Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this appeal by allowance, a covenant not to compete was executed by an employee after the first day of employment. The issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was whether the employer could enforce that provision in the post-employment timeframe although no new consideration was supplied in connection with its execution. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court properly denied a motion for a preliminary injunction: there was no evidence suggesting that, as of the commencement of the employment relationship, there was a meeting of the minds as to the noncompete agreement (NCA), or that the employee otherwise manifested his assent to provisions of the NCA that he was given, or an intent to be bound by them. View "Rullex Co., LLC. v. Tel-Stream, Inc." on Justia Law

D.R. (Father) and J.R. (Mother) (collectively, Parents) resided in Greene County, Pennsylvania with their five children, ranging in age from six to sixteen years old. Father was an attorney who, as part of his private practice, represented parents under investigation by Greene County Children and Youth Services (CYS). On October 29, 2018, Greene County CYS received a report that on October 12, 2018, Father was observed to be impaired or under the influence while in the presence of one of his children. Because Father was a practicing attorney in Greene County, and to avoid a conflict of interest, the matter was referred to Fayette County CYS (the Agency). The Agency received three reports regarding Father, one of which was an allegation of abuse towards Mother (criminal charges were dropped because she refused to testify). The Agency thereafter moved to compel Parents' cooperation with a General Protective Services Assessment. Following a hearing, orders directing Parents to permit the Agency into their home to assess the living conditions of the children, and directing Parents to cooperate with the Agency were issued. The court also ordered Father to submit observed urine samples for purposes of drug and alcohol assessments. The orders further noted that Parents’ failure to comply would subject them to sanctions. Parents appealed, and a superior court reversed, finding no link between the alleged abuse and conditions in the home. Further, though there were reports of Father's intoxication, there was no specificity as to the type of impairment or whether such impairment caused the children to be abused or neglected. The Agency argued on appeal that the Superior Court erred in holding that it was without authorization to require urine samples as part of its duty to investigate reports of suspected child abuse. Finding no reversible error in the superior court judgment, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Interest of: D.R." on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the Northern Berks Regional Police Commission’s petition for appeal in this Police and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act (Act 1111) grievance arbitration appeal. An arbitrator reinstated Officer Charles Hobart to the Northern Berks Police Department, but the trial court vacated the award based on a finding that the award required the Department to commit an illegal act. The trial court’s ruling was based on factual developments occurring after Hobart’s termination. The Commonwealth Court reversed, finding that Hobart had not yet exhausted administrative remedies that would theoretically remove the purported illegality. After review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the arbitrator's award was not illegal, and therefore reversed the Commonwealth Court. View "N Berks Reg. Police Comm. v. Berks Co. FOP" on Justia Law

Appellant Sara Ladd, a New Jersey resident, owned two vacation properties on Arrowhead Lake in the Pocono Mountains. Ladd started renting one of these properties in 2009 and the other in 2013 to supplement her income after being laid off from her job as a digital marketer. Eventually, some of her Arrowhead Lake neighbors learned of her success and asked her to manage rental of their own properties. Ladd considered “short-term” vacation rentals to be rentals for fewer than thirty days, and limited her services to such transactions only. Ladd acted as an “independent contractor” for her “clients” and entered into written agreements with them related to her services. In January 2017, the Commonwealth’s Bureau of Occupational and Professional Affairs (the Bureau), charged with overseeing the Commission’s enforcement of Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act (RELRA), called Ladd to inform her she had been reported for the “unlicensed practice of real estate.” Ladd reviewed RELRA and concluded her short-term vacation property management services were covered by the statute, and she would have to obtain a real estate broker license to continue operating her business. As Ladd was sixty-one years old and unwilling to meet RELRA’s licensing requirements, she shuttered PMVP to avoid the civil and criminal sanctions described in the statute. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the Commonwealth Court's holding that the RELA's broker licensing requirements satisfied the heightened rational basis test articulated in Gambone v. Commonwealth, 101 A.2d 634 (Pa. 1954), and thus do not violate Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution when applied to a self-described “short-term vacation property manager.” The Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Court erred in so holding, and therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ladd et al v. Real Estate Commission, et al." on Justia Law

The events that formed the basis of Nazeer Taylor’s prosecution occurred when he was fifteen years old. In March 2014, the Commonwealth filed a delinquency petition alleging that Taylor committed numerous delinquent acts purportedly stemming from recurring incidents of sexual assault of his then-eleven-year-old foster brother, A.O. This appeal asked whether a minor’s Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was violated when a juvenile court granted the Commonwealth’s request to have a delinquency matter transferred to an adult court for criminal prosecution, based in part upon the minor’s decision not to admit culpability to the delinquent acts alleged. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court judgment and remanded for a determination, in the first instance, whether the harmless error doctrine was applicable to the juvenile court's "constitutionally deficient misapplication" of the Juvenile Act's transfer provisions, and if it was not, or if the error was not harmless, for consideration of the available relief under these circumstances. View "Pennsylvania v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in this matter to consider whether a government employer properly terminated a probationary employee based on messages she posted to a social networking website. After review, the Court concluded the Commonwealth Court failed to engage in the required balancing of interests, and therefore erred when it reversed the adjudication and order of the Pennsylvania State Civil Service Commission (Commission) dismissing the probationary employee’s challenge to her termination. View "Carr v. PennDOT" on Justia Law

