Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

As a result of a vehicle search, the Commonwealth discovered a bag of marijuana and a firearm. In connection with these items, the Commonwealth charged Appellant Timothy Barr, II with: persons not to possess a firearm, possession of a firearm without a license, and possession of a small amount of marijuana. Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion, which included a motion to suppress the physical evidence gathered by police during the search, and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that the Commonwealth could not establish a prima facie case that Appellant possessed a small amount of marijuana or committed the firearm offenses. The trial court granted the motion to suppress and granted in part the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, dismissing the count of possession of a small amount of marijuana. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in this matter to examine to what extent, if at all, the smell of marijuana could be considered when determining whether law enforcement had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle. This issue arose in light of the Pennsylvania General Assembly’s enactment of the Medical Marijuana Act, which legalized the possession and use of marijuana in limited circumstances, and the Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916 (Pa. 2019), which addressed whether police could stop and frisk a person merely based on the fact that the person possessed a concealed firearm in public. Like the Superior Court, the Supreme Court held that the smell of marijuana could be a factor, but not a stand-alone one, in determining whether the totality of the circumstances established probable cause to permit a police officer to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle. The Court disagreed with the Superior Court’s decision to remand the matter to the trial court for reconsideration of its order granting the motion to suppress filed by Timothy Barr, II (“Appellant”). Instead, that portion of the Superior Court's decision was vacated, the trial court's judgment reinstated (granting Appellant’s motion to suppress), and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Barr" on Justia Law

Relator Edward J. O’Donnell filed a federal qui tam suit against his employer, alleging the employer violated the federal False Claims Act. As a financial incentive to take on this role, the FCA provided relators with a portion of any award that the federal government obtains in the qui tam action. The United States government ultimately settled with O’Donnell’s employer. O’Donnell received a 16% share of the settlement, or $34,560,000. The question before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in this case was whether this qui tam award was taxable in Pennsylvania as compensation under Section 303 of the Pennsylvania Tax Reform Code, 72 P.S. section 7303. The Supreme Court held that it was, thus reversing the order of the Commonwealth Court. View "O'Donnell v. Allegheny Co. Tax" on Justia Law

Mother J.B., lived with her two young children (“Y.W.-B” and “N.W.-B”) and the children’s father (“Father”) in Philadelphia. In 2019, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) allegedly received a general protective services report (“GPS report”) from an unidentified source alleging possible neglect by Mother. Although DHS referenced this GPS report several times at the evidentiary hearing and used it to refresh its sole witness’s recollection, it inexplicably never introduced it into evidence. The proceedings revealed the allegation suggested Mother was homeless and failed to feed one of her children during a single eight-hour period. DHS used this allegation as grounds to enter and inspect the family residence. The issue for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was whether DHS established sufficient probable cause for the trial court to issue the order permitting entry into the home without consent. To this, the Court concluded DHS did not establish probable cause, and thus reversed the order of the Superior Court holding to the contrary. View "In the Interest of: N.W.-B." on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted expedited review of this direct appeal to decide whether the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that Acting Secretary of Health Alison Beam (“the Secretary”) lacked the power under existing law and Department of Health regulations to require individuals to wear facial coverings while inside Pennsylvania’s schools as a means of controlling the spread of COVID-19. Having determined that the Secretary exceeded her authority in issuing that directive, by per curiam order on December 10, 2021, the Court affirmed the lower court’s decision nullifying the mandate, and published this opinion expounding on its reasoning. View "Corman, J., et al. v. Beam" on Justia Law

The issue this appeal presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review involved the proposed redevelopment of a 90-year-old abandoned two-story industrial building, consisting of approximately 14,000 square feet, formerly used as a garage/warehouse facility. In 2013, Appellant Metal Green Inc. purchased the property at a sheriff’s sale for approximately $90,000. In August 2016, Mt. Airy USA, a local nonprofit, commenced a legal action against Metal Green pursuant to the 2008 Abandoned and Blighted Property Conservatorship Act (“Act 135”). A court declared the property to be blighted and abandoned and ordered Metal Green to remediate the hazards that the property posed to the community. While the court possessed the authority to order the demolition of the building, it held such action in abeyance, allowing Metal Green to not only make necessary repairs, but to pursue redevelopment of the property. The Department of Licenses and Inspections denied Metal Green’s application for a building permit to convert the warehouse to apartments. The Supreme Court considered the proper legal standard to be applied when considering an application for a “use variance” under the Philadelphia Zoning Code, as well as the appropriate standard of review for such determinations. The Court held that the minimum variance requirement, as set forth in the Philadelphia Zoning Code, applied to use variances. Additionally, in determining the entitlement to a use variance, the Court concluded considerations of property blight and abandonment were more properly evaluated under the Code’s unnecessary hardship requirement, rather than under the minimum variance requirement. Finally, the Court reaffirmed its traditional abuse of discretion or error of law standard of review with respect to a court’s review of a variance determination; however, as a component thereof, the Court allowed for review for a capricious disregard of the evidence under certain circumstances. View "Metal Green Inc. v. City of Phila, et al." on Justia Law

