Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Following the death of their twenty-five-year-old son Cory Bisher (“Cory”), Brenton and Carla Bisher filed suit, without representation by counsel, against eleven defendants comprising both named individuals and corporate entities alleging their medical malpractice resulting in Cory’s death. Each parent brought their own wrongful death claims, and Carla filed a survival action on behalf of Cory’s estate (“Estate”). Following protracted proceedings, the trial court struck the amended complaint with prejudice because of defects in the Certificates of Merit mandated by Rule of Civil Procedure 1042.3 in professional liability suits against licensed professionals. On appeal, the Superior Court sua sponte determined that the Bishers committed two errors that jointly deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over all claims: Carla’s unauthorized practice of law and the lack of verification of the complaint. The panel concluded that it too lacked jurisdiction and quashed the appeal. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that neither the unauthorized practice of law in the trial court, nor the lack of verification identified by the Superior Court, implicated subject-matter jurisdiction, and thus could not be raised sua sponte. The Supreme Court also disagreed with the panel’s alternative holding that the trial court properly struck the amended complaint because of the defects in the Certificates of Merit. Because the unauthorized practice of law issue will be ripe for further litigation on remand, the Supreme Court concluded that pleadings unlawfully filed by non-attorneys were not void ab initio. "Instead, after notice to the offending party and opportunity to cure, the pleadings are voidable in the discretion of the court in which the unauthorized practice of law took place." View "Estate of Bisher v. Lehigh Vly Health Net." on Justia Law

In a case of first impression, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether the Office or Open Records (“OOR”) has the authority to review the denial of an individual’s request for records pursuant to the Right to Know Law (“RTKL”), where a public utility has designated records responsive to the request as confidential security information (“CSI”) under the Public Utility Confidential Security Information Disclosure Protection Act. The Supreme Court held that the Public Utility Commission (“PUC”) had exclusive authority to review such requests and, therefore, the OOR erred in exercising jurisdiction over the CSI-designated records. View "Energy Transfer v. Friedman" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the prosecution of two defendants in connection with alleged hazing rituals at Penn State University in 2016 and 2017 that led to the death of Timothy Piazza. The prosecutions proceeded at multiple docket numbers for each defendant, and although the common pleas court consolidated the docket numbers for trial, the docket numbers were not consolidated for all purposes. Defense suppression motions were granted in part and the Commonwealth filed two interlocutory appeals, one for each defendant. The notice of appeal for each defendant contained all docket numbers pertaining to that defendant. The Superior Court determined separate notices of appeal should have been filed for each docket number and quashed the appeals pursuant to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling in Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 976 (Pa. 2018). The Supreme Court granted review to examine whether the intermediate court correctly applied the holding in Walker considering the Commonwealth’s position the matter was more properly controlled by Always Busy Consulting, LLC v. Babford & Co., Inc., 247 A.3d 1033 (Pa. 2021) The Supreme Court concluded the exception to the Walker rule enunciated in "ABC" was not broad enough to encompass this appeal. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court remanded to the Superior Court to determine, in its discretion, whether the Commonwealth should have been granted relief through application of the safe harbor provision of Pa.R.A.P. 902. View "Pennsylvania v. Young" on Justia Law

In late 2015, decedent Cody Albert (“Cody”) and his childhood friend, Zachary Ross (“Zachary”) struggled with substance abuse issues. At that time, Zachary’s mother, April Kravchenko, was suffering from multiple myeloma for which her doctors prescribed her several opiate pain medications, which she filled at a small, independent pharmacy in Scranton called Sheeley’s Drug Store. Kravchenko and her sister Debra Leggieri worried Zachary would try to pick up (and use) Kravchenko’s pain medication from Sheeley’s while Kravchenko was in the hospital. To prevent this, Leggieri called Sheeley’s and placed a restriction on who could pick up Kravchenko’s prescriptions. Zachary called Sheeley’s one day pretending to be his mother, and asked about refilling her OxyContin prescription. Donato Iannielli, owner-pharmacist Lori Hart’s father, and the prior owner of Sheeley’s, was the pharmacist on-duty at the time, and told “Kravchenko” that her OxyContin prescription could not be filled yet, but that she had a prescription for fentanyl patches ready to be picked up. “Kravchenko” told Iannielli that she wanted to send her son to pick up the patches, but stated that he did not have a driver’s license or other form of identification. Iannielli told the caller that this would not be a problem, since he personally knew and would recognize Zachary. Cody then drove Zachary to Sheeley’s, where Zachary picked up Kravchenko’s medication even though, according to Zachary, the pharmacy receipt explicitly stated, “[d]o not give to son.” On the drive back to Zachary’s house, Cody at some point consumed fentanyl from one of the patches, smoked marijuana, and then fell asleep on the once inside the house. Later that night, Zachary tried to wake Cody up, but he was unresponsive. Cody was later pronounced dead at a hospital. Zachary eventually pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter and multiple drug offenses in connection with Cody’s overdose. The question in this appeal was whether claims brought against the pharmacy on behalf of the decedent who overdosed on illegally obtained prescription drugs was barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto. Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly applied the in pari delicto doctrine, judgment was affirmed. View "Albert v. Sheeley's Drug Store, et al." on Justia Law

The question in this case was whether a lump-sum payment that a school district made to settle a principal’s age-discrimination claim should have been included in that employee’s retirement benefit calculation. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court disregarded the Retirement Code’s statutory definition of “compensation” and instead deferred to the intent of the settling parties to treat the payment as retirement-covered compensation. Accordingly, judgment was reversed. View "Whalen v. Public School Empl. Ret Board" on Justia Law

