Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine could be invoked by a trustee to prevent the disclosure to a beneficiary of communications between the trustee and counsel pertaining to attorney fees expended from a trust corpus. To reach that issue, the Court had to first address the question of whether the Superior Court erred in disclaiming jurisdiction on the basis that the trial court’s order rejecting the privilege claim was not a collateral order, and immediately reviewable as such. The Supreme Court held unanimously that the Superior Court had immediate appellate jurisdiction to review the privilege question on the merits, and therefore erred in concluding otherwise. As to the privilege issue itself, the Superior Court indicated that, notwithstanding its perceived lack of jurisdiction, there was no evidence by which to substantiate a claim of privilege on the merits, nor any argument presented to the trial court in support thereof. For those reasons, the court was left to conclude that the privilege was unavailable under the circumstances and that the communications at issue were subject to disclosure. The Supreme Court did not reach a consensus on whether the privilege may be invoked in the trust context. Because disclosure would nevertheless result from the competing positions set forth by a majority of Justices, the lower court’s alternative ruling was affirmed by operation of law. View "In Re: Estate of McAleer" on Justia Law

Appellee Anthony Shaw was tried jointly with a co-perpetrator for the 2009 attempted murder of Alex Adebisi. At the pretrial stage, Appellee’s counsel filed a notice of alibi. At trial, only one of two identified alibi witnesses in the notice was called by the defense to testify. During her cross-examination of the testifying witness, the prosecutor referred to the notice of alibi to impeach the alibi's veracity. Defense objected, arguing the notice was not the witness' statement. After the Commonwealth concluded the cross-examination, Appellee’s counsel asked for a sidebar conference and moved for a mistrial. After Appellee was convicted and an unsuccessful direct appeal was concluded, he lodged a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act, claiming he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to amend the alibi notice prior to trial to remove the reference to a non-testifying alibi witness. The PCRA court denied relief on the post-conviction petition, Appellee appealed, and the Superior Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. With respect to trial counsel’s performance, the Superior Court found the alibi notice counsel had submitted failed to reflect his own contemporaneous understanding of the circumstances. And although counsel expressed a belief that an alibi witness could not be cross-examined with an alibi notice, the court referenced its own prior decisions which it read for the proposition that “it is well-established that an alibi notice can be used for impeachment purposes.” The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court, agreeing with the Commonwealth that the matter should have been remanded to the post-conviction court for Appellee to be afforded the opportunity to create an evidentiary record to meet his burden of demonstrating the ineffectiveness, particularly in terms of the reasonable-basis criterion. "We also find that the Superior Court should have provided the post-conviction court with the opportunity to assess prejudice in the first instance. ... Although certainly it is possible that the jurors relied on the notice to discredit the defense... it is most appropriate for the PCRA court to pass, in the first instance, on whether there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of Appellee's trial would have been different had counsel correctly handled the alibi notice." View "Pennsylvania v. Shaw" on Justia Law

In the pendency of divorce proceedings, Appellee and her husband entered into agreement governing the shared custody of their five-year-old child. Appellee repeatedly and intentionally violated this custody agreement, eventually absconding with the child ultimately to Florida, where the child remained for forty-seven days separated from her father. Appellee claimed the father was abusive, her attempts to secure assistance from the local children and youth agency had been rebuffed, and she had no option but to remove the child from the father’s care. Appellee was apprehended and charged with interference with custody of children. At trial, the Commonwealth presented testimony from the father, a clinical psychologist, a social worker, and a detective to the effect that Appellee’s allegations were false and/or unfounded. Appellee said she had been advised by a nanny the child had disclosed an incident of offensive touching by the father, and that subsequently the child repeatedly made statements to Appellee personally which were indicative of abuse. Appellee also presented the nanny’s corroborative testimony, and her cousin attested the child had apprised her of inappropriate touching too. The Pennsylvania Legislature prescribed that a defendant was innocent of the crime of “interference with custody of children” when he or she believed that intrusive actions were necessary to spare the subject child from danger. Appellee was convicted as charged and sentenced; in post-conviction proceedings, the Superior Court reversed sentence and ordered a new trial. The Commonwealth contended that the belief element of the offense should have been construed to encompass only beliefs that were held reasonably. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found Commonwealth’s arguments "are too tenuous to be credited." The Superior Court judgment was affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. H.D." on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act made inadmissible a a covertly obtained audio recording of Appellee Beth Ann Mason while she worked as a nanny in the home of the family that employed her. Because Appellee failed to demonstrate that she possessed a justifiable expectation that her oral communications would not be subject to interception by a recording device located in the children’s bedrooms, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Wiretap Act did not preclude the Commonwealth from introducing these recordings as evidence at Appellee’s trial for allegedly abusing the children in her care. The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s judgment, which held that the trial court properly suppressed the subject audio recording. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Mason" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the application of the statutory compulsory joinder rules, which generally require a prosecutor to pursue, in a single proceeding, all known charges against a defendant arising from a single criminal episode occurring within the same judicial district, subject to enumerated exceptions. In 2015, as the result of a traffic stop, Appellant Dewitt Johnson was arrested and charged with driving with a suspended license, possession with intent to deliver heroin (“PWID”), and knowing and intentional possession of heroin (“K&I”). Before the Traffic Division of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia, he was found guilty, in absentia, of the summary traffic offense. The Municipal Court’s jurisdiction was capped at criminal offenses punishable by imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; because of this, the Commonwealth pursued the drug offenses in the common pleas court. Appellant moved to dismiss, contending the prosecution was required to try all of the offenses simultaneously, per the compulsory joinder requirements of Section 110 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code. The Commonwealth conceded it was foreclosed from pursuing the K&I charge, because that crime, like the traffic offense, fell within the Municipal Court’s jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth argued that PWID remained viable, since the Municipal Court had lacked jurisdiction over that offense. In this regard, the Commonwealth invoked Section 112(1) of the Crimes Code, which served as an exception to Section 110’s general prohibition. The Superior Court accepted this argument and affirmed with respect to PWID. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court and remanded the matter for dismissal of the PWID charge: "the Commonwealth must generally assure that known offenses are consolidated at the common pleas level, when they arise out of a single criminal episode and occur in the same judicial district." View "Pennsylvania v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In a probation revocation case, the trial court entered an order removing the District Attorney’s Office and appointing a private criminal-defense attorney to represent the Commonwealth as a “special prosecutor.” Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the court lacked the authority to make such an appointment, the trial court’s order was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Mayfield" on Justia Law

