Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A dental practice owned by Timothy A. Ungarean, DMD, purchased a commercial property insurance policy from CNA and Valley Forge Insurance Company. The policy was intended to cover business-related losses. In March 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Pennsylvania's Governor ordered non-essential businesses to close, which led to significant financial losses for Ungarean's practice. Ungarean filed a claim under the policy, which was denied by CNA on the grounds that there was no physical damage to the property.Ungarean then filed a class action complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, seeking a declaration that the policy covered his pandemic-related business losses. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Ungarean, interpreting the policy's language to include loss of use of the property as a form of "direct physical loss." The court also found that none of the policy's exclusions applied to bar coverage.The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the policy language was ambiguous and should be interpreted in favor of the insured. The court held that the loss of use of the property due to the government shutdown constituted a "direct physical loss."The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court's decision. The court held that the policy's language was unambiguous and required a physical alteration to the property for coverage to apply. The court found that the economic losses suffered by Ungarean due to the government shutdown did not meet this requirement. Consequently, the court ruled that Ungarean was not entitled to coverage under the policy and remanded the case to the Superior Court with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of CNA. View "Ungarean v. CNA" on Justia Law

On December 30, 2018, Phillip Walters reported his girlfriend, Hayley Lorenzen, missing. Lorenzen had recently moved into Walters' apartment. Walters claimed that after staying up late the previous night, he found Lorenzen missing the next morning. He contacted her father and then the police. On January 9, 2019, Gabel Bell, who had a prior relationship with Walters, informed the police that Walters had killed Lorenzen. Bell detailed that Walters had strangled Lorenzen and disposed of her body in a river. Lorenzen's remains were found on July 20, 2019, leading to Walters being charged with first-degree murder, strangulation, and abuse of a corpse.The Wyoming County Court of Common Pleas convicted Walters, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Walters appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Dr. Gary Ross, the pathologist, who concluded that Lorenzen's cause of death was "strangulation by history" based solely on Bell's account, without physical evidence. The Superior Court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the pathologist's reliance on case history was permissible.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and found that Dr. Ross' testimony did not meet the requisite standard of being offered to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Dr. Ross admitted that his conclusion was based solely on Bell's statements and not on any objective medical findings due to the advanced decomposition of Lorenzen's body. The court held that this testimony improperly bolstered Bell's credibility, encroaching on the jury's role in determining witness credibility. Consequently, the court vacated Walters' judgment of sentence and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Commonwealth v. Walters" on Justia Law

Jamie Walsh and Mike Cabell competed in the April 23, 2024, primary election for the Republican nomination to represent the 117th District in Pennsylvania’s House of Representatives. Several provisional ballots were returned, and Walsh led Cabell by three votes before counting them. The Luzerne County Board of Elections held hearings to review the provisional ballots. Cabell challenged a ballot submitted by Timothy Wagner because the envelope was unsigned, and Walsh challenged a ballot submitted by Shane O’Donnell, who was registered to vote in a different county. The Board decided to count Wagner’s ballot but not O’Donnell’s.Cabell appealed to the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, which held a hearing where Wagner and O’Donnell testified. Wagner could not remember if he signed the envelope, but the court affirmed the Board’s decision to count his ballot due to no evidence of fraud and clear intent to vote. O’Donnell testified he moved to a new home less than 30 days before the election, and the court affirmed the Board’s decision not to count his vote, as he could have voted in his new district.The Commonwealth Court reversed both rulings. It held that Wagner’s unsigned ballot should not be counted based on the Election Code’s clear language. It also held that O’Donnell’s ballot should be counted because he moved within 30 days before the election, allowing him to vote in his old district.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision. It held that Wagner’s unsigned ballot should not be counted due to the clear statutory requirement for a signature. It also held that O’Donnell’s ballot should be counted because he moved within 30 days before the election, allowing him to vote in his previous district. View "IN RE: CANVASS OF PROVISIONAL BALLOTS IN THE 2024 PRIMARY ELECTION" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the enforcement of a partnership agreement following the death of a partner. Mary Ann Caruso and her sons, Peter and John, formed a partnership in 1983 to operate Hays Land Company (HLC). After Mary Ann's death, Peter and John continued the business until John's death in 2003. John's wife, Geraldine, became the executrix of his estate. Peter did not exercise the buy-out provision in the partnership agreement after John's death, and he continued to operate HLC with Geraldine, who received 50% of the business proceeds.The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County initially granted summary judgment in favor of Sandra, Peter's daughter and executrix of his estate, ruling that the Dead Man’s Act precluded Geraldine from proving the partnership agreement's continued applicability. The Superior Court reversed, finding sufficient evidence that Peter and Geraldine intended to continue the partnership under the original agreement. On remand, the trial court ordered specific performance of the buy-out provision, which the Superior Court affirmed.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and concluded that Geraldine could not enforce the partnership agreement because she was neither an original party to the agreement nor a third-party beneficiary. The court found no evidence that Peter and Geraldine explicitly agreed to be bound by the original partnership agreement after John's death. The court emphasized that the formation of a new partnership between Peter and Geraldine did not automatically incorporate the terms of the original agreement. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's order, holding that Geraldine could not compel specific performance of the buy-out provision against Sandra. View "In Re: Estate of P. Caruso" on Justia Law

