Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue raised by this appeal centered on whether power was invested in a school reform commission, under a statutory regime designed to facilitate rehabilitation of financially distressed school districts, to unilaterally alter terms and conditions of employment for teachers whose interests were represented by a bargaining unit. In December 2001, the Secretary of Education issued a declaration of financial distress pertaining to the District, and a school reform commission (SRC or “Commission”) was constituted and assumed responsibility for the District’s operations, management, and educational program, per Section 696 of the School Code. Throughout the ensuing years, the SRC and appellee Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, AFT, Local 3, AFL-CIO (the “Union”), negotiated several collective bargaining agreements. The SRC invoked Sections 693(a)(1) of the School Code, as incorporated into Section 696(i), to “make specific limited changes and to implement . . . modified economic terms and conditions for employees in the bargaining units represented by the [Union], consistent with economic terms proposed in negotiations, while maintaining all other existing terms and conditions to the extent required by law[.]” The Commission predicted that the changes would save about $44 million in 2014 through 2015 and $198 million over four years. Ultimately, the resolution purported to cancel the most recent collective bargaining agreement between the District and the Union, to the extent that it continued to govern the parties’ relations. The Commission, the District, and the Department of Education then filed a declaratory judgment action at the Commonwealth Court, asking the Court to uphold the imposition of the new economic terms and conditions as being authorized by applicable law. The Court found that the right of cancellation under Sections 693(a)(1) and 696(i) did not reach such agreements, and that on account of a prescription within Section 693 that “the special board of control shall have power to require the board of directors within sixty (60) days” to implement measures encompassing the cancellation power, the cancellation power could only have been exercised within 60 days after the December 2001 declaration of distress. The Supreme Court reviewed the Commonwealth Court's judgment, and affirmed the outcome, but on differing grounds. The Supreme Court held at least insofar as teachers were concerned, that collective bargaining agreements were “teachers’ contracts” which were excepted from a school reform commission’s cancellation powers. View "Phila. Fed. of Teachers v. SD of Phila." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was the validity of a workers’ compensation judge’s decision to reject opinion testimony from an independent medical witness presented by an employer and insurer, in the absence of any contrary evidence adduced by the claimant. In 2005, the appellant, Jeffrey Rhodes (“Claimant”) suffered injuries in a car accident, while in the course of his employment with the employer-appellee, IA Construction Corporation. In 2007, a workers’ compensation judge granted Rhodes' petition and awarded total disability benefits. Several years later, the employer filed a specialized notice under governing administrative regulations designed to initiate the impairment rating process. The Department of Labor and Industry’s Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (the “Bureau”), in turn, designated M. Bud Lateef, M.D., to conduct an IRE. Subsequently, based on the results of the ensuing examination, and given that the IRE had been requested outside the period associated with a rating accorded automatic effect, Employer filed a petition seeking to modify the workers’ compensation benefits payable to Claimant. The WCJ denied Employer’s modification petition, rejecting Dr. Lateef’s impairment rating opinion. In her estimation, Dr. Lateef’s assessment of cognition was an unduly limited one, since he performed only a cursory examination and otherwise relied upon only a limited range of medical records. In the circumstances, and particularly since Dr. Lateef specialized in physical medicine and pain management, not neurology, the WCJ indicated that she was unpersuaded by his opinion. On Employer’s appeal, the WCAB affirmed in a divided opinion. On further appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed this appeal to address the issue, as framed by Claimant, of “[w]hether the Commonwealth Court overstepped its appellate function in making credibility judgments which is the sole function of the Workers’ Compensation Judge.” The Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth Court erred in its conclusions that the WCJ lacked authority to reject the uncontradicted testimony of the IRE physician. The case was reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the WCJ's adjudication, as affimed by the WCAB. View "IA Construction v. WCAB" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether state legislators have standing to intervene in a challenge to the issuance of an executive order concerning direct care health workers. In early 2015, Governor Tom Wolf issued Executive Order 2015-05, “Participant-Directed Home Care Services,” which focused on individuals who received, and workers who provided, in-home medical and personal care. The Executive Order established, inter alia, an advisory group to ensure the quality of long-term personal assistance services to seniors and persons with disabilities, and a process by which workers who provide such care, and who were employed by the individuals they serve, could obtain a designated representative for discussions with the Secretary of Human Resources regarding various matters (namely wages, and health and retirement benefits). Petitioners filed suit arguing that Executive Order 2015-05 established organizational labor rights for domestic home care workers, but was issued without authorization and conflicted with existing Commonwealth labor laws, specifically the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act, and the Public Employe Relations Act. The Commonwealth Court conducted a hearing on Petitioners’ request for a preliminary injunction, initially rejecting rejected Appellants’ attempt to directly intervene at the preliminary injunction stage. However, the court issued an order enjoining Governor Wolf from entering into any memorandum of understanding pursuant to Executive Order 2015-05 until disposition of the matter on the merits, establishing an expedited schedule for the filing of briefs on preliminary objections and cross-motions for summary relief, and listing the matter for en banc argument. Appellants' Application to Intervene was denied, giving rise to this appeal. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that in these circumstances, Appellants did not have standing to intervene because the legislators’ interests purportedly impacted by the executive order did not involve unique legislative prerogatives, but, rather, were interests common to the general citizenry which only remotely impact the legislators’ right to act as legislators. Thus, the Court affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court denying the legislators’ request to intervene. View "Markham v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

