Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellee Jerome King sought post-conviction relief, claiming, inter alia, that he was entitled to a new trial because his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. In connection with this petition, Appellee submitted to the PCRA court a motion to preclude the Commonwealth from privately interviewing his trial counsel, who allegedly refused to cooperate with Appellee’s attempt to prepare for PCRA litigation and, instead, was collaborating with the Commonwealth. The PCRA court entered an order granting the motion, and the Superior Court affirmed that order. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to consider whether the lower courts correctly concluded that the Commonwealth should be prevented from privately interviewing a PCRA petitioner’s trial counsel under the circumstances presented in this matter. After review, the Supreme Court held that, given the circumstances relevant to this appeal, the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion by barring the Commonwealth from privately interviewing trial counsel. Consequently, it affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. View "Pennsylvania v. King" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was asked to determine whether Subsection 508(4)(i) of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC), which protected pending land development applications filed with a municipality’s governing body, extended to zoning applications submitted to its zoning hearing board that were: (1) related to the land development application; and (2) filed with the zoning hearing board during the pendency of the land development application and after an adverse zoning change. The Court concluded that Subsection 508(4)(i)’s protection did indeed extend to zoning applications under these circumstances. View "In Re: ZHB of Cheltenham Twp 12-16-15 Decision" on Justia Law

In July 2016, Appellant Markease Cousins was arrested on an active bench warrant. A search incident to arrest revealed that Appellant had in his possession 1.75 grams of cocaine. As a result, Appellant was charged with, and convicted of, possession of a controlled substance. As the conviction constituted a violation of Appellant’s probation for a prior conviction for conspiracy to commit burglary, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of one to five years incarceration for violating his probation. With regard to Appellant’s new conviction for possession of a controlled substance, the trial court imposed an additional sentence of one to three years incarceration based on the pre-sentence report which indicated Appellant had previously been convicted of possession of a small amount of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. Specifically, the trial court applied the enhanced sentencing provision of 35 P.S. section 780-113(b). In this appeal by allowance, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Superior Court erred in affirming the trial court’s application of the enhanced sentencing provision in 35 P.S. sections 780-101 et seq. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court’s decision was correct, and, thus, affirmed its order. View "Pennsylvania v. Cousins" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue presented to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court centered on whether the Business Privilege and Mercantile Tax (“BPT”) imposed by Appellee the City of York (“City”), had to be paid by Appellant, S & H Transport, Inc. (“S & H”), a freight broker, on the total yearly amount of money S & H receives from its customers for arranging shipping of commercial goods with freight carriers on their behalf, where, after deducting its commission, S & H remits the remaining money to the freight carriers as payment of their shipping fees. After careful review, the Supreme Court found that the amount of money S & H collected and passed on to freight carriers for their fees was excluded from taxation under the City’s BPT. View "S & H Transport v. City of York" on Justia Law

A jury awarded Appellant Elliot Menkowitz, M.D. $1,000,000 in compensatory damages in his defamation suit against Appellees, Peerless Publications, Inc. (“Peerless”) and Eric Engquist. Dr. Menkowitz began his employment as an orthopedic surgeon at Pottstown Memorial Medical Center (“PMMC”) in the early 1970s. At PMMC, Dr. Menkowitz was accused of verbally abusing colleagues and staff and engaging in other inappropriate behavior in front of patients. In April 1996, Dr. Menkowitz was informed that due to his inappropriate conduct, PMMC’s Medical Executive Committee and the Medical Committee of the Board had voted to suspend him or allow him to take a voluntary leave to address his behavioral problems. Dr. Menkowitz then disclosed that he had recently been diagnosed with ADHD and suggested that he might be protected under the Americans with Disabilities Act. In light of this information, PMMC did not suspend Dr. Menkowitz or require him to take a leave of absence, but issued a written warning explaining that should Dr. Menkowitz’s misbehavior continue, PMMC would summarily suspend all of his clinical privileges. Less than a year later, based upon continuing behavioral issues, PMMC suspended Dr. Menkowitz for six months. The suspension did not last for the full six months, however, as PMMC lifted it approximately one month later when Dr. Menkowitz filed suit against PMMC in federal court for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. In April 1997, the Mercury, a local Pottstown newspaper published by Peerless, ran a front-page article about Dr. Menkowitz regarding his suspension. After reading the article, Dr. Menkowitz "fell into a severe depression. Dr. Menkowitz’s treatment for this depression included multiple medications that caused fasciculations (tremors) in his arms and hands, impairing Dr. Menkowitz’s ability to perform surgery." The Superior Court found that the trial court erred in failing to enter notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") in Appellees’ favor and vacated the award of compensatory damages. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur to consider whether in so doing, the Superior Court failed to exercise appropriate deference to the fact-finder when reviewing a JNOV ruling, as explained in Joseph v. Scranton Times, L.P., 129 A.3d 404 (Pa. 2015) (“Joseph III”). The Supreme Court determined the Superior Court failed to do so, vacated its judgment and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. View "Menkowitz. v. Peerless Publications" on Justia Law

