Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute between Stewart Kramer and Valerie Concinello (Parents) and Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company (Nationwide) over the interpretation of their homeowners insurance policy. The dispute arose after the fatal drug overdose of Michael T. Murray, Jr. (Decedent) at Parents' home. The administrator of Decedent's estate sued Parents and their son, Adam Kramer, for wrongful death and survival actions. Parents sought coverage under their insurance policy with Nationwide, but Nationwide denied coverage based on a controlled substance exclusion in the policy. Parents then filed a declaratory judgment action, and the trial court ordered Nationwide to defend Parents.The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's decision but based its ruling on a different interpretation of the policy. The Superior Court concluded that the policy's controlled substance exclusion applied to the bodily injury claims in the underlying lawsuit but did not apply to emotional distress damages claimed in the wrongful death action.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Superior Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the Superior Court's interpretation that Nationwide was potentially required to pay out for emotional and mental distress damages was contrary to the unambiguous provisions of the policy and erroneous as a matter of law. The Supreme Court concluded that Nationwide had no duty to defend the underlying lawsuit because emotional and mental distress damages in the wrongful death claims were not bodily injuries under the policy. View "Kramer v. Nationwide Insurance" on Justia Law

The case involves Earl John and Christine Dwyer, who sued Ameriprise Financial, Inc. for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation. In 1985, Ameriprise fraudulently and negligently induced the Dwyers to purchase a universal whole life insurance policy by misrepresenting that their quarterly premium payments would remain the same for the life of the policy. The Dwyers surrendered life insurance policies they had purchased from other companies to facilitate this purchase. In reality, if the Dwyers’ premium payment had remained the same, the policy would have lapsed for insufficient funds in 2020.The trial court found Ameriprise guilty of violating Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (CPL) and awarded the Dwyers compensatory damages. However, the court declined to award treble damages under the CPL, reasoning that they would be duplicative of the punitive damages awarded by the jury on the common-law claims. The Superior Court affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court held that treble damages under the CPL are a separate remedy available to the Dwyers and must be considered by the trial court without regard to a punitive damages award on related common-law claims. The court concluded that nullifying the availability of a statutory award because of a common-law award is not a permissible exercise of discretion. Therefore, the court reversed the order of the Superior Court and remanded the case for reconsideration of damages under the CPL. View "Dwyer v. Ameriprise Financial" on Justia Law

In a case concerning the Senior Health Insurance Company of Pennsylvania ("SHIP"), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld a rehabilitation plan devised by the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner. SHIP, which sold long-term care policies in multiple states, became insolvent due to the high cost of care against inadequate premiums. The rehabilitation plan was designed to correct the company’s financial condition by adjusting the premiums and benefits of the existing policies. However, insurance regulators from Maine, Massachusetts, and Washington ("Regulators") objected to the plan, arguing that it exceeded the Insurance Commissioner's statutory authority and violated their states' regulatory authority over rates. The court rejected these claims, finding that the plan did not exhibit a "policy of hostility" to the public acts of other states and thus did not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The court concluded that the Commonwealth Court, holding exclusive jurisdiction over the distribution of SHIP's assets, did not abuse its discretion by approving the plan. View "In Re: Senior Health Ins. Co. of PA" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled that a "regular use" exclusion in a motor vehicle insurance policy does not violate the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), thereby reversing the order of the Superior Court. The case involved Matthew Rush, a detective, who was injured in a motor vehicle accident while driving a city-owned car insured under the city's policy. Rush had his personal vehicles insured with Erie Insurance. When Rush's injuries exceeded the liability insurance limits of the other drivers involved in the accident and the underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage limits of the city's policy, he filed a claim for UIM benefits under his Erie policies. Erie denied coverage based on the "regular use" exclusion in the Erie Policies. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the "regular use" exclusion was valid and enforceable, and did not violate the MVFRL. The court reasoned that UIM coverage was not universally portable and could, therefore, be subject to policy exclusions. View "Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange" on Justia Law

In this case before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Joseph Tambellini, Inc. and HTR Restaurants, Inc., along with other businesses, had their business interruption insurance claims related to the COVID-19 pandemic denied by their insurer, Erie Insurance Exchange. The businesses had sued Erie in various courts across Pennsylvania. Due to the factual and legal overlap among these claims, the businesses moved for all state-wide litigation to be coordinated in Allegheny County for all pre-trial and trial purposes under Rule of Civil Procedure 213.1.Erie appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed in part and reversed in part. According to the Superior Court, the trial court exceeded the authority of Rule 213.1 by ordering the coordination of similar actions against Erie that had not yet been filed. The Superior Court further held that the businesses were parties who were empowered by Rule 213.1 to file the motion for coordination.Upon the parties’ cross-appeals, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted review of both holdings. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed with the Superior Court that the trial court lacked authority to coordinate actions that had not yet been filed. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that Erie had waived any argument that the businesses could not seek coordination when it failed to raise this issue in the trial court. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s order. View "Tambellini v. Erie Insurance" on Justia Law

In a dispute arising from insurance coverage for business interruption losses during the COVID-19 pandemic in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, various businesses, including Joseph Tambellini, Inc. and HTR Restaurants, Inc., had sued their insurer, Erie Insurance Exchange, for denial of their claims. The businesses moved for the coordination of all state-wide litigation, including future filings, in Allegheny County under Rule 213.1 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for the coordination of actions in different counties that involve a common question of law or fact. The motion was granted by the trial court, but on appeal, the Superior Court held that the trial court exceeded the authority of Rule 213.1 by ordering the coordination of similar actions against Erie that had not yet been filed.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed with the Superior Court. The court found that the term "pending" in Rule 213.1 clearly refers to cases that have already been filed, and does not include cases that are imminent or impending. The court further noted that Erie had waived the argument that the plaintiffs were not entitled to seek coordination as it had not raised this issue in the trial court. The Superior Court's order was affirmed, holding that Rule 213.1 does not permit the coordination of actions that have not been filed at the time of the coordination motion and Erie had waived its argument that the plaintiffs were not entitled to seek coordination. View "HTR Restaurants v. Erie Insurance" on Justia Law

