Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In an appeal by allowance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the level of deference courts had to afford an administrative agency’s interpretation of its enabling statute. Additionally, the Court considered whether the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that Distributed Antenna System (DAS) networks were public utilities under the Pennsylvania Public Utility Code (Code), thereby reversing the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission’s (PUC) interpretation of the definition of “public utility." This case involved the status of DAS networks as public utilities in Pennsylvania. Appellees, Crown Castle NG East LLC (Crown Castle NG) and Pennsylvania-CLEC LLC (Pennsylvania-CLEC) (collectively Crown Castle), operated DAS networks. Crown Castle’s DAS networks provided telecommunications transport services to Wireless Service Providers (WSP), such as AT&T Wireless, Verizon Wireless, T-Mobile, and others. The WSPs offered "commercial mobile radio service" (CMRS) to retail end-users. The Supreme Court agreed with the Commonwealth Court that DAS network operators did not provide CMRS because DAS network operators “own no spectrum, need no phone numbers, and their contractual relationship is solely with the WSPs, not with the retail cell phone user. . . . [T]he DAS network operator has no control over the generation of that signal [that it transports for the WSPs].” Accordingly, the Court concluded that DAS network operators did not furnish CMRS and were not excluded from the definition of public utility by Section 102(2)(iv). Further, the Court concluded the Commonwealth Court did not err in holding that the PUC’s interpretation of a clear and unambiguous statutory provision was not entitled to deference. Further, the Commonwealth Court properly concluded that DAS network service met the definition of “public utility” and is not excluded from that definition as it did not furnish CMRS service. View "Crown Castle NG East LLC, et al v. Pennsylvania Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Appellant Darren Montgomery was charged with one count each of carrying a firearm on public streets in Philadelphia, and carrying a firearm without a license. The issue on appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court centered on whether the superior court erred in holding that a handgun partially tucked into one’s waistband, leaving the weapon’s handle visible, was “concealed” as a matter of law for purposes of Section 6106 of the Uniform Firearm’s Act, 18 Pa.C.S. 6106, which prohibited carrying a concealed firearm without a license. The Supreme Court rejected the superior court’s holding that any level of concealment of a firearm demonstrated concealment as a matter of law, and reaffirmed the well-settled principal that whether a defendant concealed a firearm pursuant to Section 6106 was an extremely fact-intensive question for a jury to determine based upon a consideration of the totality of the circumstances. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that a review of the totality of the circumstances established there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate a prima facie case of concealment under Section 6106. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior Court’s judgment, which reversed the trial court’s order dismissing the Section 6106 charge. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on the legality of Jimel King’s enhanced sentence for attempted murder resulting in serious bodily injury under 18 Pa.C.S. section 1102(c) when the Commonwealth failed to provide formal notice of its intent to seek the enhancement in the charging documents. Also for the Court's consideration was whether King’s consecutive sentences for the two inchoate crimes of attempted murder and conspiracy, arising out of the same incident, were precluded by 18 Pa.C.S. sections 903 and 906. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the sentence as to the enhanced murder sentence, but vacated the judgment of sentence at the conspiracy count. "The traditional merger test has no application here because the ... merger statute would never apply to the inchoate crimes of conspiracy and criminal attempt. The plain language of the specific statute governing this scenario precludes multiple sentences because there is no possibility that the conspiracy to commit aggravated assault existed independently of any conspiracy to kill, nor does the Commonwealth allege any kind of temporal separation or other circumstances to suggest that two conspiratorial agreements could have existed. By enacting Section 906, the General Assembly declared that where a defendant tries to achieve a result – in this case, murder – but fails to do so, he may only be punished once in the absence of distinct criminal objectives." The matter was remanded for resentencing. View "Pennsylvania v. King" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review in this case was whether a person subject to a bench warrant was a “fugitive from justice” such that he was a “person not to possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture” a firearm pursuant to Section 6105 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Court concluded the active bench warrant for appellant Brahim Smith rendered him a fugitive from justice prohibited from possessing a firearm, and he was properly convicted under that statute. View "Pennsylvania v. Smith" on Justia Law

While driving a vehicle in December 2014, Appellant Kaitlyn Wolfel struck two pedestrians, killing one and injuring the other. She was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence, and police transported her to a local health center for blood testing. Prior to the blood draw, police advised Appellant that, if she refused to submit to the test, she would be subject to enhanced criminal penalties pursuant to the Implied Consent Law. Appellant consented to the procedure, and the test yielded a blood alcohol content of .178 percent. Appellant was charged with numerous criminal offenses, including homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence. In 2016, while the case remained at the pretrial stage, the federal Supreme Court issued its decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016). Birchfield held, among other things, that consent to a warrantless blood draw was vitiated when such assent follows the administration by police of a warning of enhanced criminal penalties upon refusal of the testing. Appellant then lodged a motion contending, in very general terms, that Birchfield required suppression of the blood evidence. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined the Commonwealth waived its challenge to Appellant’s failure to raise a claim under Pa. Const. Article I, Section 8, by failing to challenge the suppression court’s explicit invocation of that provision before the superior court. The superior court order was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Wolfel" on Justia Law

