Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In late 2015, decedent Cody Albert (“Cody”) and his childhood friend, Zachary Ross (“Zachary”) struggled with substance abuse issues. At that time, Zachary’s mother, April Kravchenko, was suffering from multiple myeloma for which her doctors prescribed her several opiate pain medications, which she filled at a small, independent pharmacy in Scranton called Sheeley’s Drug Store. Kravchenko and her sister Debra Leggieri worried Zachary would try to pick up (and use) Kravchenko’s pain medication from Sheeley’s while Kravchenko was in the hospital. To prevent this, Leggieri called Sheeley’s and placed a restriction on who could pick up Kravchenko’s prescriptions. Zachary called Sheeley’s one day pretending to be his mother, and asked about refilling her OxyContin prescription. Donato Iannielli, owner-pharmacist Lori Hart’s father, and the prior owner of Sheeley’s, was the pharmacist on-duty at the time, and told “Kravchenko” that her OxyContin prescription could not be filled yet, but that she had a prescription for fentanyl patches ready to be picked up. “Kravchenko” told Iannielli that she wanted to send her son to pick up the patches, but stated that he did not have a driver’s license or other form of identification. Iannielli told the caller that this would not be a problem, since he personally knew and would recognize Zachary. Cody then drove Zachary to Sheeley’s, where Zachary picked up Kravchenko’s medication even though, according to Zachary, the pharmacy receipt explicitly stated, “[d]o not give to son.” On the drive back to Zachary’s house, Cody at some point consumed fentanyl from one of the patches, smoked marijuana, and then fell asleep on the once inside the house. Later that night, Zachary tried to wake Cody up, but he was unresponsive. Cody was later pronounced dead at a hospital. Zachary eventually pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter and multiple drug offenses in connection with Cody’s overdose. The question in this appeal was whether claims brought against the pharmacy on behalf of the decedent who overdosed on illegally obtained prescription drugs was barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto. Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly applied the in pari delicto doctrine, judgment was affirmed. View "Albert v. Sheeley's Drug Store, et al." on Justia Law

The question in this case was whether a lump-sum payment that a school district made to settle a principal’s age-discrimination claim should have been included in that employee’s retirement benefit calculation. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court disregarded the Retirement Code’s statutory definition of “compensation” and instead deferred to the intent of the settling parties to treat the payment as retirement-covered compensation. Accordingly, judgment was reversed. View "Whalen v. Public School Empl. Ret Board" on Justia Law

In March 2016, Christa Nesbitt was working as a server at the Whistle Stop diner in Oreland, Pennsylvania, when she first met Daniel Talley. Over the next several months, their friendly chats led to mutual affection, which then evolved into an intimate and physical relationship. In September 2016, Talley asked Nesbitt and her minor daughter, R.N., to move into his home. Nesbitt agreed. She and R.N. lived with Talley until the spring of 2017. At the end of May 2017, Nesbitt and R.N. moved out of Talley’s house. The next day, Nesbitt began receiving threatening and harassing messages on her mobile phone from unfamiliar email addresses. Nesbitt ultimately reported the threats to police, by August, Talley was arrested for aggravated assault, stalking, harassment and related offenses. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review of this matter to resolve two distinct legal issues: (1) the Commonwealth’s burden of proof when it seeks to deprive the accused of his or her state constitutional right to bail; and (2) whether the best-evidence rule allows a party to introduce printed photographs of text messages as they appeared on a cellphone’s interface—i.e., “screenshots.” The Supreme Court found that while the trial court committed an error of law in denying Talley’s motion for release on nominal bail, Talley was due no relief because he failed to prove that the error affected the outcome of his trial. Nor was a new trial warranted on his best-evidence claim, since the lower courts concluded correctly that the screenshots of the text messages were admissible duplicates. View "Pennsylvania v. Talley" on Justia Law

