination that it scheduled. The Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) suspended Claimant's wage loss benefits because of her failure to submit to the examination, but Giant Eagle appealed to the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB), contending that the WCJ had erred by suspending only wage loss benefits and not medical expense benefits too. The WCAB rejected Employer’s argument, and the Commonwealth Court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that "compensation" must include medical benefits as well as wage loss benefits under Section 314(a). However, the Court held that "compensation," as used in Section 314(a) need not always include medical expenses, and accordingly affirmed the Commonwealth Court. View "Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law

The Department of Public Welfare (DPW) and the Office of the Budget of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appealed a Commonwealth Court order which granted summary judgment to Appellees the Pennsylvania Medical Society and its individual members, and the Hospital and Healthsystem Association of Pennsylvania and its individual members. The court declared that the Commonwealth had an obligation under the Health Care Provider Retention Law (the Abatement Law) to transfer monies to the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Fund (MCARE Fund) in an amount necessary to fund dollar for dollar, all abatements of annual assessments granted to health care providers for the years 2003-2007. Upon review of the Commonwealth Court record, the Supreme Court held that the Abatement Law gave the Secretary of the Budget the discretion, but not the obligation, to transfer monies into the MCARE Fund in an amount up to the total amount of abatements granted. Furthermore, the Court concluded that Apellees had no statutory entitlement to the funds held in abatement, nor a vested right to them. View "Pa. Medical Society v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

In twelve separate matters, Commonwealth citizens, acting singly or in groups, filed appeals from the Final Plan for legislative redistricting of the Commonwealth, which was devised by Appellee 2011 Pennsylvania Legislative Reapportionment Commission (the "LRC"), in response to the U.S. decennial census. Fourteen days after the appeals were filed, seven days after the matters were briefed, and two days after the appeals were argued, the Supreme Court issued its mandate in a per curiam order filed January 25, 2012. That order declared that the Final Plan was contrary to law under Article II, Section 17(d) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and with the directive in that constitutional provision, the Court remanded the matter to the LRC to reapportion the Commonwealth in a manner consistent with this opinion. View "Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm'n" on Justia Law