Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Cedric Galette initiated a negligence action against Julie McCrey and New Jersey Transit (NJ Transit) in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. Galette alleged that he was injured when a vehicle operated by McCrey, in which he was a passenger, was struck by an NJ Transit vehicle. NJ Transit, an instrumentality of the State of New Jersey, filed a motion to dismiss the suit, invoking interstate sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motion.NJ Transit appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the trial court's decision. The Superior Court held that NJ Transit is not an instrumentality or arm of the State of New Jersey and, therefore, is not entitled to sovereign immunity protections. The court applied a six-factor test from Goldman v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority to determine NJ Transit's status and concluded that the factors did not support NJ Transit's claim to sovereign immunity.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case to determine whether the United States Supreme Court's decision in Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt (Hyatt III) compels a conclusion that interstate sovereign immunity bars Galette’s suit against NJ Transit. The court held that NJ Transit is indeed an arm of the State of New Jersey, emphasizing the statutory classification of NJ Transit as an instrumentality of the state, the degree of control the state exercises over it, and its core function of providing public transportation, which is a governmental function. Consequently, the court reversed the Superior Court's judgment, resulting in the dismissal of Galette’s suit against NJ Transit. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings regarding Galette’s claims against McCrey. View "Galette v. New Jersey Transit" on Justia Law