In May 2013, Appellant Todd Hoover pled guilty to one count of driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”) - general impairment, and one count of DUI - highest rate of impairment. On August 13, 2013, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of five years intermediate punishment, which included 90 days incarceration at the Lycoming County Prison pre-release facility. He was also ordered to pay the costs of prosecution and a fine. In 2017, Appellant filed a motion for early termination of his sentence of intermediate punishment. On September 29, 2017, the trial court determined that Appellant had “complied with all conditions of supervision, paid all fines and costs, and completed all obligations” associated with his county intermediate punishment, and, accordingly, granted his petition. That night, however, Appellant was arrested for, and charged with, another DUI offense. The Lycoming County Adult Probation Office (“LCAPO”) contacted the trial court and orally requested that it reconsider its order granting Appellant’s petition for early termination of his sentence. The trial court granted the request the same day, and scheduled a hearing to consider “whether the Court should vacate its Order releasing [Appellant] from supervision in light of the new charges.” In the interim, the Commonwealth filed a petition to revoke Appellant’s probation, asserting that his new DUI offense constituted a violation of his probation. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on whether the trial court erred by vacating, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. section 5505, its prior order granting a petition for early termination of a sentence of intermediate punishment based on the court’s discovery that the defendant committed a new offense shortly after the early termination order was entered. To this, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred, and, therefore, reversed the decision of the Superior Court affirming the trial court’s order. View "Pennsylvania v. Hoover" on Justia Law

In 2002, Walter Smith told police that Clinton Robinson killed Margaret Thomas. Later that year, Smith himself was killed when he was shot twelve times outside a Philadelphia bar. Based on ballistics evidence, the police concluded that multiple individuals had acted in concert to kill Smith. Police recovered a red baseball cap approximately nine feet from Smith’s body. The case remained unsolved until 2005, when a jailhouse informant told police he had overheard Appellant Kareem Johnson make statements implicating himself in Smith’s murder. The informant admittedly supplied this information solely in hopes of obtaining leniency when he was sentenced in federal court. DNA testing revealed that Appellant was a contributor to the DNA in the sweatband of the red cap. The Commonwealth proceeded on the understanding that there was only one baseball cap involved, and that it contained both Smith’s blood and Appellant’s DNA. A jury would convict Appellant on all counts, and sentenced him to death. Appellant moved for post-conviction relief, and was eventually granted a new trial. Appellant called as witnesses several individuals who were involved with the Commonwealth’s case at the 2007 trial or who had represented the Commonwealth in post-conviction proceedings. In questioning these witnesses, Appellant was able to uncover in some detail the extent of the Commonwealth’s mishandling of physical and DNA evidence during his trial; from this he moved to bar retrial. Appellant argued that, whether errors reflected an intentional subversion of the truth-determining process, or mere recklessness, they led to Appellant being confined on death row based on a trial the Commonwealth later conceded was constitutionally inadequate. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that although Commonwealth's acts and omissions were not made intentionally or with specific purpose to deprive Appellant of his rights, the record was consistent with the trial court's characterization that such mistakes were "unimaginable." As such, the Supreme Court found the Pennsylvania Constitution immunized Appellant from being put in jeopardy a second time. View "Pennsylvania v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Appellant Keenan Coleman petitioned for post conviction relief; he was convicted by jury of first-degree murder for the 2010 shooting death of Tobias Berry. Appellant argued he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, arguing the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the use of certain hearsay testimony, trial counsel failed to object to other testimony, and trial counsel failed to object to a portion of the prosecutor's closing argument. After review of the trial court record, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court determined the trial court indeed erred by not instructing the jury to consider the alleged hearsay testimony for limited purposes, and the PRCA court did not adequately address the issue raised from testimony regarding Appellant's alleged ownership and use of firearms. The Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA court's rejection of Appellant's ineffective assistance claim with respect to the prosecutor's closing argument. The matter was therefore remanded for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Coleman" on Justia Law

In 2015, appellant John Koehler filed his second petition for collateral relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). In 1996, a jury found Koehler guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and related offenses arising from the killing of his girlfriend and her nine-year-old son, and sentenced Koehler to death. In 2001, Koehler filed a timely PCRA petition. Therein, Koehler included a claim for relief from his death sentence due to ineffectiveness of counsel during the penalty phase. The PCRA court denied relief following a hearing, and Koehler appealed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. Then in 2015, Koehler filed a second PCRA petition, this time asserting that his due process rights had been violated during his 2012 appeal. Koehler premised this assertion upon the involvement of a former Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice in a well-publicized email scandal that included the exchange of religiously, racially, and sexually offensive emails. Viewing the subject of the infamous emails as suggesting a disregard for victims of domestic violence, Koehler alleged that the justice's participation in his previous appeal raised a risk of actual judicial bias, as well as the appearance of bias. Recognizing that his second PCRA petition was facially untimely, Koehler asserted that he met the timeliness exceptions for governmental interference and newly discovered facts. Koehler sought, inter alia, the reinstatement of his appellate rights nunc pro tunc in order to appeal anew to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court the denial of his first PCRA petition. The PCRA court dismissed the petition, holding that it was without authority to grant relief. The Supreme Court concluded that the PCRA court erred as a matter of law, as it did possess the authority to grant the form of relief that Koehler sought in the event that he established the merits of his claim. Accordingly, the PCRA court's order was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Koehler" on Justia Law