In this appeal by allowance, we consider the breadth of the authority of an interest arbitration panel acting pursuant to the Policemen and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act. In 2009, the contract between appellee City of Philadelphia and appellant the Michael G. Lutz Lodge No. 5 of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) expired, and the parties failed to negotiate a new one. The matter went to binding interest arbitration. An arbitration panel put a new collective bargaining agreement in place effective July 2009 to June 2013. One issue before the panel concerned advance notification and premium overtime for police officers for court appearances. The panel's authority came into question when it made decisions on the notification and overtime issues. The Supreme Court found that the interest arbitration panel's authority was limited to addressing issues properly submitted to the panel, or those questions reasonably subsumed within those issues. Here, the panel exceeded its authority by speaking to an issue that was neither bargained over, raised in prior related proceedings before the panel, nor reasonably subsumed within the issue that was properly before the panel. Accordingly, the Court reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court which affirmed the underlying interest arbitration award. View "Michael G. Lutz Lodge v. City of Phila." on Justia Law

Mid-Atlantic Systems of CPA, Inc. hired Appellee David Socko in March 2007 as a salesperson. Socko executed a two-year employment contract containing a covenant not to compete. In February 2009, Socko resigned from his employment with Mid-Atlantic, but the company rehired him four months later, in June 2009. At his time of rehire, Socko signed a new employment agreement containing another two-year covenant not to compete. While still employed by Mid-Atlantic, in 2010, Socko signed a third, more restrictive “Non-Competition Agreement,” which, by its terms, superseded all prior agreements. Pursuant to the Agreement (at issue in this appeal), Socko was not permitted to compete with Mid-Atlantic for two years after the termination of his employment in any of the locations Mid-Atlantic did business: Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New York, Virginia, and West Virginia. The Agreement also expressly provided for the application of Pennsylvania law, and stated that the parties intended to be “legally bound.” The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s review was one of first impression: whether the enforcement of an employment agreement containing a restrictive covenant not to compete, entered into after the commencement of employment, could be challenged by an employee for a lack of consideration, where the agreement, by its express terms, stated that the parties “intend to be legally bound,” which language implicated the insulating effect of the Uniform Written Obligations Act (“UWOA”). After review, the Supreme Court concluded that an employee was not precluded from challenging such an agreement executed pursuant to the UWOA. View "Socko. v. Mid-Atantic Systems of CPA, Inc." on Justia Law

