Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Tax Law
Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc. v. Commonwealth
Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc. (Alcatel) challenged the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's 2014 cap on net-loss carryover (NLC) deductions for corporate net income (CNI) tax. The cap allowed corporations to carry forward net operating losses up to the greater of $4 million or 25% of the company's 2014 net income. Alcatel, with a net income of $27,332,333 and accumulated losses exceeding that amount, could only carry over $6,833,083 due to the cap, resulting in a taxable income of around $20 million and a tax liability of approximately $2 million. Alcatel paid the tax and sought a refund, arguing the cap violated the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution.The Department of Revenue's Board of Appeals and the Board of Finance and Revenue denied Alcatel's refund request, citing lack of authority to decide constitutional issues. Alcatel then appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which initially affirmed the Board's decision, applying the Chevron test and concluding that the Nextel decision should not apply retroactively. However, after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in General Motors Corp. v. Commonwealth, which held that Nextel applies retroactively, an en banc panel of the Commonwealth Court reversed the earlier decision, sustaining Alcatel's exceptions and ordering a refund.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and concluded that the General Motors decision was erroneous. The Court held that Nextel should apply only prospectively, not retroactively, as it established a new principle of law. The Court applied the Chevron test, determining that retroactive application would not further the operation of the rule and would cause significant financial harm to the Commonwealth. Consequently, the Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision, ruling that due process does not require the Commonwealth to refund the taxes paid by Alcatel in 2014. View "Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law
Circle of Seasons Chart School v. Northwestern Lehigh School District
Circle of Seasons Charter School (Charter School) purchased two properties from The Pennsylvania State University (PSU) in May 2017. These properties were previously tax-exempt as part of PSU's Lehigh Valley Campus. Following the sale, Lehigh County issued assessment notices changing the properties' status from non-taxable to taxable, effective January 1, 2018. The notices did not include the required mailing date. Charter School claimed it did not receive these notices and subsequently did not pay the 2017 and 2018 tax bills until refinancing the properties in June 2018.The Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas sustained the preliminary objections of Northwestern Lehigh School District (School District) and dismissed Charter School's complaint with prejudice. The trial court found that Charter School had actual notice of the tax assessments by November 2017 and could have addressed the taxes in its 2018 annual appeal to the Lehigh County Board of Assessment Appeals (the Board). The Board granted tax-exempt status effective January 1, 2019, but Charter School did not seek retroactive relief or a refund for the taxes paid for 2017 and 2018.The Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court's decision, ruling that the defective notices entitled Charter School to a nunc pro tunc hearing before the Board to determine the validity of the assessment changes and potential refunds. The court emphasized that the omission of the mailing date on the notices was a significant defect, warranting a new hearing.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision, reinstating the trial court's order. The Supreme Court held that Charter School had the burden to establish the properties' tax-exempt status and failed to do so in a timely manner. The court concluded that Charter School waived its claims by not seeking retroactive relief or a refund during the 2018 appeal and that nunc pro tunc relief was not warranted. View "Circle of Seasons Chart School v. Northwestern Lehigh School District" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law
In Re: Trust B of Wells; Apl of: V.M.I. Foundation
A case in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania involved a dispute over the termination of a charitable trust. The trust was established by Richard H. Wells in 1965 for the sole benefit of his alma mater, the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), with the Virginia Military Institute Foundation (the “Foundation”) named as the beneficiary. Since its inception, the Trust has been managed by an independent corporate trustee, PNC Bank. The Foundation sought to terminate the Trust and receive the assets outright, arguing that it could manage the Trust with fewer expenses and higher returns.The lower courts denied the termination, concluding that the burdens of the Trust did not meet the statutory criteria for termination under Section 7740.3(e) of the Uniform Trust Act. The Foundation appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, arguing that the lower courts erroneously considered Wells’ intent to create a trust, which the Foundation claimed was not relevant under the statute.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower courts’ decision. The court held that the Foundation failed to satisfy the statutory standard under Section 7740.3(e) of the Uniform Trust Act, which requires a showing that the administrative expenses or other burdens of the trust are unreasonably out of proportion to the charitable benefits. The court concluded that the expenses and burdens of the trust, including an annual excise tax and mandatory annual distribution under the Private Foundation Rules of the Internal Revenue Code, were not unreasonably out of proportion to the trust's charitable benefits.
View "In Re: Trust B of Wells; Apl of: V.M.I. Foundation" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Tax Law, Trusts & Estates
Zilka v. Tax Review Bd. City of Phila.
