Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

J.L.P. (“Mother”) and J.D.M. (“Father”) were the parents of A.D.M. (born March 2007) and L.B.M. (born May 2011). Franklin County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) conducted a home visit with Mother. The visit was prompted by a referral alleging that Mother was on the verge of becoming homeless. Mother contacted CYS seeking to place the children due to her unstable living conditions. At the time, Father was incarcerated. That same day, the trial court ordered the children to be placed with CYS. Soon after, the children were adjudicated dependent. As required by statute, the trial court appointed a GAL for the children at the beginning of the dependency proceedings. Mother pleaded guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to twelve months of probation. Following Mother’s repeated periods of incarceration, CYS filed a TPR petition. The trial court declined to terminate Mother’s parental rights, finding that Mother, while only recently released from jail, had obtained both housing and employment. However, she would be incarcerated again for probation violations. A second termination hearing was scheduled. The trial court recognized that A.D.M.’s bond with Mother was much stronger than L.B.M.’s, and that A.D.M. would be affected adversely by the termination. However, the trial court found that A.D.M. also had a strong bond with his foster parents, and that it was in A.D.M.’s best interests to sever the bond with Mother because his most important need was permanency. The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights, finding that Mother had not remedied the conditions leading to the children’s placement. In assessing the children’s best interests, the court found that L.B.M.’s primary bond was with his foster parents. Mother appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in denying Mother’s motion for the appointment of counsel, and that the trial court abused its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights. This case required the Supreme Court to determine whether 23 Pa.C.S. sec. 2313(a), which mandated the appointment of counsel for children involved in contested involuntary termination of parental rights proceedings, was satisfied by the appointment of a GAL provided that the GAL is an attorney. The Supreme Court held that it was not. "Because the trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel for the children, and because that error is structural, we remand for a new TPR proceeding following the appointment of counsel. Because of the remand, we need not reach, and we express no opinion regarding, Mother’s challenge to the trial court’s finding on the merits that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated." View "In Re: Adoption of L.B.M." on Justia Law

Appellant Charles Hicks was tried by jury and convicted of first-degree murder, tampering with evidence, and abuse of a corpse. For these convictions, he received the death penalty. He appealed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined there was sufficient evidence to sustain appellant’s conviction for first degree murder, and his claim regarding Rule 404(b) evidence did not warrant relief. "Our careful review of the record reveals the sentence was not the product of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. To the contrary, the sentence was based on properly admitted evidence showing appellant intentionally killed the victim by cutting her throat with a knife. We further conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the aggravating circumstance of killing by means of torture as the Commonwealth expert witnesses testified the victim was severely beaten and strangled before being decapitated while she was still alive. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence." View "Pennsylvania v. Hicks" on Justia Law

In a discretionary appeal by the Commonwealth, the issue presented for the Supreme Court’s review was whether the presumption that information of public record could not be considered “unknown” for purposes of proving newly-discovered facts exception to the time requirements of the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), applied to pro se petitioners who were incarcerated. The Supreme Court held that the presumption did not apply to pro se prisoner petitioners, and so it affirmed the Superior Court’s order remanding the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Burton" on Justia Law

Pertinent to this appeal, the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”) required insurers to offer insureds Underinsured Motorist coverage. Subsection 1731(c.1) of the MVFRL stated that any UIM coverage rejection form that does not “specifically comply” with Section 1731 of the MVFRL was void and that, if an insurer failed to produce a valid UIM coverage rejection form, then UIM coverage shall be equal to the policy’s bodily injury liability limits. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in this matter to determine whether an insurer’s UIM coverage rejection form “specifically compl[ied]” with Section 1731 of the MVFRL if the insurer’s form was not a verbatim reproduction of the statutory rejection form found in Subsection 1731(c) of the MVFRL but, rather, differed from the statutory form in an inconsequential manner. The Court held that a UIM coverage rejection form specifically complies with Section 1731 of the MVFRL even if the form contains de minimis deviations from the statutory form. Because the Superior Court reached the proper result in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed that court’s judgment. View "Ford v. American States Ins." on Justia Law

