Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether it is against public policy to release reckless behavior in a pre-injury exculpatory clause. Appellant Camelback Ski Corporation, Inc. (“Camelback”) operates a ski resort in Tannersville, Pennsylvania that offers various winter activities, including skiing and snow tubing. Before permitting its patrons to enjoy snow tubing, Camelback requires each customer to sign a pre-printed release form. In 2003, Appellee Barbara Lichtman Tayar and her family visited Camelback’s facility in the early afternoon. Appellee and her family decided to join in, and, pursuant to Camelback’s requirement, Appellee signed the Release. Appellee and her family elected to use the family tubing slopes, and completed four successful runs down the mountain, with Appellant Brian Monaghan, a Camelback employee, releasing them from the summit safely each time. On the fifth time down the mountain, Appellee exited her snow tube and was immediately struck by another snow tuber coming down the slope. Employees rushed to assist Appellee out of the receiving area. As a result of the collision, Appellee suffered multiple comminuted factures of her right leg, for which she underwent surgery and required two metal plates and 14 screws to stabilize her ankle. A majority of the appellate court determined that the release at issue was valid only with respect to Camelback (and not Monaghan), and relieved Camelback from liability for only negligent conduct. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s order in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the case. The Court reversed the order of the Superior Court to the degree it concluded that Monaghan was not covered by the Release. The Court affirmed the order to the degree it reversed the grant of summary judgment on the basis that the Release did not bar claims based on reckless conduct, and remanded for further proceedings; on the latter point, the Court affirmed on the alternative basis that, to the degree it released reckless conduct, the Release was against public policy. View "Tayar v. Camelback Ski Corp., Inc." on Justia Law

This case was a direct appeal from a Commonwealth Court order which set aside the nomination petition of Andrew Gales as a Democratic Candidate for Pennsylvania State Representative in the 57th Legislative District. On April 4, 2012, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court, directed that the candidate’s name be printed on the April 24, 2012 primary election ballot, and indicated that an opinion would follow. The Court released its rationale for that order, and held that the Election Code does not prohibit an elector from signing a nomination petition using an obvious diminutive form of his or her first name, rather than the formal first name that appears on the elector’s voter registration card. View "In re Nomination Petition of Andrew Gales" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive Act (61 Pa. C.C. 4501-4512 (RRRI Act)) applied to defendants sentenced to mandatory terms required by two drug trafficking sentencing provisions. The superior court concluded that the RRRI Act was applicable, and affirmed Appellee Frederick Hansley's sentence. The Commonwealth challenged the trial court's application of the mandatory penalties of the trafficking sentencing provisions, contending: (1) that the trial court lacked the authority to impose lesser minimum penalties than those prescribed by those statutes; and (2) the drug trafficking sentencing statutes conflict with the RRRI Act, and that the plain language of the former provisions established that the General Assembly intended the mandatory penalties to "override" any other conflicting statutes, then-existing or later-adopted. The Supreme Court affirmed, recognizing "that the effect of the RRRI Act may be to reduce the total time in prison that an offender subject to a mandatory minimum sentence must serve. But, it is eminently clear from the plain language of the legislation that the General Assembly intended that result - for a limited class of statutorily defined defendants, upon the completion of several conditions, and subject to the controlling discretion of the Parole Board. [The Court's] plain language interpretation accords with the legislative intent as [it understood] it, and gives effect to all provisions of the relevant sentencing statutes. Accordingly, the decision below is affirmed." View "Pennsylvania v. Hansley" on Justia Law

Appellant Mark Spotz appealed the denial of his petition for collateral relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder for the 1995 shooting death of Penny Gunnet for which he was sentenced to death. Appellant raised numerous issues on appeal; the Supreme Court concluded that there was "no merit" to any of the issues he raised and affirmed the decision of the PCRA court. View "Pennsylvania v. Spotz" on Justia Law

