Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellee United States Organizations for Bankruptcy Alternatives, Inc. (USOBA) and Appellant Department of Banking challenged different aspects of the Commonwealth Court's decision that the Pennsylvania Debt Management Services Act (Act 117) was unconstitutional in part. At the request of the Supreme Court, the parties addressed whether the lower court's disposition was a final order appealable pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Procedure. The General Assembly adopted Act 117 in October 2008 to regulate, in relevant part, providers of debt settlement services (“DSS”). A DSS provider negotiates with creditors on behalf of a consumer “for the purpose of the creditor forgiving part or all of the principal of the debt incurred or credit extended to that consumer.” Pursuant to Section 3(b) of Act 117, DSS providers are prohibited from operating in Pennsylvania without a license from the Banking Department, and are required to comply with the Department’s regulations. Other sections of Act 117 list licensing fees, describe the initial licensing, license renewal, revocation, and reinstatement processes, and create penalties for violations of the statute. USOBA claimed that Act 117 violates the non-delegation, equal protection, and due process provisions of the Pennsylvania and U.S. Constitutions, and requested a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and compensation for attorneys’ fees and costs. The Department denied the allegations, and filed an Application for Summary Relief, claiming that the contentions in the complaint were insufficient as a matter of law to state a claim. Following a hearing, the Commonwealth Court denied the Department’s application in an unpublished opinion. Upon review of the Act, the applicable legal authority and the trial record, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court's order was not appealable and quashed the parties' appeals. View "United States Org. for Bankruptcy Alt. v. Dept. of Banking" on Justia Law

Appellant Anne Marie Morack worked for Appellee Gentex Corporation for over thirty years. In 2005, she left when swelling and pain in her hands were too overwhelming for her to continue work. She sought medical help, and notified her employer of the pain. In early 2005, Appellant applied for short-term disability, noting on her application for benefits that she did not believe her injury was work-related. After consultation with a specialist, Appellee learned that her injury was work-related. Gentex ultimately appealed the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board's decision granting Appellant's claim to the Commonwealth Court, contending that Appellant did not timely notify her supervisor of the injury nor aptly describe the injury to comply with the state workers' compensation act. The Commonwealth Court reversed, finding Appellant did not aptly describe her injury nor give Gentex adequate notice. The Supreme Court granted allocatur to determine what constitutes sufficient notice under the Act, and to "speak to" an employer's duty to conduct reasonable investigations into the circumstances surrounding a work-related injury. Under the Act, notice is a prerequisite to receive workers' compensation benefits, and the claimant bears the burden of demonstrating that proper notice was given. Upon review of the applicable case law in this instance, the Court found that, "consistent with the humanitarian purposes of the Act, [the Court] made it clear that even imperfect notice can satisfy" its strictures. The Court employed a "totality of the circumstances" approach to determining whether Appellant in this case both satisfied the notice and description of the injury in making her claim for benefits. In reversing the Commonwealth Court, the Supreme Court found that Appellant's collective communications with Gentex satisfied the notification requirements of the Act. View "Gentex Corp v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

The issue in this case centers around whether an inoperable handgun is considered a "firearm" for sentencing purposes. In 2006, Appellant Sue Zortman and her boyfriend were the subject of a grand jury investigation regarding suspected drug activity. Appellant allowed state narcotics agents to search her home and purse. The agents found various amounts of marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a bank deposit bag and a loaded .357 Magnum handgun. Appellant would eventually be sentenced to five years' imprisonment with three years' probation. Appellant argued on appeal that the mandatory minimum sentence should not have been imposed upon her since at the time of her arrest, the handgun was "inoperable" due to the absence of a firing pin. The State argued that the applicable sentencing statute does not require that the gun be functional for the mandatory minimum sentence to be applicable. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that it did not matter whether the gun was operational, it was still a gun. The Court affirmed Appellant's sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Zortman " on Justia Law

