Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Ryan Safka was the driver of an automobile that crashed killing three of his four passengers. The investigating police officer believed that Appellant’s speed caused the accident. He, in part, relied upon data retrieved from the vehicle’s Event Data Recorder (EDR) which recorded the vehicle’s speed for the five seconds prior to the airbag’s deployment. In his vehicular manslaughter bench trial, after the evidence was closed, the trial court reopened it to permit the parties to present additional evidence concerning the reliability of the EDR data. The question this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was whether the trial court erred in reopening evidence. The Court held that because it was a non-jury trial, the trial court had the discretion to reopen the record sua sponte to receive additional testimony to avoid a miscarriage of justice, and did not abuse its discretion by doing so. View "Pennsylvania v. Safka" on Justia Law

Candidate Joseph Vodvarka appealed a Commonwealth Court deicision which set aside his nomination petition as Democratic Party candidate for the U.S. Senate in a primary election held in April 2016. The Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision and ordered Vodvarka be placed on the ballot. At issue was a challenge to the register of voters, or the Statewide Uniform Registry of Electors or "SURE." The Supreme Court held that the signature of a registered voter whose name appeared in the SURE registry could not be stricken from a nominating petition solely because the address listed on the nominating petition was different from the address at which the signer was currently registered to vote. View "In Re: Nom. of Joseph Vodvarka" on Justia Law

In August 2012, Appellee Matthew Wolfe, then eighteen years old, engaged in sexual intercourse with a thirteen-year-old girl on several occasions. He was charged with and convicted by a jury trial for a number of sexual offenses, including two counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse. During Appellee’s trial and prior to sentencing, the United States Supreme Court issued its "Alleyne v. United States," (133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013)) decision, overruling its own prior precedent and establishing a new constitutional rule of law, grounded on the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed appeal in Wolfe's case to assess the validity of the Superior Court’s sua sponte determination that a sentencing statute was facially unconstitutional under Alleyne. "We are not unsympathetic to the plight of the Commonwealth in Alleyne’s wake, given the volume of the mandatory minimum sentences that must be stricken, and the scale of the task of resentencing. We also appreciate that, in enacting the mandatory minimum sentencing regime, the General Assembly had acted in good faith reliance on the previous jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States, which was discarded by that Court in Alleyne. Nevertheless, new constitutional rules of Alleyne’s magnitude often have unavoidable, wide-scale consequences." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision. View "Pennsylvania v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

In a direct appeal, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review involved a challenge to the regularity of the enactment of Act 192 of 2014. Act 192 began as House Bill 80 (“HB 80”), introduced in January 2013. Initially, HB 80 was a two-page bill which added the newly-defined offense of theft of secondary metal (such as copper and aluminum, or wire and cable used by utilities and transportation agencies) to the Crimes Code at Section 3935. The bill was titled, “AN ACT Amending Title 18 (Crimes and Offenses) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, defining the offense of theft of secondary metal; and prescribing penalties.” After undergoing minor revisions, HB 80 was approved by the House and sent to the Senate. The Senate Judiciary Committee added a section amending the existing trespass provision of the Crimes Code to specify that an individual who trespasses in order to steal secondary metal commits a first-degree misdemeanor as a “simple trespasser.” Meanwhile, in April 2013, a separate House bill, HB 1243, was introduced and began proceeding through the General Assembly. HB 1243 changed various provisions of subchapter 61(A) of the Crimes Code, (the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995). As amended on its second consideration in the House, the bill retained some of its original provisions and, important to this dispute, encompassed substantial additions to Section 6120, which generally prohibited counties and other municipalities from regulating the lawful ownership, possession, transfer, or transportation of firearms and ammunition. On October 15, 2014, HB 1243’s substantive provisions were folded into HB 80. The Supreme Court concluded that Act 192 violated the single-subject rule of Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. View "Leach v. Turzai" on Justia Law

Appellant Antyane Robinson appealed the PCRA court's denial as untimely his second petition for relief. Acknowledging that current Pennsylvania jurisprudence renders his petition time-barred, Appellant requested that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court create an equitable exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirements. The Court declined Appellant’s invitation and affirmed the PCRA court’s dismissal of his petition as untimely filed. View "Pennsylvania v. Robinson" on Justia Law

