Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On Friday, January 9, 2009, after business hours, an unidentified motor vehicle crashed into and felled a utility pole carrying electric lines owned and operated by Duquesne Light. Several wires were connected to Burton L. Hirsh’s Funeral Home, and at least one was stripped from the attachment point to the building’s electrical system located on the structure. In addition to the funeral home, a number of other local buildings lost power as a result of the incident, although no structure other than Hirsh’s was connected directly to the downed pole. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review, as framed by appellant, was “[w]hether the Superior Court erred in imposing upon electric utilities a burdensome and unprecedented duty to enter customers’ premises and inspect customers’ electrical facilities before restoring power after an outage” The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court, finding that Duquesne Light failed to adequately confront the common-law duties invoked by Hirsh or the warnings dynamic tempering the Superior Court’s ruling. The Superior Court did not err to the extent that it recognized a duty, on the part of an electric service provider, to take reasonable measures to avert harm in a scenario in which the utility has actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition impacting a customer’s electrical system, occasioned by fallen and intermixed electrical lines proximate to the customer’s premises. The Court offered no opinion as to whether Duquesne Light had actual or constructive knowledge of an unreasonable risk in this scenario, since the electric company’s summary judgment effort was not staged in a manner which would have elicited an informed determination on such point. View "Alderwoods (PA), Inc. v. Duquesne Light" on Justia Law

In 2009, following a joint investigation by the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General and the Centre County Drug Task Force into cocaine trafficking by appellee Gregory Palazzari, appellee was arrested and charged with multiple drug trafficking offenses under the Controlled Substances, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (Drug Act). The Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section of the Attorney General’s Office petitioned the trial court for forfeiture of Appellee’s property located at 605 University Drive, State College pursuant to the Forfeiture Act, alleging that appellee had used the property for the storage and sale of cocaine, as well as a place to meet his drug supplier. In a discretionary appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the general applicability of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure to forfeiture proceedings brought pursuant to the Forfeiture Act, specifically, the availability of summary judgment pursuant to Rule 1035.2, Pa.R.C.P. in such proceedings. Although the trial court granted forfeiture of the property to the Commonwealth upon its motion for summary judgment, the Commonwealth Court reversed, broadly holding that the Rules of Civil Procedure generally and Rule 1035.2 in particular were inapplicable to forfeiture proceedings. The Commonwealth appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that the Rules of Civil Procedure applied to forfeiture proceedings where they do not conflict with the Forfeiture Act, and that there was no conflict between the entry of summary judgment pursuant to Rule 1035.2 and the Act. As such, the Court reversed and reinstated the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the Commonwealth. View "Pennsylvania v. All That Certain Lot et al (Palazzari)" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on the viability of the historic police power of the state in validating and regulating riparian rights and remedies where it was alleged that a downstream landowner subject to federal rail-safety regulations obstructed a natural watercourse causing upstream flooding and significant damage as a result. Hotel owner David Miller and his hotel (appellants) sought to hold the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA") liable for water damage allegedly resulting from the negligent construction and/or maintenance of a nearby SEPTA-owned railroad bridge. Appellants purchased hotel property in 1996, and they claimed that the bridge thereafter obstructed the flow of a creek which ran under the bridge, causing the creek to flood appellants' upstream hotel on three separate occasions of extreme weather conditions. On each occasion, appellants experienced flooding that filled the hotel basement and first floor. In 2001, the hotel closed and appellants declared bankruptcy. "As this is an area of law that has been regulated by the Commonwealth for centuries," the Pennsylvania Court concluded that there was no clear and manifest federal congressional intention to preempt Pennsylvania law central issue of this case. The Court declined to "invalidate the rights and remedies afforded to appellants under the laws of this Commonwealth." The Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's order and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Miller v. SEPTA" on Justia Law

