Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Kevin Murphy was convicted by jury for the first-degree murder of his mother, sister and aunt. This case went before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on direct appeal. Three of the five challenges to the judgment of sentence raised by Appellant centered on the adequacy of the Commonwealth’s evidence of his guilt. He also argued that the trial court erred in not suppressing certain evidence from trial. In Appellant’s final argument, he asserted that, because the aggravating circumstances found by the jury in the penalty proceedings overlapped, the jury impermissibly “double-count[ed]” the aggravation. Finding no reversible error as to any of Appellant's claims, the Supreme Court affirmed his death penalty. View "Pennsylvania v. Murphy" on Justia Law

In a discretionary appeal by the Commonwealth, the Supreme Court considered whether Appellee Claude Descardes was entitled to seek review of his ineffectiveness of counsel claim, based on counsel’s failure to advise him of the collateral consequences of his guilty plea, via a petition for writ of coram nobis. Appellee, a Haitian national who held resident alien status in the United States, pled guilty to insurance fraud, a felony, and conspiracy to commit insurance fraud. Appellee was not advised prior to entering his plea that deportation was a collateral consequence of his plea pursuant to the Immigration and Naturalization Act. Appellee was sentenced to one year of probation and a fine, and did not appeal his judgment of sentence. He completed serving his probationary sentence in November 2007. In 2009, Appellee left the United States on personal business and, when he attempted to reenter the country, United States immigration officials denied him reentry due to his felony convictions. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that Appellee was not entitled to seek review of his ineffectiveness of counsel claim, and accordingly vacated the Superior Court's judgment holding to the contrary. Appellee's underlying petition for postconvicton relief was dismissed. View "Pennsylvania v. Descardes" on Justia Law

Responding to adverse financial conditions in the Philadelphia School District, the Pennsylvania Legislature amended the School Code in the late 1990s by adding provisions to the Distress Law tailored to school districts of the first class. In this matter, the issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether legislation designed to help the Philadelphia School District recover from financial hardship violated the non-delegation rule. The Court held that Section 696(i)(3) of the School Code, 24 P.S. sec. 6-696(i)(3), was unconstitutional, violating the non-delegation rule of Article II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Accordingly Respondents’ actions taken pursuant to that provision were null and void, and Respondents were permanently enjoined from taking further action under the authority it conferred. View "W. Phila A.C.E. Sch. v. S.D. of Phila." on Justia Law

From 2010 to 2012, Appellant Freedom Medical Supply, Inc. (“Freedom”), provided electrical muscle stimulators (“EMSs”) and portable whirlpools to automobile accident victims covered by Appellee State Farm Fire and Casualty Company and/or State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (collectively, “State Farm”). Notably, although Freedom purchased these items for relatively little cost, it applied significant markups. As found by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania herein, Freedom purchased the EMSs for approximately $20 to $30 each, yet charged approximately $1,525 to $1,600 each, and purchased the whirlpools for approximately $40 each, yet charged approximately $525 each. Because neither the EMSs nor portable whirlpools have a federally-determined Medicare fee, Freedom sought reimbursement from State Farm for 80% of the foregoing charges. State Farm denied Freedom's claims, and the district court ultimately agreed with State Farm when Freedom filed suit. Freedom appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which, noting that no Pennsylvania court or agency has addressed the question, sought to certify to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The question presented was: "[m]ay an insurer use methods not specifically identified in [the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL)] to calculate the 'usual and customary' charge for devices and services not listed on the Medicare Fee Schedule for purposes of determining the amount to be paid to providers of those devices and services?" In answer to the question submitted, the Supreme Court held that Section 69.43(c) of the MVFRL permitted, but did not require, that reimbursements be calculated predicated on the provider’s bill for services or the data collected by the carrier. View "Freedom Medical Supply v. State Farm" on Justia Law

In a discretionary appeal, the issue presented to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether the Transfer between Entities Act (a provision of the Public School Code designed to protect teachers affected by inter-school transfers of educational programs) applied where the transferred students were placed into pre-existing classes and no new classes added. The Central Westmoreland Career and Technology Center, a public vocational technical school (the “Vocational School”), provided career and technical training to high school students from numerous sending school districts within Westmoreland County, including Appellee Penn-Trafford School District (“Penn-Trafford”). For a number of years, the Vocational School taught math to students from the high schools in such districts who were enrolled in career and technical programs at the Vocational School. During this time, the sending school districts were providing the same math instruction to students in their high schools who were not enrolled at the Vocational School. In early 2010, eight sending school districts, including Penn-Trafford, advised the Vocational School that, beginning with the 2010-11 school year, they would be providing math instruction to the vocational students at the students’ home high schools rather than sending them to the Vocational School for math. Due to these changes, the Vocational School curtailed its math offerings and suspended five certified math teachers. The Supreme Court concluded that the transfer of students and the assumption of program responsibility by the receiving entity were alone sufficient to implicate the protections conferred under the Act. The Commonwealth Court's order was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "CWC v. Penn-Trafford" on Justia Law