Claimant Kevin Ressler suffered a work-related injury in 1995. He received Workers' Compensation benefits. In 2004, Claimant submitted to an independent medical evaluation (IME). The sequence of events since the IME make up the heart of this appeal. In June 2004, Claimant had surgery related with his work-related injury. In July 2004, his employer petitioned to terminate benefits as of the date of the IME. The employer also requested a supersedeas. The Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) denied the superseadas in August 2004. In October of that year, the insurer received the invoice for the June surgery and paid the amount by the end of January, 2005. In June 2005, the WCJ granted the employer's petition to terminate benefits. The Workers' Compensation Appeal Bard (WCAB) affirmed that decision. The insurer then requested reimbursement for the 2004 surgery from the Supersedeas Fund. The Bureau of Workers' Compensation challenged the request because Claimant's surgery predated the supersedeas request. The WCJ found that no obligation to pay arose until the bill was submitted to the insurer in October 2004. Because the obligation to pay arose after the denial of supersedeas, reimbursement was appropriate. The WCAB affirmed. The issue of whether the Supersedeas Fund may deny reimbursement of treatment rendered before the insurer requested supersedeas came before the Supreme Court. Upon review of the trial record and the Workers' Compensation Act, the Court concluded that the lower courts appropriately ordered reimbursement to the insurer for undue payments made after the supersedeas request and in direct response to the earlier denial. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Bur. of Workers' Comp., Aplt v. WCAB" on Justia Law

Following a bench trial in October 2001, Appellee Jules Jette was found guilty of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, endangering the welfare of a child and corruption of minors charges. Appellee was sentenced to ten to twenty years' imprisonment, with consecutive terms of probation for seven and five years. The post-conviction-relief court (PCRA) found no merit to Appellee's claims for relief. Appellee's counsel strategically chose not to challenge all issues addressed by the PCRA court in its opinion that dismissed the case. Appellee appeared pro se to appeal to the Superior Court. The Superior Court found that Appellee was entitled to new counsel and remanded the case back to the PCRA court. The Commonwealth appealed the Superior Court's order to the Supreme Court. After a careful review of the Superior Court's opinion, the applicable law and the briefs of the parties, the Supreme Court found that the Superior Court misread the applicable legal standard which was the basis of its opinion. As a result, the Commonwealth found itself in the "unusual position" of advocating in defense of the "honor, independence and professionalism of the criminal defense bar" in its appeal of the Superior Court's order. The Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's order and remanded the case back to the PCRA for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Jette" on Justia Law