Appellant Friends of Pennsylvania Leadership Charter School appealed an order of the Commonwealth Court which held that the retroactive real estate tax exemption provided in Section 1722-A(e)(3) of the Public School Code, 24 P.S. 17-1722-A(e)(3), was unconstitutional. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed (though by different reasoning), concluding that retroactive application of the real estate tax exemption of Section 1722-A(e)(3) was unconstitutional under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it violated the separation of powers doctrine. View "Friends of PaLCS v. Chester Cty Bd of Assess" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Newtown Township Board of Supervisors enacted a Planned Residential Development Ordinance. This appeal centered on challenges to the validity of that ordinance and to the approval of a Tentative PRD Plan pursuant to it. Intervenors BPG Real Estate Investors (BPG) submitted an application under the anticipated PRD Ordinance for approval of a Tentative PRD Plan, proposing multi-use development of an approximately 218-acre tract of land that it owned. The Township Board orally approved BPG's Tentative PRD Plan, and later issued a written decision granting approval. Newtown Square East, L.P. (NSE), which owned a two-acre tract of land adjacent to BPG's tract, filed a challenge to the validity of the PRD Ordinance with the Newtown Township Zoning Hearing Board, and filed an appeal of the Township Board's approval of BPG's Tentative PRD Plan with the court of common pleas. With regard to its validity challenge before the Zoning Board, NSE argued, inter alia, that the PRD Ordinance violated Article VII of the MPC by, allegedly, failing to require that a tentative plan identify the uses of buildings and other structures, and permitting the location of buildings to be subject to free modification between the time of tentative plan approval and final plan approval. Following several hearings, the Zoning Board upheld the validity of the PRD Ordinance, finding that its minor textual variations from the relevant provisions of the MPC, Article VII, did not create an inconsistency or conflict with the enabling legislation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the ordinance. View "Newtown Square East v. Twp. of Newtown" on Justia Law

The primary question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a municipal authority could exercise its eminent domain powers to condemn an easement over privately-owned land, where the sole purpose of the easement is to supply a private developer with land to install sewer drainage facilities needed for a proposed private residential subdivision. "While this determination may seem to interfere with the ability of municipal water and/or sewer authorities to expand their operations under circumstances where, as here, there is an overarching nexus between the taking and private development, it is not this Court’s function to ameliorate such difficulties by departing from the statutory text. [. . .] The Legislature’s decision to exempt regulated public utilities, but not municipal authorities, from the preclusive rule set forth in Section 204(a) demonstrates that it intended to allow – within constitutional limitations – the continued use of eminent domain for the provision of public services such as water and sewer access in tandem with private development for a limited, defined class of condemnors. As RAWA is not within that class, its condemnation of the drainage easement is in violation of PRPA." View "Reading Area Wat Auth v. Schuyl River Grwy, et al" on Justia Law

In August, 2010, Appellants, Washington County residents Raymond and Donna Mantia, hired Appellee, West Virginia contractor Shafer Electric & Construction, to build a 34 foot by 24 foot, two-car garage addition onto their house. The proposals for the garage did not comply with several requirements of Section 517.7 of the Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act. Specifically, any home improvement contract, in order to be valid and enforceable against the owner of real property, had to be legible, in writing, and contain thirteen other specific requirements. Despite the detail in the specifications for the work to be completed, the contract here only complied with subsections (5), (7), and (8) of Section 517.7(a). Notwithstanding these deficiencies, work on the project began in October, 2010, when Appellants, who owned their own excavation business, began the foundation excavation. When Appellee commenced construction of the addition, it contended that problems surfaced because of Appellants' failure to complete the excavation work properly. During the subsequent months, Appellants eventually reexcavated the foundation area for the addition and, in the process (according to Appellee), changed the design of the addition several times. Negotiations into these design changes and other necessary alterations as a result of the excavation problems occurred, but ultimately failed when Appellants apparently refused to enter into a new contract with Appellee. Upon the breakdown of the negotiations, the parties mutually agreed that Appellee would invoice Appellants for the work completed, and that Appellee would discontinue efforts on the project. Appellants refused to pay the bill. Appellee responded by filing a mechanic's lien in the Washington County Court of Common Pleas. When Appellants still had failed to satisfy the outstanding balance, Appellee filed a civil action in the common pleas court, alleging both breach of contract and quantum meruit causes of action. The Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in this matter to determine whether the Act barred a contractor from recovery under a theory of quantum meruit in the absence of a valid and enforceable home improvement contract as defined by the Act. The Superior Court held that the Act did not bar a cause of action sounding in quantum meruit and, for slightly different reasons, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Shafer Electric & Construction v. Mantia" on Justia Law