William Herold worked for the University of Pittsburgh as a stationary engineer from 1976 to 2004, during which he was exposed to asbestos. He later became a foreman, a position without asbestos exposure, and retired in 2015. In 2019, Herold was diagnosed with mesothelioma, attributed to his asbestos exposure, and he died in 2022. His estate filed a common law negligence action against the University and other defendants in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas.The trial court denied the University’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that the Occupational Disease Act (ODA) provided the exclusive remedy for Herold’s claim. The court found that Herold’s mesothelioma, manifesting more than four years after his last exposure, was not compensable under the ODA. The Commonwealth Court affirmed, holding that the ODA’s exclusivity provision did not apply to Herold’s non-compensable claim, allowing the common law action to proceed.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case, focusing on whether the ODA’s exclusivity provision barred Herold’s common law action. The Court held that the ODA’s exclusivity provision extends only to claims asserting compensable disability or death, defined as occurring within four years of the last employment. Since Herold’s mesothelioma manifested beyond this period, the exclusivity provision did not apply, and the common law action was permissible. The Court also determined that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not require the claim to be adjudicated by the workers’ compensation authorities, as the issues were not complex or technical.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision, allowing the common law negligence action to proceed in the trial court. View "In Re: Estate of W. Herold" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellants, Dr. Simon and Toby Galapo, placed signs with anti-hate and anti-racist messages on their property after a neighbor, Denise Oberholzer, called Dr. Galapo an anti-Semitic slur. The signs were visible from the Oberholzers' property and other neighbors' homes. The Oberholzers filed a civil complaint seeking to enjoin the signs, claiming they constituted a private nuisance, intrusion upon seclusion, defamation, false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.The Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas granted a permanent injunction, ordering the Galapos to reposition the signs so they did not face the Oberholzers' property. The court found the signs severely impacted the Oberholzers' well-being and quiet enjoyment of their home. The court also determined the injunction was a permissible time, place, and manner restriction on speech.The Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated the injunction, holding that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard. The Superior Court concluded the injunction was content-neutral but remanded the case for the trial court to apply the more rigorous standard from Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., which requires that the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Superior Court's decision, holding that the injunction constituted an impermissible prior restraint under Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Court emphasized that the signs were pure speech on matters of public concern and that the trial court lacked the power to enjoin such speech. The Court also held that the publication of language giving rise to tort claims other than defamation cannot be enjoined under Article I, Section 7. The Court concluded that the signs did not invade the Oberholzers' substantial privacy interests in an essentially intolerable manner. View "Oberholzer v. Galapo" on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice case, Bobbi Ann Mertis filed a lawsuit against Dr. Dong-Joon Oh, North American Partners in Anesthesia (Pennsylvania), LLC (NAPA), Wilkes-Barre Hospital, and Commonwealth Health. Mertis alleged that Dr. Oh negligently administered a femoral nerve block, causing her a femoral nerve injury. Dr. Oh retained a law firm, Scanlon, Howley & Doherty, to represent him. Later, Dr. Eugene Kim, the orthopedic surgeon who performed Mertis’s knee surgery and was not named as a defendant, also retained the same law firm after receiving a subpoena to appear at a discovery deposition.The Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas denied Mertis's motion for sanctions to disqualify the law firm from representing Dr. Oh and to bar the firm's further ex parte communication with Dr. Kim. The court found no violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4003.6, which regulates obtaining information from a party's treating physician. Mertis appealed to the Superior Court, which reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case. The Superior Court found that Rule 4003.6 was violated and that the law firm's concurrent representation of Dr. Oh and Dr. Kim was tantamount to ex parte communication.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court concluded that a law firm representing a defendant treating physician cannot obtain information from a nonparty treating physician without the patient's written consent or through an authorized method of discovery. The court found that the client exception in Rule 4003.6(1) does not permit a law firm to obtain information from a nonparty treating physician by entering into an attorney-client relationship with that physician when the law firm's attorneys were already prohibited from obtaining information from that physician under Rule 4003.6 prior to entering such attorney-client relationship. View "Mertis v. Oh" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Stewart Kramer and Valerie Concinello (Parents) and Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company (Nationwide) over the interpretation of their homeowners insurance policy. The dispute arose after the fatal drug overdose of Michael T. Murray, Jr. (Decedent) at Parents' home. The administrator of Decedent's estate sued Parents and their son, Adam Kramer, for wrongful death and survival actions. Parents sought coverage under their insurance policy with Nationwide, but Nationwide denied coverage based on a controlled substance exclusion in the policy. Parents then filed a declaratory judgment action, and the trial court ordered Nationwide to defend Parents.The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's decision but based its ruling on a different interpretation of the policy. The Superior Court concluded that the policy's controlled substance exclusion applied to the bodily injury claims in the underlying lawsuit but did not apply to emotional distress damages claimed in the wrongful death action.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Superior Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the Superior Court's interpretation that Nationwide was potentially required to pay out for emotional and mental distress damages was contrary to the unambiguous provisions of the policy and erroneous as a matter of law. The Supreme Court concluded that Nationwide had no duty to defend the underlying lawsuit because emotional and mental distress damages in the wrongful death claims were not bodily injuries under the policy. View "Kramer v. Nationwide Insurance" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Beverly Ferraro, slipped and fell at a Burger King restaurant in Butler County, Pennsylvania, and filed a negligence lawsuit against the restaurant's operators. Ferraro filed her complaint within the two-year statute of limitations for negligence actions. However, she encountered difficulties in serving the complaint to the defendants, Patterson-Erie Corporation D/B/A Burger King and Burger King Corporation, due to issues with the Sheriff's service and the COVID-19 pandemic. Ferraro eventually served the complaint through a private process server and later reinstated the complaint and served it through the Sheriff, but this occurred after the original statute of limitations period had elapsed.The defendants argued that the action was barred by the statute of limitations because Ferraro did not make a good faith effort to serve them in a timely manner. The trial court denied the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the Superior Court affirmed this decision. The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, arguing that the lower courts' conclusions conflicted with previous court rulings on the issue of timely service of process.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the order of the Superior Court. The court held that Ferraro failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that she made a good faith effort in diligently and timely serving process on the defendants. Therefore, the defendants' informal receipt of actual notice was irrelevant. The court emphasized that plaintiffs cannot opt out of the rules to give notice of the commencement of a lawsuit by informal means. If attempts at service of process are optional for giving such notice, then no plaintiff would be required to rely on the service of process rules to impart notice. View "Ferraro v. Patterson-Erie" on Justia Law