On February 6, 2007, following a narcotics investigation and surveillance operation by the Philadelphia police and the FBI, Nasir Far, Regina Little, and Garnell Brown (collectively, "Appellees") were arrested. Appellees were charged with possession with intent to deliver PCP ("PWID-PCP"), possession with intent to deliver marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and conspiracy. Appellees' cases were commenced in the Court of Common Pleas. Although the cases were listed for a preliminary hearing on several dates, the Commonwealth repeatedly failed to produce a chemical laboratory report of the PCP analysis, without which the Commonwealth could not present a prima facie case for PWID-PCP, and thus the cases were continued. In early 2008, Appellees moved for dismissal of the charges against them based on Pa.R.Crim.P. 1013(A)(4), which governs cases that commence in the Court of Common Pleas, but are subsequently transferred to Philadelphia Municipal Court. The Court of Common Pleas conducted a hearing, wherein the Commonwealth countered that Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, the general prompt trial rule applicable to the Court of Common Pleas applied to Appellees' cases. The court did not agree with the Commonwealth, but rather accepted Appellees' contention that Rule 1013(A)(4) controlled the time frame under which the Commonwealth was required to bring Appellees to trial in the Court of Common Pleas under the circumstances of this case. The question therefore, before the Supreme Court was which statute governed the circumstances of this case. The Court determined that the Superior Court incorrectly applied Rule 1013 to the circumstances of this case. Accordingly the Court reversed the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Far" on Justia Law

Appellant Willie Sneed appealed the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Appellant fatally shot Calvin Hawkins in 1980 after discovering that Hawkins and two accomplices sold him aspirin instead of cocaine. A jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder and possession of an instrument of crime. The jury found two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances, resulting in the imposition of the death sentence. Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition. It was discovered shortly before Appellant was scheduled to be executed that no one had reviewed his initial PCRA petition. A stay of execution was granted, and in 2000, Appellant with counsel filed an amended PCRA petition raising twenty-five claims of error. Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected Appellant's allegations of error for "lack of arguable merit." The case was remanded to the PCRA court to conduct a new penalty phase hearing based on the Court's prior decision stemming from Appellant's pro se petition. View "Pennsylvania v. Sneed" on Justia Law

In a matter of first impression, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the Commonwealth's waiver of application of the school zone mandatory minimum sentence at the original sentencing precluded the Commonwealth from subsequently seeking its application following the revocation of probation. In 2008, two men broke into Appellee Robert Mazzetti's apartment and stole marijuana and other items. At the time of the incident, Appellee was a college student residing in an off-campus apartment. Police would later arrest Appellee and charge him with possession with the intent to deliver the stolen marijuana. Pursuant to an agreement, Appellee pled guilty in exchange for an agreed upon sentence of twelve months of probation; the Commonwealth agreed not to prosecute the other charges. At the time of the plea, the Commonwealth agreed to waive the mandatory minimum sentence applicable to possession in a school zone. Appellee later violated the terms of his probation when he attempted to steal two jars of honey from a grocery store. The Commonwealth moved to revoke Appellee's probation, and provided notice of its intent to seek the school zone mandatory minimum for the possession conviction. The trial court deferred resentencing to allow the parties to brief the issue of whether the Commonwealth could ask the court to impose the school zone mandatory minimum at resentencing following the probation revocation. The trial court eventually ruled that it was not required to impose the mandatory minimum sentence, and the Superior Court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the statutory scheme governing the mandatory minimum precluded the Commonwealth from requesting imposition of the mandatory minimum at resentencing when it waived its initial applicability. View "Pennsylvania v. Mazzetti" on Justia Law

At issue in this direct appeal to the Supreme Court was a statutory prerequisite to the obligation of the Insurance Department to defend certain medical professional liability actions asserted against health care providers, and to the requirement for payment of claims asserted in such actions from the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Fund. Specifically, resolution of the appeal turned on when, under the governing statute, a "claim" is "made" outside a specified four-year time period. On June 4, 2007, Joanna Ziv filed a praecipe for a writ of summons naming Appellant Phillip Yussen, M.D. and other medical providers as defendants. A complaint was filed on August 2, 2007, alleging medical negligence last occurring on July 7, 2003. Appellant’s primary insurer, Pennsylvania Healthcare Providers Insurance Exchange, requested that the claim be accorded Section 715 status by the Insurance Department. The Department denied such request, however, on the basis that the claim had been made less than four years after the alleged malpractice. Appellant initially challenged this determination in the administrative setting, and a hearing ensued. Before the examiner, Appellant argued that, consistent with the policy definition of a "claim," the date on which a claim is made for purposes of Section 715 cannot precede the date on which notice is provided to the insured. Appellee, on the other hand, contended that a claim is made when it is first asserted, instituted, or comes into existence - including upon the tender of a demand or the commencement of a legal action - and that notice to the insured or insurer is not a necessary prerequisite. In this regard, Appellee Medical Care Availability & Reduction of Error Fund highlighted that Section 715 does require "notice" of the claim to trigger the provider's obligation to report the claim to the Fund within 180 days, but the statute does not contain such an express notice component in delineating the four-year requirement. The Commonwealth Court sustained exceptions to the hearing examiner's recommendation lodged by Appellee and entered judgment in its favor. In its review, the Supreme Court found "claim" and "made" as used in Section 715 ambiguous. The Court determined that for purposes of Section 715, the mere filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons does not suffice to make a claim, at least in absence of some notice or demand communicated to those from whom damages are sought. The Court remanded the case for entry of judgment in Appellant's favor. View "Yussen v. Med. Care Availability & Reduction of Error Fund" on Justia Law

