Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Joan Grove was awarded a jury verdict of $250,000.00 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, in a personal injury action against Appellee, Port Authority of Allegheny County. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court vacated the award of damages and remanded for a new trial on the basis that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on negligence per se. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur to determine whether the trial court’s failure to give a negligence per se charge, where the jury nevertheless found Grove negligent, amounted to error because the negligence per se charge was relevant to apportionment of factual cause. The Supreme Court concluded it did. Because the jury found Grove negligent, any perceived error in failing to instruct on negligence per se was harmless error. Importantly, the Commonwealth Court did not make a finding of prejudice in its harmless error analysis; “it merely opined the proposed instructions could have influenced the jury. The standard is not that the omitted instructions could have influenced the jury. Prejudice is required. A lack of any prejudice analysis undermines the Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that the error was not harmless.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s order reversing the trial court and granting Port Authority a new trial. This matter was remanded to the Commonwealth Court for disposition of Grove’s cross-appeal. View "Grove v. Port Authority of Allegheny County" on Justia Law

Susan Yanakos suffered from a genetic condition called Alpha-1 Antitrypsin Deficiency (AATD). In the summer of 2003, one of Susan’s physicians, Dr. Amadeo Marcos, advised her that she needed a liver transplant due to the progression of her AATD. Because Susan was not a candidate for a cadaver liver, her son Christopher volunteered to donate a lobe of his liver to his mother. Christopher advised one of his mother’s physicians that several of his family members suffered from AATD, but that he was unsure whether he did as well. Additional laboratory tests for Christopher were ordered, but Christopher was never informed him of the results, which allegedly showed that Christopher had AATD and was not a candidate for liver donation. One month after Christopher’s consultation with physicians, surgery proceeded; a portion of Christopher’s liver was removed and transplanted into Susan. More than twelve years later, Christopher, Susan, and Susan’s husband, William Yanakos sued UPMC, and the doctors involved, raising claims for battery/lack of informed consent, medical malpractice, and loss of consortium. The Yanakoses alleged that they did not discover Appellees’ negligence until eleven years after the transplant surgery, when additional testing revealed that Susan still had AATD, which the transplant should have eliminated. In this appeal by allowance, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether the seven-year statute of repose in Section 1303.513(a) of the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act (MCARE Act) comported with Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Because the Court concluded the seven-year statute of repose was not substantially related to an important government interest, it reversed the Superior Court’s order affirming the trial court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings and remanded for further proceedings. View "Yanakos. v. UPMC, et al" on Justia Law

Kenneth and Theresa-Ramondo purchased a property in Chester County, Pennsylvania in 1991 known as a “flag lot:” a narrow strip (the “pole”) that connected the main portion to a public street. The Ramondo pole extended six hundred feet from Garrett Mill Road to the main portion of the Ramondo property, the flag portion, which was approximately 5.62 acres. Thaddeus Bartkowski, III, and Crystal Anne Crawford (“the Bartkowskis”) bought the neighboring property 2012, which was also a flag lot. The pole of the Bartkowski property, also measuring twenty-five feet wide, abutted and ran parallel with the Ramondos’ pole. The flag portion of the Bartkowski property was approximately 5.25 acres. The portion of land at issue in this appeal involved the adjoining Ramondo and Bartkowski poles, upon which the Ramondos constructed a driveway that gave them access to Garrett Mill Road. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a landowner had to prove impossibility of alternative access arising from zoning and regulatory prohibitions or conditions of the land in order to establish an easement by necessity. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the Ramondos an easement by necessity based upon the theory that establishing necessity requires proving impossibility of alternative access. The Supreme Court concluded this was error, reversed the Superior Court, remanded for further proceedings. View "Bartkowski v. Ramondo" on Justia Law

In 2014, Pennsylvania State Police Troopers conducted a traffic stop after observing Appellant Kirk Hays fail to use his right turn signal and then twice cross over the white fog lines on the roadway. Upon interaction with Appellant, a Trooper smelled alcohol and suspected Appellant was driving under the influence of alcohol. Following two failed field sobriety tests, Appellant was taken into custody and transported to a DUI Center, whereupon Appellant acquiesced to a blood draw; testing revealed his BAC to be 0.192. Appellant was charged with three summary offenses and two counts of DUI. Appellant moved to suppress all evidence resulting from the traffic stop, arguing the Trooper lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle. The motion was denied, trial was held and Appellant was ultimately convicted and sentenced only to Count 1, DUI. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on September 1, 2016, alleging he was entitled to a new trial because of Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (2016). The Commonwealth filed an answer, asserting Appellant waived any challenge to the voluntariness of his consent by failing to raise the issue in his omnibus pre-trial motion. The Commonwealth conceded Appellant’s case was not yet final when Birchfield was decided, and that Appellant first raised his Birchfield issue in his timely filed post-sentence motion. However, the Commonwealth argued that retroactivity only applied in cases where the question was properly preserved at all stages. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur in this matter to determine whether Birchfield applied to all cases not yet final when the decision was rendered, and determined Appellant was not entitled to retroactive application of Birchfield based on his failure to preserve the issue below. View "Pennsylvania v. Hays" on Justia Law

At issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in this matter was whether a criminal defendant’s conviction of carrying a concealed firearm without a license could be sustained on a constructive-possession theory where the gun was physically held and used by another person during the alleged crime. Appellant Alanah Peters asked the victim, Jesse Hicks, for money to help her father evade eviction. At first Hicks promised to give the father money. He and appellant had an argument, and Hicks rescinded his offer. Two men and appellant arrived at Hicks’ apartment, one holding a handgun. The men forced their way into Hicks’ bedroom. Unable to find any cash, the unarmed man told the other to shoot. The shot pierced Hicks’ jaw, tongue, and shoulder, and dislodged some of his teeth. The assailants kicked Hicks in the face and left the room. Appellant, who had remained outside the room, suggested they check Hicks’ pockets. The men re-entered the room and, as Hicks lay bleeding on the floor, removed his pants, took his $700, and fled. The men were never identified or apprehended. Appellant was charged with numerous offenses including attempted murder, robbery, aggravated assault, and conspiracy. Most relevant to this appeal, she was charged with carrying a concealed firearm without a license. Under the facts of this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined constructive possession could not be used to support appellant’s conviction for carrying a concealed firearm without a license. View "Pennsylvania v. Peters" on Justia Law

In 2012, Appellee attended a fraternity party and consumed alcohol. Sometime thereafter, he encountered University of Pittsburgh police officers answering a call from dispatch that there was an intoxicated individual attempting to harm himself outside of one of the residence halls of the university. Officers observed though Appellee appeared to be intoxicated, he had sustained superficial cuts to his arm and wrist area, and that other officers found a small knife attached to a money clip on the ground near where Appellee was found. Appellee was transferred to a nearby psychiatric treatment facility wherein Appellee's attending psychiatrist applied to extend Appellee's stay for 20 days. Section 303 of the Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”) required the holding of a hearing on the application before a mental health review officer or a judge at the facility in which the involuntarily committed person was being housed, and also directed that counsel be appointed to represent the person at that hearing. At the 2015 expungement hearing, Appellee averred he was not advised of any hearing prior to involuntary commitment, nor was he appointed counsel. Over two years later, Appellee filed his expungement petition, broadly alleging there was no lawful basis for his commitment." The State Police argued to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court the lower courts ruling on this petition lacked jurisdiction to order expungement. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed a superior court order that reversed a common pleas court's order dismissing Appellee's petition. View "In Re: J.M.Y." on Justia Law

Appellant Scott Bishop was a parolee. During a home visit in March 2015, a parole agent performed a drug test, which indicated that methamphetamine was present in Appellant’s urine. Appellant was handcuffed and asked whether the agent would find anything in the residence that would violate parole conditions. Appellant then admitted that he had a firearm in a hallway closet. The agent proceeded to the closet, where he found a revolver, marijuana, electronic scales, and packaging materials. Appellant argued that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should interpret the provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution conferring upon individuals a right against self-incrimination to provide greater protection than the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States. The Commonwealth countered that this claim was not properly preserved. In terms of efforts by criminal defendants to raise claims for departure from federal constitutional jurisprudence on independent state grounds, the the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth was correct that the precedent of the Pennsylvania Court required that some analysis explaining the grounds for departure was required. Because Appellant did not distinguish between the federal Fifth Amendment and Pennsylvania Constitution Article I, Section 9 before the suppression court, his claim favoring departure was waived. Furthermore, Appellant also waived the claim for additional protection under the state constitution in the Superior Court, since he did not develop any supportive reasoning before that court either. View "Pennsylvania v. Bishop" on Justia Law

TSG Real Estate, LLC (“TSG”) was a real estate company that owned a commercial property in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania (the “Property”). Initially, TSG hired New Hart Corporation d/b/a Hart Corporation (“Hart”) as its broker to market the Property. As TSG’s agreement with Hart was to expire, TSG began considering replacement brokers, one of which was Binswanger of Pennsylvania, Inc. (“Binswanger”). Two days before TSG informed Binswanger of its decision to hire it as its broker, TSG received a written offer from TWA Holdings, LLC (“TWA”) to purchase the Property for $3.7 million. TSG negotiated an agreement with Binswanger culminating in a September 27, 2013 “Exclusive Right To Sell Or Lease Agreement” (“Broker Agreement”) with Binswanger. The Broker Agreement permitted TSG to continue using other brokers in connection with any sale to TWA, and provided, inter alia, (1) if Binswanger sold the Property, it would be entitled to a 5% commission; (2) all commissions would be considered to be earned and payable “at the time scheduled for closing on a sale;” (3) a “carve-out period” which allowed that if another broker “completed” a sale, exchange, or transfer of the Property to TWA on or before January 5, 2014, Binswanger would earn no commission; (4) if another broker completed a sale of the Property to TWA after January 5, 2014, the other broker and Binswanger would split a 5% commission; and (5) the duration of the agreement was for one year; however, TSG had the right to terminate the agreement after 6 months with 30 days prior written notice to Binswanger. Two days prior to the expiration of the carve-out period contained in the Broker Agreement, TSG, via Hart and another broker, Gelcor Realty (“Gelcor”), entered into an Agreement of Sale with TWA, selling the Property for $3.4 million. In this appeal by allowance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the entitlement to broker commissions for the sale of commercial property. Applying the plain and unambiguous language of the Broker Agreement, the Supreme Court found the sale of the Property was completed at the time of closing, i.e., on April 24, 2014. As the sale was not completed on or before January 5, 2014, but only after the carve-out period had expired, Binswanger was entitled to a commission pursuant to the Broker Agreement fee schedule. View "Binswanger of PA Inc v. TSG Real Estate LLC." on Justia Law

