Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

TSG Real Estate, LLC (“TSG”) was a real estate company that owned a commercial property in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania (the “Property”). Initially, TSG hired New Hart Corporation d/b/a Hart Corporation (“Hart”) as its broker to market the Property. As TSG’s agreement with Hart was to expire, TSG began considering replacement brokers, one of which was Binswanger of Pennsylvania, Inc. (“Binswanger”). Two days before TSG informed Binswanger of its decision to hire it as its broker, TSG received a written offer from TWA Holdings, LLC (“TWA”) to purchase the Property for $3.7 million. TSG negotiated an agreement with Binswanger culminating in a September 27, 2013 “Exclusive Right To Sell Or Lease Agreement” (“Broker Agreement”) with Binswanger. The Broker Agreement permitted TSG to continue using other brokers in connection with any sale to TWA, and provided, inter alia, (1) if Binswanger sold the Property, it would be entitled to a 5% commission; (2) all commissions would be considered to be earned and payable “at the time scheduled for closing on a sale;” (3) a “carve-out period” which allowed that if another broker “completed” a sale, exchange, or transfer of the Property to TWA on or before January 5, 2014, Binswanger would earn no commission; (4) if another broker completed a sale of the Property to TWA after January 5, 2014, the other broker and Binswanger would split a 5% commission; and (5) the duration of the agreement was for one year; however, TSG had the right to terminate the agreement after 6 months with 30 days prior written notice to Binswanger. Two days prior to the expiration of the carve-out period contained in the Broker Agreement, TSG, via Hart and another broker, Gelcor Realty (“Gelcor”), entered into an Agreement of Sale with TWA, selling the Property for $3.4 million. In this appeal by allowance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the entitlement to broker commissions for the sale of commercial property. Applying the plain and unambiguous language of the Broker Agreement, the Supreme Court found the sale of the Property was completed at the time of closing, i.e., on April 24, 2014. As the sale was not completed on or before January 5, 2014, but only after the carve-out period had expired, Binswanger was entitled to a commission pursuant to the Broker Agreement fee schedule. View "Binswanger of PA Inc v. TSG Real Estate LLC." on Justia Law

This appeal involved an ejectment action commenced by the City of Philadelphia (“City”) against Francis Galdo, and a counterclaim to quiet title filed by Galdo, claiming ownership of the property at issue by adverse possession. In 1974, City Council passed an ordinance authorizing the Commissioner of Public Property to execute a Declaration of Taking of several properties, including the Parcel at issue here. On November 13, 1974, the City obtained fee simple title to the Parcel by condemnation, with the notice of condemnation stating that the Parcel had been condemned for transit purposes. In 1976, the Commonwealth filed a notice of condemnation against several of the City’s lots, indicating that the Commonwealth would permanently retain the land in the I-95 right-of-way, and that the Commonwealth would have a temporary easement on other condemned properties, including the Parcel condemned by the City, during the period that the Elevated Frankford train line was rerouted to allow for construction of I-95. Germane to this appeal, the parties agreed the City did not physically occupied the Parcel since completion of the work connected to the rerouting of the Elevated Frankford train line in the 1970s. Further, it was undisputed the City did not perform any maintenance, grass- cutting, grading, or landscaping on the Parcel. Instead, after the highway construction was completed, the City viewed the Parcel as “surplus property” that was not actively being used. At least a decade after construction of I-95 had been completed, in September 1989, Galdo purchased a two-story dwelling located directly across the street from the Parcel. At that time, the Parcel was not being maintained and was purportedly home to “prostitutes” and “derelicts”. Galdo cleared the Parcel of weeds and trash, poured a concrete slab, and parked his vehicles there. He also used the Parcel to discard debris from the remodeling of his home. By 1992, Galdo poured another concrete slab on the Parcel for storing materials and enclosed that area with a fence. In 1994, he installed on the Parcel a fire pit and a picnic table affixed to the ground. Over the years Galdo continued to make improvements to the Parcel. He never obtained any permits to make improvements to the Parcel, did not pay property taxes for the Parcel, and did not provide evidence that he insured the Parcel. Further, it is undisputed that the City never gave Galdo permission to possess the land at issue. The trial court ruled in favor of the City, holding that it was immune from suit because a claim of adverse possession could not lie against a municipality. The Commonwealth Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded for trial on the adverse possession claim, holding that the adverse possession claim could proceed against the City because the property was not devoted to a public use during the twenty-one-year prescriptive period, as required for immunity to apply. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed the City was not immune from a claim of adverse possession under the facts presented and affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court. View "City of Phila. v. Galdo" on Justia Law

