Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On August 4, 2014, Appellant Donna Javitz became the Director of Human Resources for Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. Her union-related responsibilities included participating in investigatory meetings for disciplinary matters involving union employees. In March 2015, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME” or “Union”) filed an unfair labor practice charge (“ULP Charge”) with the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board against Luzerne County, raising allegations concerning Javitz’s conduct in two investigatory meetings. Paula Schnelly, an administrative assistant in the appellate division of the Luzerne County’s District Attorney’s Office and Union president, attended the investigatory meetings referenced in the ULP Charge as a representative for the Union members. Attached to the ULP Charge were documents in support of the allegations, among them were what appeared to Javitz to be transcripts of the investigatory meetings at issue. The highly detailed nature of the documents, as well as Javitz’s recollection that Schnelly did not take notes during investigatory meetings, gave rise to a suspicion on Javitz’s part that Schnelly recorded the investigatory meeting in violation of the Wiretap Act. Javitz took her concern to the Director of Administrative Services, David Parsnik. Together they took the matter to the Luzerne County District Attorney. The District Attorney stated that she would refer the matter to the Attorney General’s Office to investigate, as Schnelly’s employment in the District Attorney’s office created a conflict of interest. Javitz contended, she learned the County Manager, Robert Lawton, instructed the District Attorney to drop the matter. In October 2015, the Union and County settled the ULP Charge. A week later, Javitz was terminated from her position. Javitz filed suit in federal district court, naming Luzerne County, Lawton, and Parsnik as defendants. Her complaint raised federal and state claims, including a claim under the Whistleblower Law. The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court related to the standard that a plaintiff must meet in order to establish a prima facie claim under Pennsylvania’s Whistleblower Law and whether the Commonwealth Court erred in its application of that standard. The Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court did so err. Its order was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Javitz v. Luzerne Co., et al." on Justia Law

This case was one of many lawsuits concerning Act 13 of 2012, which amended Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas Act. Act 13 included the grant of authority by the General Assembly to the Agencies to promulgate regulations for unconventional gas wells. In October 2016, the Marcellus Shale Coalition (the “MSC”) filed a Petition seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, raising seven counts, only one of which was at issue in this appeal. That count pertained to portions of the regulations set forth at Sections 78a.1 and 78a.15. Each challenged regulatory provision interacted to some degree with Section 3215 of the Oil and Gas Act of 2012, titled “Well location restrictions.” In this appeal as of right, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was asked to pass upon the breadth of the legislative rulemaking authority given to the Department of Environmental Protection (the “Department”) and the Environmental Quality Board (the “Board”) (collectively, the “Agencies”) by the General Assembly in the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act of 1984. The Agencies contended the Commonwealth Court erroneously concluded that they exceeded their authority and consequently struck down certain regulations designed to aid the Agencies in information gathering attendant to the issuance of permits for new unconventional gas wells. The Supreme Court found the General Assembly intended to give the Agencies the leeway to promulgate the challenged regulations and that those regulations were reasonable. The Court therefore reversed the Commonwealth Court. View "Marcellus Shale Coalition v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, et al." on Justia Law