This appeal involved an ejectment action commenced by the City of Philadelphia (“City”) against Francis Galdo, and a counterclaim to quiet title filed by Galdo, claiming ownership of the property at issue by adverse possession. In 1974, City Council passed an ordinance authorizing the Commissioner of Public Property to execute a Declaration of Taking of several properties, including the Parcel at issue here. On November 13, 1974, the City obtained fee simple title to the Parcel by condemnation, with the notice of condemnation stating that the Parcel had been condemned for transit purposes. In 1976, the Commonwealth filed a notice of condemnation against several of the City’s lots, indicating that the Commonwealth would permanently retain the land in the I-95 right-of-way, and that the Commonwealth would have a temporary easement on other condemned properties, including the Parcel condemned by the City, during the period that the Elevated Frankford train line was rerouted to allow for construction of I-95. Germane to this appeal, the parties agreed the City did not physically occupied the Parcel since completion of the work connected to the rerouting of the Elevated Frankford train line in the 1970s. Further, it was undisputed the City did not perform any maintenance, grass- cutting, grading, or landscaping on the Parcel. Instead, after the highway construction was completed, the City viewed the Parcel as “surplus property” that was not actively being used. At least a decade after construction of I-95 had been completed, in September 1989, Galdo purchased a two-story dwelling located directly across the street from the Parcel. At that time, the Parcel was not being maintained and was purportedly home to “prostitutes” and “derelicts”. Galdo cleared the Parcel of weeds and trash, poured a concrete slab, and parked his vehicles there. He also used the Parcel to discard debris from the remodeling of his home. By 1992, Galdo poured another concrete slab on the Parcel for storing materials and enclosed that area with a fence. In 1994, he installed on the Parcel a fire pit and a picnic table affixed to the ground. Over the years Galdo continued to make improvements to the Parcel. He never obtained any permits to make improvements to the Parcel, did not pay property taxes for the Parcel, and did not provide evidence that he insured the Parcel. Further, it is undisputed that the City never gave Galdo permission to possess the land at issue. The trial court ruled in favor of the City, holding that it was immune from suit because a claim of adverse possession could not lie against a municipality. The Commonwealth Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded for trial on the adverse possession claim, holding that the adverse possession claim could proceed against the City because the property was not devoted to a public use during the twenty-one-year prescriptive period, as required for immunity to apply. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed the City was not immune from a claim of adverse possession under the facts presented and affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court. View "City of Phila. v. Galdo" on Justia Law

In 2008, Appellants, Gamesa Energy USA, LLC and Gamesa Technology Corporation, Inc. (Gamesa), entered into a commercial lease agreement (the Lease) to rent 35,000 square feet of office space in Philadelphia (the Premises) from Appellees, Ten Penn Center Associates, L.P. and SAP V Ten Penn Center NF G.P. L.L.C. (collectively Ten Penn Center). In May 2011, following Gamesa’s submission of the information required under Article 20.2 of the Lease, Ten Penn Center approved a request to sublease approximately 15,000 square feet, or forty percent of the Premises, to Viridity Energy, Inc. (Viridity) through August of 2018. In April 2012, Gamesa informed Ten Penn Center it would be moving out of the Premises as part of a corporate consolidation, and would continue to pay its monthly rent and attempt to find a sub-lessee for the open space. Viridity remained in the Premises under the terms of its sublease with Gamesa. Gamesa was twice late with the rent after it moved out, but still paid amounts due. In 2012, Gamesa submitted a request to Ten Penn Center for consent to sublease 5,200 square feet of the Premises to Business Services International, LLC (BSI), a business entity comprised of two foreign corporations formed for the particular purpose of subleasing office space through Gamesa. Ten Penn Center responded on June 26th, informing Gamesa it was in default of the Lease for vacating the Premises and, as a result, Ten Penn Center had no obligation to entertain the request to sublease. Ten Penn Center proposed it would grant consent to the BSI sublease if Gamesa forfeited its remaining tenant improvement allowance. Thereafter, negotiations between the parties stalled, and the proposed sublease with BSI never materialized. In 2013, Gamesa filed a complaint against Ten Penn Center, asserting claims of breach of contract, tortious interference in business relationships, and unjust enrichment. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review of this commercial landlord and tenant dispute to determine whether the Superior Court erred in holding the tenant was limited to damages for breach of contract and could not also recover the rent it paid following the landlord’s breach, despite prevailing on its claims for both remedies at trial. After careful review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the Superior Court. View "Gamesa Energy USA v. Ten Penn Center, et al" on Justia Law