In 2008, Appellants, Gamesa Energy USA, LLC and Gamesa Technology Corporation, Inc. (Gamesa), entered into a commercial lease agreement (the Lease) to rent 35,000 square feet of office space in Philadelphia (the Premises) from Appellees, Ten Penn Center Associates, L.P. and SAP V Ten Penn Center NF G.P. L.L.C. (collectively Ten Penn Center). In May 2011, following Gamesa’s submission of the information required under Article 20.2 of the Lease, Ten Penn Center approved a request to sublease approximately 15,000 square feet, or forty percent of the Premises, to Viridity Energy, Inc. (Viridity) through August of 2018. In April 2012, Gamesa informed Ten Penn Center it would be moving out of the Premises as part of a corporate consolidation, and would continue to pay its monthly rent and attempt to find a sub-lessee for the open space. Viridity remained in the Premises under the terms of its sublease with Gamesa. Gamesa was twice late with the rent after it moved out, but still paid amounts due. In 2012, Gamesa submitted a request to Ten Penn Center for consent to sublease 5,200 square feet of the Premises to Business Services International, LLC (BSI), a business entity comprised of two foreign corporations formed for the particular purpose of subleasing office space through Gamesa. Ten Penn Center responded on June 26th, informing Gamesa it was in default of the Lease for vacating the Premises and, as a result, Ten Penn Center had no obligation to entertain the request to sublease. Ten Penn Center proposed it would grant consent to the BSI sublease if Gamesa forfeited its remaining tenant improvement allowance. Thereafter, negotiations between the parties stalled, and the proposed sublease with BSI never materialized. In 2013, Gamesa filed a complaint against Ten Penn Center, asserting claims of breach of contract, tortious interference in business relationships, and unjust enrichment. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review of this commercial landlord and tenant dispute to determine whether the Superior Court erred in holding the tenant was limited to damages for breach of contract and could not also recover the rent it paid following the landlord’s breach, despite prevailing on its claims for both remedies at trial. After careful review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the Superior Court. View "Gamesa Energy USA v. Ten Penn Center, et al" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit certified a question of law to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court regarding whether an increase to the limits of underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage for multiple vehicles that are insured under an existing policy constitutes a “purchase” for purposes of Subsection 1738(c) of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”). Michelle Barnard purchased a personal automobile policy from Travelers Home and Marine Insurance Company (“Travelers”) to insure her two vehicles. As part of this policy, Barnard purchased UIM coverage in the amount of $50,000 per vehicle. Barnard waived stacking of her UIM coverage limits. Two years later, Barnard increased the UIM coverage limit on each of her vehicles to $100,000. Barnard did not execute a new stacking waiver at that time. Then several more years later, Barnard was involved in a motor vehicle accident with an underinsured motorist. When Barnard sought UIM benefits from Travelers, Travelers offered her $100,000 based upon the UIM coverage limit on one of her vehicles. Barnard filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking $200,000 in stacked UIM benefits. Travelers removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Based upon the plain language of Subsection 1738(c), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court answered the Third Circuit's question in the affirmative: therefore, an increase of UIM coverage under circumstances as was presented here triggered an insurance company’s statutory obligation to offer an insured the opportunity to waive stacking of the new, aggregate amount of UIM coverage. View "Barnard v. Travelers Home, et al" on Justia Law

