Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2013, Rahiem Fant pled not guilty to various charges related to an incident during which he allegedly stabbed a man in the abdomen and arm. While waiting for trial, he was detained at the Clinton County Correctional Facility. In 2014, approximately one week before his scheduled trial, Fant’s counsel received from the Commonwealth a production of recordings made at the Facility. All but two of the recordings consisted of conversations that occurred between Fant and his visitors in the Facility’s visitation room. As a result of these recorded visit conversations, law enforcement personnel retrieved additional evidence they sought to use at trial. Fant filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude at trial the visit conversation recordings and the evidence discovered as a result of them. He argued that the recordings violated Pennsylvania's Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act. The Commonwealth countered that Section 5704(14) of the Act permitted these recordings because it authorized county correctional facilities to record “any telephone calls from or to an inmate,” as long as certain conditions were met. Following a hearing, the suppression court granted Fant’s motion to suppress, making several findings of fact before concluding that the visit conversations were not “telephone calls” because the “every day common sense use of the word telephone does not include this scenario.” The Commonwealth appealed, and the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the calls made on the "telephone" system for visit conversations were indeed "telephone calls." On this point, the Supreme Court affirmed the suppression court, finding that the "telephone" system as used by the prison system was not a telephone in its ordinary meaning under the Act, and therefore were not subject to an exception under the Act. View "Pennsylvania v. Fant" on Justia Law

Lansdale Borough Police Officer George Johnson received a subpoena to attend a preliminary hearing; his attendance at the hearing was critical as he had conducted the field sobriety tests relating to a criminal defendant’s charges of driving under the influence of alcohol. Without requesting a continuance or notifying anyone of his inability to attend, Johnson failed to appear at the preliminary hearing, resulting in the dismissal of the criminal charges. Police Chief Robert McDyre met with Johnson to determine why he missed the preliminary hearing. When Chief McDyre asked why he failed to appear at the hearing, Johnson responded that he had forgotten about the hearing as he had been distracted because his son had been bitten by the neighbor’s pitbull five days prior, despite having been given notice of the hearing. Johnson told his Chief that he was attempting to reinstate the criminal charges by informing both the district court and the assistant district attorney that he had missed the preliminary hearing, but not because he forgot that it was scheduled, but because he was sick. Noting that the officer's reasoning for missing the hearing changed, Chief McDyre placed Johnson on administrative leave. The Chief later recommended that Johnson's employment be terminated. Johnson appealed. Based on his prior disciplinary history, his failure to appear at the preliminary hearing, and his false statements to the court and the assistant district attorney, the Civil Service Commission denied Officer Johnson’s appeal of his termination. The trial court affirmed the Commission's rulings on two charges and reversed on two others. The court ultimately reversed Johnson's termination. In their appeal to the Commonwealth Court, Lansdale Borough and the Lansdale Borough Civil Service Commission contended that the trial court erred in conducting its substantial evidence review by rejecting the Commission’s factual findings that were supported by the record and by modifying Officer Johnson’s termination to a thirty-day suspension. Having determined that the Borough Code affords the trial court de novo review of the Commission’s adjudication, the Commonwealth Court concluded that the trial court acted within its statutory authority when it rejected the Commission’s conclusions on charges three and four. The Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to determine whether a trial court’s standard of review of an adjudication of a municipal civil service commission where no new evidence was presented on appeal was governed by the Borough Code, which has been interpreted as providing for de novo review, or by the Local Agency Law, which provided for a limited appellate review under those circumstances. The Supreme Court held that when the two statutes are read in pari materia, "it becomes clear that a limited appellate standard of review applies. Accordingly, we respectfully reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court, which held that de novo review was appropriate, and remand the matter for further proceedings." View "Johnson v. Lansdale Boro." on Justia Law

In the three consolidated appeals, all of which originated in the Court of Common Pleas of York County before the same judge, the Superior Court applied its en banc decision in "Commonwealth v. Hainesworth," (82 A.3d 444 (2013) (en banc)), and concluded that Appellees were entitled to specific performance of their plea agreements, i.e., Appellees’ sexual offender registration requirements were governed by "Megan’s Law," which was in effect when Appellees entered their plea agreements, and not by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which superseded Megan’s Law. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine "Hainesworth" and its applicability to Appellees’ cases. Consistent with the Superior Court’s decision in Hainesworth, the Supreme Court held that Appellees are entitled to the benefit of the bargains struck with the Commonwealth when the trial court accepted the parties’ plea agreements. View "Pennsylvania v. Grace" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a contractor could maintain an action under the Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act (CASPA) against a property owner’s agents. Beginning in 2005, Appellant Scungio Borst & Associates (SBA) entered into a series of written and oral construction contracts with Appellee 410 Shurs Lane Developers, LLC (410 SLD), which 410 SLD’s part-owner and president, Appellee Robert DeBolt, executed on 410 SLD’s behalf. Therein, SBA agreed to improve real property owned by 410 SLD in connection with the development of a condominium complex, and did so until November 2006, when SBA’s contracts were terminated with approximately $1.5 million in outstanding payments due. SBA requested payment, but 410 SLD, again through DeBolt, refused. Accordingly, SBA sued 410 SLD; its alleged successor corporation, Appellee Kenworth II, LLC; and DeBolt in his personal capacity. SBA asserted, among other claims, violations of CASPA. After careful review, the Supreme Court held that a contractor could not maintain an action under CASPA, and, accordingly, affirmed the order of the Superior Court. View "Scungio Borst & Assoc. v. 410 Shurs Lane Developers, LLC" on Justia Law

