Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellee Mendy Trigg was the parent of J.T., who, in 2011, was age 4 and afflicted with craniosynostosis. In 2011, J.T. underwent surgery at the Hospital to correct this condition. Afterward, J.T. was transferred for post- operative care to one of Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh's (“Hospital”) intensive care units. While recovering there, J.T. fell out of the hospital bed, and, as a result, suffered damage to the surgically repaired cranial area, necessitating immediate ameliorative surgery. Subsequently, Appellees filed suit against the Hospital alleging, inter alia, that the Hospital was negligent in placing J.T. in a regular adult size hospital bed, due to the large spaces between the vertical side rails, which they alleged, enabled J.T.'s fall. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted review of this case to consider whether Appellees' argument that the trial court erred by not personally observing the demeanor of prospective jurors they challenged for-cause during voir dire. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded Appellees waived their argument for appellate review, and, thus, that the Superior Court erred in considering it. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Superior Court judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Trigg v. Children's Hospital of Pgh." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the alleged conduct of an insured, Harold McCutcheon, Jr. (McCutcheon), as described in a personal injury lawsuit filed against his estate by Richard Carly, obligated McCutcheon’s insurer, appellant Erie Insurance Exchange (Erie) to defend the estate against Carly’s complaint. In 2013, McCutcheon broke into the home of his ex-wife, Terry McCutcheon, in order to shoot and kill her, and then kill himself. He communicated these intentions in a note he left for his adult children. McCutcheon succeeded in executing this plan, first shooting and killing Terry and, eventually, shooting and killing himself. However, after McCutcheon killed Terry but before he killed himself, Carly arrived on the scene. Carly, who had been dating Terry, approached the front door of her home, rang the doorbell and received no answer. Carly became concerned, placed his hand on the doorknob “in order to enter and the door was suddenly pulled inward by [McCutcheon] who grabbed [Carly] by his shirt and pulled him into the home.” McCutcheon was “screaming, swearing, incoherent, and acting ‘crazy.’” Then, “a fight ensued between the two and at the time, [McCutcheon] continued to have the gun in his hand” which he apparently had used to kill Terry. During this “struggle” between the two men, McCutcheon was “knocking things around, and in the process [he] negligently, carelessly, and recklessly caused the weapon to be fired which struck [Carly] in the face,” causing severe injuries. In addition, “other shots were carelessly, negligently and recklessly fired” by McCutcheon, “striking various parts of the interior of the residence and exiting therefrom.” Carly filed suit against McCutcheon’s estate, and the estate — administered by McCutcheon’s adult children — sought coverage of the lawsuit under two insurance policies issued by Erie to McCutcheon: the Erie Insurance Home Protector Policy (homeowner’s policy) and the Erie Insurance Personal Catastrophe Liability Policy (personal catastrophe policy). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held Carly’s allegations were sufficient to trigger Erie’s duty to defend, and accordingly, affirmed the superior court's order. View "Erie Ins. v. Moore, et al" on Justia Law

Appellant Donald Tedford was convicted of first-degree murder and rape on February 6, 1987. He appealed the dismissal of his second petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), on December 2, 2014, as amended by a counseled petition on May 5, 2015, and a supplemental petition filed on June 9, 2015. In connection with his initial filings, Tedford sought wholesale discovery of the prosecution’s entire file, but the PCRA court concluded that the petition (as amended) was not timely filed. Tedford also appealed the PCRA court’s order denying his supplemental PCRA petition, in which he requested discovery, an evidentiary hearing, and/or a new trial based upon the admission of expert testimony presented at trial related to microscopic hair analysis. The PCRA court concluded that pursuant to PCRA Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), it had jurisdiction to consider the merits of Tedford's newly-discovered-facts claims, but ultimately it concluded Tedford had not asserted a meritorious claim in accordance with Section 9543(a)(2)(vi). Finding no reversible error in that analysis, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the petition for relief. View "Pennsylvania v. Tedford" on Justia Law

