Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2008, a high school student was involved in a traffic stop and was subsequently arrested for illegal possession of prescription drugs. Later that evening, Pennsylvania State Trooper Scott Miscannon met with the student, who quickly agreed to become a confidential informant. The trooper proposed that the student engage in a controlled buy in order to inculpate the arrestee's drug supplier. The student agreed to participate and identified Appellee as his dealer named "Wes," provided a description of Wes's appearance and his automobile, and indicated he could contact Wes via cell phone. The Commonwealth charged Appellee with three counts each of possession of a controlled substance, possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Appellee filed a motion to suppress the entirety of the evidence against him based upon alleged violation of the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress, and the Commonwealth appealed to Superior Court. In a unanimous, unpublished memorandum opinion, the Superior Court affirmed the suppression of the evidence. Reviewing the Act's definitions of "intercept[ion]" and "device," the court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that the cell phone did not fall within the definition of a "device" under the Act. While the court agreed that the cell phone was not a device with respect to the student, it opined that the phone was nevertheless a device with respect to Trooper Miscannon because the service provider had not furnished it to him. Accordingly, the court concluded that Trooper Miscannon's dialing, direction to place the call on speaker mode, and listening to the conversation constituted his use of the student's cell phone, and, because the trooper was not a furnished "subscriber or user" of the cell phone, this use was an unlawful interception under the provisions of the Act. Analyzing the statutory language employed by the General Assembly in the definitional portion of the Wiretap Act, the Supreme Court saw "no basis upon which to categorize the [student's] cell phone as a device with respect to him, but not as a device with respect to the Commonwealth." Accordingly the Superior Court's order was reversed.View "Pennsylvania v. Spence" on Justia Law

In 2008, the dismembered body of Deanna Null was discovered in seven garbage bags strewn along Pennsylvania Routes 80 and 380. After receiving information that Null was last seen riding with appellee, police interviewed him. He admitted smoking crack cocaine with Null in the past and giving her money and drugs in exchange for sex. Appellee was arrested and charged with criminal homicide, aggravated assault, tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, and abuse of a corpse. The Commonwealth sought the death penalty. Prior to trial, the Commonwealth provided notice under Pa.R.E. 404(b)2 of its intent to present evidence of "prior bad acts" through several named witnesses. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on Pa.R.E. 403 and 404(b). The trial court ruled pre-trial that certain Commonwealth witnesses identified pursuant to Rule 404 would be cumulative, rendering their testimony inadmissible under Rule 403. The Court concluded this was error, reversed the Superior Court's order, and remanded to the trial court. View "Pennsylvania v. Hicks" on Justia Law

Greenwood Gaming and Entertainment appealed the Commonwealth Court's en banc decision overruling exceptions and affirming a panel decision of that court, which likewise affirmed the order of the Board of Finance and Review regarding calculation of a slot machine tax. Greenwood petitioned the Supreme Court to reverse the decision and hold that the relevant section of the Gaming Act (4 Pa.C.S. sections 1101-1904) allowed for the cost of promotional awards given away by the gaming facility to be subtracted prior to calculation of the "gross terminal revenue" for purposes of slot machine taxes. Upon review of the arguments of the parties, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings: "to be deductible, the promotional awards must result from playing slot machines, and Greenwood is obligated to prove as much. After review of the Stipulation, we conclude that questions of fact remain concerning whether the specific awards claimed are a 'result of playing a slot machine.'" View "Greenwood Gaming v. PA Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Mechanics' Lien Law of 1963 authorized a union employee benefit trust to file a lien on behalf of union members who performed work for a construction contractor. Developer raised a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer as to each complaint, alleging that the Trustees lacked standing to assert a mechanics' lien claim on behalf of the unionized workers because such workers were employees of Contractor and, as such, were neither "contractors" nor "subcontractors." The Supreme Court concluded that the union workers were not subcontractors, and the Trustees, by corollary in their representative capacity, were not entitled file a lien claim on the workers' behalf. Although the 1963 Act was intended to protect subcontractors who suffer harm occasioned by the primary contractor’s failure to meet its obligations, we have determined that the Legislature did not intend the term "subcontractor" to subsume employees of the primary contractor. Furthermore, the Superior Court erred in overturning the demurrers based on an implied-in-fact contract theory. The order of the Superior Court was reversed, and the case is remanded for reinstatement of the county court’s order. View "Bricklayers of Western PA v. Scott's" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether county commissioners could place an ordinance-generated referendum question on the primary election ballot seeking to amend a home rule charter without first seeking election of a commissioned study when the question adopted by the ordinance attempted to abolish certain row offices. In 2013, the Lackawanna County Board of Commissioners sought to direct that a referendum question be placed on the May 21, 2013, municipal primary election ballot proposing to abolish the elected offices of Sheriff, Clerk of Judicial Records, Recorder of Deeds and Register of Wills, and to redefine the duties that had been assigned to those positions as legislative powers under its Charter. Appellant Joseph Pilchesky filed a pro se petition requesting that the trial court strike the ballot question or, in the alternative, that the Board of Elections separate the single ballot question into four queries, one for each of the offices to be abolished. In his petition, Pilchesky also asserted that Ordinance 224 directed a ballot question that proposed a change in the form of government rather than an amendment to the Charter and that such a change can be effected only by petition or ordinance seeking election of a government study commission under 53 Pa.C.S. 2911. The trial court denied the challenge seeking to bar Ordinance 224 from appearing on the primary ballot, and rejeted Pilchesky's argument that the changes to the existing form of government proffered by Ordinance 224 could be accomplished by the statutorily mandated government study commission. In an unpublished memorandum opinion, the Commonwealth Court unanimously affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that in light of the plain language of the Home Rule Law and the considerations Pilchesky raised, the amendment proposed by the Commissioners constituted a change in the form of government that could have been accomplished only by following the procedure outlined in Subchapter B of the Home Rule Law. The decision of the Commonwealth Court was Reversed. View "Pilchesky v. Lackawanna County" on Justia Law