In March 2016, Appellant Jose Vellon was arrested for DUI of alcohol pursuant to Subsection 3802(a)(1) of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) (general impairment). A violation of this statute constituted an “ungraded misdemeanor.” Vellon was accepted into the Accelerated Rehabilitation Disposition (“ARD”) Program. Several months later, police charged Vellon with another DUI. As a result of the Second DUI, the trial court entered an order removing Vellon from ARD. Vellon pleaded guilty to the First and Second DUIs, and in October 2017, he was sentenced on both DUI violations. Appellee Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (“PennDOT”) informed Vellon that it would be suspending his driving privileges as a collateral consequence of his DUI convictions pursuant to Section 3804 of the Vehicle Code. Vellon appealed only his license suspension for the First DUI. In this appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was asked whether the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that, in drafting Section 3806, the General Assembly intended to mandate that, when a defendant is sentenced for two driving-under- the-influence (“DUI”) offenses on the same day, both offenses had be considered prior offenses to each other with each warranting civil recidivist collateral consequences, despite the facts that the defendant committed the DUI violations at different points in time and had never previously been convicted of DUI. To this, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Commonwealth Court and reversed that court’s order. View "Vellon v. Dept of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Secretary of the Commonwealth decertified certain voting equipment that Fulton County acquired from Dominion Voting Systems, Inc. (“Dominion”) in 2019 and used in the 2020 general election. The Secretary decertified the voting equipment after learning that, following the 2020 election, Fulton County had allowed Wake Technology Services, Inc. (“Wake TSI”), to perform a probing inspection of that equipment as well as the software and data contained therein. The Secretary maintained that Wake TSI’s inspection had compromised the integrity of the equipment. Fulton County and the other named Petitioner-Appellees petitioned in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction to challenge the Secretary’s decertification authority generally and as applied in this case. During the pleading stage, the Secretary learned that Fulton County intended to allow another entity, Envoy Sage, LLC, to inspect the allegedly compromised equipment. The Secretary sought a protective order from the Commonwealth Court barring that inspection and any other third-party inspection during the litigation. The court denied relief. The Secretary appealed that ruling to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which entered a temporary order on January 27, 2022, to prevent the inspection and to preserve the status quo during the Court's review of the Secretary’s appeal. Months later—and with no public consideration, official proceedings, or notice to the courts or other parties to this litigation—the County allowed yet another party, Speckin Forensics, LLC to inspect the voting equipment and electronic evidence at issue in this litigation. Upon learning of this alleged violation of the temporary order, the Secretary filed an “Application for an Order Holding [the County] in Contempt and Imposing Sanctions.” The Supreme Court found Fulton County willfully violated the Supreme Court's order. The Court found Fulton County and its various attorneys engaged in a "sustained, deliberate pattern of dilatory, obdurate, and vexatious conduct and have acted in bad faith throughout these sanction proceedings." Taken as a whole, that behavior prompted the Court to sanction both the County and the County Attorney. View "County of Fulton, et al. v. Sec. of Com." on Justia Law

Appellants Robert and Kelly Franks sought automobile insurance from Appellee, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company in 2013 for their two vehicles. Appellants included underinsured motorist coverage (“UIM”) in their policy but completed a form rejecting stacked UIM coverage in compliance with Section 1738(d)(2) of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”). Absent such waiver, stacked coverage would be the default. Appellants removed one of the original vehicles and added a third vehicle to the policy effective 2014, and again rejected stacked UIM coverage. They made another change to the policy in 2015, removing the other of the original insured vehicles with a different car. No additional form rejecting stacked UIM coverage was offered or sought to be completed on the occasion of the removal of the last vehicle, and the ongoing premiums paid by Appellants reflected the lower rate for non-stacked UIM overage on two vehicles. Robert was injured in an accident caused by the negligence of a third party. That party had insufficient liability coverage to cover Robert's injuries. Appellants initiated a claim for UIM benefits under their policy with State Farm, but the parties disagreed on the limit to their benefits. Appellants contended with the last change to the policy, there was no valid waiver of stacked UIM coverage, resulting in a default stacked coverage mandated by statute. The issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review in this matter was whether the Superior Court erred as a matter of law by holding that removal of a vehicle from a multiple motor vehicle insurance policy, in which stacked coverage had previously been waived, did not require a renewed express waiver of stacked coverage pursuant to Section 1738(c). The Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court did not err and affirmed its judgment. View "Franks, et al. v. State Farm Mutual" on Justia Law

