Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2013, while in the Navy, Appellee A.L. had intercourse with the adult victim when her ability to consent was impaired by alcohol. He was charged with sexual assault under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Appellee was tried by general court-martial, with a panel of service members acting as fact-finders. The panel returned a verdict of guilty. Appellee was sentenced to sixty days’ confinement, a reduction in rank, and a dishonorable discharge. He appealed to the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed the conviction and sentence. After his discharge from the Navy, Appellee moved to Pennsylvania. He registered with the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) as a sex offender subject to registration under Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). The PSP determined Appellee’s crime triggered a Tier III registration obligation. Appellee appealed that designation, arguing PSP’s action was adjudicative and not merely ministerial. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed appeal in this matter to determine whether sexual assault as defined under the Uniform Code of Military Justice was comparable to sexual assault as defined under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code so as to make Appellee a lifetime SORNA registrant. The Supreme Court concluded the military statute under which Appellee was convicted effectively defined two crimes, and PSP lacked a valid foundation to discern which of the two formed the basis for the military panel’s finding of guilt. Therefore, Appellee’s court-martial conviction could not be the basis for his classification as a Tier III registrant. View "A. L. v. PA State Police" on Justia Law

Appellants Patrick and Pamela Lutz (“Homeowners”) owned a single-family, detached home on a half-acre lot along Kesslersville Road in Plainfield Township, Northampton County, Pennsylvania. The property was located in a farm and forest district under the township’s zoning code. Single-family dwellings were permitted in that district but, per the zoning code, they are subject to setback requirements. Homeowners decided to add onto the back of their home. The design called for an addition to extend to the building envelope in the back: to 50 feet shy of the rear property line, with a raised, covered deck extending 18 feet into the rear setback area. When Homeowners submitted their plan to the township for approval, the zoning officer sent them written notice that the deck would not be allowed because it intruded into 50-foot setback area. He observed Homeowners could seek relief from the zoning hearing board (the “Board”) in the form of a dimensional variance. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed appeal to consider whether the Commonwealth Court correctly applied its standard of appellate review relative to the grant of a dimensional zoning variance. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was evenly divided; by operation of law, the Commonwealth Court’s judgment was thus affirmed. View "Kneebone v. Lutz" on Justia Law

On November 17, 2017, Patrolman Brian Shaw of the City of New Kensington Police Department was shot and killed in the line of duty. At 8:06 p.m. Officer Shaw informed dispatch that a vehicle had failed to stop for his lights and sirens. Shortly afterwards, Officer Shaw announced that he was pursuing on foot. Moments later he radioed that he had been shot. Because no one witnessed the shooting, the Commonwealth established appellant Rahmel Sal Holt’s guilt through circumstantial evidence, including the testimony of Tavon Harper, the driver of the vehicle Officer Shaw attempted to stop. Holt would ultimately be convicted, for which he was sentenced to death. Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was automatic. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Holt" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael Parrish appealed after the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). To the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Parrish raised numerous claims of error, including a layered ineffectiveness claim in connection with the failure of trial counsel to file a notice of appeal after his conviction and death sentence. The first layer of his claim was the contention that trial counsel were ineffective for not consulting with him regarding his appellate rights before failing to file a notice of appeal, and in so doing, violated a constitutional duty established in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000). The second layer of the claim was Parrish’s assertion that his initial PCRA counsel’s stewardship of the failure to consult claim before the PCRA court was deficient, in that initial PCRA counsel failed to present any evidence or legal argument to substantiate the failure to consult claim. In his brief to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Parrish identified the evidence and legal theory that his initial PCRA counsel should have presented to the PCRA court. Parrish raised the second layer of his claim for the first time to the Supreme Court in this appeal, and the Supreme Court concluded he was permitted to do so without a finding of waiver based upon a recent decision in Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021). Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded this case for the introduction of evidence and legal argument so that the PCRA court could issue a decision on the merits of Parrish’s layered failure to consult claim. View "Pennsylvania v. Parrish" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in this matter to determine whether its reasoning in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 231 A.3d 807 (Pa. 2020) applied to preclude the retrial of Appellant Derrick Edwards on double jeopardy principles where the prosecutor acted with discriminatory intent when exercising a peremptory strike of an African American juror in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). After review, the Court held that the prosecutor’s violation of Batson under the circumstances presented did not preclude the retrial of Appellant. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court, which affirmed the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss the charges against him on double jeopardy grounds. View "Pennsylvania v. Edwards" on Justia Law