Appellant Joseph McCabe was arrested on charges of theft by unlawful taking and receiving stolen property in connection with the April 2015 taking of a collection of gold coins from the home of Thomas and Kathy Mohn, with whom Appellant had been staying. Montgomery County had instituted a Veterans Treatment Court (VTC) Program in 2011; Appellant applied for participation in the VTC and was accepted into the program. As a condition thereof, he entered an open plea to the theft charge graded as a third-degree felony. The VTC’s order accepting the plea noted that sentence would be deferred and, as a condition, that a restitution hearing would be scheduled. Appellant successfully completed the requirements and conditions of the VTC program. The court reviewed the sentencing guidelines and acknowledged Appellant’s success in the VTC program, and sentenced Appellant to a two-year term of probation. Appellant moved for reconsideration of the sentence, which was ultimately denied. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted certiorari review in this case to determine whether a problem-solving court like the VTC, was subject to to Chapter 3 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure (the Rules) governing Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD). The Court also considered whether Appellant, due to his inability to fully pay restitution, was denied the full benefit of the problem-solving court in contravention of his rights to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court found positive sentencing consideration, including dismissal of charges, could accompany a successful completion of the program, but the program did not create guarantees, procedures, or discretion not already authorized under the Rules. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s determination that the trial court’s sentencing order regarding restitution was not governed by Chapter 3 of the Rules. The Court also affirmed the judgments of the lower courts, finding no as-applied constitutional infirmities to have been established in Appellant’s claim. View "Pennsylvania v. McCabe" on Justia Law

During the investigation, officers obtained a warrant to search for evidence of possession and distribution of child pornography on the electronic devices in the home of Appellant, Eric Green. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in this matter to address whether that search warrant was overbroad. After careful consideration, the Court found no reversible error with the lower courts' determinations that the warrant was not overbroad because it described the physical devices and digital data for which there was probable cause as nearly as may be under the circumstances. Accordingly, the Superior Court judgment was affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. Green" on Justia Law

The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (“Hearing Office”) concluded that, in the fee review setting, a non-treating healthcare provider, like a pharmacy, could not challenge a utilization review (“UR”) determination that medications prescribed by a treating healthcare provider, such as a physician, but dispensed by the non-treating entity, were unreasonable and unnecessary for the treatment of a claimant’s work-related injury. The Commonwealth Court affirmed the Hearing Office’s order. However, after reaching this result, the intermediate court held that for UR procedures occurring in the future, when an employer, insurer or an employee requests UR, non-treating providers, such as pharmacies, had to be afforded notice and an opportunity to establish their right to intervene in the UR proceedings. While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s result, it rejected its prospective holding that non-treating healthcare providers had to be given notice and an opportunity to intervene in UR proceedings. View "Keystone Rx v. Bureau. of Workers' Compensation" on Justia Law

Appellant Vincent Lorino worked as an equipment operator for the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“Employer”) when he slipped on the running board of the truck he used for work and fell backwards, injuring his lower back and left hip. Employer accepted liability for a low back sprain/tear and a left hip sprain/tear pursuant to two medical-only notices of compensation payable (“NCP”). In February 2017, Employer referred Appellant for an independent medical examination (“IME”). The IME examiner determined Appellant had fully recovered from his injuries, that any pain Appellant experienced was the result of pre-existing degenerative disc disease, and that Appellant required no further treatment. As a result, Employer filed a petition to terminate Appellant’s treatment. Appellant retained counsel for the hearing on Employer’s termination petition. At the hearing, Appellant testified he had been receiving treatment from Dr. Shivani Dua, who administered epidural steroid injections to alleviate the pain in his back and left hip. Appellant explained that while the steroid injections would alleviate his pain for a few months, the pain would slowly return, at which point he would need to return for additional injections. Appellant indicated he received his most recent injection approximately two to three weeks before the IME. At the conclusion of the hearing, Appellant requested, in addition to continued medical benefits, attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 440 of the Workers' Compensation Act, asserting that, because he received only medical benefits, he was unable to retain the services of an attorney based on a traditional contingent fee arrangement, and instead was required to enter into an hourly-rate fee agreement. At issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was the propriety of the Commonwealth Court’s construction of Section 440 of the Act as precluding an award of attorney’s fees to a claimant when an employer established a reasonable basis for seeking a termination of benefits. The Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Court’s interpretation of Section 440 was contrary to the statute’s express language, and, therefore, reversed in part and remanded. View "Lorino v. WCAB (Commonwealth of PA)" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether Section 1729-A(a) of the Charter School Law imposed a mandatory deadline by which a school district had to decide to renew or not renew a charter school’s charter. In 2006, Appellant Eastern University Academy Charter School (“Eastern”), applied to the School District of Philadelphia (the “School District”) seeking to establish a charter school program aimed at enabling students to earn college credits at Eastern University while completing their high school studies. In 2009, the School District granted Eastern a charter to operate a middle school and high school for students grades 7 through 12. Eastern’s 2012 renewal application incorporated its original charter application and obligated Eastern to continue its operations in accordance with the standards and goals it had represented in its original application. However, during the ensuing term of the charter, Eastern’s program shifted, as its affiliation with Eastern University, ended. Eastern nevertheless submitted a second renewal application in the fall of 2016, seeking its continued operation as an “early college” program, the mission of which remained preparing students for postsecondary education and providing dual enrollment opportunities to high school students. While Eastern acknowledged it was no longer affiliated with the University, it indicated that its students had begun taking college courses elsewhere during the 2016-2017 school year, and that it was actively researching additional college-level opportunities for its students. On June 1, 2017, the School District’s Charter Schools Office (the “CSO”) recommended that Eastern’s charter not be renewed; after a hearing, the School District voted not to renew Eastern's charter. Eastern appealed, arguing, among other things, that the School District’s failure to issue its nonrenewal decision prior to the charter’s expiration date – June 30, 2017 – invalidated the nonrenewal under Section 1729-A of the Charter School Law. The Supreme Court determined the legislature imposed no such deadline, and affirmed the Commonwealth Court's order upholding the decision not to renew Eastern's charter. View "Eastern Univ. Acad. C.S. v. Sch.Dist. of Phila." on Justia Law

