Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case involved questions of how the attorney-client privilege should apply in the context of derivative litigation. The nonprofit corporations involved in this matter were the Pittsburgh History and Landmarks Foundation (“the Foundation”) and its subsidiary, the Landmarks Financial Corporation (“the Corporation”), which managed the Foundation’s endowment. Plaintiffs were five former members of the Boards of Trustees of the Foundation and the Corporation who alleged they were improperly and ineffectively removed from the Boards in an attempt to thwart their oversight of the Foundation’s president, whom they believed was engaging in actions that were improper and not in accord with the Foundation’s mission. The Foundation’s Board created a Governance Task Force to review various practices of the Foundation; the Task Force recommended that both Boards be reduced substantially in number. The Foundation Board approved this recommendation and removed all trustees then serving from both Boards; significantly smaller boards were elected and as a result of these consolidations, and Derivative Plaintiffs lost their seats on the Boards. In accord with standard procedures for bringing a derivative action adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042 (Pa. 1997). The Supreme Court rejected the Commonwealth Court’s adoption of a qualified attorney-client privilege as set forth in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), which the Supreme Court viewed as inconsistent with prior Pennsylvania caselaw emphasizing predictability in the application of the attorney-client privilege. However, the Commonwealth Court’s decision not to apply the fiduciary or co-client exceptions to the attorney-client privilege under the facts of this case was affirmed. The matter was remanded for further al court and the Commonwealth Court and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Pgh History v. Ziegler" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to determine whether the enhanced sentence imposed on appellant Samuel Monarch due to his failure to submit to chemical testing was unconstitutional. The Superior Court acknowledged enhanced penalties for a failure to submit to warrantless blood testing violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution under Birchfield v. North Dakota, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (2016), but nevertheless determined appellant’s enhanced sentence was not unconstitutional because he also refused to submit to breath testing. The Supreme Court held the Superior Court erred in this regard and, accordingly, reversed that court’s order, vacated appellant’s judgment of sentence, and remanded for resentencing. View "Pennsylvania v. Monarch" on Justia Law

In this appeal by allowance, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on whether a defendant’s fugitive status during the period for filing a notice of appeal – where his attorney filed a timely notice of appeal on his behalf and he later returned after the appeal period ended, but prior to the deadline for filing an appellate brief – resulted in the defendant forfeiting his right to appeal. The Court affirmed the superior court, which found a defendant fugitive’s right to appeal to be forfeited in these circumstances. View "Pennsylvania v. Adams" on Justia Law

A jury convicted appellant Ricardo Natividad in 1997 of first-degree murder, carrying a firearm on a public street, two counts of possession of an instrument of crime, two counts of robbery, one count of robbery of a motor vehicle, kidnapping, and criminal conspiracy. The charges arose from separate indictments for the robbery of Michael Havens and the murder of Robert Campbell. At the penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict of death after finding the aggravating circumstances, killing while in the perpetration of a felony, and a significant history of violent felony convictions, outweighed the sole mitigating factor, appellant’s life history. He appealed directly to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court after an order dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief. Appellant presented multiple challenges pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), none of which the Supreme Court determined would afford him relief. Therefore, the Court affirmed the order dismissing appellant’s petition. View "Pennsylvania v. Natividad" on Justia Law

In May 2015, a jury found Jordan Clemons guilty of first-degree murder for killing Karissa Kunco during the early morning hours of January 12, 2012. Upon the jury’s recommendation, the trial court sentenced Clemons to death. In this direct appeal, Clemons raised numerous instances of trial court error and challenged the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. Finding no reversible errors, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Clemons’ judgment of sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Clemons" on Justia Law

In December of 2012, a criminal complaint was filed against Appellant Michael Norton, charging him with five counts of indecent assault and one count of corruption of minors. According to the complaint and the accompanying affidavit of probable cause, on at least five occasions from September of 2008 through April of 2012, Appellant sexually abused his paramour’s granddaughter (“Victim”), born in September of 2004. A trial court used the standard announced in Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284 (Pa. 2015) to deny a presentence motion to withdraw a plea of nolo contendere, and the superior court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so denying the motion. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the superior court correctly concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion by denying the presentence motion to withdraw a plea of nolo contendere. View "Pennsylvania v. Norton" on Justia Law