In this case, the Superior Court affirmed a trial court order that dismissed a plaintiff’s complaint based upon plaintiff’s failure to timely serve her complaint upon the defendant despite the fact that plaintiff’s actions did not amount to intentional conduct. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to address whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicted with Lamp v. Heyman, 366 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1976) and its progeny, and responded in the negative. Consistent with the Superior Court’s decision, the Supreme Court held that a trial court has the discretion to dismiss a complaint when a plaintiff fails to offer proof that she diligently attempted to serve process on a defendant in a timely manner and there was no evidence to indicate that the defendant had actual notice of the commencement of the action in the relevant time frame, regardless of whether the plaintiff acted or failed to act intentionally. Because the Superior Court reached the correct result in this matter, judgment was affirmed. View "Gussom v. Teagle" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in this case to determine the propriety of raising a claim in a habeas corpus petition that the sentencing statute under which Appellant was sentenced was unconstitutionally vague, or if such a claim was properly considered an illegal sentence claim cognizable solely under the mandates of the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). Appellant Ingram Moore was convicted by jury of first degree murder and possession of an instrument of crime for the 1993 murder of Kevin Levy. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. He filed a federal writ of habeas corpus, which was dismissed as time barred. In April 2015, Appellant filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum. Appellant’s petition lay dormant until he filed a Motion to Compel Disposition on March 12, 2016. Appellant then filed another Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on April 15, 2016 raising a claim that his continued incarceration was illegal as the statute he was sentenced under was unconstitutionally vague for failing to give defendant notice that a sentence of life imprisonment meant without parole. A trial court ultimately dismissed Appellant’s petitions on May 31, 2017 “pursuant to the [PCRA].” Appellant appealed pro se. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal and held the trial court correctly viewed Appellant’s petitions for habeas relief as petitions for post-conviction relief under the PCRA. In making this determination, the Superior Court noted a writ of habeas corpus was properly considered a PCRA petition if the issue raised was cognizable under the PCRA. Appellant conceded that an issue cognizable under the PCRA must be brought through the PCRA’s procedures. Appellant asserted his claim that the statute he was sentenced under was void for vagueness was not a claim that fell within the specified claims available for relief under the PCRA and therefore was properly brought in a habeas petition. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding his arguments fell within the PCRA's purview. The trial court correctly dismissed his petition; the Superior Court's order was affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. Moore" on Justia Law

Appellee John Linkosky applied for renewal of his Pennsylvania driver’s license. The Department of Transportation (PennDOT) granted the renewal application and issued him a temporary internet driver’s license, which was valid from October 4 to October 18, 2018. The accompanying instructions advised Linkosky that he would receive a camera card within ten days. The instructions further directed Linkosky to present the camera card at any Department photo center and have a new photo taken for purposes of receiving a renewed photo driver’s license. On October 16, 2018, Linkosky pled guilty in Ohio to DUI. As a result, his operating privileges were suspended in that state for a period of twelve months, with credit awarded to him from June 30, 2018. At some point during October 2018, Linkosky received his camera card from the Department, but misplaced it. Nearly two months after his Ohio DUI conviction, Linkosky asked for a replacement camera card from PennDOT. PennDOT denied Linkosky’s request, finding that as of the date of his application for a replacement camera card, the National Driver Register (“NDR” or “Register”) indicated that his operating privileges were suspended in Ohio. The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on whether PennDOT erred in denying Linkosky a replacement camera card. The Supreme Court found PennDOT did not err in denying the replacement card; the Commonwealth Court's judgment, which affirmed the trial court's sustaining of the licensee's statutory appeal, was reversed. View "Linkosky v. PennDOT" on Justia Law

In this appeal by allowance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether, under the Pennsylvania Adoption Act, an attorney could act as both guardian ad litem and legal counsel for a minor child, in the context of a petition for termination of parental rights, where counsel did not expressly inquire into the child’s preferred outcome of the termination proceedings. In these unique circumstances, the Court found the attorney was able to fulfill her professional duties and act in both roles. Thus, the Court affirmed the Superior Court order, which affirmed the termination of parental rights in this case. View "In Re: P.G.F." on Justia Law