In July 2004, Appellant James Vandivner fatally shot his fiancee, Michelle Cable, for which he received the death penalty. Appellant appealed the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, raising claims pertaining to his pre-trial, guilt, and penalty-phase proceedings. The PCRA court, having concluded Appellant’s claim did not have arguable merit, did not fully address Appellant's ineffectiveness of counsel claims. The Supreme Court concluded this omission required further review. It vacated the PCRA court’s order and remanded this matter back to the PCRA court for preparation of a supplemental opinion addressing whether any reasonable basis existed for trial counsel’s failure to investigate certain aspects of Appellant's ineffectiveness claims. View "Pennsylvania v. Vandivner" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence for Richard Poplawski, convicted in 2011 of killing three Pittsburgh police officers. The officers were killed on April 4, 2009, when they responded to Poplawski's home for a domestic dispute with his mother. Poplawski, armed with multiple weapons, thousands of rounds of ammunition and body armor launched a gunfight with the city that lasted for hours. "The record shows that the jury balanced three aggravating circumstances against two statutory mitigating circumstances and determined that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. Therefore, there exists no ground to vacate the sentence." View "Pennsylvania v. Poplawski" on Justia Law

Appellant Lenwood Mason's convictions arose from the June 1994, stabbing death of Iona Jeffries, for which he received the death penalty. His first Post-Conviction Relief Act petition was dismissed, and he appealed. Appellant contended that the cumulative effect of errors committed by the trial court and trial counsel’s ineffectiveness prevented the jury from hearing important evidence relevant to making its guilt phase and sentencing determinations. He raised eleven claims of error on appeal to the Supreme Court. With respect to issues one through six, and eight through eleven, the Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA court. In issue seven, Appellant's PCRA petition was pending when the U.S. Supreme Court decided "Atkins v. Virginia," (536 U.S. 304 (2002)). With respect to issue seven, Appellant argued that under Atkins, he was ineligible for the death penalty, and that the PCRA court erred in permitting Appellant acting pro se (over trial counsel's objection), to "waive" this claim. The Supreme Court found that, "where confronted with neither a basic, fundamental decision concerning Appellant’s PCRA challenge nor disagreement between counsel and Appellant with respect to the overarching objectives of the challenge, the PCRA court erred in ruling that counsels’ authority to seek an Atkins hearing was subject to Appellant’s veto. Furthermore, by acting directly on Appellant’s pro se letter moving for the court to accept his waiver of the counseled Atkins claim, the PCRA court impermissibly invited hybridized representation." The Supreme Court reversed on issue seven and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Mason" on Justia Law

In 2011, Heather Forsythe and Appellant Patrick Haney presented at Ruby Memorial Hospital in Morgantown, West Virginia with Forsythe’s four-year-old son, Trenton Lewis St. Clair. When Trenton arrived, he had neither a pulse nor signs of life. Forsythe and Appellant told emergency personnel that Trenton had fallen down a flight of stairs. Attempts to resuscitate the boy were unsuccessful, and he was pronounced dead shortly after arriving at the hospital. An examining physician's testimony at trial stated that it was “immediately evident that the child had been beaten. He was covered in bruises. There was blood around his mouth.” Forsythe gave a written statement to police explaining that she had observed Appellant physically abusing Trenton. Appellant would later be charged with first-degree murder and child endangerment. He ultimately received the death penalty for these crimes. His appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was automatic. After review, the Court concluded all of appellant's claimed of error at trial were meritless, and it affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Haney" on Justia Law

Through Pennsylvania’s Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act, ("Act 2"), the General Assembly created a scheme for establishing “cleanup standards” applicable to voluntary efforts to remediate environmental contamination for which a person or entity may bear legal responsibility. Appellant EQT Production Company (“EPC”), owned and operated natural gas wells in the Commonwealth. In May 2012, the company notified Appellee, the Department of Environmental Protection (the “Department” or “DEP”), that it had discovered leaks in one of its subsurface impoundments containing water that had been contaminated during hydraulic fracturing operations. Subsequently, EPC cleared the site of impaired water and sludge and commenced a formal cleanup process pursuant to Act 2. In May 2014, the agency tendered to EPC a proposed “Consent Assessment of Civil Penalty,” seeking to settle the penalty question via a payment demand of $1,270,871, subsuming approximately $900,000 attending asserted ongoing violations. EPC disputed the Department’s assessment, maintaining that: penalties could not exceed those accruing during the time period in which contaminants actually were discharged from the company’s impoundment; all such actual discharges ended in June 2012; and the Act 2 regime controlled the extent of the essential remediation efforts. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether ECT had the right to immediately seek a judicial declaration that the DEP's interpretation of the Act was erroneous. The Court held that the impact of the Department’s threat of multi-million dollar assessments against EPC was sufficiently direct, immediate, and substantial to create a case or controversy justifying pre-enforcement judicial review via a declaratory judgment proceeding, and that exhaustion of administrative remedies relative to the issues of statutory interpretation that the company has presented was unnecessary. View "EQT Production Co. v. DEP" on Justia Law