The issue presented to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court by this case was one of first impression: whether a woman’s use of opioids while pregnant, which results in a child born suffering from neonatal abstinence syndrome(“NAS”), constitutes “child abuse.” In 2016, A.A.R. (“Mother”), was released from incarceration, after which she relapsed into drug addiction, using opioids (pain pills) and marijuana. Mother subsequently learned that she was pregnant with L.J.B. (“Child”). She sought treatment for her addiction, first through a methadone maintenance program and then with subutex. Mother again relapsed, and in mid-January 2017 she tested positive for opiates, benzodiazepines and marijuana, none of which were prescribed for her. Mother gave birth to Child on January 27, 2017; at the time of Child’s birth, Mother tested positive for marijuana and subutex. By the third day of life, Child began exhibiting symptoms of NAS, including tremors, excessive suck, increased muscle tone and loose stools, which doctors treated with morphine. Mother reportedly left Child in the hospital and did not consistently check on her or stay with her (despite the availability of a room for her to do so). Hospital personnel communicated all of this information to the Clinton County Children and Youth Social Services Agency (“CYS”), which ultimately took emergency custody of the child. The Pennsylvania Child Protective Services Law (“CPSL”) defined “child abuse,” in relevant part, as “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly ... (1) [c]ausing bodily injury to a child through any recent act or failure to act,” or “(5) [c]reating a reasonable likelihood of bodily injury to a child through any recent act or failure to act.” The Supreme Court concluded,based on the relevant statutory language, that a mother cannot be found to be a perpetrator of child abuse against her newly born child for drug use while pregnant. The Court therefore reversed the decision of the Superior Court and remanded the matter for reinstatement of the trial court’s order. View "In the Interest of: L.J.B" on Justia Law

The issue presented to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in this appeal centered on whether producers of natural gas from certain vertical wells were subject to assessment of a yearly impact fee established by Chapter 23 of the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act (“Act 13”). The vertical wells that at issue used the hydraulic fracturing process ("fracking") to extract natural gas through a vertical well bore from Marcellus Shale. Specifically, the issue centered on whether an impact fee would be assessed whenever a vertical well’s production exceeded an average of 90,000 cubic feet of natural gas per day for even one month of the year, or whether the well must exceed this production threshold in every month of the year, for the fee to be imposed. After careful review, the Supreme Court concluded that, under the relevant provisions of Act 13, the impact fee would be imposed on such wells if their production exceeds 90,000 cubic feet of natural gas per day for even one month of the year, as found by the Public Utility Commission (“PUC”). Therefore, the Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s order, which had reversed the PUC; the PUC's order was reinstated. View "PA Independent Oil & Gas Assoc. v. PUC" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue presented to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether an exception to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act applied ― the real property exception to governmental immunity ― and, in particular, whether the absence of padding on a gym wall, into which a student ran during gym class, causing injury, fell within the exception. In 2012, then-nine-year-old Jarrett Brewington ran in a relay race during gym class at Walter G. Smith Elementary School in Philadelphia. While Jarrett was running, he tripped and fell, causing him to propel into the wall at the end of the gym, hit and cut his head, and lose consciousness. No padding covered the gym wall, which was made of concrete. Jarrett was later diagnosed with a concussion, was absent from school for one to two months after the incident, and continued experiencing headaches and memory problems years later. In 2013, Jarrett’s mother, Syeta Brewington, brought an action against Walter G. Smith Elementary School and the School District of Philadelphia (collectively, the “School”), alleging Jarrett’s injuries occurred because of a defective and dangerous condition of the premises, namely, the concrete gym wall, and that the School was negligent in failing to install padded safety mats to cushion the wall. In response, the School filed, inter alia, a motion for summary judgment, raising the defense of governmental immunity, and claiming that the real property exception to governmental immunity under the Act did not apply. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the lack of padding of a gym wall could constitute negligence in the care, custody, and control of real property, and, thus, fell within the Act’s real estate exception. View "Brewington v. Phila. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

William Rivera appealed the death sentence he received for the 1995 carjacking and murder of Tae Hung Kang. The Post-Conviction Relief court limited his appeal to one issue — whether penalty phase counsel was ineffective for failing to present mental health and life history mitigation evidence. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated on numerous occasions that “no number of failed claims may collectively warrant relief i[f] they fail to do so individually.” However, the Court has also acknowledged that “‘if multiple instances of deficient performance are found, the assessment of prejudice properly may be premised upon cumulation.’” The Court found "the great majority" of appellant’s individual claims lacked merit, therefore the Court was satisfied appellant was not entitled to relief based on cumulative prejudice. Therefore, the PCR court properly dismissed appellant's petition for relief after having limited its hearing to one issue. View "Pennsylvania v. Rivera" on Justia Law