A special complement of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania assembled to address multiple issues raised in this appeal. The underlying civil action was a defamation case arising out of a newspaper column written by defendant-appellee Karen Heller, and published in the Philadelphia Inquirer in November 2009. The column contained negative commentary about purported actions of plaintiff-appellant John Dougherty, who was the Business Manager of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 98 and a self-described public figure and a participant in numerous civic and philanthropic activities. When confronted with information demonstrating that the commentary concerning Appellant’s conduct was false, Appellee conceded the unfoundedness and publicly apologized. The misinformation, however, appeared on Appellee’s Facebook page for an indeterminate period of time after the apology and apparently remained available through third-party sources until several years later. Appellant’s attorneys expressed concern that video footage resulting from the deposition should not be displayed for any purpose beyond the litigation. Appellee’s attorney, for her part, repeatedly indicated that she intended to use the videotape solely for purposes of the litigation, and that she would abide by all of her obligations under the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Professional Conduct. She declined, however, to make a specific commitment that was asked of her by appellant's counsel. Appellee’s attorney then suggested an arrangement whereby the videotape deposition would proceed as planned, and she would agree not to give the tape to anyone for ten days, during which time Appellant could seek a protective order or other relief from the court. Appellant’s lawyers declined this proposal. The court of common pleas entered an order granting Appellee’s motion to compel and denying Appellant’s motion for protective relief. The court directed Appellant to appear for a videotape deposition within fifteen days. Although the court believed that the potential abuse of a videotape deposition was separable from the merits, it did not accept that the issue was so important as to justify as-of-right interlocutory appellate review. A divided en banc Superior Court affirmed. The issues raised by this appeal for the Supreme Court's review centered on a threshold objection to temporary judicial assignments to the Supreme Court and a challenge to a supplanted order that previously had dismissed the appeal. In addition, a jurisdictional question was raised concerning whether a common pleas court’s denial of a motion for a protective order of the videotaped deposition constituted a collateral order subject to as-of-right interlocutory appellate review. Finally, on the merits, the appeal of the common pleas court’s refusal to issue a protective order proscribing such dissemination. The application for relief challenging temporary judicial assignments made to the Supreme Court for purposes of resolving this appeal was denied. The Superior Court's order was vacated, this appeal quashed as an unauthorized interlocutory one, and the matter was remanded to the common pleas court. View "Dougherty v. Heller" on Justia Law

In 2008, Appellant Omar Cash shot and killed Muliek Brown at a car wash in Philadelphia. The shooting was caught on the carwash’s surveillance video, which showed Brown cleaning the tire rims of his car and Appellant approaching him from behind and shooting him in the back of the head. Following the shooting, Appellant fled the scene, and Robert Green, a carwash employee who watched the shooting take place on a monitor inside the carwash’s office, called 911. As one police officer secured the scene, his partner, Officer Pross, was approached by Marcus Howard, who indicated that he saw a light-complexioned male with a “Muslim beard” and wearing a black hoodie and Capri shorts, consistent with Appellant’s appearance, flee the scene. Officers would ultimately secure Appellant's arrest in New York City; he was extradited back to Philadelphia where he was charged with first-degree murder. Appellant would be convicted by jury and sentenced to death. He raised several alleged errors warranting the overturn of his conviction. Finding none, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. Cash" on Justia Law

Appellant Ihor Malanchuk, a carpenter, fell from scaffolding at a residence where he was working and suffered injury. Initially, he brought a civil action against the owner of the premises, Ilya Sivchuk. Later, Appellant initiated a separate proceeding against another worker, Appellee Alex Tsimura. Sivchuk filed a motion requesting that the two actions be consolidated pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 213(a). After the completion of discovery, Appellee and Sivchuk pursued summary judgment. The common pleas court issued a single order granting Appellee’s motion in its entirety but awarding Sivchuk only partial relief. Accordingly, as against Sivchuk, the litigation ripened toward trial. Appellant filed a notice of appeal, proceeding under the Tsimura case caption, to challenge the summary relief Appellee had obtained. In an opinion per Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925, the common pleas court expressed its belief that this appeal was premature. The question presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether an order awarding summary judgment in one of two civil cases consolidated for purposes of discovery and trial was appealable immediately as of right. The Court "realize[d] that consolidation questions have generated a great deal of controversy at both the federal and state levels, as reflected in a persistent split of authority regarding whether, or to what extent, consolidation effects a merger of claims for purposes of immediate appealability and otherwise. [. . .] complete consolidation (or merger or fusion of actions) does not occur absent a complete identity of parties and claims; separate actions lacking such overlap retain their separate identities and require distinct judgments; these principles pertain equally to appealability determinations; and they continue to operate even in the face of an order purporting to consolidate the actions 'for all purposes.'" In this case, complete consolidation did not occur, the common pleas court’s order awarding summary judgment in favor of Appellee was a final one as to the Tsimura case. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Malanchuk. v. Sivchuk" on Justia Law

