Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In consolidated appeals, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on whether, under the terms of the “replacement cost coverage” policies at issue, the insurer was permitted to withhold from any actual cash value (“ACV”) payment general contractor’s overhead and profit (“GCOP”) expenses, unless and until the insureds undertook repairs of the damaged property, even though the services of a general contractor were reasonably likely to be needed to complete the repairs. Appellants Konrad Kurach and Mark Wintersteen (“Policyholders”) each purchased identical “Farmers Next Generation” insurance policies from Appellee Truck Insurance Company (“Insurer”), to cover their Pennsylvania residential dwellings. Subsequent to the purchase of these policies, both Policyholders sustained water damage to their houses in excess of $2,500, and both filed claims with Insurer under the policies. Thus, where, as here, the cost of repairing or replacing a policyholder’s damaged property exceeds $2,500, Insurer was first required to pay the ACV of the property at the time of the loss to the policyholder (“step one”). Once the repair or replacement of the damaged property is commenced, Insurer was then obligated (in “step two”) to pay the depreciated value of the damaged property and also the expense of hiring a general contractor, “unless the law of [Pennsylvania] requires” payment of GCOP as part of ACV. After careful review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court, which found the insurer was entitled to withhold such costs. View "Wintersteen v. Truck Ins. Exchange" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review in this case was whether the Mercer County, Pennsylvania District Attorney's Office, and later the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General, violated the due process rights of Appellant Michael Bagnall under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) when it failed to disclose a cooperation agreement between the DA's Office and a key witness in Appellant's murder prosecution. The issue arose under circumstances where the OAG assumed the prosecution of Appellant prior to trial due to a conflict of interest between the DA’s Office and Appellant’s defense counsel, and the OAG was never made aware of the existence of the agreement. After review of the trial court record, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the OAG was imputed with knowledge of the agreement between the DA’s Office and the key witness at Appellant’s trial, and that, having satisfied all of the requirements for establishing a Brady violation, Appellant was entitled to a new trial. Because the Superior Court reached a contrary result, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "Pennsylvania v. Bagnall" on Justia Law

In an appeal by allowance, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's consideration was whether the statute criminalizing retaliation against witnesses applied only to witnesses in civil litigation. In March 2014, Husband and Wife witnessed a fatal shooting outside their home. In their grand jury testimony about the incident, they implicated Theodore Smedley. In June 2015, shortly before Smedley’s trial was scheduled to begin, an arson fire occurred at the couple’s house, where they and their daughter were sleeping. Although the flames engulfed the home, all three occupants escaped, albeit with injuries. Appellant Charles Nevels, Smedley’s cousin, was eventually arrested in connection with the fire and charged with multiple counts of retaliation against a witness, attempted homicide, and aggravated arson. A jury convicted Appellant on all counts, and he was sentenced to a lengthy prison term. On appeal, Appellant argued, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain his conviction for retaliation against a witness. Appellant argued that 18 Pa.C.S. 4953(a) required the retaliation to have been committed against a “witness, victim or a party in a civil matter.” He maintained that such language excluded Husband and Wife because they provided testimony in a criminal matter. A divided superior court affirmed Appellant's sentence. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed with Appellant's preferred reading of the statute, "there is little indication that that addition to the list of persons protected under Section 4953 was intended to affirmatively remove protections that already existed for victims and witnesses in criminal matters." Judgment was affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. Nevels III" on Justia Law