The trial court granted Timothy Trahey’s motion to suppress the results of a blood test that revealed his blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”), finding no justification for the investigating officers’ failure to obtain a search warrant before conducting the test. On the Commonwealth’s appeal, the Superior Court reversed, opining that the Commonwealth’s evidence sufficiently established the existence of exigent circumstances, thus excusing the absence of a warrant. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, finding that while the exigency analysis is an objective one, "even disregarding the officers’ subjective motivations, or their candid acknowledgment that they would have obtained a search warrant if they thought it necessary, there was no time-sensitive need to conduct a warrantless blood test under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s conclusion that the test was justified by exigent circumstances was drawn in error." View "Pennsylvania v. Trahey" on Justia Law

In August 2015, a deputy sheriff conducted a vehicle stop of Appellant Victor Copenhaver’s pickup truck. Upon approaching the truck, the deputy noticed an odor of alcohol and marijuana emanating from the passenger compartment. After administering field sobriety tests, he arrested Appellant for suspected driving under the influence of alcohol and controlled substances (“DUI”). Appellant was ultimately charged with DUI and other offenses. Appellant challenged the deputy’s authority to conduct a traffic stop and sought suppression of all evidence obtained during the encounter. Rather than presenting testimony at a suppression hearing, the parties stipulated that Appellant was driving the vehicle in question and that the deputy had training and qualifications equivalent to that of a police officer. The parties also agreed that the vehicle stop occurred as a result of the deputy observing the tailgate to the pickup truck being in a down position, which caught the deputy's attention. The deputy further observed the registration on the pickup truck was expired, and additionally, the registration number was identified as belonging to a vehicle other than the one on which it was attached. The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was whether the deputy could lawfully conduct the traffic stop based on the expired registration sticker, on a theory that such a violation amounts to a breach of the peace. The Supreme Court concluded driving a vehicle with an expired registration did not entail a breach of the peace. It vacated the superior court's order insofar as it held that the expired registration was a breach of the peace, thus alone authorizing the deputy to stop Appellant's vehicle. Notably, in light of its holding, the Supreme Court found the superior court did not proceed to consider other relevant questions, such as whether the parties’ factual stipulation should have been read as indicating that the officer’s understanding that the registration sticker was associated with a different vehicle arose in the pre-stop timeframe – consistent with the Commonwealth’s position throughout this litigation. "These issues should be resolved in the first instance by the intermediate court on remand." View "Pennsylvania v. Copenhaver" on Justia Law

California law enforcement officers interviewed Appellant Stacy Britton in her California residence and, unbeknownst to her, recorded those interviews. Over Appellant’s objection, Pennsylvania used those recordings as evidence to help convict Appellant of murder in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to examine whether the California law enforcement officers were acting as agents of the Pennsylvania State Police when they recorded the interviews with Appellant in her California home, and if so, whether Pennsylvania's constitutional and statutory protections were available to Appellant under those circumstances. The Court concluded the California law enforcement officers were not acting as agents of the Pennsylvania State Police when they interviewed Appellant, making analysis of whether any Pennsylvania-specific constitutional or statutory protections unwarranted. Because the Supreme Court concluded the Pennsylvania trial court reached the proper result in this matter, it affirmed that court's judgment. View "Pennsylvania v. Britton" on Justia Law