In April 2017 and June 2017, Appellant Diane Zilka filed petitions with the Philadelphia Department of Revenue (the “Department”), seeking refunds for the Philadelphia Tax she paid from 2013 to 2015, and in 2016, respectively. During the relevant tax years, Appellant resided in the City, but worked exclusively in Wilmington, Delaware. Thus, she was subject to four income taxes (and tax rates) during that time: the Philadelphia Tax; the Pennsylvania Income Tax (“PIT”); the Wilmington Earned Income Tax (“Wilmington Tax”); and the Delaware Income Tax (“DIT”). The Commonwealth granted Appellant credit for her DIT liability to completely offset the PIT she paid for the tax years 2013 through 2016; because of the respective tax rates in Pennsylvania versus Delaware, after this offsetting, Appellant paid the remaining 1.93% in DIT. Although the City similarly credited against Appellant’s Philadelphia Tax liability the amount she paid in the Wilmington Tax — specifically, the City credited Appellant 1.25% against her Philadelphia Tax liability of 3.922%, leaving her with a remainder of 2.672% owed to the City — Appellant claimed that the City was required to afford her an additional credit of 1.93% against the Philadelphia Tax, representing the remainder of the DIT she owed after the Commonwealth credited Appellant for her PIT. After the City refused to permit her this credit against her Philadelphia Tax liability, Appellant appealed to the City’s Tax Review Board (the “Board”). The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review as whether, for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis implicated here, state and local taxes had to be considered in the aggregate. The Court concluded state and local taxes did not need be aggregated in conducting a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, and that, ultimately, the City’s tax scheme did not discriminate against interstate commerce. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court order. View "Zilka v. Tax Review Bd. City of Phila." on Justia Law
Synthes USA HQ v. Pennsylvania
This case centered upon how Appellee Synthes USA HQ, Inc. should apportion its income between Pennsylvania and other states in order to calculate its Pennsylvania corporate net income tax. The two issues presented were: (1) does the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) have the authority to represent the Commonwealth in this litigation, where it asserted an interpretation of the relevant tax provision contrary to the reading forwarded by the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue (“Department”); and (2) whether the allocation of a corporation's sales of services between Pennsylvania and other states for purposes of calculating the corporation’s income that was taxable in Pennsylvania. After review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Attorneys Act permitted the OAG to take a position on behalf of the Commonwealth that was inconsistent with the position adopted by the Department, but the Court ultimately rejected the OAG’s reading of the relevant tax provision in favor of the interpretation presented by the Department. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court remanding this case to the Board of Finance and Revenue for calculation and issuance of a tax refund by the Department to Synthes for the 2011 tax year. View "Synthes USA HQ v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law
Myers v. Pennsylvania
This direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court centered on the efforts of Appellee John Myers to obtain a refund of 38 cents in sales tax he paid on purchases he made with redeemed coupons at BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. (BJ’s). The parties petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to interpret Section 33.2(b) of the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue Code, which excluded “from the taxable portion of the purchase price, if separately stated and identified." A vendor owes the state sales tax on the full price of the item unless it can establish a “new purchase price” of the item, which may be established where “both the item and the coupon are described on the invoice or cash register tape.” The Pennsylvania Department of Revenue Board of Appeals (BOA) relied on Section 33.2, which permitted amounts represented by coupons to establish a new purchase price “if both the item and the coupon are described on the invoice or cash register tape.” The BOA concluded that the coupons were not adequately described on the receipts, and nothing indicated which items the coupons were related. A unanimous three-judge panel of the Commonwealth Court reversed the Board’s order and found Appellee was entitled to a refund of overpaid sales tax. The Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court, finding none of the receipts at issue here satisfied subsection 33.2(b)(2)’s description requirement. Because it was Appellee’s burden to prove that he was entitled to a refund of sales tax, he did not meet his burden. View "Myers v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law
O’Donnell v. Allegheny Co. Tax
Relator Edward J. O’Donnell filed a federal qui tam suit against his employer, alleging the employer violated the federal False Claims Act. As a financial incentive to take on this role, the FCA provided relators with a portion of any award that the federal government obtains in the qui tam action. The United States government ultimately settled with O’Donnell’s employer. O’Donnell received a 16% share of the settlement, or $34,560,000. The question before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in this case was whether this qui tam award was taxable in Pennsylvania as compensation under Section 303 of the Pennsylvania Tax Reform Code, 72 P.S. section 7303. The Supreme Court held that it was, thus reversing the order of the Commonwealth Court. View "O'Donnell v. Allegheny Co. Tax" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Tax Law