In a case brought before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Michael and Melissa Sullivan sued Werner Company and Lowe's Companies, Inc. over a mobile scaffold that collapsed and caused serious injury to Michael Sullivan. The Sullivans claimed the scaffold was defectively designed because it was possible for a user to inadvertently rotate the deck pins off the platform during normal use.Before trial, the Sullivans filed a motion to preclude Werner and Lowe’s from admitting into evidence any industry or government standards, which the trial court granted. The jury ultimately found Werner and Lowe’s liable for the design defect and awarded the Sullivans $2.5 million in damages.Werner and Lowe's appealed, arguing that they should have been allowed to present evidence that the mobile scaffold complied with industry and governmental safety standards. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower courts' decisions, ruling that such compliance evidence remained inadmissible in products liability cases.The court applied the risk-utility test, which asserts that a product is in a defective condition if a ‘reasonable person’ would conclude that the probability and seriousness of harm caused by the product outweigh the burden or costs of taking precautions. The court concluded that evidence of a product’s compliance with governmental regulations or industry standards is inadmissible in design defect cases to show a product is not defective under the risk-utility theory because such evidence goes to the reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct in making its design choice, not to whether the product was defectively designed. View "Sullivan v. Werner Co." on Justia Law

Cosmo DiNardo (“DiNardo”) suffered from bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and schizoaffective disorder, and, as a result, exhibited psychosis, grandiose speech, suicidal ideation, as well as homicidal ideation and violent behavior. He confessed to killing four individuals, and pleaded guilty to four counts of first-degree murder. He subsequently filed a complaint against his treating psychiatrist and health care providers, claiming that his criminal conduct was the result of his psychiatrist’s grossly negligent treatment, and sought compensatory damages, indemnification for judgments levied against him by his victims’ families, and counsel fees. In an appeal by allowance, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's consideration was whether the “no felony conviction recovery” rule precluded DiNardo’s cause of action. Because the Court found the rule barred the medical malpractice claims at issue in this appeal, it affirmed the order of the Superior Court. View "DiNardo v. Kohler, et al." on Justia Law

In this case, a Pennsylvania trial court transferred venue based on a determination the corporate defendant did not regularly conduct business in Philadelphia County because only 0.005% of the company’s total national revenue was derived from that county. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed, holding the trial court abused its discretion in transferring venue. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to evaluate the Superior Court’s determination, and affirmed: venue was proper in Philadelphia County. View "Hangey, et al. v. Husqvarna, et al." on Justia Law

In August 2014, Dairy Farmers of America, Inc. (“DFA”) sponsored a golf outing for its employees at Tanglewood Golf Course in Mercer County, Pennsylvania. As a condition of attendance, DFA required employees to provide a “monetary contribution to offset costs and expenses” associated with the event, which it used to pay for items such as “greens fees, food and alcohol.” One of DFA’s employees, Roger Williams, made the contribution and attended the golf outing. According to Appellant David Klar, DFA had reason to know that Williams was an alcoholic and that he previously had been arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. At the event, Williams’ alcohol consumption was unsupervised, and he drank beyond the point of visible intoxication. Williams departed the golf outing in his car. While driving, Williams encountered Klar, who was operating a motorcycle in the southbound lane. Williams swerved across the center line into Klar’s path. The resulting collision caused Klar to suffer numerous and grievous injuries. Klar sued both Williams and DFA, contending that they were jointly and severally liable for his injuries. This case calls upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to revisit precedents that have prevailed for half a century and that imposed liability upon persons and entities licensed to engage in the commercial sale of alcohol while limiting the liability of non-licensees and “social hosts.” The lower courts applied these precedents to conclude that an organization which hosted an event at which alcohol was provided, but was not a liquor licensee, could not be held liable for injuries caused by a guest who became intoxicated at the event. Finding no basis to disturb the long-settled law of Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Klar v. Dairy Farmers of America" on Justia Law