Morrison Informatics, Inc. (the “Company”) filed a petition for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy relief in September 2009. In May 2011, the Company and two shareholders, who also were officers of the corporation, commenced a civil action in the court of common pleas against Members 1st Federal Credit Union, Mark Zampelli, and Scott Douglass. In the ensuing complaint, the Company and the Shareholders asserted that, beginning sometime after January 2005 and continuing into 2009, the Company’s finance manager, Zampelli, had colluded with a Credit Union relationships officer, Douglass, to embezzle Company funds. The complaint advanced claims against the Credit Union, Zampelli, and Douglass variously sounding in fraud, conversion, civil conspiracy, and negligence. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review concerned whether a federal bankruptcy trustee could be substituted as a plaintiff in a civil action previously commenced by the debtor in bankruptcy in a Pennsylvania state court, although the statutory limitations period expired prior to the attempted substitution. "Although we recognize that the interests of a debtor and a trustee may diverge in some respects, we find it most important that trustees’ interests are derivative, and accordingly, they generally cannot assert any greater rights as against defendants than debtors could have in the first instance." The Supreme Court departed from the Superior Court’s focus on the continued “existence” of the Company after the initiation of insolvency proceedings, and the Court rejected a strict rule foreclosing a relation-back approach to substitution of a bankruptcy trustee for a debtor. Instead, the Court held that relation back in favor of a federal bankruptcy trustee was appropriate, at least where the trustee has acted in a reasonably diligent fashion to secure his or her substitution, and there is no demonstrable prejudice to defendants. View "Morrison Info. v. Members 1st FCU" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was the validity of a workers’ compensation judge’s decision to reject opinion testimony from an independent medical witness presented by an employer and insurer, in the absence of any contrary evidence adduced by the claimant. In 2005, the appellant, Jeffrey Rhodes (“Claimant”) suffered injuries in a car accident, while in the course of his employment with the employer-appellee, IA Construction Corporation. In 2007, a workers’ compensation judge granted Rhodes' petition and awarded total disability benefits. Several years later, the employer filed a specialized notice under governing administrative regulations designed to initiate the impairment rating process. The Department of Labor and Industry’s Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (the “Bureau”), in turn, designated M. Bud Lateef, M.D., to conduct an IRE. Subsequently, based on the results of the ensuing examination, and given that the IRE had been requested outside the period associated with a rating accorded automatic effect, Employer filed a petition seeking to modify the workers’ compensation benefits payable to Claimant. The WCJ denied Employer’s modification petition, rejecting Dr. Lateef’s impairment rating opinion. In her estimation, Dr. Lateef’s assessment of cognition was an unduly limited one, since he performed only a cursory examination and otherwise relied upon only a limited range of medical records. In the circumstances, and particularly since Dr. Lateef specialized in physical medicine and pain management, not neurology, the WCJ indicated that she was unpersuaded by his opinion. On Employer’s appeal, the WCAB affirmed in a divided opinion. On further appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed this appeal to address the issue, as framed by Claimant, of “[w]hether the Commonwealth Court overstepped its appellate function in making credibility judgments which is the sole function of the Workers’ Compensation Judge.” The Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth Court erred in its conclusions that the WCJ lacked authority to reject the uncontradicted testimony of the IRE physician. The case was reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the WCJ's adjudication, as affimed by the WCAB. View "IA Construction v. WCAB" on Justia Law