In February, 2006, Konstantinos Koumboulis shot and killed his wife and himself inside his house. The murder/suicide was highly publicized in the local media and on the internet. The Jaconos purchased the property from the Koumboulis estate at auction in September, 2006, for $450,000. After investing thousands in renovations, the Jaconos listed the property for sale in June, 2007. They informed Re/Max, their listing agents, of the murder/suicide. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court for review was whether the occurrence of a murder/suicide inside a house constituted a material defect of the property, such that appellees' failure to disclose the same to the buyer of the house constituted fraud, negligent misrepresentation, or a violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law's (UTPCPL). The Court concluded a murder/suicide does not constitute an actionable material defect. View "Milliken v. Jacono" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Archdiocese of Philadelphia filed an Application for Zoning/Use Registration Permit with the Philadelphia Department of Licenses and Inspections ("L&I") for conversion of the Nativity B.V.M. Elementary School into a 63-unit, one-bedroom apartment complex for low income senior citizens. The school was built in 1912 and operated by the Archdiocese in legal non-conformance with subsequently enacted zoning codes until 2008, when it had been closed due to declining enrollment and insufficient revenue. In 2009, the Archdiocese received funding under the Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly program of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") to convert the school to senior housing. L&I denied the Archdiocese's Application for Zoning/Use Registration Permit as not in compliance with several provisions of the Philadelphia Zoning Code. The Archdiocese appealed to the City of Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment ("ZBA") for use and dimensional variances. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the Commonwealth Court applied an improper standard in reversing the ZBA's grant of a variance. After careful review of the Commonwealth Court's opinion the Court concluded that the court erred by relying on an improper standard for unnecessary hardship and by substituting its judgment for that of the ZBA, thereby applying an incorrect standard of review. View "Marshall v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Appellants appealed a Commonwealth Court decision which considered the application of personal income tax (PIT) to various nonresidents, who invested as limited partners in a Connecticut limited partnership, which existed for the sole purpose of owning and operating a skyscraper in Pittsburgh, which ultimately went into foreclosure in 2005. The Commonwealth Court held that the partnership was subject to PIT commensurate with the total debt discharged as a result of the foreclosure, and therefore the nonresident limited partners were liable for PIT in an amount proportionate with their shares in the partnership. The Partnership incurred net operating losses for accounting, federal tax, and PIT purposes in every year of its existence. For PIT purposes, the Partnership allocated those losses to Appellants (and all of the other limited partners) and, because Appellants had no Pennsylvania-based income for 1985-2004, they did not file Pennsylvania PIT returns for those years. By June 30, 2005, the compounded, accrued interest totaled $2.32 billion, thus making the total liability on the Purchase Money Note more than $2.6 billion. When the Note matured given the insurmountable debt that had accrued, the Partnership was unable to sell the Property. Accordingly, the lender foreclosed, and, because the Partnership no longer owned the Property, the Partnership soon after liquidated. None of the limited partners, including Appellants, received any proceeds from the Property’s foreclosure or the Partnership’s liquidation, and therefore lost their entire investments in the Partnership. Following the Property’s foreclosure, but prior to the Partnership’s liquidation, the Partnership reported a gain as a result of the foreclosure on its federal and state tax filings that consisted of the unpaid balance of the Purchase Money Note’s principal and the accrued, compounded interest. Despite their individual investment losses, the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue assessed PIT against Appellants, plus interest and penalties, related to the foreclosure on the Property for the 2005 tax year. The Supreme Court empathized with Appellants who found "themselves with significant financial burdens because of the loss of their investments, the liquidation of the Partnership, and the foreclosure of the Property." Nevertheless, the assessment of PIT by the Department was proper, as a matter of constitutional, statutory, and regulatory law. Therefore, the Court affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court sustaining the assessment of PIT. View "Wirth v. Pennsylvania " on Justia Law