The State Ethics Commission (Commission) appealed from an order of the Commonwealth Court that reversed the Commission's findings that Appellee Kenneth Kistler had violated two provisions of the Public Official and Employee Ethics Act (Act). Appellee was a member of the Carbon-Lehigh Intermediate Unit's (CLIU) board of directors from 1998 to 2002. As chairman of the building committee, Appellee was charged with pursuing the board's interests in various construction projects. Appellee also owned two building supply businesses. In late 1999, the board explored the possibility of constructing a garage in which to house its buses. The project's architect contacted Appellee as possible supplier for the project. Subsequently, Appellee resigned from his position with CLIU as a possible conflict-of-interest. At a board meeting, the solicitor for the CLIU opined that Appellee could "properly participate" in construction of the garage, but that he should abstain from any votes relating to that project. More projects were planned, and Appellee's businesses were again considered as suppliers. By this time, Appellee had withdrawn completely from participation with the CLIU's building committee. In 2004, the Commission notified Appellee that he was being investigated for possible violations of the Ethics Act. The Commission thereafter concluded that Appellee unintentionally violated the Act three times. The Commonwealth Court reversed the Commission’s decision. In its interpretation of the Ethics Act, the court found no evidence that Appellee's participation in the building committee's discussions lead to the committee's choosing his private businesses for its building projects. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court correctly interpreted the Ethics Act and affirmed its decision. View "Kistler v. State Ethics Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 2005, Robert Sample was found face down on a Philadelphia city sidewalk, dead from multiple gunshot wounds to his head and neck. In canvassing the area for witnesses, detectives knocked on the door of a third-floor apartment in a nearby high-rise. Jamilla and Dominique Everett opened the door. After obtaining permission to enter the apartment, detectives found Jamilla's children, Dominique's boyfriend Khalif Alston and Appellee Ernest Cannon asleep inside. Everyone inside the apartment denied any knowledge of the shooting but agreed to accompany the police to the station for further questioning. Later on the day of the murder, the Everetts consented to a search of their apartment. Police recovered a semiautomatic handgun from inside the toilet tank. Everyone inside the apartment that day was questioned again. When detectives interviewed Mr. Alston, he confessed to his role in the crime and implicated Appellee. Following the consolidation of their cases, a jury tried both men. Since Appellee and Mr. Alston were being tried together, the statement that Mr. Alston gave to the police on the day of the murder was redacted by substituting the phrase "the other guy" for any reference to Appellee by name. The prosecution "slipped" and named Appellee in his opening statement as he recounted the events on the date of the murder. At the conclusion of the prosecutor's opening, Appellee objected and moved for a mistrial, claiming that the prosecutor "broke the redaction." The trial court gave the jury an immediate cautionary instruction. The jury returned a verdict against Appellee, convicting him of first-degree murder, robbery, conspiracy and carrying a firearm. The trial court then sentenced Appellee to life in prison for the murder conviction, with concurrent sentences for the other charges. On appeal to the Superior Court, Appellee successfully argued that he was entitled to a new trial because of the prosecutor's slip up during his opening statement. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that the trial judge's cautionary instruction was sufficient to support Appellee's conviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court gave "direct, unequivocal and strong" cautionary instructions, repeatedly detailing the proper manner of weighing the evidence. "The trial court, which is in the best position to assess whether any prejudice can be cured, determined that the prosecutor's comment did not justify a mistrial." Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Superior Court and reinstated the verdict and sentences of the trial court. View "Pennsylvania. v. Cannon" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court consolidated four cases to decide whether adopted children whose adoptions were procured through a state-licensed private agency in the 1990s were eligible to receive adoption assistance subsidies retroactive to the dates of the children’s adoptions and prospectively through their eighteenth birthdays. The children’s attorneys successfully argued to the Commonwealth Court that the adopted children were eligible for subsidies pursuant to the Pennsylvania Adoption Opportunities Act (AOA). The Department of Public Welfare (DPW) appealed the Commonwealth Court’s decision. Upon review of the underlying cases, the Supreme Court held that "adoption subsidies were never intended to be windfalls for adoptive parents." The Court reversed the lower court’s decision and reinstated the DPW's ruling with respect to the appellants in the consolidated cases. View "Laird v. Penna. Dep't. of Public Welfare" on Justia Law

Appellant Robert Petty is sole owner of Co-Appellant R.G. Petty Masonry. Appellants contracted with Respondent Blue Cross of Northeastern Pennsylvania (Blue Cross), a nonprofit hospital corporation that provides health insurance coverage for its employees. Appellants are covered under the group policy as subscribers. Appellants filed a four-count class action suit against Blue Cross, alleging that it violated the state Nonprofit Law by accumulating excessive profits and surplus well beyond the "incidental profit" permitted by statute. The second count alleged Blue Cross breached its contract with Appellants by violating the Nonprofit Law. The third count alleged Blue Cross owed appellants a fiduciary duty by virtue of their status as subscribers, and that duty was breached when it accrued the excess surplus. The fourth count requested an inspection of Blue Cross' business records. The trial court found Appellants lacked standing to challenge Blue Cross' alleged violations of the Nonprofit Law and dismissed the suit. The Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court. Upon careful consideration of the briefs submitted by the parties in addition to the applicable legal authorities, the Supreme Court found that Appellants indeed lacked standing under the Nonprofit Law to challenge Blue Cross by their four-count complaint. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions and dismissed Appellants' case. View "Petty v. Hospital Service Assoc. of NE Penna." on Justia Law

Defendant Ralph Birdsong unsuccessfully appealed his sentence for murder, rape and assault. He was sentenced to death. In his appeal to the Supreme Court, he argued that the appellate court improperly denied his petition for post conviction relief. Defendant cited multiple errors at trial that entitled him to a reduction in his sentence or complete dismissal of the charges against him. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and found that Defendant was not entitled to relief. The Court affirmed the order of the lower courts denying Defendant's petition for post conviction relief.