Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue at the heart of this appeal involved whether the superior court interpreted and applied section 385 of the Second Restatement of Torts, which relates to the liability of a contractor or employee who creates a dangerous condition on land on behalf of the land's possessor. Appellee PA Partners, LP sold its steel plant to First Mississippi Steel, Inc. (FMS) in a "turn-key" transaction. FMS employees were operating one of the furnaces when a burn-through and series of steam explosions occurred. During the incident, hot steel fragments and parts of the plant structure fell onto the pouring platform and struck them. One employee was fatally injured and the other survived with scarring and disfigurement. Paula Livingston Gresik (the decedent's widow) and Joseph Beltowski (the injured employee) and his wife sued multiple parties, including PA Partners for damages arising out of the accident. Several years of litigation ensued and the court of common pleas dismissed some of the claims on preliminary objections. Eventually PA Partners remained as the only defendant in the suit. After further pleadings and discovery, the court granted PA Partners' motion for summary judgment on the sole remaining cause of action. The employees appealed to the superior court, maintaining that the court of common pleas failed to recognize that PA Partners could be held liable under a theory of negligent construction described in Section 385 of the Second Restatement of Torts. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Section 385 did not provide a basis to hold PA Partners liable for damages ensuing from the accident. Accordingly, the Court held that the employees did not demonstrate that the court of common pleas erred in sustaining PA Partners' demurrer. View "Gresik v. PA Partners, LP" on Justia Law

In this discretionary appeal, the Supreme Court was asked to address whether the "regular use" exclusion in a personal automobile insurance police was valid to preclude payment of underinsured motorist benefits (UIM) to a police officer injured in the course of employment while operating his police vehicle for which the officer did not have an ability to obtain UIM coverage. Appellant Robert Williams was a Pennsylvania State Trooper seriously injured in an accident involving his police vehicle. At the time of the accident, Appellant maintained a personal automobile insurance policy with Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO). He sought to recover UIM benefits from GEICO from the accident, but GEICO denied coverage citing the "regular use" exclusion contained in the policy. The trial court granted GEICO's motion to dismiss, and the Superior Court affirmed in an unpublished memorandum. Appellant argued on appeal that because of the special factual circumstances and challenges he faces as a state trooper, his insurer should have provided him with UIM coverage "despite the unambiguous policy exclusion because Pennsylvania has a strong public policy of protecting police officers and other first responders such that they are entitled to special treatment." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded "Appellant's argument simply fails." The Court held that the trial and superior courts were correct in denying Appellant coverage under his UIM policy, and affirmed their decisions. View "Williams v. Government Employees Ins. Co." on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court was whether an opinion rendered by a medical expert was sufficient to rebut the presumption of disease causation under the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act. Joseph Kriebel worked for the City of Philadelphia as a firefighter from 1974 to 2003. He died in 2004 from liver disease caused by hepatitis C. His widow Appellant Patricia Kriebel, filed a claim petition under the Act in 2005, alleging that her husband contracted hepatitis C in the course of his employment. Appellant sought to raise the presumption of occupational exposure. In support of her claim, Appellant presented the testimony of her husband's treating physician. The City rebutted the presumption of disease causation with testimony of its own medical expert. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that an expert's opinion does not constitute substantial competent evidence where it is based on a series of assumptions that lack the necessary factual predicate. Since the medical opinions in this case were based on unfounded suppositions, they were legally insufficient to overcome the presumption of disease causation. The Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court that held that the City overcame the presumption with its' medical expert's testimony, and reinstated the order of the superior court which held in favor of Appellant. View "City of Philadelphia v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd." on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court was whether it was a violation of public policy to exclude from underinsured motorist coverage (UIM) a claim by an individual eligible for workers' compensation benefits. Appellant Frank Heller was severely injured from an automobile accident that happened during the course of his employment as a police officer for Sugarcreek Borough. Workers' Compensation covered his medical expenses and two-thirds of his salary. The Borough paid the remainder of Appellant's salary. Appellant's losses and damages far exceeded the policy limit from the tortfeasor's insurance carrier. Accordingly, Appellant notified his insurer of a potential UIM claim and sought UIM benefits from the Borough pursuant to a policy issued by the Pennsylvania League of Cities and Municipalities. Ultimately, Appellant's claim was denied. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that an exclusion in Appellant's workers' compensation policy violated public policy and was therefore unenforceable. The Court reversed the Commonwealth Court which held that the policy considerations favored the insurer: "Invalidating the workers' compensation exclusion would not force [the UIM insurer] to underwrite an unknown risk for which it did not receive compensation. The Borough voluntarily elected to purchase optional UIM coverage. .. [W]e find [Appellant's] assertion that the Borough purchased illusory coverage persuasive… the vast majority of all UIM claims likely will be made by Borough employees who are eligible for workers' compensation. The subject exclusion operates to deny UIM benefits to anyone who is eligible for workers' compensation." View "Heller v. Pa. League of Cities and Municipalities" on Justia Law