A mother filed for sole custody of her two daughters, alleging the father, who resides in Guatemala, had abused, neglected, and abandoned the children. The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas granted her sole custody but denied her request for Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) findings, which are necessary for the children to seek SIJ status with federal immigration authorities. The court found insufficient evidence of abuse, neglect, or abandonment under Pennsylvania law and questioned whether it was in the children's best interest to issue an SIJ order.The mother appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which affirmed the lower court's decision. The Superior Court held that SIJ determinations could only be made in dependency proceedings, not in custody proceedings where one parent is awarded sole custody.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court's decision. The Court clarified that under federal SIJ law, a child involved in custody proceedings resulting in sole custody being awarded to a parent in the United States can seek SIJ determinations in that context. The Court held that the Superior Court erred in limiting SIJ determinations to dependency proceedings and that the record supported the children's entitlement to predicate SIJ determinations.The Supreme Court directed the custody court to enter orders consistent with its opinion, including findings that reunification with the father is not viable due to abandonment and neglect, and that it is not in the children's best interest to return to Guatemala. The case was remanded to the custody court for entry of these orders. View "Velasquez v. Miranda" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellants, Dr. Simon and Toby Galapo, placed signs with anti-hate and anti-racist messages on their property after a neighbor, Denise Oberholzer, called Dr. Galapo an anti-Semitic slur. The signs were visible from the Oberholzers' property and other neighbors' homes. The Oberholzers filed a civil complaint seeking to enjoin the signs, claiming they constituted a private nuisance, intrusion upon seclusion, defamation, false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.The Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas granted a permanent injunction, ordering the Galapos to reposition the signs so they did not face the Oberholzers' property. The court found the signs severely impacted the Oberholzers' well-being and quiet enjoyment of their home. The court also determined the injunction was a permissible time, place, and manner restriction on speech.The Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated the injunction, holding that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard. The Superior Court concluded the injunction was content-neutral but remanded the case for the trial court to apply the more rigorous standard from Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., which requires that the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Superior Court's decision, holding that the injunction constituted an impermissible prior restraint under Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Court emphasized that the signs were pure speech on matters of public concern and that the trial court lacked the power to enjoin such speech. The Court also held that the publication of language giving rise to tort claims other than defamation cannot be enjoined under Article I, Section 7. The Court concluded that the signs did not invade the Oberholzers' substantial privacy interests in an essentially intolerable manner. View "Oberholzer v. Galapo" on Justia Law

Gary and Mary Wolfe own property in Muhlenberg Township, which includes a roofing business and several rental homes. Reading Blue Mountain and Northern Railroad Company (RBMN) sought to condemn a portion of the Wolfes' property to reestablish a rail siding to serve Russell Standard, an asphalt company. The Wolfes objected, arguing the taking was for a private benefit rather than a public purpose.The Berks County Court of Common Pleas sustained the Wolfes' objections, finding the condemnation was intended solely to benefit Russell Standard and not the public. The court noted that the rail siding would disrupt the Wolfes' property and existing businesses, and that Russell Standard could use its own property for the rail connection. RBMN's refusal to consider alternative routes further indicated a private benefit.The Commonwealth Court reversed, relying on older case law that generally supported railroad takings for public use. The panel presumed RBMN's taking was for a public purpose, emphasizing the historical importance of railroads in serving public needs.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision. The Court held that the taking did not serve a public purpose as required by the Constitution. The Court emphasized that the public must be the primary and paramount beneficiary of the taking, which was not demonstrated in this case. The evidence showed the taking primarily benefited Russell Standard, with no significant public advantage. The Court remanded the case for reinstatement of the trial court's order dismissing the condemnation action. View "Wolfe v. Reading Blue Mountain" on Justia Law