Montour Township (Township) Pennsylvania has a zoning ordinance (Ordinance) under which the Township has been divided into different districts, including agricultural districts. The Ordinance permits several “Intensive Agriculture and Agricultural Support” uses, including “hog raising,” in agricultural districts by special exception. The Nutrient Management Act (Act), required certain agricultural operations to comply with various standards regarding the management of livestock manure, among other “nutrients.” At the heart of the Act is the mandate that certain agricultural operations adopt a “nutrient management plan” or “NMP.” The Act also contained a provision outlining the manner in which the Act, as well as the regulations and guidelines promulgated pursuant to it, preempt local regulation of nutrient management. Scott Sponenberg (Applicant) owned property used as a livestock and crop farm within an agricultural district in the Township. In April 2013, Applicant filed an application for a special exception with the Montour Township Zoning Hearing Board (ZHB) based on his desire to build a swine nursery barn with under building concrete manure storage (i.e., a manure storage facility) on his property. Applicant’s planned use was not subject to the various requirements established under the Act, which applied to NMP operations. The ZHB initially granted Applicant’s special exception application subject to conditions. Following two appeals filed by various objectors, including Russell Berner, Donna Berner, Kendall Dobbins, Robert Clark, and Robert Webber (Objectors), the matter returned to the ZHB by way of order from the Commonwealth Court for the ZHB to render necessary findings regarding Applicant’s compliance with the Ordinance’s special exception requirements. In this appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether, and if so, to what extent, the Act preempted local regulation of nutrient management by agricultural operations that were not otherwise subject to the Act’s requirements. The Court held the Act preempted local regulation of agricultural operations not subject to the Act’s requirements to the extent that the local regulation was more stringent than, inconsistent with, or in conflict with those requirements. Because the Commonwealth Court reached a contrary result, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s order. View "Berner,et al v. Montour ZHB" on Justia Law

Betty and Curtis Shiflett sued Lehigh Valley Hospital and Lehigh Valley Health Network, Inc. (collectively, the “Hospital”) for negligence in connection with injuries Betty suffered while in the hospital for knee surgery. The jury returned a verdict for the Shifletts, awarding them $2,391,620 in damages. The Superior Court ruled that one of the claims upon which the Shifletts prevailed at trial was time-barred and should not have been submitted to the jury. Finding that some portion of the jury’s damage award may have been based upon the time-barred claim, the intermediate appellate court remanded the case for a new trial on damages. After its review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court erred in this regard, as pursuant to the “general-verdict rule” adopted by Halper v. Jewish Family & Children’s Services, 963 A.2d 1282 (Pa. 2009), the Hospital waived any entitlement to a new trial on damages when it failed to request a special interrogatory on the verdict sheet that would have permitted the jury to allocate the damages awarded on each claim. View "Shiflett v. Lehigh Valley Health" on Justia Law

Appellant Dynan Turpin was arrested and charged with, inter alia, three counts of possession of a controlled substance, and one count each of conspiracy to commit possession with the intent to deliver and receiving stolen property. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to determine whether a search warrant for an entire multi-bedroom residence shared by appellant and his roommate, Benjamin Irvin, was constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution even though the warrant was premised solely on the activity of Irvin. After review, the Supreme Court concluded police had probable cause to search the entire residence and therefore the warrant was constitutionally permissible. View "Pennsylvania v. Turpin" on Justia Law

Christian Ford was charged with DUI and drug possession charges stemming from three separate arrests. The first, Ford was arrested for DUI and one count of driving with a suspended license. Ford subsequently failed to appear for his preliminary hearing on those charges, and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. Six months after Ford’s failure to appear at his preliminary hearing on the DUI charges, two police officers spotted Ford at a grocery store. After confirming that Ford had an active bench warrant, the officers approached him in the parking lot, but he fled on foot. When the officers eventually caught Ford, he continued to resist, and substantial force was required to effectuate the arrest. A search incident to arrest revealed that Ford had 159 stamp bags of heroin and a digital scale in his possession. He was charged with possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (“PWID”), possession of drug paraphernalia, and resisting arrest. Ford posted bail ten days later and again was released from custody. A few weeks after posting bail, Ford went missing. A bail bondsman returned him to prison; the bondsman noticed that Ford was carrying a stamp bag of heroin and a syringe, leading to more drug possession charges. Ford entered into a negotiated guilty plea agreement, which disposed of all three of his criminal cases. The trial court accepted Ford’s guilty plea and sentenced him accordingly. In a petition for post-conviction relief, Ford alleged he could not pay the fines associated with his plea agreement, and that his inability to pay those fines would prevent him from being paroled. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the Sentencing Code mandated trial courts “shall not sentence a defendant to pay a fine unless it appears of record that the defendant is or will be able to pay” it. The question presented in Ford’s post-conviction appeal was whether the Sentencing Code’s ability-to-pay prerequisite was satisfied when a defendant agrees to pay a given fine as part of a negotiated guilty plea agreement. The Court held that it was not, and that a defendant’s mere agreement to pay a specific fine did not constitute evidence that he was or would be able to satisfy the financial obligation. Therefore, the case was remanded for the trial court to make findings on Ford’s ability to pay. The sentence was vacated in its entirety. View "Pennsylvania v. Ford" on Justia Law