In 1985, the Board of Commissioners of Lackawanna County formed the Multi-Purpose Stadium Authority of Lackawanna County. The Stadium Authority subsequently acquired a minor league baseball team, now the "SWB Yankees." Capital was raised via bonds and other public financing, the Authority constructed the Lackawanna County Stadium, now known as PNC Field to serve as the home field for the franchise. From 1989 to 2006, the Authority managed all projects at the Stadium, including the day-to-day operations of the team. The Authority eventually consummated a management agreement with Mandalay Baseball Properties, LLC, a private entity, which vested Mandalay with the overall management and control of the day-to-day operations of the baseball club and the Stadium. Under the contract, Appellant SWB Yankees, LLC became the sole and exclusive manager of all baseball operations and other entertainment activities and events conducted at the Stadium. Gretchen Wintermantel, a reporter for the Scranton Times Tribune (collectively “Appellees”), submitted a request to the Stadium Authority seeking “access to and copies of all names and the bids submitted to [Appellant] for a concessionaire contract at [the Stadium].” Appellees invoked the Right-to-Know Law, which generally provides for access to “public records,” of a Commonwealth or local agency. The Stadium Authority’s solicitor denied the request, stating that the Authority did not possess such information, and that it was not performing a governmental function on behalf of the Stadium Authority. Appellees appealed to the Office of Open Records, taking the position that any action by Appellant as the Stadium Authority’s agent is public business. In its opinion, the court of common pleas initially rejected Appellant’s argument that the bids for a concessionaire contract were not “records” for purposes of the Right-to-Know Law, since Appellees’ request was phrased broadly such that it might be read as subsuming intangible information. After Appellant lodged an appeal, the Commonwealth Court issued its decision in "East Stroudsburg University Foundation v. OOR," (995 A.2d 496 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010)) determining that “all contracts that governmental entities enter into with private contractors necessarily carry out a ‘governmental function’ [for purposes of Section 506(d)(1)] --because the government always acts as the government.” Having reviewed the relevant statutory scheme, the parties’ arguments, and the record, the Supreme Court agreed with the appeals officer, the court of common pleas, and the Commonwealth Court that the disclosure of any written concessionaire bids is required per Section 506(d)(1) of the Right-to-Know Law. View "SWB Yankees, LLC v. Wintermantel" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether Appellant Six L's Packing Company and its claims administrator Broadspire Services, Inc. bore liability for workers' compensation benefits as a statutory employer of an injured truck driver employed as an independent contractor. Appellant owns and leases various farms and distribution and processing facilities in North America. Claimant suffered injuries in a vehicle accident on a Pennsylvania roadway while transporting Appellant’s tomatoes between a warehouse in Pennsylvania and a processing facility in Maryland. Appellant submitted evidence to establish that it did not own trucks or employ drivers, but, rather, utilized independent contractors to supply transportation services. Appellant thus took the position that it was not Claimant’s employer. The WCJ found Appellant liable for payment of workers' compensation benefits. On further appeal, the Commonwealth Court affirmed on essentially the same reasoning as that of the WCJ. In its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court, recognizing "a degree of ambiguity inherent in the overall scheme for statutory employer liability, arising out of differences in the definitions for “contractor” as used in various provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA); the idiosyncratic conception of subcontracting fashioned in Section 302(a) [of the Act]; the substantial overlap between Sections 302(a) and (b); and the apparent differences in the depiction of the concept of statutory employment as between the Act’s liability and immunity provisions. Viewing the statutory scheme as a whole, however, and employing the principle of liberal construction in furtherance of the Act’s remedial purposes, [the Court found] it to be plain enough that the Legislature meant to require persons (including entities) contracting with others to perform work which is a regular or recurrent part of their businesses to assure that the employees of those others are covered by workers’ compensation insurance, on pain of assuming secondary liability for benefits payment upon a default." View "Six L's Packing Co. v. WCAB" on Justia Law