Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In October 2009, Appellees Richard and Joyce Rost filed suit against multiple manufacturers of asbestos, averring that exposure to the defendants’ asbestos containing products caused Richard to contract mesothelioma. Before trial, the Rosts settled their claims against all defendants except for Appellant Ford Motor Company (“Ford”). Over Ford’s objections, the trial court consolidated the case for trial with two other mesothelioma cases. Trial commenced in September 2011, at which time the trial court reminded the parties of a pre-trial ruling, precluding any expert from offering testimony that “each and every breath” of asbestos may constitute an evidentiary basis for the jury to find that the defendant’s product was a substantial cause of mesothelioma. The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on the proper application of the “frequency, regularity, and proximity” criteria in asbestos product liability litigation, seeking to provide further illumination on the principles set forth in its decisions in this area. After review, the Court concluded the trial court and the Superior Court properly applied those principles in this case, and thus affirmed the judgment entered in favor of Appellees. View "Rost v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Appellant Michael R. Veon, a twenty-two-year member and eventual Minority Whip of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, was entitled to $20,000 annually to cover business expenses associated with maintenance of a district office, as well as $4,000 for postage. Pursuant to House Democratic Caucus (“Caucus”) procedures, Veon could seek additional funds from Caucus leadership if he exhausted his $20,000 allocation, and it was not uncommon for Caucus members to do so. In 1991, Veon formed the Beaver Initiative for Growth (“BIG”), a non-profit corporation. BIG received all of its funding from public sources, primarily through the Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development (“DCED”). Veon's Beaver County district office initially shared space with BIG, but opened two more district offices, for which the rent easily exceeded his caucus allotment. Veon was criminally charged with various offenses relating to BIG paying the district offices' rents. After some charges were withdrawn, Veon went to trial on nineteen counts. In the portion of the jury charge that was relevant to Veon’s appeal to the Supreme Court, the trial court defined the pecuniary requirement in the conflict of interest statute. The statute prohibited public officials from leveraging the authority of their offices for “private pecuniary benefit;” at issue here was whether or not that benefit extended to what the trial court in this case referred to as “intangible political gain.” In addition, another issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Commonwealth could receive restitution following prosecution of a public official for a crime involving unlawful diversion of public resources. The Court concluded the trial court committed prejudicial error in its jury charge regarding conflict of interest, and that it erred in awarding restitution to the DCED. Veon's judgment of sentence was vacated, the matter remanded for a new trial on conflict of interest, and for other proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Veon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted discretionary review to determine the propriety of a trial court considering victim impact evidence at a sentencing proceeding where the offenses at issue were not crimes against a person. The Superior Court held, as a matter of law, such evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible at sentencing under such circumstances, the trial court therefore abused its discretion, and resentencing was required. The Supreme Court disagreed with this broad holding and, in particular, the construction of 42 Pa.C.S. Section 9738 as a provision circumscribing evidentiary relevance at sentencing. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Superior Court's order and remanded for resentencing. View "Pennsylvania v. Ali" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania State Education Association was an organization made up of 150,000 public school teachers, support staff, bus drivers, cafeteria workers, custodians, secretaries and teachers’ aides. In 2009, the organization and fourteen of its member public school employees (collectively, “PSEA”) filed suit against the Office of Open Records, its Executive Director, and the Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development (collectively, the “OOR”), seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to prevent the release of home addresses of public school employees, and a declaration that the home addresses of public school employees are exempt from public access. PSEA asserted that numerous school districts had received requests for the names and addresses of public school employees, and some had already released this information. Contending that the public school employees lacked any adequate procedural remedy to prevent the release of private information protected by the Pennsylvania Constitution. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review involved an examination of the scope of the “personal security” exception to disclosure under the Right to Know Law (“RTKL”), and, more specifically, whether school districts must disclose the home addresses of public school employees. Under the prior Right to Know Act, (repealed, effective January 1, 2009) (“RTKA”), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had on three occasions ruled that certain types of information, including home addresses, implicated the right to privacy under Article 1, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and thus required a balancing to determine whether the right to privacy outweighs the public’s interest in dissemination. "Our task here is to determine whether this analysis continues to obtain under the RTKL. We hold that it does." View "Pennsylvania State Ed. Assoc. v. Pennsylania" on Justia Law

In 2013, Rahiem Fant pled not guilty to various charges related to an incident during which he allegedly stabbed a man in the abdomen and arm. While waiting for trial, he was detained at the Clinton County Correctional Facility. In 2014, approximately one week before his scheduled trial, Fant’s counsel received from the Commonwealth a production of recordings made at the Facility. All but two of the recordings consisted of conversations that occurred between Fant and his visitors in the Facility’s visitation room. As a result of these recorded visit conversations, law enforcement personnel retrieved additional evidence they sought to use at trial. Fant filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude at trial the visit conversation recordings and the evidence discovered as a result of them. He argued that the recordings violated Pennsylvania's Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act. The Commonwealth countered that Section 5704(14) of the Act permitted these recordings because it authorized county correctional facilities to record “any telephone calls from or to an inmate,” as long as certain conditions were met. Following a hearing, the suppression court granted Fant’s motion to suppress, making several findings of fact before concluding that the visit conversations were not “telephone calls” because the “every day common sense use of the word telephone does not include this scenario.” The Commonwealth appealed, and the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the calls made on the "telephone" system for visit conversations were indeed "telephone calls." On this point, the Supreme Court affirmed the suppression court, finding that the "telephone" system as used by the prison system was not a telephone in its ordinary meaning under the Act, and therefore were not subject to an exception under the Act. View "Pennsylvania v. Fant" on Justia Law