In 2002, Edella and Eric Johnson executed a $74,000 mortgage and associated promissory note, secured by property in Pittsburgh. The instrument was recorded and later assigned to the Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company (“Mellon”). Six years later, the Johnsons defaulted on their mortgage. In March 2009, Mellon, through its debt-collection counsel Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, LLP (“Phelan”), filed a complaint in mortgage foreclosure. In that complaint, Phelan included a claim for attorneys’ fees of $1,300. Following a non-jury trial, the court entered judgment for Mellon. In March 2012, while the underlying mortgage foreclosure case was still ongoing, the Johnsons filed the instant class action against Phelan. When the Pennsylvania Loan Interest and Protection Law ("Act 6") was enacted in 1974, a “residential mortgage” was defined as “an obligation to pay a sum of money in an original bona fide principal amount of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) or less.” In 2008, however, the General Assembly amended Act 6’s definition of a “residential mortgage” to increase the principal-amount ceiling to $217,873 - a base figure that automatically was adjusted for inflation annually. This appeal centered on whether that increased principal-amount ceiling should apply to mortgages that were executed before the 2008 amendment to Act 6. Specifically, the question presented was whether the $74,000 mortgage the Johnsons executed should have been considered a "residential mortgage" under Act 6, given that when Appellants' lender initiated foreclosure proceedings in 2009, the increased principal-amount ceiling had gone into effect. Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that nothing in the 2008 legislation amending Act 6 demonstrated that the revised figure should have applied retroactively, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's order. View "Johnson v. Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg" on Justia Law

In April 2015, Appellant James Byrd, a/k/a/ Al-Tariq Sharif Ali Byrd, moved in with Dana Heaps after being released on bail for charges filed in February, 2015 unrelated to this case. While residing with Heaps, Appellant learned she was taking Seroquel, a prescription anti-psychotic medication. Appellant told Heaps that he did not approve of her taking the medicine. He took the Seroquel away from her. Unbeknownst to Heaps, in mid-May 2015, Appellant apparently gave Heaps a larger dose than was prescribed, causing Heaps to become unconscious. Appellant later showed Heaps, and her friend, Carlos Dukes, a cell phone video of Heaps in her state of unconsciousness. Heaps testified the video showed Appellant removing her clothes, rubbing his penis on her face, inserting his penis in her mouth, and engaging in vaginal and anal intercourse with her, all while she remained unconscious. Heaps later told investigating officers that Appellant told her the video should serve as a warning to her on the dangers of taking Seroquel. A month later, Appellant was arrested on a parole violation warrant issued by the State of Ohio and recommitted to the Allegheny County Jail. Between June 2015 and February 2016, while incarcerated at the jail, Appellant received several visits from Heaps. At the time, all visits at the Allegheny County Jail were conducted over a closed-circuit system using telephone-like handsets. Before the parties were connected to speak, a verbal alert advised, “this call may be monitored or recorded.” Heaps, her boyfriend, and her family, contacted the the police to report that Appellant was threatening them through phone calls from the Allegheny County jail. In its investigation of these new allegations, the Commonwealth obtained the recordings of the conversations between Appellant and Heaps made during her jail visits. In one particular conversation, Appellant and Heaps discussed the May 2015 assault. The Commonwealth charged Appellant with one count of rape of an unconscious victim, two counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse of an unconscious victim, two counts of aggravated indecent assault of an unconscious victim, two counts of terroristic threats, and one count each of stalking, indecent assault of an unconscious person, invasion of privacy, and persons not to possess firearms. Appellant moved to suppress the recordings of the jail-visit conversations, contending they were made in violation of the Wiretap Act. After review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the recording warning Appellant he “may be monitored or recorded,” and Appellant’s conduct in speaking after the warning, satisfies the mutual consent exception to the Wiretap Act. View "Pennsylvania v. Byrd" on Justia Law

In a matter of first impression, the issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was the appropriate test to determine whether a claimant who is otherwise entitled to receive unemployment compensation benefits due to a separation from employment becomes ineligible for those benefits as a result of being self-employed pursuant to Section 402(h) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (the Act, known as the self-employment exclusion). The Court held that Section 4(l)((2)(B), 43 P.S. section 753(l)(2)(B), contained the appropriate test for determining whether or not an individual is in self-employment. If an individual was not in “self-employment,” then he remained eligible for benefits. Applying that test to the facts of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's ruling that the claimant was not self-employed. View "Lowman v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

