Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At some time in the early morning hours of December 27, 1996, Appellant entered his estranged wife Carla’s home and then shot Carla and her fourteen-year-old daughter D.M. in the head, killing both of them. The Commonwealth charged Appellant with one count of burglary and two counts of first-degree murder. A jury found Appellant guilty of those charges. After a penalty hearing, the jury sentenced Appellant to death on both of his murder convictions. On July 17, 2014, the PCRA court entered an order dismissing another handful of Appellant’s claims based upon the evidence presented in the initial evidentiary hearing. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed that order in all respects, save one. "Respectfully, the PCRA court did not provide its rationale for rejecting the fact-intensive issue relating to Appellant’s competency to proceed to trial and represent himself and prior counsels’ alleged ineffectiveness for failing to pursue the issue." Consequently, this matter was remanded to the PCRA court solely to issue a supplemental opinion addressing its reasons for denying relief on these claims. View "Pennsylvania v. Reid" on Justia Law

In October 2016, Kevin Jalbert (“Victim”) was shot seven times in Coatesville, Pennsylvania, and died as the result of the shooting. Several persons witnessed the incident, including Justin Griest and A.H. Appellant Sheron Purnell was identified as the shooter, and the Commonwealth charged him with first-degree murder, third-degree murder, and firearms not to be carried without a license. When police interviewed A.H. about the assault, she stated that she was afraid to speak about the group who committed the act because they were part of the gang that she saw when Victim was murdered. A.H. also shared that she did not want to testify about the assault because she feared that someone from the gang would shoot her. The Commonwealth requested that a “comfort dog” be present during A.H.’s trial testimony at trial. The motion explained that a sheriff’s deputy would transport the comfort dog, Melody, to the court and that the dog would enter the courtroom before the jury’s entrance. According to the motion, the comfort dog would be placed in the witness stand outside the presence of the jury and would exit the courtroom after the jury left the room. In response to the Commonwealth’s motion, Appellant’s counsel stated his concern that the jury would see the dog and feel sympathy for A.H. Defense counsel also feared that A.H. may comment on the presence of the dog given her alleged propensity to get distracted. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in this matter to consider the appropriate test to apply to a trial court’s determination concerning whether a witness in a criminal case may utilize a “comfort dog” for support during his or her trial testimony. The Supreme Court held that a trial court should balance the degree to which the accommodation will assist the witness in testifying in a truthful manner against any possible prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Here, the trial court allowed a witness to testify with the assistance of a comfort dog, and the Superior Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. The Supreme Court agreed with the Superior Court and, therefore, affirmed that court’s judgment. View "Pennsylvania v. Purnell" on Justia Law

Appellant Daniel Mohn was a Republican committeeperson of Appellee, the Bucks County Republican Committee, for the voting district of Yardley Borough. In 2014, he was first elected to a two-year term, and reelected in 2016. After the election, the acting chairman of Appellee’s Ethics Committee sent a letter to Appellant advising him that complaints had been lodged by Bryan McNamara and Nicholas and Sandra Liberato, alleging among other things, that Appellant had “actively campaigned against an endorsed candidate for committeeman and disparaged the importance and value of the Bucks County Republican Committee Sample Ballot.” In his correspondence to Appellant, the acting chairman also related that an investigatory hearing had been scheduled before the Ethics Committee. Appellant asked for, and was granted, a short continuance. Appellant's counsel took the position that the Code of Ethics reposited in the Committee Rules applied solely to elected and appointed public officials, not party officials. As such, counsel opined that the Ethics Committee lacked the authority to conduct any proceedings and asserted that the hearing should be cancelled. In the alternative, counsel reiterated his request for a longer continuance and complained that he hadn’t been provided with requested documents. The hearing before the Ethics Committee apparently proceeded nevertheless, and at the conclusion of the hearing, the Executive Committee voted to disqualify Appellant as a committeeperson and declare his office vacant. Appellant and two other individuals filed a complaint in the court of common pleas seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent their removal as committeepersons, as well as an award of attorneys’ fees as a sanction for purported bad faith. The plaintiffs also filed a separate emergency motion asking the court to enjoin the conduct of any hearing before the Executive Committee. The issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in this matter reduced to a question of the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania courts to intervene in the internal affairs of political parties. The Court credited Appellee's position that “through its internal, self-organized apparatus, [it was] permitted to construe its own governing rules and to disqualify elected occupants of its offices from participation in its affairs by exercising its own judgment, free from judicial interference.” View "Mohn v. Bucks Co. Republican Committee" on Justia Law