In 2016, Appellant James Hamlett, Jr. was convicted of numerous crimes deriving from a sexual assault upon a minor, and lengthy concurrent terms of incarceration were imposed at sentencing. On appeal, the superior court found that the trial court had erred in admitting a video of a forensic interview of the victim into evidence. Nevertheless, the intermediate court invoked the harmless-error doctrine to deny Appellant’s request for a new trial, reasoning that the video was merely cumulative of properly-admitted evidence in the form of the victim's testimony. The Commonwealth hadn't argued harmlessness. Nonetheless, the superior court invoked the precept that an appellate court could affirm a valid verdict based on any reason appearing in the record, regardless of whether the rationale was raised by the appellee. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to determine whether it should prohibit Pennsylvania appellate courts from exercising their discretion to apply the harmless-error doctrine when deemed warranted, in criminal cases where advocacy from the Commonwealth on the subject was lacking. Appellant's core position on appeal was that the practice of appellate courts exercising their discretion like this should have been disapproved and discarded: that application of the right-for-any-reason doctrine to support sua sponte harmless-error review inappropriately relieved the government from meeting its burden of proof of harmlessness, upon an appellate court's discernment of trial error. To this, the Supreme Court disagreed, affirming the superior court judgment. View "Pennsylvania v. Hamlett" on Justia Law

Appellants, the manufacturers of various pesticides, appealed a Superior Court decision reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in their favor following the trial court’s determination that the testimony of the experts proffered by Appellee, the Executor of the Estate of Thomas J. Walsh, failed to satisfy the test set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). For nearly forty years, Walsh served as a groundskeeper and golf course superintendent at several Pittsburgh area golf courses. His work involved the regular application of various pesticides (primarily insecticides and fungicides) on the golf courses. Over this time, Walsh kept a detailed record of his activities regarding the pesticides he used, including a detailed log of the specific products and the dates of their applications. In 2008, Walsh was suffering from fever, chills, and a cough when he arrived at an emergency room. A bone marrow biopsy resulted in a diagnosis of Acute Myelogenous Leukemia (“AML”). Cytogenetic testing revealed significant chromosomal aberrations. On February 2, 2009, Walsh died. His treating oncologist, James Rossetti, D.O., later opined that Walsh’s extensive exposure to pesticides raised a high degree of suspicion that said exposure played a significant role in the development of his AML. After review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling, but gave instructions that on remand to the trial court, the Appellants should be given the opportunity to renew their Frye motions. View "Walsh v. BASF Corporation et al." on Justia Law

In Pennsylvania ex rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 581 A.2d 172 (Pa. 1990), a five-Justice majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held hearsay evidence alone was insufficient to establish a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing. In this case, a divided superior court recognized the Verbonitz holding, but did not follow it, despite acknowledging “the facts of Verbonitz are virtually indistinguishable from the case sub judice.” The Superior Court articulated five reasons for its departure from Verbonitz: (1) the Verbonitz Court did not agree on a single rationale to support its holding; (2) the Superior Court, in Pennsylvania v. Ricker, 120 A.3d 349 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“Ricker I”), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 170 A.3d 494 (Pa. 2017) (per curiam) (“Ricker II”), rejected the position of the three-Justice Verbonitz plurality, opining hearsay violated confrontation rights; (3) the Verbonitz minority relied on a substantive due process analysis contradicted by Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994); (4) Verbonitz was decided before the 2013 amendments to Pa.R.Crim.P. 542(E); and (5) there was no procedural due process violation here. Upon careful review, the Supreme Court held the superior court erred to the extent it concluded hearsay evidence alone was sufficient to establish a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision in this matter and disapproved that court's prior decision in Ricker I, which similarly concluded hearsay evidence alone was sufficient to establish a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing. View "Pennsylvania v. McClelland" on Justia Law

A mental health patient lived in a forty-unit apartment building and repeatedly told his doctors and therapists he would kill an unnamed “neighbor.” He ultimately carried out his threat, killing an individual who lived in his building, a few doors away from his own apartment. In subsequent wrongful death litigation filed by the victim’s mother, the providers argued they had no duty to warn anyone about their patient’s threats because he never expressly identified a specific victim. The trial court rejected this argument and denied the providers’ motion for summary judgment, allowing the case to proceed to trial. On appeal, the Superior Court agreed, and finding no reversible error, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. View "Maas v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

In 2008, Elma Betty Temple (“Elma”), who suffered from Alzheimer’s disease, became a resident of Providence Care Center, a nursing home located in Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania. Providence Care Center, LLC (“Providence”) owned and operated the facility, while Grane Healthcare Company (“Grane”) provided management services. In November 2011, Elma, then aged 81, fell while walking on a ramp. She suffered a fracture in her right humerus, a fracture in her right pelvis, and a laceration to her right elbow. Providence apparently was not supervising Elma at the time; the only witness to the incident, a hospice chaplain, was not a designated caregiver. In 2012, Emla's son, James Temple (“Temple”), filed a complaint on Elma’s behalf against Providence and Grane, alleging negligence and corporate negligence, and sought punitive damages. Temple alleged that Providence should have known that Elma required supervision, because of two previous falls in 2011. Temple further claimed that the facility was understaffed, and that Providence failed to provide needed safety measures. In this case, a panel of the superior court concluded that, even though Providence had waived its opportunity to ask for a mistrial, the trial court nonetheless possessed and invoked its inherent authority to grant a new trial sua sponte for the same reasons that Providence raised in its post-trial motions. In so ruling, the superior court affirmed the trial court’s grant of a new trial. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that a trial court possesses "the very limited and restrained authority to halt proceedings and compel them to begin anew based upon that unpreserved error. But in such a circumstance, a trial court may only use its sua sponte authority to grant a new trial where 'exceedingly clear error' results in 'manifest injustice,' of a constitutional or structural nature." Because Providence did not preserve its request for a mistrial and because the trial court did not grant, and could not have granted, a new trial sua sponte based upon the unpreserved request for a mistrial, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Temple v. Providence Care Center" on Justia Law