Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether it is against public policy to release reckless behavior in a pre-injury exculpatory clause. Appellant Camelback Ski Corporation, Inc. (“Camelback”) operates a ski resort in Tannersville, Pennsylvania that offers various winter activities, including skiing and snow tubing. Before permitting its patrons to enjoy snow tubing, Camelback requires each customer to sign a pre-printed release form. In 2003, Appellee Barbara Lichtman Tayar and her family visited Camelback’s facility in the early afternoon. Appellee and her family decided to join in, and, pursuant to Camelback’s requirement, Appellee signed the Release. Appellee and her family elected to use the family tubing slopes, and completed four successful runs down the mountain, with Appellant Brian Monaghan, a Camelback employee, releasing them from the summit safely each time. On the fifth time down the mountain, Appellee exited her snow tube and was immediately struck by another snow tuber coming down the slope. Employees rushed to assist Appellee out of the receiving area. As a result of the collision, Appellee suffered multiple comminuted factures of her right leg, for which she underwent surgery and required two metal plates and 14 screws to stabilize her ankle. A majority of the appellate court determined that the release at issue was valid only with respect to Camelback (and not Monaghan), and relieved Camelback from liability for only negligent conduct. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s order in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the case. The Court reversed the order of the Superior Court to the degree it concluded that Monaghan was not covered by the Release. The Court affirmed the order to the degree it reversed the grant of summary judgment on the basis that the Release did not bar claims based on reckless conduct, and remanded for further proceedings; on the latter point, the Court affirmed on the alternative basis that, to the degree it released reckless conduct, the Release was against public policy. View "Tayar v. Camelback Ski Corp., Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this direct appeal to the Supreme Court was a statutory prerequisite to the obligation of the Insurance Department to defend certain medical professional liability actions asserted against health care providers, and to the requirement for payment of claims asserted in such actions from the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Fund. Specifically, resolution of the appeal turned on when, under the governing statute, a "claim" is "made" outside a specified four-year time period. On June 4, 2007, Joanna Ziv filed a praecipe for a writ of summons naming Appellant Phillip Yussen, M.D. and other medical providers as defendants. A complaint was filed on August 2, 2007, alleging medical negligence last occurring on July 7, 2003. Appellant’s primary insurer, Pennsylvania Healthcare Providers Insurance Exchange, requested that the claim be accorded Section 715 status by the Insurance Department. The Department denied such request, however, on the basis that the claim had been made less than four years after the alleged malpractice. Appellant initially challenged this determination in the administrative setting, and a hearing ensued. Before the examiner, Appellant argued that, consistent with the policy definition of a "claim," the date on which a claim is made for purposes of Section 715 cannot precede the date on which notice is provided to the insured. Appellee, on the other hand, contended that a claim is made when it is first asserted, instituted, or comes into existence - including upon the tender of a demand or the commencement of a legal action - and that notice to the insured or insurer is not a necessary prerequisite. In this regard, Appellee Medical Care Availability & Reduction of Error Fund highlighted that Section 715 does require "notice" of the claim to trigger the provider's obligation to report the claim to the Fund within 180 days, but the statute does not contain such an express notice component in delineating the four-year requirement. The Commonwealth Court sustained exceptions to the hearing examiner's recommendation lodged by Appellee and entered judgment in its favor. In its review, the Supreme Court found "claim" and "made" as used in Section 715 ambiguous. The Court determined that for purposes of Section 715, the mere filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons does not suffice to make a claim, at least in absence of some notice or demand communicated to those from whom damages are sought. The Court remanded the case for entry of judgment in Appellant's favor. View "Yussen v. Med. Care Availability & Reduction of Error Fund" on Justia Law