In a case of first impression, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the Commonwealth Court properly calculated the “cost” of steel products under the Steel Products Procurement Act (“Steel Act” or “the Act”), which required that “75% of the cost of the articles, materials and supplies [of a steel product] have been mined, produced or manufactured” in the United States. G. M. McCrossin, Inc. (“McCrossin”), a contracting and construction management firm, served as the general contractor for the Lycoming County Water and Sewer Authority (“Authority”) on a project known as the Montoursville Regional Sewer System Waste Water Treatment Plan, Phase I Upgrade (“Project”). In July 2011, McCrossin entered into an agreement with the Authority to supply eight air blower assemblies, which move air from one area to another inside the waste treatment facility. United Blower, Inc. (“UBI”), became a subcontractor on the Project. UBI was to supply the eight blowers required by the original specifications and was to replace the three digestive blowers as required by a change order. UBI prepared a submittal for the blowers which McCrossin in turn submitted to the Authority’s Project engineer, Brinjac Engineering (“Brinjac”). As part of the submittal, McCrossin provided Brinjac and the Authority with a form, which verified that 75% of the cost of the blowers was attributable to articles, materials, and supplies (“AMSs”) that were mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States. The total amount McCrossin paid UBI for the blower assemblies and digestive blowers was $239,800. The amount paid by the Authority to McCrossin for these items was $243,505. Authority employees began to question whether McCrossin and UBI provided products that complied with the Steel Act. The Supreme Court held the Commonwealth Court improperly calculated the cost of the steel products at issue, thereby reversing and remanding for further proceedings. View "United Blower, et al. v Lycoming Water & Sewer" on Justia Law

In October 2006, Appellant Robert Flor entered a plea of guilty to the first-degree murder of Officer Brian Gregg, of the Newtown Borough Police Department. He further entered pleas nolo contendere to various other charges in connection with the events of September 29, 2005. A jury found: (1) the victim was a peace officer; (2) Appellant committed the murder during the perpetration of a felony; (3) in the commission of the offense, Appellant knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim; and (4) Appellant had a significant history of violent felony convictions. The jury found no mitigating circumstances. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s death sentence on July 22, 2010, and the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari on April 18, 2011. In May 2011, Appellant filed a timely pro se motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). In November 2018, the PCRA court denied the petition, and Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the PCRA court's denial of relief, and affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. Flor" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to consider whether the Commonwealth Court erred in quashing the notice of appeal filed by the Family Court of the Court of Common Pleas of the First Judicial District (the Family Court) on the basis that the trial court’s order was not an appealable collateral order under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313. Because the Court concluded the trial court’s order denying summary judgment on sovereign immunity grounds was a collateral order, appealable as of right under Rule 313, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court and remanded to the Commonwealth Court for further proceedings. View "Brooks v. Cole, et al." on Justia Law

Appellee Northside Leadership Conference (NLC), was a non-profit community development corporation that owned contiguous real property in Pittsburgh situated in a local neighborhood commercial zoning district designated for mixed use. In 2018, NLC applied for variances and special exceptions necessary to, inter alia, maintain the retail space, remodel and reopen the restaurant and permit the construction of six additional dwelling units. In 2018, a three-member panel of the Pittsburgh Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) conducted a hearing on NLC’s applications. Appellants Stephen Pascal and Chris Gates attended the hearing and objected to NLC’s applications. The ZBA ultimately granted the variance and special exception applications. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to consider whether the Commonwealth Court erred in approving a decision granting zoning relief despite: (1) the timing of the decision and (2) the alleged conflict of interest of one member of a three-member panel of the ZBA. We affirm in part and reverse in part, and remand for a new hearing before a different three-member panel of the ZBA.The Supreme Court found that the ZBA member ruling on the propriety of zoning applications brought by an organization on whose board she sat at all relevant times "so clearly and obviously endangered the appearance of neutrality that her recusal was required under well-settled due process principles that disallow a person to be the judge of his or her own case or to try a matter in which he or she has an interest in the outcome." The Supreme Court held the Commonwealth Court erred in rejecting appellants’ arguments on this issue and upholding the resulting tainted ZBA decision. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s order in part and reversed in part. The matter was remanded for a new hearing on the appellee NLC’s zoning applications before a newly constituted panel of the ZBA. View "Pascal, et al. v. City of Pgh ZBA, et al." on Justia Law