The Bert Company, dba Northwest Insurance Services (“Northwest”), was an insurance brokerage firm with clientele in northwestern Pennsylvania and western New York. From 2005 to 2017, Matthew Turk (“Turk”) was employed as an insurance broker with Northwest. First National Insurance Agency, LLC (“FNIA” or "First National") was an insurance brokerage firm. To grow its business in that region, First National developed a plan to takeover Northwest, initially by convincing key Northwest employees to leave Northwest for FNIA and to bring their clients with them. Through the fall and winter of 2016, Turk repeatedly met with First National about the plan with the hope that First National could gut Northwest by hiring the bulk of its highest producers, acquiring their clients, and ultimately forcing that company to sell its remaining book of clients. Pursuant to the plan, Turk remained at Northwest to convince the company to sell its remaining business to First National. Northwest refused, choosing instead to fire Turk and initiate legal action. In this appeal by permission, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court opined on the jurisprudence of the United State Supreme Court addressing the constitutionality of an award of punitive damages by a civil jury in the Commonwealth. The Pennsylvania Court's grant of allowance addressed the narrow issue of the appropriate ratio calculation measuring the relationship between the amount of punitive damages awarded against multiple defendants who are joint tortfeasors and the compensatory damages awarded. The superior court calculated the punitive to compensatory damages ratio using a per-defendant approach, rather than a per-judgment approach. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court generally endorsed the per-defendant approach as consistent with federal constitutional principles that require consideration of a defendant’s due process rights. Further, the Court concluded that under the facts and circumstances of this case, it was appropriate to consider the potential harm that was likely to occur from the concerted conduct of the defendants in determining whether the measure of punishment was both reasonable and proportionate. View "The Bert Company v. Turk, et al." on Justia Law

Appellants Robert and Kelly Franks sought automobile insurance from Appellee, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company in 2013 for their two vehicles. Appellants included underinsured motorist coverage (“UIM”) in their policy but completed a form rejecting stacked UIM coverage in compliance with Section 1738(d)(2) of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”). Absent such waiver, stacked coverage would be the default. Appellants removed one of the original vehicles and added a third vehicle to the policy effective 2014, and again rejected stacked UIM coverage. They made another change to the policy in 2015, removing the other of the original insured vehicles with a different car. No additional form rejecting stacked UIM coverage was offered or sought to be completed on the occasion of the removal of the last vehicle, and the ongoing premiums paid by Appellants reflected the lower rate for non-stacked UIM overage on two vehicles. Robert was injured in an accident caused by the negligence of a third party. That party had insufficient liability coverage to cover Robert's injuries. Appellants initiated a claim for UIM benefits under their policy with State Farm, but the parties disagreed on the limit to their benefits. Appellants contended with the last change to the policy, there was no valid waiver of stacked UIM coverage, resulting in a default stacked coverage mandated by statute. The issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review in this matter was whether the Superior Court erred as a matter of law by holding that removal of a vehicle from a multiple motor vehicle insurance policy, in which stacked coverage had previously been waived, did not require a renewed express waiver of stacked coverage pursuant to Section 1738(c). The Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court did not err and affirmed its judgment. View "Franks, et al. v. State Farm Mutual" on Justia Law

In 2018, Albert Mione (“Mione”) was in a collision while operating his motorcycle. Mione’s motorcycle was insured by Progressive Insurance, under a policy that did not include UM/UIM coverage. Albert and his wife Lisa jointly owned a car, which was insured by Erie Insurance on a single-vehicle policy that included UM/UIM coverage with stacking. Mione’s adult daughter Angela also lived in the couple’s home, and she too owned a car, which Erie insured on a single-vehicle policy (“Angela’s policy”). Both of the Erie policies contained household vehicle exclusions barring UM/UIM coverage for injuries sustained while operating a household vehicle not listed on the policy under which benefits are sought. The courts below held that the exclusions were valid and enforceable, citing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 1998 decision in Eichelman v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 711 A.2d 1006 (Pa. 1998). The Miones, contended that the lower courts erred in applying Eichelman, arguing that the Supreme Court sub silentio overruled that decision in Gallagher v. GEICO Indemnity Co., 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2019). The Supreme Court rejected the Miones’ argument, and affirmed. View "Erie Insurance Exch. v. Mione, et al." on Justia Law

A declaratory judgment action was filed in the context of two insurance- company liquidation matters. The parties asserted they informally agreed, among themselves, and the single Commonwealth Court Judge overseeing the cases, to a procedure for a three-judge panel of the Commonwealth Court to render a decision to be reviewable via exceptions by the Commonwealth Court, en banc. However, as the agreement was not memorialized as of record, the party aggrieved by the panel opinion, the statutory liquidator, lodged an immediate appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court after that opinion and order were filed, and then filed exceptions with the Commonwealth Court, en banc. After the Commonwealth Court, en banc, rendered a second opinion and order, overruling the exceptions and confirming the panel’s initial decision, the statutory liquidator filed a second appeal with the Supreme Court parallel to the first. This raised a jurisdictional question. The Supreme Court found two of four petitions filed were properly dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The other two were properly before the Court, and on the merits, the Court affirmed the Panel's July 9, 2021 order: “[t]here is simply no statutory authority for this well-intentioned proposal [or] any standard to guide the Liquidator’s establishment [of the proposal] or [the Commonwealth Court’s] evaluation thereof.” View "In Re: American Network Ins. Co." on Justia Law