General Motors Corp. v. Pennsylvania
General Motors was a Delaware corporation engaged in the sale of motor vehicles in Pennsylvania, and subject to Pennsylvania’s corporate income tax. GM contested the calculation of its 2001 Tax Year corporate income tax, after filing a report of change in its federal taxable income in March 2010. In February 2012, GM timely filed a petition for refund with the Department of Revenue’s (“Department”) Board of Appeals. It claimed that the cap on the net loss carryover (NLC) resulted in a “progressive effective tax rate” which violated the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. It explained that “a taxpayer conducting business on a larger scale in Pennsylvania pays a higher effective tax rate than a similarly situated taxpayer conducting business on a smaller scale.” In Nextel Communications of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Department of Revenue, 171 A.3d 682 (Pa. 2017), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the NLC deduction applicable to corporate income tax for the tax year ending December 31, 2007 (“2007 Tax Year”), violated the Uniformity Clause. Here, the Court applied Nextel and considered GM's constitutional challenges to the NLC provisions applicable to corporate income tax in the tax year ending December 31, 2001 (“2001 Tax Year”). The Supreme Court agreed with the Commonwealth Court that Nextel applied retroactively to this case, however, it reversed the Commonwealth Court to the extent it remedied the violation of the Uniformity Clause by severing the $2 million NLC deduction cap, which would have resulted in an unlimited NLC deduction. Instead, the Supreme Court severed the NLC deduction provision in its entirety, resulting in no NLC deduction for the 2001 Tax Year. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s order to the extent it directed the Department to recalculate GM’s corporate income tax without capping the NLC deduction and issue a refund for the 2001 Tax Year, which the Court concluded was required to remedy the due process violation of GM’s rights pursuant to McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Department of Business Regulation of Florida, 496 U.S. 18 (1990). View "General Motors Corp. v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law
Greenwood Gaming v. Pennsylvania
Appellee Greenwood Gaming & Entertainment Inc. (“Greenwood”) operated Parx Casino (“Parx”), located in Bensalem, Pennsylvania. During 2014, as part of its efforts to encourage slot machine and table game play, Greenwood distributed to patrons of Parx who played its slot machines and table games various “promotions, giveaways and direct player development:” items given away included cash, department store gift cards, and items of personal property. Parx also gave away tickets to attend live concerts and entertainment performances. In 2016, Greenwood filed a petition for refund with the Board of Appeals of the Department of Revenue (“Board of Appeals”) for the calendar year 2014, contending that it was entitled under Section 1103 of the Pennsylvania Gaming Act to exclude from the taxable revenue attributable to its table games and slot machines the value of all cash and personal property it distributed to the players of those games. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that concert tickets were not services within the meaning of Section 1103, and so were excludible from these taxable revenues. View "Greenwood Gaming v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law
In Re: Appeal of Coatesville Area Sch Dist
Two taxing districts undertook parallel challenges to a property’s partial tax exemption. Appellee Huston Properties, Inc. (“Taxpayer”), owned the subject property (the “Property”). In 2013, Taxpayer, claiming to be a charitable institution, sought tax-exempt status for the Property for the 2014 tax year. After a hearing, the Chester County Board of Assessment Appeals granted a partial exemption, reasoning that that portion of the Property was used for charitable purposes. The City of Coatesville appealed that decision to the Court of Common Pleas. Six days later, the Coatesville Area School District, another taxing authority encompassing the Property, lodged its own appeal, also challenging the Property’s partially-tax-exempt status. The School District also intervened in the City's case. Ultimately, the trial court affirmed the Board's grant of a partial exemption. Both the City and the School District appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and Taxpayer cross-appealed as to each, seeking fully-exempt status for the Property. In a memorandum decision, the Commonwealth Court vacated and remanded to the trial court for more specific findings to support the partial tax exemption. On remand, the trial court set forth particularized findings and conclusions, and re-affirmed its earlier decision assessing the Property. At this juncture, the City elected not to appeal to the Commonwealth Court. The School District appealed the ruling in its own case, but it did not appeal the identical, simultaneous ruling which contained the City’s docket number. Taxpayer moved to quash the School District’s appeal. The Commonwealth Court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal observing that the common pleas court’s ruling in the City’s case became final after no party appealed it. Because the School District had intervened in that matter, it was a party to those proceedings. With that premise, the court found that res judicata and collateral estoppel barred it from reaching the merits. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that issue preclusion under the rubric of collateral estoppel should not have been applied to defeat the School District’s ability to obtain merits review of its substantive arguments in the intermediate court. The Commonwealth Court's judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for a merits disposition of the consolidated cross-appeals. View "In Re: Appeal of Coatesville Area Sch Dist" on Justia Law