In 2016, Craig Steltz filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. William Meyers, Vincera Core Institute, and Vincera Institute (collectively Appellants). While rehabilitating from surgery, Steltz, a professional football player, felt a pop in his right leg. This led him to return to Dr. Meyers, after team physicians received results from a MRI. At a follow-up appointment, Dr. Meyers also performed an MRI on Steltz, discussed the MRI with Dr. Adam Zoga, a musculoskeletal radiologist, and concluded Steltz had scar tissue breakup, a normal postoperative finding, and not a new injury. However, Dr. Paul Read, a second musculoskeletal radiologist, also independently reviewed the second MRI, and issued a report concluding there was a complete tear of the adductor tendon. Based on these conflicting interpretations of the MRI, Steltz alleged Dr. Meyers was negligent in failing to diagnose and disclose the existence of the tear as reported by Dr. Read. Appellants’ counsel’s first line of questioning to Dr. Zoga on direct examination at trial, asked Dr. Zoga's estimation of how many musculoskeletal radiologists there were in the US, and commented, in his question, that "plaintiff couldn’t find one of them to come into this courtroom to support Dr. Read, did you know that?" Steltz's counsel requested a curative instruction, and moved for a mistrial. The trial court gave the jury a curative instruction and denied the mistrial. Appellants' counsel, in closing, referred back to that line of questioning, asserting Steltz “didn’t bring anybody in to dispute [Dr. Crain and Dr. Zoga] because they can’t.” Steltz’s counsel did not object to any of these statements. Instead, in rebuttal, Steltz’s counsel reiterated that Dr. Read was a board-certified radiologist with a focus in musculoskeletal radiology. The jury returned a verdict for Appellants. Steltz filed a post-trial motion asserting the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial because the effect of Appellants’ counsel’s question to Dr. Zoga was so prejudicial that no jury instruction could adequately cure the prejudice. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial based on a single, unanswered question proposed to an expert witness, and that decision alone could not later serve as the basis for granting a new trial. View "Steltz v. Meyers M.D., et al." on Justia Law

In February 2017, Caleb Zweig died after a brief but tragic interaction with his college fraternity brother, appellant Brady DiStefano. Appellant initially was charged with aggravated assault and criminal homicide due to this encounter; however, the criminal homicide charge later was dismissed as the Commonwealth failed to produce prima facie evidence to support it. In response to Appellant’s subsequent pretrial motion, the trial court entered an order precluding the Commonwealth from presenting at Appellant’s trial any evidence suggesting that Appellant caused Zweig’s death. The Commonwealth appealed that order to the Superior Court, which reversed the trial court’s order. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to determine whether the Superior Court misapplied the appellate court standard for reviewing trial court evidentiary rulings. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court misapplied the relevant standard of review in reversing the trial court’s order. Thus, it vacated the Superior Court’s judgment, reinstated the trial court’s order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Distefano" on Justia Law