Due to Pennsylvania's loss of population relative to the nation as a whole, Pennsylvania’s allotted number of congressional representatives declined from eighteen to seventeen. As a result, Pennsylvania required a new congressional districting plan drawn with only seventeen districts for the May 17, 2022, Primary Election. Because the General Assembly and the Governor failed to agree upon a congressional redistricting plan, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was tasked with that “unwelcome obligation.” After deliberating and affording due consideration to a Special Master’s findings and recommendation and reviewing de novo the relative merit of the submitted congressional plans, the Court respectfully declined to adopt the Special Master’s analysis and ultimate plan selection. Rather, on February 23, 2022, the Supreme Court entered a per curiam order, directing that the Pennsylvania primary and general elections for seats in the United States House of Representatives commencing in 2022 would be conducted in accordance with the plan submitted to the Special Master by the Carter Petitioners. The Court's order indicated that an opinion would follow, and this opinion was filed in accordance therewith. View "Carter, et al. v. Chapman, et al." on Justia Law

In 2011, during the course and scope of his employment as a shipwright, Claimant Robert Arlet slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk on the premises of his employer, Flagship Niagara League (Employer), sustaining injuries. Employer had obtained a Commercial Hull Policy from Acadia Insurance Company (Insurer). Through the policy, Insurer provided coverage for damages caused by the Brig Niagara and for Jones Act protection and indemnity coverage for the “seventeen (17) crewmembers” of the Brig Niagara. Employer had also at some point obtained workers’ compensation insurance from the State Workers’ Insurance Fund (SWIF). Insurer paid benefits to Claimant under its Commercial Hull Policy’s “maintenance and cure” provision. Claimant filed for workers’ compensation benefits. Employer asserted Claimant’s remedy was exclusively governed by the Jones Act. Employer also filed to join SWIF as an additional insurer in the event the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) was deemed to supply the applicable exclusive remedy, and Employer was found to be liable thereunder. SWIF denied coverage, alleging Employer’s policy was lapsed at the time of Claimant’s injury. Thereafter, Claimant filed an Uninsured Employers Guaranty Fund (UEGF) claim petition, asserting the fund’s liability in the event he prevailed, and Employer was deemed uncovered by SWIF and failed to pay. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) found that as a land-based employee, Claimant did not meet the definition of seaman under the Jones Act and was, therefore, entitled to pursue his workers’ compensation claim. The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was one of first impression: the right of an insurer to subrogation under the WCA. The Supreme Court concluded Insurer’s Commercial Hull Policy did not cover Claimant, because Claimant was not a “seaman” or crew member. The WCA’s exclusive remedy applied, but Insurer was seeking subrogation for payment it made on a loss it did not cover. "[T]he 'no-coverage exception' to the general equitable rule precluding an insurer from pursuing subrogation against its insured comports with the purposes and public policy supporting the rule and hereby adopt it as the law of this Commonwealth. ... any equitable rule precluding an insurer from seeking subrogation against its insured is best tempered by the exception adopted herein today." View "Arlet v. WCAB (L&I)" on Justia Law