A representative of Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., d/b/a Havencrest Nursing Center (Extendicare), executed an arbitration agreement with Anna Marie Taylor (“Decedent”) requiring the arbitration of claims arising from Decedent’s stay at the Extendicare facility. Following Decedent’s death, Daniel and William Taylor (“the Taylors”) brought wrongful death claims on behalf of themselves as wrongful death beneficiaries and survival claims on behalf of Decedent’s estate against Extendicare and two other defendants. Extendicare moved to bifurcate the wrongful death and survival actions, and to compel arbitration of Decedent’s survival claim pursuant to the arbitration agreement and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The trial court relied upon Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 213(e) to deny Extendicare’s motion to bifurcate, and the Superior Court affirmed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the FAA preempted the lower courts’ application of Rule 213(e) under the facts presented. Upon review, the Court concluded that the FAA preempted the application of Rule 213(e), and required arbitration of the survival claim against Extendicare. The Court therefore reversed the Superior Court, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc." on Justia Law

In his second collateral capital appeal, Jermont Cox challenged the denial of his Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition, contending that newly-discovered facts entitle him to a new trial. Following its thorough review, the Supreme Court agreed with the PCRA court’s determination that Cox’s petition was untimely and therefore affirmed its order. View "Pennsylvania v. Cox" on Justia Law

This case was a direct appeal of an interlocutory order precluding the Commonwealth from presenting victim impact evidence at a re-sentencing hearing of Appellee Joseph Kindler, who was convicted of first-degree murder in 1983 and previously was sentenced to death. The preliminary issue for the Supreme Court's review was whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. After review, the Court concluded that it did not: thus, it did reach the merits of the Commonwealth’s claim that the trial court erred by entering the order precluding the Commonwealth from presenting victim impact evidence at Appellee’s re-sentencing hearing. Instead, the case was transferred to the Superior Court. View "Pennsylvania v. Kindler" on Justia Law

Mount Airy #1, LLC operated a hotel and casino located in Mount Pocono. Mount Airy challenged the constitutionality of Section 1403(c) of the Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming Act. That section levied a “local share assessment” against all licensed casinos’ gross slot machine revenue. According to Mount Airy, the statutory provision violated the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution because it imposed grossly unequal local share assessments upon similarly situated slot machine licensees. After review of the parties' arguments, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the local share assessment was a non-uniform tax of the sort prohibited by Article 8, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Therefore, the Court severed Subsections 1403(c)(2) and (c)(3) from the Gaming Act. View "Mount Airy #1, LLC v. Pa. Dept. of Revenue, et al." on Justia Law

James Ball, III was charged with and tried for a summary offense before a Magisterial District Judge (“MDJ”). The MDJ convicted Ball of a lesser included offense, implicitly acquitting him of the greater charged offense. Ball appealed his conviction to the court of common pleas (“the trial court”) for a de novo trial, whereupon the Commonwealth sought to re-try him on the greater offense. The trial court allowed the Commonwealth to try Ball on the original charge, notwithstanding Ball’s objection that reinstating that charge violated the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Ball was convicted of the greater offense, and he appealed to the Superior Court. Finding merit in Ball’s double jeopardy claim, the Superior Court reversed the trial court and discharged Ball. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur to determine whether the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy barred the Commonwealth from reinstating Ball’s implicitly-acquitted greater offense. The Court held that the Commonwealth could not prosecute a defendant for the greater offense under these circumstances. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court on this issue. Furthermore, the Court granted allocatur to decide whether the Superior Court erred when it discharged Ball after having found that the prohibition on double jeopardy precluded his retrial on the greater summary offense. On this issue, the Court concluded that the Superior Court did err. "A MDJ has the authority, sua sponte, to convict a defendant of an uncharged, lesser included offense, and the defendant has a right to have that conviction reviewed by a court of record." The case was remanded back to the trial court for a trial de novo limited only to the lesser included offense. View "Pennsylvania v. Ball III" on Justia Law

The question this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was whether a cause of action existed under Pennsylvania law entitling a class of indigent criminal defendants to allege prospective, systemic violations of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel due to underfunding, and to seek and obtain an injunction forcing a county to provide adequate funding to a public defender’s office. In early 2012, a number of attorneys resigned from the Office of the Public Defender (OPD) of Luzerne County. Because the County implemented a hiring freeze in February of that year, Chief Public Defender Al Flora could not fill the positions. By April, the OPD staff consisted of only four full-time attorneys, thirteen part-time attorneys, three investigators, four secretaries, one receptionist, and one office administrator. The OPD continued to operate with five unfilled attorney positions, three full-time and two part-time. Most of the attorneys who worked for the OPD did not have their own desks, telephones, or computers. One part-time attorney informed Flora that he could not accept any more cases because, due to his current caseload, he could not satisfy his ethical duties to any additional defendants. Despite Flora’s efforts, no additional funding was forthcoming, and none appeared likely, Flora, along with plaintiffs Samantha Volciak, Yolanda Holman, Charles Hammonds (collectively, plaintiffs), and on behalf of unnamed but similarly situated individuals, filed a class action lawsuit against Luzerne County and Robert Lawton, its County Manager (collectively, Appellees). Simultaneously, plaintiffs brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim, and a claim under Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, seeking an injunction against Appellees requiring the immediate appointment of private counsel to assist them in their defenses and requiring additional funding to satisfy the OPD’s obligation to ensure that all qualified applicants receive competent legal representation. Two days later, plaintiffs moved for a peremptory writ of mandamus and a preliminary injunction. Pursuant to "Gideon v. Wainwright," (372 U.S. 335 (1963)) and its progeny, and because remedies for Sixth Amendment violations need not await conviction and sentencing, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that such a cause of action existed, so long as the class action plaintiffs demonstrate “the likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law.” View "Kuren, et al v. Luzerne County" on Justia Law