Thomas E. Bold, Jr. was found unconscious behind the wheel of his legally parked car in a mall parking lot. The car's engine was running, and the headlights were on. When roused by Officer Thomas Gelnett, Bold appeared intoxicated and admitted to drinking at a nearby bar. He intended to sleep in his car until he was fit to drive. Bold was arrested for DUI and refused a blood test at a medical facility. Consequently, PennDOT suspended his license for 18 months due to his refusal.Bold appealed the suspension in the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas. During the hearing, Officer Gelnett admitted there was no evidence that Bold had driven the car while intoxicated. The court initially upheld the suspension but later reversed its decision, finding no reasonable grounds to believe Bold was in control of the vehicle's movement. The court cited the case Solomon v. PennDOT, which found insufficient grounds for suspicion when a suspect was found sleeping in a parked car with the engine running.The Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe Bold was in actual physical control of the vehicle. The court relied on past cases where the presence of a driver in a running vehicle was deemed sufficient for reasonable grounds. However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the circumstances did not provide reasonable grounds to believe Bold was operating or in actual physical control of the vehicle's movement. The court emphasized that the implied consent law requires some objective evidence of control over the vehicle's movement. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's ruling, siding with Bold. View "Bold v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

On December 3, 2017, Yuguang Lin and Ruan “Katie” Wenting were robbed by three masked men who took their belongings and forced entry into their apartment, stealing money, cigarettes, and cigars. The police tracked Lin’s stolen cell phone to a vehicle where they found Shaquan Lewis and Raheem Stevenson (Appellant) along with the stolen items. Appellant was charged with robbery, burglary, and criminal conspiracy.The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County held a jury trial where Appellant decided to testify. Before he took the stand, his counsel made an oral motion in limine to exclude a 2005 burglary conviction, arguing its remoteness. The trial court denied the motion, ruling the conviction admissible. Appellant then preemptively disclosed the conviction during his testimony. The jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to eight to sixteen years of incarceration followed by ten years of probation. Appellant’s post-sentence motion challenging the admissibility ruling was denied, and he appealed to the Superior Court.The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Appellant forfeited his right to challenge the admissibility of the prior conviction by introducing it himself. The court relied on Commonwealth v. Conner and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ohler v. United States, which held that a defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction cannot claim error on appeal.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and disagreed with the Superior Court. It held that a defendant does not waive the right to appeal a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of a prior conviction by preemptively introducing the evidence following an adverse in limine ruling. The court reversed the Superior Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Commonwealth v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

The case involves the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) developing a rulemaking package to join the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), aimed at reducing CO2 emissions from power plants. The RGGI Regulation faced opposition from the Pennsylvania Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB) and other state officials, leading to litigation. Three nonprofit environmental organizations (Nonprofits) sought to intervene in the litigation to defend the RGGI Regulation, citing environmental and health concerns.The Commonwealth Court initially denied the Nonprofits' application to intervene, ruling that their interests were adequately represented by DEP. The court also granted a preliminary injunction against the RGGI Regulation. Nonprofits appealed both the denial of intervention and the preliminary injunction.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case. It found that the Nonprofits had established a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation, based on the testimony of their members regarding the adverse health and environmental impacts of CO2 emissions. The court determined that DEP did not adequately represent the Nonprofits' interests, particularly because DEP had not invoked the Environmental Rights Amendment (ERA) in its defense of the RGGI Regulation.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision denying the Nonprofits' application to intervene, allowing them to participate as parties in the ongoing litigation. However, the appeal from the preliminary injunction was dismissed as moot because the Commonwealth Court had already issued a permanent injunction against the RGGI Regulation, superseding the preliminary injunction. View "Shirley v. PA Legislative Reference Bureau" on Justia Law