The civil action underlying this appeal was selected as a test case for the admissibility of expert opinion evidence to the effect that each and every fiber of inhaled asbestos is a substantial contributing factor to any asbestos-related disease. The inquiry has proceeded under principles derived from 'Frye v. United States' (293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)). Upon its consideration of the evidence presented by both sides, the trial court sustained the Frye challenge and precluded the plaintiffs from adducing the 'any exposure' opinion. Focusing upon methodology, the judge found no support for the any exposure theory of specific causation in any of the sources upon which the expert relied. The Superior Court majority was very critical of the trial court's treatment of the Frye challenge on several fronts. While finding error in the threshold determination, the Superior Court nevertheless proceeded to review the trial court's finding as to general acceptance, concluding that the judge had abused his discretion. At the outset, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court's decision to conduct a Frye hearing concerning the any-exposure opinion to be appropriate. While the Superior Court was correct that the trial court judge did not embellish his opinion with specific citations to the record, his findings and conclusions were 'amply supported throughout that record nonetheless.' The Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse his discretion in its Frye assessment. The order of the Superior Court was reversed, and the case was remanded for consideration of whether there were remaining, preserved issues on appeal which were obviated by the intermediate court's approach to the common pleas court's ruling. View "Betz v. Pneumo Abex LLC" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a medical-device product liability action in which a strict liability, design-defect theory was asserted. Given that the surgical instrument at issue was said to have multiple applications, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the trial court's threshold risk-utility analysis should have been limited to the particular one alleged to have caused the decedent harm. Additionally, the appeal was allowed to consider the degree to which an appellate court is bound by such weight and credibility determinations as may be made by a trial court in a risk-utility assessment. The decedent Sandra Selepec, underwent gastric bypass surgery in August 2002. The surgeon used a product manufactured by Appellee Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. known as an ETS-Flex45 Articulating Endoscopic Linear Cutter, or an "endocutter." Appellee also marketed its product as being useful in more traditional surgery, in which larger incisions are made to expose organs to open view and accessibility. Mrs. Selepec's surgery was of this latter kind. During recovery, Mrs. Selepec experienced complications, and surgeons reentered her abdomen to discover that two of the bypass staples failed. On the merits, Appellee argued that courts applying the risk-utility analysis have always considered the risks, benefits, and design constraints associated with all intended uses of a product; to artificially limit the risk utility analysis to the particular use to which a plaintiff put a product in a particular case would be to ignore the inherent, essential characteristics that informed the design; and to hold multi-use products to the same standard as single-use products would be tantamount to requiring the sale of multiple single-use products, which would be inefficient and impractical, if not impossible. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that trial courts are not restricted to considering a single use of a multiuse product in design defect, threshold, risk-utility balancing. The Court also declined to disturb the Superior Court's legal determination as to the appropriate risk-utility calculus. View "Beard v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc." on Justia Law

In this appeal by allowance, the Supreme Court considered whether the "separate disease" rule (also referred to as the "two-disease" rule) allows an individual to bring separate lawsuits for more than one malignant disease which allegedly resulted from the same asbestos exposure. The matter arose from Appellee Herbert Daley's 1989 diagnosis of pulmonary asbestosis and squamous-cell carcinoma in his right lung. He filed suit against several defendants seeking compensatory damages for work-related injuries and settled. In 2005, Appellee filed suit against US Supply, Duro-Dyne and A.W. Chesterson alleging that a late diagnosis of mesothelioma was caused by the same exposure that resulted in his lung cancer. The companies argued that Pennsylvania had not adopted the two-disease rule, and that his mesothelioma diagnosis was barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Upon review, the Court concluded that the rule did apply, and, accordingly, the Court affirmed an order of the Superior Court, which reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of U.S. Supply Co. and Duro-Dyne Corp. View "Daley v. A.W. Chesterton" on Justia Law

This case raised the question of whether an uninsured driver who was injured in a motor vehicle accident with an insured driver, may sue the insured driver in tort for economic damages. "The question highlight[ed] a tension" in the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, (MVFRL), 75 Pa.C.S. 1701-1799, and Pennsylvania decisional precedent, as noted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. On the one hand, Section 1714 of the MVFRL prohibits uninsured drivers from recovering first-party benefits, which include medical and income loss benefits. On the other, Section 1705 of the MVFRL deems uninsured drivers to have chosen the limited tort alternative, which permits recovery of damages for economic loss sustained in a motor vehicle accident as the consequence of the fault of another person. Loss is commonly understood as being comprised of damages for medical expenses and wage loss. "Thus, it may appear as though the MVFRL both prohibits and permits insurance recovery to uninsured drivers for this category of damages or loss." The Supreme Court answered the question posed by the Third Circuit in the negative: Section 1714 of the MVFRL does not preclude an uninsured motorist from recovering tort damages for economic loss from an alleged third-party tortfeasor under the torfeasor’s liability coverage. View "Corbin v. Khosla" on Justia Law