Following his arrest on suspicion of DUI in May 2015, appellant Thomas Bell was transported to the Lycoming County DUI Center. There, a detective read the PennDOT DL-26 form to appellant and he refused to submit to a blood test. Appellant was subsequently charged with DUI — general impairment, and a summary traffic offense for failing to use required lighting. Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to dismiss, arguing he had a constitutional right to refuse to submit to a warrantless blood test and thus evidence of his refusal should be suppressed and the DUI charge dismissed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to determine whether Section 1547(e) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. §1547(e), which expressly allowed the Commonwealth to introduce evidence at trial that a defendant charged with Driving Under the Influence (DUI) refused to submit to chemical testing, violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Supreme Court concluded the evidentiary consequence authorized by Section 1547(e) was constitutional, and affirmed the order of the Superior Court. View "Pennsylvania v. Bell" on Justia Law

In 2012, a firearm was stolen from appellee Richard Navarro. In November 2013, as a result of appellee’s alterations to a prescription for Percocet tablets, he pleaded guilty to two counts of forgery graded as first-degree misdemeanors and the court sentenced him to twenty-four months’ probation. Sometime thereafter, appellee learned the Pennsylvania State Police ("PSP") had recovered his stolen firearm and he submitted an application for its return pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Uniform Firearms Act (“UFA”). Although the UFA expressly precluded persons convicted of certain enumerated crimes from possessing firearms, forgery was not one of them, and no other precluding classifications existed under Pennsylvania law to bar appellee from firearm possession. However, PSP denied the application because a Pennsylvania Instant Check System (“PICS”) report indicated appellee had disqualifying convictions under federal law. Appellee challenged the denial. The issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was whether, when denying the return of a firearm on the basis of a federal statute, specifically 18 U.S.C. 922(g), the Pennsylvania State Police had to establish the subject firearm moved in interstate or foreign commerce. The Supreme Court answered "yes," and affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court remanding the matter for further proceedings. View "Navarro v. PA State Police" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Appellees Burton and Joanne Adams demonstrated that opening a private road over the property of Appellant James Corl was necessary under the Private Road Act. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the Adamses did not demonstrate necessity as a matter of law based on their contemplated future use of their property, when, as in accordance with the Act, necessity had to be based on the existing use of the property. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s order affirming the trial court’s confirmation of the Board of View’s (Board) report recommending the grant of a private road in favor of the Adamses. View "In Re: Petition of Adams" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to consider whether Section 614 of Municipalities Planning Code, 53 P.S. section 10614, which set forth the powers of a zoning officer, provided sufficient basis to determine, absent evidence of actual job duties, if a zoning officer was a management-level employee under the Public Employe Relations Act (PERA). Because the Supreme Court held that Section 614 did not render a zoning officer a management-level employee, the Court held that such evidence was required, and therefore reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court. View "Exeter Twp. v. PLRB, Teamsters Local Union" on Justia Law

In late 2016, then-Pennsylvania Attorney General Bruce Beemer petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, pursuant to the Investigating Grand Jury Act, for an order to convene a multicounty investigating grand jury having statewide jurisdiction to investigate organized crime or public corruption or both. This appeal concerned a motion for return of property filed by several Lackawanna County governmental entities (“County”) relative to materials seized by the Office of Attorney General (“OAG”). The OAG seized the County’s property pursuant to search warrants issued by the Supervising Judge of the 41st Statewide Investigating Grand Jury. After the 41st Statewide Investigating Grand Jury was empaneled and an investigation was ongoing, an OAG Special Agent and a Pennsylvania State Trooper applied to Judge Sarcione for four warrants to search and seize certain property belonging to the County. Approximately a year later, the County moved for return of property. Notably, the County filed its motion in the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, which comprised the 45th Judicial District. In its motion, the County advanced a threefold argument to support its claim of entitlement to lawful possession of the seized materials: (1) the underlying search warrants were unconstitutionally general and overbroad; (2) the seizing of judicial and other governmental officials’ property infringed upon various privacy interests and legal privileges; and (3) the search warrants were invalid under Pa.R.Crim.P. 200. Without confirming or denying the existence of a grand jury investigation due to secrecy concerns, the OAG nevertheless challenged the lower court’s jurisdiction to hear the motion for return. The Supreme Court determined that the judge overseeing the Grand Jury, was empowered to issue search warrants in any judicial district, provided that the warrants related to an investigation of the 41st Statewide Investigating Grand Jury. Because there was no dispute the search and seizure warrants for the County’s property related to such an investigation, the supervising judge was authorized to issue them. Further, because the County’s motion for return of property challenged the validity of those search warrants, it related to the work of the 41st Statewide Investigating Grand Jury and had to be presented to the Supervising Judge, who had to adjudicate the motion or conclude it did not raise grand jury secrecy concerns. As the lower court reached the opposite conclusions, the Supreme Court vacated its order and remanded for further proceedings. View "In Re: Return of Seized Property of Lackawanna Cty" on Justia Law