Appellant, Joseph Petrick, contracted with a homeowner, Donna Sabia, to perform remodeling work. Sabia paid Appellant a deposit of $1,750.00 plus $300.00 to cover the cost of city permits. Appellant began some of the contracted work at which time Sabia paid an additional $1,750.00 to Appellant. That same day, Appellant and Sabia’s son, Carmen Fazio, who also resided in the home, entered into a second contract for Appellant to do some painting in the home. As consideration, Fazio purchased a $600.00 saw for Appellant. Appellant and Fazio entered into a third contract to install siding on the exterior of the home. Fazio paid Appellant $2,300.00 to purchase materials. Appellant did not finish the work; Appellant eventually advised Sabia and Fazio that he could not complete the jobs but would refund $4,950.00 within a week. Appellant never refunded any money or the saw, nor did he ever purchase the siding materials or obtain the permits from the city. Appellant filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In his petition, Appellant listed Sabia and Fazio as creditors. The bankruptcy court issued a discharge order in March 2016. In October 2015, a City of Scranton Police Detective filed a criminal complaint charging Appellant with theft by deception and deceptive business practices. After a bench trial, the court found Appellant guilty of theft by deception and not guilty of deceptive business practices. The court sentenced Appellant to a term of incarceration of three to eighteen months. Appellant was also ordered to pay $6,700.00 in restitution. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of his sentence, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment of sentence. On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Appellant argued that the portion of his sentencing order requiring him to pay restitution was illegal because the debt was discharged in bankruptcy. Appellant argued that the Bankruptcy Code specified that the filing of a petition operated as an automatic stay of any action to recover a debt that preceded the filing. The Supreme Court found the mandatory restitution order served criminal justice goals, and were distinct from civil debt liability with respect to discharge in bankruptcy. “This distinction is unaffected by the temporal relationship between the proceedings in the bankruptcy court and the criminal prosecution. Additionally, it is unaffected by a creditor’s participation in the bankruptcy proceedings.” The Court determined there was no indication in this case the restitution award was improperly sought by the prosecutor or awarded by the sentencing court. Accordingly, it affirmed the Superior Court. View "Pennsylvania v. Petrick" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Pennsylvania State Police and the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) set up a commercial vehicle inspection program authorized by Subsection 4704(a)(2) of the Vehicle Code. The inspection program was scheduled approximately one month in advance and occurred at a Clinton County landfill located in the Village of McElhatten. Appellant Jeffrey Maguire’s truck was stopped at the checkpoint by Pennsylvania State Police. The trooper conducted a “Level Two” inspection, which included a review of Appellant’s documents and a walk-around inspection of the truck, checking its lights, horn, wipers, tires, and wheels. During the course of this conversation, the trooper detected the smell of alcohol on Appellant’s breath. Following the inspection, the trooper had Appellant exit the truck, told him that he smelled of alcohol, and asked whether he had been drinking. Appellant stated that he drank one beer on his trip to the landfill. At that point, the trooper noticed a cooler on the floor of the truck near the gearshift, the contents of which were a yellow plastic bag that was wet from ice, three twelve-ounce cans of beer, and one or two bottles of water. Appellant failed field sobriety testing. Appellant was arrested, transported to the Jersey Shore Hospital for blood testing, and ultimately charged with several counts of driving under the influence (“DUI”), as well as five counts of unlawful activities. In Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 535 A.2d 1035 (Pa. 1987) (plurality), and Commonwealth v. Blouse, 611 A.2d 1177 (Pa. 1992), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted guidelines for assessing the constitutionality of government-conducted systematic vehicle checkpoints to which the entirety of the public are subjected. Before the Court in this case was the issue of whether the Tarbert/Blouse guidelines were applicable to statutorily authorized warrantless inspections of commercial vehicles. The Court determined they were not: such inspections should be scrutinized in accord with the test outlined by the United States Supreme Court in New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), adopted in Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Petroll, 738 A.2d 993 (Pa. 1999). Because a panel of the Superior Court, in a two-to-one majority decision, reached the correct result, the Supreme Court affirmed that court’s judgment, which reversed a trial court’s order granting appellant’s motion to suppress evidence. View "Pennsylvania v. Maguire" on Justia Law