In this case, two townships disputed the location of their common boundary. Pursuant to the Second Class Township Code, the trial court appointed three commissioners to ascertain that boundary. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to consider whether such commissioners, when tasked with determining the location of a municipal boundary but concluding that they could not do so with certainty, could consider the townships’ acquiescence to a line used as the boundary and relied upon by residents, and accordingly recommend the adoption of that alternative line as the municipal boundary. The Supreme Court concluded that, in such a narrow circumstance, the commissioners could rely upon the equitable doctrine of acquiescence in making their determination, and need not search indefinitely for evidence of the original boundary. Accordingly, the Court reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court and remanded for reinstatement of the trial court’s order. View "Adams Twp. v. Richland" on Justia Law

Appellant Bernard Cousar appealed a Court of Common Pleas order denying, without a hearing, the guilt phase claims contained in his petition for relief from his death sentence under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). After review, the Supreme Court remanded this case back to the PCRA court for an evidentiary hearing limited to two issues pertaining to whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for: (1) failing to show the ballistics evidence purportedly tying appellant to a series of crimes and murders was inconsistent; and (2) impeach an eyewitness’s in-court identification of appellant with the witness’s inability to identify appellant at his preliminary hearing. View "Pennsylvania v. Cousar" on Justia Law

In 2007, Junius Burno was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder for which he was sentenced to death. In this direct appeal, Burno challenged the admissibility of his confession to the murders, the sufficiency of the evidence, the alleged denial of his right to a speedy trial, and the admissibility of certain evidence establishing an aggravating factor for purposes of the death penalty. The Supreme Court rejected all but one of these challenges on the merits. The Court found merit to Burno’s argument that one of his statements to police was inadmissible because it was obtained during the course of plea negotiations. However, the Court ultimately concluded that the erroneous admission of this statement at trial was harmless. Consequently, the Court affirmed Burno’s death sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Burno" on Justia Law

This was a capital direct appeal arising out of Appellant Ricky Smyrnes' participation, with a group of five other individuals, in the kidnapping, torture, and murder of Jennifer Lee Daugherty. The case was a companion one to that of co-perpetrator Melvin Knight. Appellant forced the victim to write a staged suicide note, after which Appellant and Knight dragged her to the bathroom; Knight repeatedly and fatally stabbed her; Appellant slit her wrists (albeit superficially); Appellant and Knight choked her as she lay dying; and her body was placed in a trash can. Appellant and Knight moved the can and body outside to a remote location, where these were discovered the next day. Apparently in light of developing evidence that a disturbance had occurred in Appellant’s apartment, police began to interview the co-perpetrators, and inculpatory statements were obtained. At the penalty hearing, the Commonwealth pursued, and the jury found present, the aggravating circumstances involving torture and a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of personal violence. One or more jurors also found mitigation in the form of “mental illness, childhood physical abuse, [and] childhood sexual abuse.” Upon balancing, however, the jurors unanimously agreed that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigation and, accordingly, returned the death verdict. This direct appeal followed, in which Appellant presented fifteen claims for relief. Finding no reversible error after review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction and sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Smyrnes" on Justia Law

Appellants Main Line Gardens, Inc. and Coffman Associates, LLC (collectively, “Main Line”), petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the issue of whether it was proper for the Commonwealth Court to dismiss its appeal because it did not file briefs at the trial court in support of post-trial motions. The Supreme Court concluded that the Commonwealth Court erred, and thus remanded the case for merits review of the issues raised on appeal. View "Willistown Twp. v. Main Line Gardens" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) appealed a Superior Court judgment holding that section 6111.1(g)(2) of the Uniform Firearms Act, which provided for review by a court of common pleas of a request for the expungement of the PSP’s records of an individual’s involuntary civil commitment under section 7302 (“302”) of the Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”), required a de novo hearing at which clear and convincing evidence must be presented in support of the 302 commitment. The Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court erred, as the plain language of section 6111.1(g)(2) required a court of common pleas to review only the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 302 commitment, limited to the information available to the physician at the time he or she made the decision to commit the individual, viewed in the light most favorable to the physician as the original decision-maker to determine whether his or her findings are supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Because the Superior Court reviewed the trial court’s decision through an "improper lens," the Supreme Court vacated its decision and remanded this case back to that court for further proceedings. View "In Re Vencil" on Justia Law