Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1998, Appellant Milton Montalvo, along with his brother, conspired to kill Appellant's wife Miriam Ascensio. At the time, the couple had recently separated. One neighbor observed broken glass on Ascensio’s porch, knocked on the door, and received no response. After looking into the window and observing a male lying on the floor, the neighbor instructed his wife to call the police. Upon their arrival, the police discovered the bodies of Ascensio and Lugo inside the residence: Ascensio’s neck was slashed several times, her skull fractured by a blunt object, and her eye punctured; Lugo’s body had a fatal stab wound to the chest, and a tube of lipstick was protruding from his teeth. Crime scene investigators collected a blood sample on a window blind hanging inside the broken pane of glass in Ascensio’s porch door and another blood sample on a cloth bag found on a sofa bed. Both samples were later determined to be Appellant’s blood. A witness who knew the brothers gave a tape-recorded statement to police, relaying what she heard at a grocery store. She further indicated that Appellant and his brother appeared at her home the morning after the murders and that Appellant stated, “We killed my wife.” Soto also told police that the men explained that Appellant killed Lugo and his brother killed Ascensio, and that they intended to flee to Florida or the Dominican Republic. More than eight months later, in January of 1999, police apprehended Appellant in Florida. In a recorded statement to police, Appellant denied any involvement in the murders. Pennsylvania charged Appellant with two counts of murder. He was convicted by jury; at issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was Appellant's appeal of post-conviction relief on grounds he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase of his trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed denial of relief. View "Pennsylvania v. Montalvo" on Justia Law

In 1997, Appellant Russell Cox was convicted of first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, rape, and possessing an instrument of crime, in connection with his participation, along with co-defendant Percy Lee, in the February 27, 1986 brutal slayings of Evelyn Brown and her seventeen-year-old daughter, Tina. Petitioner was 18 years old at the time of the crimes and Lee was 17 years old. In the subsequent penalty phase, the jury found: (1) the killings were committed during the perpetration of a felony; (2) the killings were committed by means of torture; and (3) Appellant was convicted of another offense for which a life sentence could be imposed. The jury also found: (1) Appellant’s lack of a criminal record; (2) Appellant’s young age; and (3) other mitigation concerning Appellant’s character and the circumstances of the offense. Determining the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, the jury sentenced Appellant to death on each murder count. Appellant appealed dismissal of his second petition for post-conviction relief. After review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the PCRA court’s evaluation of the evidence in this case erroneously incorporated invalid and irrelevant considerations, tainting its conclusion. Because conflicts remained in the testimony, the Court remanded to the PCRA court to reconsider the existing record in this case in accordance with its opinion. The Court affirmed the PCRA court in all other respects. View "Pennsylvania v. Cox" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development (“DCED”) designated the City of Pittsburgh as a financially distressed municipality under the Municipal Financial Recovery Act (“Act 47”). The City’s collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with Appellant Fraternal Order of Police Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1 (the “Union”) expired on December 31, 2014. As the parties were unable to reach consensus on a new CBA, they entered into interest arbitration governed by the Policemen and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act (“Act 111”). After an evidentiary hearing encompassing ten days of testimony before an Act 111 arbitration panel, the panel issued a final award covering years 2015-2018. The Award contained numbered factual findings one of which included a list of itemized findings relating to the City’s population, income, housing vacancy rate, and, most relevantly, the City’s police officer compensation as measured against other economically and demographically comparable subdivisions. The Union’s financial expert had testified in a prior matter in 2014 that the City’s police pay was above the median of a comparison group; the City’s police officers paid substantially lower contributions toward health insurance than other City employees for the same coverage level; and the Union’s own financial expert believed City police officers were paid competitively. The Union filed an appeal in the Commonwealth Court, contending that the Award deviated from the Plan by failing to ensure competitive compensation for police officers as required by the Plan. The Union argued that the court had jurisdiction to rule on its appeal per Section 252(e) of Act 47. Te Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined the Commonwealth Court properly held that the Union’s challenge to the Award fell outside the scope of Section 252(e). Accordingly, that court’s order quashing the parties’ appeals was affirmed. View "FOP Fort Pitt v. City of Pgh" on Justia Law

Appellees Steven and Mary Szabo, owned real property where they operate a hair salon and skin care business. The property abutted Route 19 and Old Washington Road, was improved with a parking lot and commercial structure. Appellant, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT or Department) developed a road expansion plan to connect Route 19 with Old Washington Road by means of an exit ramp that would run across a section of the Szabos land, identified in the declaration of taking as Parcel 5. The Department attempted to purchase the property from the Szabos; however, the parties could not come to an agreement. The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was whether a failure to file preliminary objections to a declaration of taking resulted in waiver under Section 306 of the Eminent Domain Code, 26 Pa.C.S. sections 101-1106 (Code). After careful review, the Court held that the declaration did not establish the extent or effect of the taking. Accordingly, the failure to file preliminary objections within thirty days of service did not result in waiver of the right to assert ownership and seek just compensation, and therefore the Court affirmed the decision of the Commonwealth Court to remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing. View "Szabo v. PennDOT" on Justia Law