A Special Touch (Salon) was a sole proprietorship owned by Colleen Dorsey (Owner) offering nail, skin, massage, and permanent cosmetic services. After a 2014 audit, the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry (Department), Office of Unemployment Compensation Tax Services (OUCTS) issued a Notice of Assessment to the Salon indicating that it owed unemployment compensation (UC) contributions and interest in the amount of $10,647.93 for the period of 2010 through the second quarter of 2014. This assessment was based on OUCTS’s determination that ten individuals providing work for the Salon had been misclassified as independent contractors rather than employees of the Salon, thus subjecting it to the UC taxes. This discretionary appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court required a determination of what “customarily engaged” meant, as that term was used in Subsection 4(l)(2)(B) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law), 43 P.S. section 753(l)(2)(B). In particular, the Supreme Court had to determine whether the phrase required an individual to be involved in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business in actuality, as opposed to having the mere ability to be so involved. The Court concluded the phrase “customarily engaged” as used in Subsection 4(l)(2)(B) mandated that an individual actually be involved in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business. Because the Commonwealth Court reached a contrary conclusion, the Court reversed. View "A Special Touch v. UC Tax Services" on Justia Law

Appellant, J.M.G., was born in August 1996. From an early age, J.M.G. experienced chronic mental health issues and a series of resultant hospitalizations. Following an incident in 2013, during which he attempted to choke his adoptive mother (Mother), J.M.G. consented to a voluntary admission into Philhaven, a behavioral health facility treating children and adolescents. Thereafter, J.M.G. agreed to a voluntary admission into Bradley Center, a residential treatment facility. While at Bradley Center, J.M.G. made revelations to Mother that he had been sexually inappropriate with his adoptive sister. Mother referred the matter to Childline. A subsequent investigation resulted in J.M.G. being adjudicated delinquent for one count of misdemeanor indecent assault. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in this case to decide whether the harmless error doctrine was applicable to determinations made by the trial court under Act 211 when the materials provided to the Sexual Offender Assessment Board (SOAB), and considered by the Commonwealth’s expert in preparing his report and rendering his opinion, erroneously contained privileged communications under 42 Pa.C.S. section 5944 of the Judicial Code, establishing psychologist-patient privilege. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the harmless error doctrine did not apply. View "In the Interest of: J.M.G." on Justia Law

Petitioners were four Pennsylvania businesses and one individual who sought extraordinary relief from Governor Wolf’s March 19, 2020 order compelling the closure of the physical operations of all non-life-sustaining business to reduce the spread of the novel coronavirus disease (“COVID-19”). The businesses of the Petitioners were classified as non-life-sustaining. In an Emergency Application for Extraordinary Relief, Petitioners raised a series of statutory and constitutional challenges to the Governor's order, contending the Governor lacked any authority to issue it and that, even if he did have such statutory authority, it violates various of their constitutional rights. Petitioners asserted the exercise of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s King’s Bench jurisdiction was not only warranted but essential given the unprecedented scope and consequence of the Executive Order on businesses in the Commonwealth. Exercising King's Bench jurisdiction, the Supreme Court concluded Petitioners could not establish any constitutional bases for their challenges. The claim for relief was therefore denied. View "Friends of Danny DeVito, et al v. Wolf" on Justia Law

On September 20, 2010, at age of 13 appellant, H.R., was adjudicated delinquent for indecent assault of a complainant less than 13 years of age. Appellant was placed on official probation and, pursuant to Section 6352 of the Juvenile Act, was ordered to undergo inpatient treatment at a sex offender residential treatment facility. Appellant remained in treatment when he turned 20 in February 2017 and he was assessed pursuant to Section 6352, the results of which found that involuntary treatment at a sex offender residential treatment facility pursuant to the Court-Ordered Involuntary Treatment of Certain Sexually Violent Persons Statute (Act 21) was still necessary. On January 4, 2018, following a hearing, a trial court denied appellant's motion to dismiss and granted the petition for involuntary treatment, determining appellant was an sexually violent delinquent child (SVDC) and committing him to one year of mental health treatment. On appeal, appeal, appellant argued: (1) Act 21 was punitive in nature, and this its procedure for determining whether an individual was an SVDC was unconstitutional; and (2) retroactive application of amendments to Act 21 made effective in 2011, was also unconstitutional. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined the superior court correctly determined the relevant provisions of Act 21 were not punitive, were constitutional, thus, affirming the trial court's order. View "In re: H.R." on Justia Law