In a "unique" workers’ compensation case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocated to determine whether the Commonwealth Court erred in finding claimant Laura O’Rourke met her burden of proving that she sustained a work-related injury in the course and scope of her employment when she was brutally stabbed by her son in the middle of the night while she was sleeping in her bedroom in her own home. "While it is undeniable that these circumstances are tragic," the Court could not conclude Claimant had shown her injuries were within the type of harm the Legislature intended to provide compensation for under the Workers’ Compensation Act, and agreed with the Commonwealth Court dissent, that stated it “defied logic” to find this case to involve a work-related injury. View "O'Rourke v. WCAB" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the Commonwealth Court applied the proper legal principles and level of deference in its appellate review of the decision of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB), which found Lancaster County (the County) engaged in unfair labor practices under Sections 1201(a)(1) and (3) of the Public Employee Relations Act (PERA), when it terminated the employment of Adam Medina and Tommy Epps. During a 2010 organizing effort, Medina attended meetings held by a Union, reported back to the third shift staff members, and successfully encouraged other employees to attend meetings, as well as vote in favor of unionizing. Epps supported the Union’s efforts and talked to other staff members about how the Union could benefit them. A fellow employee reported to supervisors that accused someone of stealing foodstuffs from her open workplace mailbox. An internal investigation revealed Media taking a snack-sized bag of potato chips on one day; Epps took a similarly-sized bag of cookies from the box. Though no one had previously been disciplined for incidents like these, Media and Epps were fired for taking items from the mailbox. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Court indeed applied the wrong standards in reversing the Board. The case was remanded for further consideration of issues raised by the parties on appeal but not previously addressed by the Commonwealth Court. View "Lancaster Co v. PA Labor Relations Board -" on Justia Law

Appellant Ralph Bailets was employed by the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission from 1998 to 2008. Appellant achieved “outstanding” and “commendable” performance ratings while employed as the Commission’s manager of financial reporting and systems. During this time, appellant frequently complained that he observed improprieties and wasteful practices regarding various matters, including a Commission computer systems contract with Ciber, Inc., EZPass discounts, politically motivated personnel actions, and the use of multiple, unnecessary external investment managers. Appellant’s job title and responsibilities were changed in June, 2008, he was removed from an additional position as assistant secretary-treasurer around the same time, and his employment by the Commission was ultimately terminated in November, 2008. Believing these actions were retaliation for his reports of wrongdoing and waste at the Commission, appellant filed a complaint in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction, alleging a single claim under the Whistleblower Law, against the Commission, Anthony Q. Maun, the Commission’s director of accounting; and Nikolaus H. Grieshaber, the Commission’s chief financial officer (collectively, appellees). In an unreported, single-judge opinion, Senior Judge Friedman held the decision to terminate appellant was “a management discretionary action, motivated by legitimate employer objectives.” The court concluded there were legitimate reasons for firing appellant, and there was nothing in the record establishing the decision makers who terminated his position were even aware of appellant’s reports of alleged wrongdoing and waste; the evidence instead showed 15 positions were eliminated in November, 2008, because of “a poor economy, declining traffic, and necessary expense reductions across the Commission.” After review, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court. The Court found sufficient evidence that appellant made prima face evidence of violations of the Whistleblower law, "which at the very least created issues of material fact to preclude the grant of summary judgment." View "Bailets v. Pa. Turnpike Commission" on Justia Law

Appellants The International Association of Firefighters, Local 22, AFL-CIO, and its named officers (collectively, the Union) was the collective bargaining unit representing the City of Philadelphia’s firefighters and paramedics. It appealed a Commonwealth Court order reversing the trial court’s grant of peremptory judgment in mandamus for the Union and against the City of Philadelphia, Mayor Michael Nutter, Richard Negrin, and Lloyd Ayers (collectively, the City), and required the City to fill vacancies immediately in the positions of Fire Captain and Fire Lieutenant. The Commonwealth Court held that neither the Home Rule Charter nor the Civil Service Regulations required vacancies to be filled immediately. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the Union did not establish a clear legal right to relief or a corresponding duty in the City, and that it was therefore not entitled to mandamus relief. View "Phila Firefighters' Union. v. City of Phila" on Justia Law

The primary issue presented by this case for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether Section 306(b)(3) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) required an employer to provide an injured employee with written “notice of ability to return to work” before offering alternative employment where the injured employee has not yet filed a claim petition and, thus, never proved entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits. The Court held that Section 306(b)(3) notice was required where the employer was seeking to modify existing workers’ compensation benefits based on medical evidence establishing that the injured employee was able to return to work in some capacity. Because the injured employee in this case had not yet received workers’ compensation benefits when the offer of alternative employment was rendered, the employer had no duty to provide notice of ability to work pursuant to Section 306(b)(3). View "Sch. Dist of Phila. v. WCAB" on Justia Law