In this case, the trial and intermediate courts determined that a general contractor was not a statutory employer relative to an employee of its subcontractor. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on the tension between such rulings and the Supreme Court’s longstanding jurisprudence that conventional subcontract scenarios serve as paradigm instances in which the statutory-employment concept applies. Appellant Worthington Associates, Inc., was hired as the general contractor for an addition to a Levittown church. Worthington, in turn, entered into a standard-form subcontract with Patton Construction, Inc., of which Appellee Earl Patton was the sole shareholder and an employee, to perform carpentry. While working at the construction site, Mr. Patton fell and sustained injuries to his back. Subsequently, the Pattons commenced a civil action against Worthington contending that the company failed to maintain safe conditions at the jobsite. Worthington moved for summary judgment on the basis that it was Mr. Patton’s statutory employer and, accordingly, was immune from suit. After the motion was denied, trial proceeded during which Worthington reasserted its claim to immunity in unsuccessful motions for a nonsuit and a directed verdict. "Having set up an errant dichotomy for the jurors, the [trial] court proceeded to instruct them concerning the differences between independent contractors and employees at common law. In doing so, the trial court compounded the underlying conceptual difficulties it had engendered, because [the Supreme] Court has long held that, for the salient purposes under Sections 203 and 302(b) of the WCA, the term 'independent contractor' carries a narrower meaning than it does at common law." The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Pattons in the amount of $1.5 million in the aggregate. Post-trial motions were denied, and Worthington appealed. A Superior Court panel affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Mr. Patton’s relationship with the owner here was undeniably a derivative one, arising per a conventional subcontract with a general contractor (Worthington). "[U]nder longstanding precedent, neither Patton Construction, Inc., nor Mr. Patton was an 'independent contractor' relative to Worthington." View "Patton v. Worthington Associates" on Justia Law

Appellant Lance Arrington appealed the death sentence he received after a jury convicted him of first-degree murder and for violating the Uniform Firearms Act. While appellant raised numerous claims of error to challenge the sentence, the Supreme Court found none and affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Arrington" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Superior Court erred in affirming the trial court's suppression of physical evidence seized incident to arrest based on an expired arrest warrant where the arresting officer reasonably believed the warrant was valid. Upon review of the particular circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court was correct in suppressing the evidence in question here. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court. View "Pennsylvania v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Appellant Michelle Sue Tharp was convicted of first degree murder and related offenses after she deliberately starved her seven-year-old daughter to death. After her judgment of sentence was affirmed on appeal, Appellant filed a petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). Following several evidentiary hearings, the Court of Common Pleas (PCRA court) dismissed Appellant’s petition. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA court’s denial of relief on Appellant’s guilt phase claims, and reversed on the PCRA court’s denial of relief on the claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present mental health mitigation evidence during the penalty phase of trial. Accordingly, the case was remanded for a new penalty hearing. View "Pennsylvania v. Tharp" on Justia Law

This case was a direct appeal of a death sentence imposed after a jury convicted Appellant Jeffrey Martin of one count of first-degree murder and other charges arising from the strangulation death of a twelve-year-old girl. The jury concluded, with respect to the circumstances of the murder, that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances, and imposed the death sentence. The primary issues raised by Appellant on appeal centered on whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdicts for the additional charges of rape, sexual assault, and statutory sexual assault. Appellant argued that because there was insufficient evidence to prove that the killings had been committed during the perpetration of these felonies, the jury considered non-existing aggravating circumstances when it imposed the sentence of death. Appellant also challenged the ruling of the suppression court that allowed certain evidence to be presented against him at trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. Martin" on Justia Law