Brothers-Appellees Gerald and Louis Garzone are licensed funeral home directors in Philadelphia. They contracted with a business that sold human cadavers and harvested tissue for resale and medical use. The arrangement was undertaken without the knowledge or consent of the families of the deceased and continued through September 2005, at which point Michael Mastromarino, owner of Biomedical Tissue Services, learned that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was investigating him. Mastromarino advised Appellees to destroy their records days before FDA investigators arrived. A grand jury charged Appellees with 244 counts of theft by unlawful taking (of body parts), abuse of corpses, and various other charges. Appellees informed the Commonwealth that they intended to continue to trial, even knowing that all other codefendants intended to plead guilty and cooperate with the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth prepared for trial, but on the scheduled trial date, Appellees pleaded guilty to all charges. At sentencing, the Commonwealth asked if the court would "consider requiring the defendants to pay cost[s] of prosecution or a portion," arguing that its personnel had to devote extensive resources and hours to prepare for a long trial. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether a trial court may order a convicted offender to pay the costs of the Commonwealth (for the sum total of salaries of the attorneys, investigators and other officials involved in preparing for trial). The Superior Court vacated the trial court’s imposition of such costs. The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court: "Although our reasoning does not track that of the panel below, we are in agreement with its central holding that, "[a]lthough the crimes in this case are particularly heinous, if the General Assembly intended to permit such recovery of regularly paid salaries of assistant district attorneys and detectives to be costs associated with the prosecution, the Legislature would have expressly done so." View "Pennsylvania v. Garzone" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted review of this case to consider whether a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) exists where the emotional distress results from a "negligent breach of a contractual or fiduciary duty," absent physical impact or injury. After review of the development of the tort of NIED under Pennsylvania law and that of other states, the Court concluded that it was appropriate to extend liability for the infliction of emotional distress to a limited "species" of cases. Specifically, the Court suggested that NIED was not available in "garden-variety breach of contractual or fiduciary duty cases," but only in those cases where there exists a special relationship where it is foreseeable that a breach of the relevant duty would result in emotional harm so extreme that a reasonable person should not be expected to endure the resulting distress. The Court further concluded that recovery for NIED claims does not require a physical impact. View "Toney v. Chester Co. Hosp." on Justia Law

Appellant Brenda Jones was involved in an automobile accident with another driver that caused damage to her vehicle. Appellant's insurance policy with Nationwide Property and Casualty Company (Nationwide) included collision coverage for the vehicle involved, subject to a $500 deductible. The policy also provided Nationwide with the right of subrogation. Nationwide paid Appellant for all damage to the vehicle, reduced by the $500 deductible. Nationwide then filed a subrogation claim against the other driver and recovered under the other driver's liability coverage. The recovery, while in excess of Appellant's deductible, was only ninety percent of the amount Nationwide paid Appellant under the collision coverage policy. Nationwide paid Jones a pro rata share of the subrogation award by reimbursing her for ninety percent of her deductible, which amounted to $450. Appellant filed a class action against Nationwide claiming that Nationwide's uniform practice of pro rating reimbursements of deductibles violated the "made whole" doctrine. All claims were based upon Appellant's conclusion that Nationwide should have reimbursed her for her entire $500 deductible, despite the provision in the policy granting Nationwide subrogation rights. Appellant also sought injunctive relief to stop Nationwide's practice of pro rata deductible reimbursement. The Supreme Court concluded that the "made whole" doctrine did not apply to the collision coverage at issue in this case, the Court affirmed the dismissal of Appellant's class action. View "Jones v. Nationwide Property & Casualty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant Kia Motors America, Inc. unsuccessfully defended a class action lawsuit for breach of express warranty. It appealed a superior court's decision to affirm certification of the class by the trial court, and the amount of damages and litigation costs awarded to the class. Costs included a significant legal fee, entered pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Improvement Act (MMWA). Appellee Shamell Samuel-Bassett, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated filed this class action lawsuit in January 2001, alleging that her Kia had an unsafe manufacturing defect in the braking system. In 2005, a jury rendered a verdict in favor of the class for breach of express warranty, and awarded damages in the amount of $600 per class member. The court molded the verdict to account for the 9,402 class members to which the parties had stipulated and recorded a $5.6 million verdict. Represented by new counsel, Kia filed an unsuccessful post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or for a new trial. The issues on appeal to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the class was properly certified; (2) whether evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict and whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; (3) whether the jury’s verdict was properly molded to account for the 9,402 members of the class; (4) whether the trial court had authority to award attorneys’ fees after Bassett entered judgment on the class verdict; and (5) whether the risk multiplier was properly applied to an award of counsel fees under the MMWA. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part, the trial court's decision. The Court reversed the trial court to the extent that its order provided for enhancement of the attorneys' fees award beyond the amount permitted in the MMWA. View "Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc." on Justia Law