Kenneth Taggart appealed a superior court order affirming a trial court’s verdict on mortgage foreclosure in favor of Great Ajax Operating Partnership (“Great Ajax”). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded Great Ajax or its predecessors failed to provide pre-foreclosure notice before initiating a second mortgage foreclosure action as required by the Loan Interest and Protection Law, 41 P.S. sections 101-605 (“Act 6”). In reaching this conclusion, the Court held the purposes of Act 6 were served by requiring each action in mortgage foreclosure to be preceded by a separate pre-foreclosure notice. A lender may not recycle a stale pre-foreclosure notice that it issued in connection with a prior complaint in mortgage foreclosure. Because Great Ajax failed to provide a separate pre-foreclosure notice before initiating the second action, the superior court's judgment was reversed. View "JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Taggart" on Justia Law

This appeal required the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to determine whether a “household vehicle exclusion” contained in a motor vehicle insurance policy violated Section 1738 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”), 75 Pa.C.S. 1738, because the exclusion impermissibly acted as a de facto waiver of stacked uninsured and underinsured motorist (“UM” and “UIM,” respectively) coverages. In 2012, Appellant Brian Gallagher was riding his motorcycle when William Stouffer ran a stop sign in his pickup truck, colliding with Gallagher’s motorcycle, causing Gallagher to suffer severe injuries. At the time of the accident, Gallagher had two insurance policies with GEICO; one included $50,000 of UIM coverage, insured only Gallagher’s motorcycle; the second insured Gallagher’s two automobiles and provided for $100,000 of UIM coverage for each vehicle. Gallagher opted and paid for stacked UM and UIM coverage when purchasing both policies. Stouffer’s insurance coverage was insufficient to compensate Gallagher in full. Consequently, Gallagher filed claims with GEICO seeking stacked UIM benefits under both of his GEICO policies. GEICO paid Gallagher the $50,000 policy limits of UIM coverage available under the Motorcycle Policy, it denied his claim for stacked UIM benefits under the Automobile Policy. GEICO based its decision on a household vehicle exclusion found in an amendment to the Automobile Policy. The exclusion states as follows: “This coverage does not apply to bodily injury while occupying or from being struck by a vehicle owned or leased by you or a relative that is not insured for Underinsured Motorists Coverage under this policy.” According to Gallagher, by denying him stacked UIM coverage based upon the household vehicle exclusion, GEICO was depriving him of the stacked UIM coverage for which he paid. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the household vehicle exclusion violated the MVFRL, and vacated the Superior Court’s judgment, reversed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of GEICO, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Gallagher v. GEICO" on Justia Law

This case involved questions of how the attorney-client privilege should apply in the context of derivative litigation. The nonprofit corporations involved in this matter were the Pittsburgh History and Landmarks Foundation (“the Foundation”) and its subsidiary, the Landmarks Financial Corporation (“the Corporation”), which managed the Foundation’s endowment. Plaintiffs were five former members of the Boards of Trustees of the Foundation and the Corporation who alleged they were improperly and ineffectively removed from the Boards in an attempt to thwart their oversight of the Foundation’s president, whom they believed was engaging in actions that were improper and not in accord with the Foundation’s mission. The Foundation’s Board created a Governance Task Force to review various practices of the Foundation; the Task Force recommended that both Boards be reduced substantially in number. The Foundation Board approved this recommendation and removed all trustees then serving from both Boards; significantly smaller boards were elected and as a result of these consolidations, and Derivative Plaintiffs lost their seats on the Boards. In accord with standard procedures for bringing a derivative action adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042 (Pa. 1997). The Supreme Court rejected the Commonwealth Court’s adoption of a qualified attorney-client privilege as set forth in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), which the Supreme Court viewed as inconsistent with prior Pennsylvania caselaw emphasizing predictability in the application of the attorney-client privilege. However, the Commonwealth Court’s decision not to apply the fiduciary or co-client exceptions to the attorney-client privilege under the facts of this case was affirmed. The matter was remanded for further al court and the Commonwealth Court and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Pgh History v. Ziegler" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to determine whether the enhanced sentence imposed on appellant Samuel Monarch due to his failure to submit to chemical testing was unconstitutional. The Superior Court acknowledged enhanced penalties for a failure to submit to warrantless blood testing violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution under Birchfield v. North Dakota, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (2016), but nevertheless determined appellant’s enhanced sentence was not unconstitutional because he also refused to submit to breath testing. The Supreme Court held the Superior Court erred in this regard and, accordingly, reversed that court’s order, vacated appellant’s judgment of sentence, and remanded for resentencing. View "Pennsylvania v. Monarch" on Justia Law

In this appeal by allowance, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on whether a defendant’s fugitive status during the period for filing a notice of appeal – where his attorney filed a timely notice of appeal on his behalf and he later returned after the appeal period ended, but prior to the deadline for filing an appellate brief – resulted in the defendant forfeiting his right to appeal. The Court affirmed the superior court, which found a defendant fugitive’s right to appeal to be forfeited in these circumstances. View "Pennsylvania v. Adams" on Justia Law

A jury convicted appellant Ricardo Natividad in 1997 of first-degree murder, carrying a firearm on a public street, two counts of possession of an instrument of crime, two counts of robbery, one count of robbery of a motor vehicle, kidnapping, and criminal conspiracy. The charges arose from separate indictments for the robbery of Michael Havens and the murder of Robert Campbell. At the penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict of death after finding the aggravating circumstances, killing while in the perpetration of a felony, and a significant history of violent felony convictions, outweighed the sole mitigating factor, appellant’s life history. He appealed directly to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court after an order dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief. Appellant presented multiple challenges pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), none of which the Supreme Court determined would afford him relief. Therefore, the Court affirmed the order dismissing appellant’s petition. View "Pennsylvania v. Natividad" on Justia Law