In 2009, when he was seventeen-and-a-half years old, appellant Michael Felder was playing in a pick-up basketball game with Andrew Williams at an outdoor court in Philadelphia. The pair were matched against brothers Jarrett and Malcolm Green. Appellant’s style of play became aggressive; an argument ensued after Williams refused to hand the ball over to the Greens. Appellant walked to the sideline and removed a .380 semiautomatic handgun from his gym bag, and shot Malcolm in the head before shooting Jarrett in the stomach and leg. A jury convicted appellant of first-degree murder and aggravated assault. Pursuant to the then-applicable mandatory sentence for first-degree murder, which also applied to juveniles, appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Superior Court vacated appellant’s judgment of sentence two years later; by then, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286 (Pa. 2013) (“Batts I”) had been decided. Since appellant’s judgment of sentence was not yet final, the Superior Court determined he was entitled to the benefit of those rulings and to consideration of the Miller factors before being resentenced, and remanded the case for such proceedings. Upon remand, the court imposed a discretionary 50-years-to-life sentence for appellant’s first-degree murder conviction. On appeal to the Superior Court, appellant challenged the legality of his sentence, arguing “a 50-year minimum sentence is a de facto life sentence.” The Superior Court found that although the sentence precluded appellant from seeking parole until he was 68 years old, it was constitutional because it “was the result of an individualized and discretionary sentencing hearing[.]” The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review limited to whether appellant's sentence was indeed a de facto life sentence requiring the sentencing court under Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (“Batts II”), "[to] first find permanent incorrigibility, irreparable corruption or irretrievable depravity beyond a reasonable doubt." The Supreme Court determined Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S.Ct. 1307 (2021) "abrogates our foundational understanding in Batts II." So long as the sentence imposed is discretionary and takes into account the offender’s youth, even if it amounts to a de facto life sentence, Miller is not violated. "Because the sentencing court in the present case followed this procedure, we affirm." View "Pennsylvania v. Felder" on Justia Law

As a result of a vehicle search, the Commonwealth discovered a bag of marijuana and a firearm. In connection with these items, the Commonwealth charged Appellant Timothy Barr, II with: persons not to possess a firearm, possession of a firearm without a license, and possession of a small amount of marijuana. Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion, which included a motion to suppress the physical evidence gathered by police during the search, and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that the Commonwealth could not establish a prima facie case that Appellant possessed a small amount of marijuana or committed the firearm offenses. The trial court granted the motion to suppress and granted in part the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, dismissing the count of possession of a small amount of marijuana. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in this matter to examine to what extent, if at all, the smell of marijuana could be considered when determining whether law enforcement had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle. This issue arose in light of the Pennsylvania General Assembly’s enactment of the Medical Marijuana Act, which legalized the possession and use of marijuana in limited circumstances, and the Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916 (Pa. 2019), which addressed whether police could stop and frisk a person merely based on the fact that the person possessed a concealed firearm in public. Like the Superior Court, the Supreme Court held that the smell of marijuana could be a factor, but not a stand-alone one, in determining whether the totality of the circumstances established probable cause to permit a police officer to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle. The Court disagreed with the Superior Court’s decision to remand the matter to the trial court for reconsideration of its order granting the motion to suppress filed by Timothy Barr, II (“Appellant”). Instead, that portion of the Superior Court's decision was vacated, the trial court's judgment reinstated (granting Appellant’s motion to suppress), and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Barr" on Justia Law

Relator Edward J. O’Donnell filed a federal qui tam suit against his employer, alleging the employer violated the federal False Claims Act. As a financial incentive to take on this role, the FCA provided relators with a portion of any award that the federal government obtains in the qui tam action. The United States government ultimately settled with O’Donnell’s employer. O’Donnell received a 16% share of the settlement, or $34,560,000. The question before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in this case was whether this qui tam award was taxable in Pennsylvania as compensation under Section 303 of the Pennsylvania Tax Reform Code, 72 P.S. section 7303. The Supreme Court held that it was, thus reversing the order of the Commonwealth Court. View "O'Donnell v. Allegheny Co. Tax" on Justia Law