The issue this matter presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review involved the alleged forfeiture of a parent’s share in his child’s estate where his child died without a will. Specifically, the question was whether an adult decedent, who became disabled after reaching the age of majority, was a dependent child for purposes of the forfeiture statute. Generally, where an intestate decedent dies without a spouse or issue but with living parents, his or her parents were entitled to inherit the individual’s estate as tenants by the entirety. Notably, the Code did not define the phrase “dependent child.” Decedent was 18 years old when he sustained gunshot wounds, rendering him a paraplegic. At age 37, he died intestate without a spouse or issue, and Appellant (“Mother”) was granted letters of administration. Decedent’s estate subsequently recovered a $90,000 wrongful-death award, which became the estate’s sole asset. Mother filed a petition for forfeiture of estate, asserting that Appellee (“Father”) forfeited his share of the estate by allegedly failing to perform his duty of support. After Father’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was denied, the orphans' court held a hearing. The Supreme Court held that the concepts of a dependent child and the parental duty of care, as they were referenced in Section 2106(b) of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code, contemplated a legally-imposed parental duty stemming from a state of dependency arising under the established law of the Commonwealth. The Court also agreed with the orphans’ court that in this matter, Mother failed to demonstrate Decedent was a dependent child – and concomitantly, that Father had a duty of care – as required to obtain relief under that provision. View "In Re: Estate of Small" on Justia Law

In this appeal by allowance, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether application of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”) to the judicial branch of our tripartite form of government violated separation of powers principles. On April 3, 1989, the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas (“CCP”) Office of Adult Probation hired Appellant Michael Renner as a Parole Officer. In July 2011, Appellant informed Lehigh County Chief Probation Officer John Sikora that he had been diagnosed with a serious mental health condition and was hospitalized; he was subsequently absent from work for 4 to 6 weeks. During Appellant’s absence, Sikora telephoned him numerous times to confirm the legitimacy of Appellant’s condition. Upon his return to work, Appellant alleged Sikora and Lehigh County Benefits Manager Mark Surovy, both of whom supervised Appellant, pressured Appellant to resign or take a leave of absence. Appellant confronted Sikora about his hostilities towards him, but Sikora refused to discuss the matter. Subsequently, in March 2014, Sikora terminated Appellant for failing to administer a urine test to an offender under his supervision. Appellant claimed the test was not required and that the reason for his termination was pretextual. Appellant protested his termination to then-President Judge of the CCP Carol McGinley, but Judge McGinley refused to take any action. As a result, Appellant claimed he could not obtain other employment in any other court system, and, in 2014, he filed a charge of unlawful discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which was dual-filed with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (“PHRC”), against Lehigh County Adult Probation, Sikora, and Surovy. Thereafter, Appellant completed training as a municipal officer, and, subsequently, was offered a police officer position by Northampton and Fountain Hill Boroughs. Appellant alleged that the CCP and Lehigh County learned that Appellant was offered employment as a police officer, and caused an order to be issued banning Appellant from possessing a firearm or taser in the Lehigh County Courthouse, Old Courthouse, and Government Center. As a result, Northampton and Fountain Hill Boroughs rescinded their employment offers. Appellant eventually got his gun possession ban lifted, but as a condition, the CCP and Lehigh County required him to undergo a medical exam, which Appellant contended was a violation of the PHRA. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that application of the PHRA to the judiciary would violate separation of powers principles, and thus, affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court. View "Renner v. CCP of Lehigh Co., et al" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the Commonwealth challenged orders of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas relieving appellees, Claude Lacombe and Michael Witmayer, of their duty to comply with Subchapter I of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), based upon the court’s finding Subchapter I, as retroactively applied to appellees, was a punitive and unconstitutional ex post facto law. After review of the trial court records, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred, and found Subchapter I was nonpunitive and did not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. View "Pennsylvania v. Witmayer" on Justia Law

In a matter of first impression, a Pennsylvania superior court held that anti-alienation provisions governing municipal pensions found in various statutes protected assets from attachment and other legal process (including a contract claim) only while those assets remained in the possession of the pension fund administrator. Specifically, the court determined that a spouse’s promise to waive her right to her husband’s pension benefits, including agreeing to transfer such benefits after receiving them from the administrator, was legally enforceable. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that because the superior court’s interpretation was consistent with the plain language of the statutes, the context in which the provisions appear, and Pennsylvania precedent interpreting similar statutory language, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the superior court. View "Estate of M&J Benyo v. Breidenbach" on Justia Law