In Commonwealth v. Eid, 249 A.3d 1030 (Pa. 2021), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found Section 1543(b)(1.1)(i) of the Vehicle Code unconstitutionally vague in contravention of state and federal due process principles because it failed to specify a maximum term of imprisonment. The Court granted allowance of appeal in this case to determine whether another subsection of that same statute, Section 1543(b)(1)(iii), was unconstitutional for similarly failing to specify a maximum term of imprisonment. The Court declined to find this provision unconstitutional and therefore affirmed the Superior Court’s order. View "Pennsylvania v. Rollins" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned whether Dr. Timothy Shrom and Debra Shrom were eligible under the Pennsylvania Storage Tank and Spill Prevention Act (Act) for payment from the Underground Storage Tank Indemnification Fund (Fund) for costs they incurred in remediating contamination caused by fuel releases from underground storage tanks (USTs or tanks) located on their property. The Fund concluded, and the Underground Storage Tank Indemnification Board (Board) ultimately agreed, that the Shroms were ineligible for such payment because the subject USTs were not registered with the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) as required by Section 503 of the Act and the registration fees were not paid at the time of the fuel releases that gave rise to the Shroms’ claim for remediation costs. The Commonwealth Court reversed the Board’s decision on appeal, concluding that: (1) the Shroms were eligible to receive payment from the Fund for remediation costs under the Act; (2) the Board’s holding relative to the timing of the payment of the Section 503 registration fees constituted an unlawful de facto regulation; and (3) contrary to the Board’s finding, payment of the Shroms’ claim did not appear to pose any imminent risk to the Fund’s solvency. Finding no error in the Commonwealth Court’s decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. View "Shrom, et al v PA Underground Storage Tank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Respondent Lindsay Franczyk, was working at a Home Depot store when a customer’s dog bit her. Franczyk reported the bite promptly to her supervisors, Philip Rogers and Thomas Mason (collectively with Home Depot, “Defendants”). Franczyk later was diagnosed with cubital tunnel syndrome, which required surgical repair. Franczyk claimed and received Workers’ Compensation Act ("WCA") benefits. Franczyk sued Defendants. In her relevant claim, Franczyk asserts that Defendants failed to investigate the incident sufficiently, and that they negligently allowed the dog owner and witnesses to leave without obtaining identifying information. She contended these acts and omissions denied her the opportunity to file a third-party suit against the dog owner. After the pleading and discovery phases of the litigation concluded, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming immunity under the WCA’s exclusivity provision. The trial court recognized a novel exception and denied the employer’s motion for summary judgment. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed: "the exception proffered by the lower courts cannot be reconciled with the Act’s design, purpose, or plain language." Thus, judgment was reversed. View "Franczyk v. Home Depot, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant Damien Green appealed a superior court order which quashed his appeal of a Court of Common Pleas order. The superior court concluded the trial court’s order, granting decertification to a juvenile who was to be tried as an adult for murder, constituted a legal nullity because the decertification order was not filed within the time constraints set forth in Section 6322(b) of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa. C.S. § 6322(b), and Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 597 (Rule 597). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted review in this case to consider, as a matter of first impression, whether a transfer order filed after the 20-day limitation in Section 6322 of the Juvenile Act and Rule 597 was a legal nullity or should exceptions created by Pennsylvania jurisprudence under similar rules and statutes be applicable. Following oral argument, the Supreme Court entered a per curiam order October 28, 2022, affirming the Superior Court’s order quashing the appeal. The order also remanded the matter to the trial court for immediate entry of an order by the clerk of courts pursuant to Rule 597(D). View "Pennsylvania v. Green" on Justia Law

The underlying proceedings took place before the Pennsylvania Lawyers Fund for Client Security, an entity created by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to reimburse clients for financial losses caused by their attorneys. Daryl Yount, Esquire, an attorney involved in these proceedings, sought access to an audio recording of a hearing conducted on October 19, 2021, before a Hearing Committee appointed by the Fund’s Board of Trustees. Yount attempted to obtain this recording via the subpoena process in Pa.R.D.E. 521(c), an effort that the Hearing Committee rejected. The Supreme Court determined the subpoena was only valid for the purpose of summoning witnesses to testify at a hearing: he attempted to use it to require the production of an audio recording. For this reason alone, the Hearing Committee did not err in determining that Attorney Yount’s subpoena was invalid. The Supreme Court affirmed the Hearing Committee’s determination that the subpoena was invalid without prejudice, so that Attorney Yount could seek the requested item through other means. View "Yount v. Pa. Lawyers Fund Client Sec." on Justia Law