In March 2016, Christa Nesbitt was working as a server at the Whistle Stop diner in Oreland, Pennsylvania, when she first met Daniel Talley. Over the next several months, their friendly chats led to mutual affection, which then evolved into an intimate and physical relationship. In September 2016, Talley asked Nesbitt and her minor daughter, R.N., to move into his home. Nesbitt agreed. She and R.N. lived with Talley until the spring of 2017. At the end of May 2017, Nesbitt and R.N. moved out of Talley’s house. The next day, Nesbitt began receiving threatening and harassing messages on her mobile phone from unfamiliar email addresses. Nesbitt ultimately reported the threats to police, by August, Talley was arrested for aggravated assault, stalking, harassment and related offenses. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review of this matter to resolve two distinct legal issues: (1) the Commonwealth’s burden of proof when it seeks to deprive the accused of his or her state constitutional right to bail; and (2) whether the best-evidence rule allows a party to introduce printed photographs of text messages as they appeared on a cellphone’s interface—i.e., “screenshots.” The Supreme Court found that while the trial court committed an error of law in denying Talley’s motion for release on nominal bail, Talley was due no relief because he failed to prove that the error affected the outcome of his trial. Nor was a new trial warranted on his best-evidence claim, since the lower courts concluded correctly that the screenshots of the text messages were admissible duplicates. View "Pennsylvania v. Talley" on Justia Law

Appellant Joseph McCabe was arrested on charges of theft by unlawful taking and receiving stolen property in connection with the April 2015 taking of a collection of gold coins from the home of Thomas and Kathy Mohn, with whom Appellant had been staying. Montgomery County had instituted a Veterans Treatment Court (VTC) Program in 2011; Appellant applied for participation in the VTC and was accepted into the program. As a condition thereof, he entered an open plea to the theft charge graded as a third-degree felony. The VTC’s order accepting the plea noted that sentence would be deferred and, as a condition, that a restitution hearing would be scheduled. Appellant successfully completed the requirements and conditions of the VTC program. The court reviewed the sentencing guidelines and acknowledged Appellant’s success in the VTC program, and sentenced Appellant to a two-year term of probation. Appellant moved for reconsideration of the sentence, which was ultimately denied. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted certiorari review in this case to determine whether a problem-solving court like the VTC, was subject to to Chapter 3 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure (the Rules) governing Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD). The Court also considered whether Appellant, due to his inability to fully pay restitution, was denied the full benefit of the problem-solving court in contravention of his rights to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court found positive sentencing consideration, including dismissal of charges, could accompany a successful completion of the program, but the program did not create guarantees, procedures, or discretion not already authorized under the Rules. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s determination that the trial court’s sentencing order regarding restitution was not governed by Chapter 3 of the Rules. The Court also affirmed the judgments of the lower courts, finding no as-applied constitutional infirmities to have been established in Appellant’s claim. View "Pennsylvania v. McCabe" on Justia Law

During the investigation, officers obtained a warrant to search for evidence of possession and distribution of child pornography on the electronic devices in the home of Appellant, Eric Green. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in this matter to address whether that search warrant was overbroad. After careful consideration, the Court found no reversible error with the lower courts' determinations that the warrant was not overbroad because it described the physical devices and digital data for which there was probable cause as nearly as may be under the circumstances. Accordingly, the Superior Court judgment was affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. Green" on Justia Law

The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (“Hearing Office”) concluded that, in the fee review setting, a non-treating healthcare provider, like a pharmacy, could not challenge a utilization review (“UR”) determination that medications prescribed by a treating healthcare provider, such as a physician, but dispensed by the non-treating entity, were unreasonable and unnecessary for the treatment of a claimant’s work-related injury. The Commonwealth Court affirmed the Hearing Office’s order. However, after reaching this result, the intermediate court held that for UR procedures occurring in the future, when an employer, insurer or an employee requests UR, non-treating providers, such as pharmacies, had to be afforded notice and an opportunity to establish their right to intervene in the UR proceedings. While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s result, it rejected its prospective holding that non-treating healthcare providers had to be given notice and an opportunity to intervene in UR proceedings. View "Keystone Rx v. Bureau. of Workers' Compensation" on Justia Law

Appellant Vincent Lorino worked as an equipment operator for the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“Employer”) when he slipped on the running board of the truck he used for work and fell backwards, injuring his lower back and left hip. Employer accepted liability for a low back sprain/tear and a left hip sprain/tear pursuant to two medical-only notices of compensation payable (“NCP”). In February 2017, Employer referred Appellant for an independent medical examination (“IME”). The IME examiner determined Appellant had fully recovered from his injuries, that any pain Appellant experienced was the result of pre-existing degenerative disc disease, and that Appellant required no further treatment. As a result, Employer filed a petition to terminate Appellant’s treatment. Appellant retained counsel for the hearing on Employer’s termination petition. At the hearing, Appellant testified he had been receiving treatment from Dr. Shivani Dua, who administered epidural steroid injections to alleviate the pain in his back and left hip. Appellant explained that while the steroid injections would alleviate his pain for a few months, the pain would slowly return, at which point he would need to return for additional injections. Appellant indicated he received his most recent injection approximately two to three weeks before the IME. At the conclusion of the hearing, Appellant requested, in addition to continued medical benefits, attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 440 of the Workers' Compensation Act, asserting that, because he received only medical benefits, he was unable to retain the services of an attorney based on a traditional contingent fee arrangement, and instead was required to enter into an hourly-rate fee agreement. At issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was the propriety of the Commonwealth Court’s construction of Section 440 of the Act as precluding an award of attorney’s fees to a claimant when an employer established a reasonable basis for seeking a termination of benefits. The Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Court’s interpretation of Section 440 was contrary to the statute’s express language, and, therefore, reversed in part and remanded. View "Lorino v. WCAB (Commonwealth of PA)" on Justia Law