Lansdale Borough Police Officer George Johnson received a subpoena to attend a preliminary hearing; his attendance at the hearing was critical as he had conducted the field sobriety tests relating to a criminal defendant’s charges of driving under the influence of alcohol. Without requesting a continuance or notifying anyone of his inability to attend, Johnson failed to appear at the preliminary hearing, resulting in the dismissal of the criminal charges. Police Chief Robert McDyre met with Johnson to determine why he missed the preliminary hearing. When Chief McDyre asked why he failed to appear at the hearing, Johnson responded that he had forgotten about the hearing as he had been distracted because his son had been bitten by the neighbor’s pitbull five days prior, despite having been given notice of the hearing. Johnson told his Chief that he was attempting to reinstate the criminal charges by informing both the district court and the assistant district attorney that he had missed the preliminary hearing, but not because he forgot that it was scheduled, but because he was sick. Noting that the officer's reasoning for missing the hearing changed, Chief McDyre placed Johnson on administrative leave. The Chief later recommended that Johnson's employment be terminated. Johnson appealed. Based on his prior disciplinary history, his failure to appear at the preliminary hearing, and his false statements to the court and the assistant district attorney, the Civil Service Commission denied Officer Johnson’s appeal of his termination. The trial court affirmed the Commission's rulings on two charges and reversed on two others. The court ultimately reversed Johnson's termination. In their appeal to the Commonwealth Court, Lansdale Borough and the Lansdale Borough Civil Service Commission contended that the trial court erred in conducting its substantial evidence review by rejecting the Commission’s factual findings that were supported by the record and by modifying Officer Johnson’s termination to a thirty-day suspension. Having determined that the Borough Code affords the trial court de novo review of the Commission’s adjudication, the Commonwealth Court concluded that the trial court acted within its statutory authority when it rejected the Commission’s conclusions on charges three and four. The Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to determine whether a trial court’s standard of review of an adjudication of a municipal civil service commission where no new evidence was presented on appeal was governed by the Borough Code, which has been interpreted as providing for de novo review, or by the Local Agency Law, which provided for a limited appellate review under those circumstances. The Supreme Court held that when the two statutes are read in pari materia, "it becomes clear that a limited appellate standard of review applies. Accordingly, we respectfully reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court, which held that de novo review was appropriate, and remand the matter for further proceedings." View "Johnson v. Lansdale Boro." on Justia Law

In the three consolidated appeals, all of which originated in the Court of Common Pleas of York County before the same judge, the Superior Court applied its en banc decision in "Commonwealth v. Hainesworth," (82 A.3d 444 (2013) (en banc)), and concluded that Appellees were entitled to specific performance of their plea agreements, i.e., Appellees’ sexual offender registration requirements were governed by "Megan’s Law," which was in effect when Appellees entered their plea agreements, and not by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which superseded Megan’s Law. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine "Hainesworth" and its applicability to Appellees’ cases. Consistent with the Superior Court’s decision in Hainesworth, the Supreme Court held that Appellees are entitled to the benefit of the bargains struck with the Commonwealth when the trial court accepted the parties’ plea agreements. View "Pennsylvania v. Grace" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a contractor could maintain an action under the Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act (CASPA) against a property owner’s agents. Beginning in 2005, Appellant Scungio Borst & Associates (SBA) entered into a series of written and oral construction contracts with Appellee 410 Shurs Lane Developers, LLC (410 SLD), which 410 SLD’s part-owner and president, Appellee Robert DeBolt, executed on 410 SLD’s behalf. Therein, SBA agreed to improve real property owned by 410 SLD in connection with the development of a condominium complex, and did so until November 2006, when SBA’s contracts were terminated with approximately $1.5 million in outstanding payments due. SBA requested payment, but 410 SLD, again through DeBolt, refused. Accordingly, SBA sued 410 SLD; its alleged successor corporation, Appellee Kenworth II, LLC; and DeBolt in his personal capacity. SBA asserted, among other claims, violations of CASPA. After careful review, the Supreme Court held that a contractor could not maintain an action under CASPA, and, accordingly, affirmed the order of the Superior Court. View "Scungio Borst & Assoc. v. 410 Shurs Lane Developers, LLC" on Justia Law

A representative of Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., d/b/a Havencrest Nursing Center (Extendicare), executed an arbitration agreement with Anna Marie Taylor (“Decedent”) requiring the arbitration of claims arising from Decedent’s stay at the Extendicare facility. Following Decedent’s death, Daniel and William Taylor (“the Taylors”) brought wrongful death claims on behalf of themselves as wrongful death beneficiaries and survival claims on behalf of Decedent’s estate against Extendicare and two other defendants. Extendicare moved to bifurcate the wrongful death and survival actions, and to compel arbitration of Decedent’s survival claim pursuant to the arbitration agreement and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The trial court relied upon Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 213(e) to deny Extendicare’s motion to bifurcate, and the Superior Court affirmed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the FAA preempted the lower courts’ application of Rule 213(e) under the facts presented. Upon review, the Court concluded that the FAA preempted the application of Rule 213(e), and required arbitration of the survival claim against Extendicare. The Court therefore reversed the Superior Court, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc." on Justia Law

In his second collateral capital appeal, Jermont Cox challenged the denial of his Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition, contending that newly-discovered facts entitle him to a new trial. Following its thorough review, the Supreme Court agreed with the PCRA court’s determination that Cox’s petition was untimely and therefore affirmed its order. View "Pennsylvania v. Cox" on Justia Law