In 1983, David Santana was convicted of rape in New York. At the time, neither New York nor Pennsylvania had enacted a sex offender registration scheme. However, as time passed, states began enacting statutory schemes aimed at monitoring sexual offenders by requiring them to comply with strict registration and notification requirements. In 1995, New York passed the “Sex Offender Registration Act” (“SORA”), which became effective in January 1996. Pennsylvania followed suit, enacting the first version of Megan’s Law in 1995. In this case, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on whether its decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz (holding that SORNA constituted a punitive regulatory scheme that, when imposed retroactively to sex offenders who committed their offenses prior to SORNA’s enactment, amounted to an unconstitutional ex post-facto law) applied with equal force to offenders whose triggering offenses occurred in another state. The Supreme Court concluded that it did, thereby affirming the Superior Court. View "Pennsylvania v. Santana" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in this case to clarify whether resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was precluded when the plaintiff introduced enough “direct” evidence that the Doctrine was not the only avenue to a finding of liability - whether the two approaches to satisfying the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden were mutually exclusive. The Superior Court held that they were not exclusive. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court correctly vacated the trial court's refusal to charge the jury on res ipsa loquitur, and remanded for a new trial. View "Lageman v. Zepp, et al." on Justia Law

A Virginia resident filed an action in Pennsylvania against a Virginia corporation, alleging injuries in Virginia and Ohio. The plaintiff asserted that Pennsylvania courts had general personal jurisdiction over the case based exclusively upon the foreign corporation’s registration to do business in the Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that Pennsylvania's statutory scheme violated due process to the extent that it allowed for general jurisdiction over foreign corporations, absent affiliations within the state that were so continuous and systematic as to render the foreign corporation essentially at home in Pennsylvania. The Court further agreed that compliance with Pennsylvania’s mandatory registration requirement did not constitute voluntary consent to general personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order, which sustained the foreign corporation’s preliminary objections and dismissed the action with prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway" on Justia Law

General Motors was a Delaware corporation engaged in the sale of motor vehicles in Pennsylvania, and subject to Pennsylvania’s corporate income tax. GM contested the calculation of its 2001 Tax Year corporate income tax, after filing a report of change in its federal taxable income in March 2010. In February 2012, GM timely filed a petition for refund with the Department of Revenue’s (“Department”) Board of Appeals. It claimed that the cap on the net loss carryover (NLC) resulted in a “progressive effective tax rate” which violated the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. It explained that “a taxpayer conducting business on a larger scale in Pennsylvania pays a higher effective tax rate than a similarly situated taxpayer conducting business on a smaller scale.” In Nextel Communications of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Department of Revenue, 171 A.3d 682 (Pa. 2017), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the NLC deduction applicable to corporate income tax for the tax year ending December 31, 2007 (“2007 Tax Year”), violated the Uniformity Clause. Here, the Court applied Nextel and considered GM's constitutional challenges to the NLC provisions applicable to corporate income tax in the tax year ending December 31, 2001 (“2001 Tax Year”). The Supreme Court agreed with the Commonwealth Court that Nextel applied retroactively to this case, however, it reversed the Commonwealth Court to the extent it remedied the violation of the Uniformity Clause by severing the $2 million NLC deduction cap, which would have resulted in an unlimited NLC deduction. Instead, the Supreme Court severed the NLC deduction provision in its entirety, resulting in no NLC deduction for the 2001 Tax Year. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s order to the extent it directed the Department to recalculate GM’s corporate income tax without capping the NLC deduction and issue a refund for the 2001 Tax Year, which the Court concluded was required to remedy the due process violation of GM’s rights pursuant to McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Department of Business Regulation of Florida, 496 U.S. 18 (1990). View "General Motors Corp. v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

Following the death of their twenty-five-year-old son Cory Bisher (“Cory”), Brenton and Carla Bisher filed suit, without representation by counsel, against eleven defendants comprising both named individuals and corporate entities alleging their medical malpractice resulting in Cory’s death. Each parent brought their own wrongful death claims, and Carla filed a survival action on behalf of Cory’s estate (“Estate”). Following protracted proceedings, the trial court struck the amended complaint with prejudice because of defects in the Certificates of Merit mandated by Rule of Civil Procedure 1042.3 in professional liability suits against licensed professionals. On appeal, the Superior Court sua sponte determined that the Bishers committed two errors that jointly deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over all claims: Carla’s unauthorized practice of law and the lack of verification of the complaint. The panel concluded that it too lacked jurisdiction and quashed the appeal. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that neither the unauthorized practice of law in the trial court, nor the lack of verification identified by the Superior Court, implicated subject-matter jurisdiction, and thus could not be raised sua sponte. The Supreme Court also disagreed with the panel’s alternative holding that the trial court properly struck the amended complaint because of the defects in the Certificates of Merit. Because the unauthorized practice of law issue will be ripe for further litigation on remand, the Supreme Court concluded that pleadings unlawfully filed by non-attorneys were not void ab initio. "Instead, after notice to the offending party and opportunity to cure, the pleadings are voidable in the discretion of the court in which the unauthorized practice of law took place." View "Estate of Bisher v. Lehigh Vly Health Net." on Justia Law