Appellant Anne Marie Morack worked for Appellee Gentex Corporation for over thirty years. In 2005, she left when swelling and pain in her hands were too overwhelming for her to continue work. She sought medical help, and notified her employer of the pain. In early 2005, Appellant applied for short-term disability, noting on her application for benefits that she did not believe her injury was work-related. After consultation with a specialist, Appellee learned that her injury was work-related. Gentex ultimately appealed the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board's decision granting Appellant's claim to the Commonwealth Court, contending that Appellant did not timely notify her supervisor of the injury nor aptly describe the injury to comply with the state workers' compensation act. The Commonwealth Court reversed, finding Appellant did not aptly describe her injury nor give Gentex adequate notice. The Supreme Court granted allocatur to determine what constitutes sufficient notice under the Act, and to "speak to" an employer's duty to conduct reasonable investigations into the circumstances surrounding a work-related injury. Under the Act, notice is a prerequisite to receive workers' compensation benefits, and the claimant bears the burden of demonstrating that proper notice was given. Upon review of the applicable case law in this instance, the Court found that, "consistent with the humanitarian purposes of the Act, [the Court] made it clear that even imperfect notice can satisfy" its strictures. The Court employed a "totality of the circumstances" approach to determining whether Appellant in this case both satisfied the notice and description of the injury in making her claim for benefits. In reversing the Commonwealth Court, the Supreme Court found that Appellant's collective communications with Gentex satisfied the notification requirements of the Act. View "Gentex Corp v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Appellant Walnut Street Associates (WSA) provides insurance brokerage services and helps employers obtain health insurance for their employees. Appellee Brokerage Concepts, Inc. (BCI) is a third party administrator of employee benefit plans. Procacci retained BCI as administrator of its insurance plans, and BCI paid commissions to WSA based on premiums paid by Procacci. In 2005, Procacci requested BCI reduce its costs, but BCI would not meet Procacciâs proposal. Procacci then notified BCI that it would take its business elsewhere. BCI asked Procacci to reconsider, and in the process, disclosed to Procacci how much it paid to WSA as its broker. The amount was higher than Procacci believed WSA had been earning, but there was no dispute that BCIâs statements about WSAâs compensation were true. As a result of BCIâs letter, Procacci terminated its contract with WSA. WSA sued BCI alleging that BCI tortiously interfered with the WSA/Procacci contract by disclosing the amount of WSAâs compensation. BCI argued that it could not be liable for tortious interference because what it said was true, or otherwise justified and privileged. At trial, the jury found that BCI did interfere in the WSA/Procacci contract. BCI appealed, and the appellate court reversed the trial courtâs judgment. The appellate court adopted a section of the Restatement of Torts, which said that truth is a defense to a claim of tortious interference. WSA maintained that the Restatement was not applicable according to Pennsylvania law. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and adopted the Restatement defense that truth is a defense to claims of tortious interference with contractual relations. The Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court.

In 1998, Appellee Stephen Heim filed a professional liability action against two doctors and their medical practices alleging that their negligent care from 1992 to 1996 caused the death of his wife. In August 2000, Mr. Heim received a jury verdict for over $1 million. The jury attributed a substantial percentage of fault to Mrs. Heim, and apportioned the remaining liability among the defendant doctors, which they bore jointly and severally. At the time of the alleged negligent acts, the doctors each maintained primary professional liability insurance coverage for $200,000 per occurrence under a policy issued by a private insurer. That insurer went bankrupt, and the policy was assumed by the Pennsylvania Property and Casualty Association (PPCIGA). Excess liability protection was provided to health care providers through a government-run contingency fund known as the Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund (CAT Fund). It was determined that the primary insurance policy left a $100,000 shortfall in order to satisfy Mr. Heimâs judgment. The CAT Fund determined it had no responsibility to redress the shortfall from the primary insurerâs bankruptcy. With no insurance money to protect them, Mr. Heim sued against the doctorsâ assets seeking to recover the unpaid portion of the judgment that neither the insurance company nor the CAT Fund would pay. The Commonwealth Court ruled in Mr. Heimâs favor, but in accordance with joint and several liability, applied the order to both PPCIGA and the CAT Fund. The Fund appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found that under the statutory scheme that governs the CAT Fund, the facts of this case clearly implicated the Fundâs responsibility to the doctors to pay for the $100,000 shortfall left by their primary insurance policy. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Commonwealth Court.