The Appellee in this case, K.N.B., was a freshman at Clarion University in 2015. K.N.B. claimed that a fellow Clarion student, M.D., sexually assaulted her in September 2015. K.N.B. initially did not report the assault to the police. Only after seeing M.D. at a Walmart in early 2018 did K.N.B. report the assault to the Clarion University Police Department. By this time, K.N.B. was no longer a student at the University. The main question this appeal presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was whether a petition seeking a protective order under the Protection of Victims of Sexual Violence or Intimidation Act (“PVSVIA”) was subject to the two-year statute of limitations governing certain enumerated civil actions, or the six-year catch-all statute of limitations that applies to non-enumerated actions. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the six-year limitations period applied, affirming the superior court. View "K.N.B. v. M.D." on Justia Law

In this appeal by allowance, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's consideration centered on whether the Commonwealth was permitted to introduce nearly all of a child sexual assault victim’s forensic interview in rebuttal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 106. In January 2011, Appellant Thomas Raboin began dating K.B. He moved into K.B.’s home shortly thereafter, where she lived with her three minor daughters and multiple other individuals. At this time, K.B.’s eldest daughter (“the victim”) was in kindergarten. Appellant moved out a few years later when the couple ended their relationship, at which point the victim was in second grade. During the victim’s fourth-grade year, she disclosed to her mother that Appellant had sexually abused her while living in their home. K.B. immediately contacted the police, who arranged for a forensic interview. The forensic interview was videotaped and observed by a detective behind a one-way mirror. Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with: involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child, unlawful contact with a minor, indecent assault of a person less than thirteen years of age, endangering the welfare of a child, corruption of minors, and indecent exposure. In 2018, Appellant proceeded to a jury trial. Appellant testified in his own defense at trial, denying the allegations. At the conclusion of Appellant’s presentation of evidence, the Commonwealth requested to play the victim’s forensic interview in rebuttal on the basis that it was a prior consistent statement. Following a lengthy in-chambers discussion involving specific objections to portions of the forensic interview, the trial court largely permitted its introduction, aside from several pages that the court reasoned were hearsay. The trial court’s rationale for allowing introduction of the forensic interview was that it constituted a prior consistent statement and rehabilitative evidence. The Supreme Court concluded that introduction of the interview on this basis was improper, and remanded for the Superior Court to consider, as the trial court initially concluded, whether the interview was nonetheless admissible as a prior consistent statement under Pa.R.A.P.613(c). View "Pennsylvania v. Raboin" on Justia Law

In 2017, Appellant Waylynn Howard (Mother) and her three-year-old daughter (Child) were riding in a car-for-hire which was involved in a three-vehicle accident on a state highway outside of Pittsburgh. At the time of the accident, Mother was sitting in the front passenger seat of the vehicle, and Child was sitting in the back seat, on the passenger side. There was no car seat in the vehicle, and none of the occupants were wearing seatbelts. None of the individuals involved sustained serious injuries. A police officer responded to the scene, and, based on his affidavit of probable cause, Mother was charged with reckless endangerment of another person, and endangering the welfare of a child, a first-degree misdemeanor. At a stipulated bench trial based entirely on the affidavit of probable cause, Mother was convicted of both offenses. The trial court imposed a sentence of one year probation for Mother’s conviction for endangering the welfare of a child, and no further penalty for her conviction for reckless endangerment. Mother appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain both of her convictions. In an unpublished memorandum opinion, a divided panel of the Superior Court reversed Mother’s conviction for reckless endangerment of another person, finding her actions did not rise to the level of criminal recklessness. However, the panel affirmed Mother’s conviction for endangering the welfare of a child. In this appeal by allowance, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s review centered on whether whether evidence that a parent allowed her child to ride in a car-for-hire without being restrained by a child safety seat was, without more, sufficient to support a conviction for endangering the welfare of children under 18 Pa.C.S. 4304(a)(1). The Court concluded that it was not. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s decision was reversed and Appellant’s conviction and judgment of sentence were vacated. View "Pennsylvania v. Howard" on Justia Law