Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A series of cross-appeals involved tax credits and refunds for overpayments of the City of Philadelphia’s Business Privilege Tax (BPT). The City appealed the Commonwealth Court’s decision affirming the award of credits to Keystone Health Plan East, Inc., and QCC Insurance Company (collectively, Taxpayers), who appealed the same decision affirming the denial of their refund requests. The Philadelphia Department of Revenue agreed Taxpayers overpaid their taxes, but denied the refund requests as untimely. Taxpayers appealed to the Philadelphia Tax Review Board, arguing the net income corrections effectively reset the “due date” since they had 75 days from the completion of an IRS audit to file the amended returns. The Review Board rejected Taxpayers’ argument, determining “due date” referred to the date the returns were initially due (April 15, 2004 and 2005, respectively). Notwithstanding this denial of refunds, the Review Board, sua sponte, awarded Taxpayers credits for their overpayments. The trial court affirmed the Review Board’s decision. Both parties appealed, and a divided three-judge panel of the Commonwealth Court affirmed. The majority further held the trial court did not err in affirming the award of credits. Finding no reversible error in the Commonwealth Court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Phila. v. Tax Review Bd." on Justia Law

Hayley Twinn sometimes called appellant Aric Woodard to help watch her son Jaques. Twinn assured appellant that she would return to appellant's house to retrieve the child, but November 7, 2011, Twinn did not show as promised. Appellant called around looking for Twinn, admonishing that if Twinn did not come get her child, she would be sorry. Police responded to a 911 dispatch where a two-year-old male was under cardiac arrest. The child was wet, naked and smelling of feces. The child was taken to the hospital. While at the hospital awaiting a prognosis, appellant stated that because the child had defecated and smeared it on the kitchen floor, appellant had "popped him," and sent the child to the bathroom to clean himself. Appellant alleged the child was found slumped over and unresponsive in the bathtub minutes later. Appellant was ultimately charged with the first degree murder of Jaques, and he directly appealed his conviction and sentence to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Appellant raised twelve issues for the Court's review. And after careful consideration of each, the Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction and sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Woodard" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s review centered on review of a Commonwealth Court order Court interpreting a provision of a consent decree, negotiated by the Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania ("OAG") and approved by the Commonwealth Court, between Appellant UPMC, a nonprofit health care corporation, and Appellee Highmark, a nonprofit medical insurance corporation, which established the obligations of both parties with respect to certain health care plans serving vulnerable populations. Specifically, the Court considered whether the Commonwealth Court erroneously interpreted this "vulnerable populations" provision as creating a contractual obligation for UPMC to treat all participants in Highmark’s "Medicare Advantage Plans" (for which Highmark and UPMC currently have provider contracts which UPMC has indicated it will terminate) as "in-network" for purposes of determining the rates it is permitted to charge these individuals for physician, hospital, and other medical services during the duration of the consent decree. After careful review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s finding that the "vulnerable populations" clause of the consent decree required UPMC to "be in a contract" with Highmark for the duration of the consent decree, and, thus, that UPMC physicians, hospitals, and other services shall be treated as "in-network" for participants in Highmark Medicare Advantage plans which were subject to provider contracts between Highmark and UPMC set to be terminated by UPMC on December 31, 2015. The Court also affirmed the portion of the Commonwealth Court’s order requiring judicial approval for any further changes in business relationships between these parties which were governed by the consent decree, but quashed as not yet ripe for review the portion of the order which directed the OAG to file a request for supplemental relief to effectuate compliance with the consent decree. View "Pennsylvania v. UPMC" on Justia Law

This matter arose from a series of articles written by James Conmy and Edward Lewis which appeared from June 1 to October 10, 2001, in the Citizens’ Voice, a newspaper in the Wilkes-Barre/Scranton area owned by The Scranton Times L.P. The articles reported about the existence of a federal criminal investigation into the alleged ties of William D’Elia, the reputed head of the Bufalino crime family of northeastern Pennsylvania, and Thomas A. Joseph, Sr. to organized crime activities. The articles included information related to, inter alia, the May 31, 2001, execution of search warrants by a large contingent of federal agents and state troopers at the residence of Joseph, Sr., the office of Joseph, Sr.’s business, Acumark, Inc., the residence of Samuel Marranca, the residence of Jeanne Stanton, and the residence of D’Elia. Defendants The Scranton Times L.P., The Times Partner, Conmy, and Lewis appealed a superior court order which affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County and granted appellees Thomas A. Joseph, Thomas J. Joseph, Acumark, Inc., and Airport Limousine and Taxi Service, Inc. a new trial. After careful consideration of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the superior court erred in granting Appellees a new trial, and therefore, reversed. View "Joseph v. Scranton Times" on Justia Law

Appellee Stevenson Rose and Shawn Sadik brutally attacked Mary Mitchell in a park in the East Liberty neighborhood of Pittsburgh. During the attack, the men kicked the victim in the head approximately 60 times, stabbed her in the throat, and inserted a piece of aluminum framing into her vagina, causing serious internal injuries. The victim was left naked and bleeding until she was discovered by two individuals. The attack left the victim in a vegetative state. Rose provided police with a statement in which he admitted that he and Sadik attacked the victim after drinking and doing drugs. The issue in this discretionary appeal before the Supreme Court was whether a defendant convicted of third-degree murder had to be sentenced under the sentencing statute in effect at the time the defendant committed the ultimately deadly assault upon the victim, or whether the defendant was subject to an enhanced penalty pursuant to a subsequently-enacted sentencing statute which was in effect at the time of the victim’s death 14 years later. After review, the Court concluded that imposition of a sentence in excess of that prescribed by statute at the time the defendant committed the deadly assault violated and was prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. As such, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s order vacating appellee’s sentence, and remanded for resentencing. View "Pennsylvania v. Rose" on Justia Law

Appellee-Defendant Jose Luis Olivo was arrested in 2012, and charged with two counts of rape and involuntary deviant sexual intercourse and one count each of indecent assault, indecent exposure, endangering the welfare of children, and corruption of minors. The charges arose from allegations that he sexually abused his paramour’s daughter, starting in January 2009 when the victim was four and continuing until February 2012, when she was seven. Four days prior to the scheduled start of trial, Olivo presented a motion in limine to prevent the Commonwealth from presenting expert testimony pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. 5920 regarding child victim responses to sexual violence. Section 5920 applied to Olivo’s September 2012 criminal complaint because the Legislature made it effective for prosecutions filed on or after August 28, 2012. The court continued the trial to allow the presentation of argument regarding the motion in limine. The trial court suspended as unconstitutional Section 5920, concluding that the statute violated the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s exclusive control over judicial procedures pursuant to Article V, Section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that Section 5920 did not violate its authority under the Pennsylvania Constitution, and reversed the trial court’s decision suspending it. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Olivo" on Justia Law

While arguing with his wife, appellant struck her, knocked her to the ground, and attempted to force her back into their home; she escaped and drove to the police station. Police charged appellant with harassment and simple assault. While in prison awaiting his preliminary hearing, appellant tried to call his wife multiple times; she did not answer because the calls upset her. On time, appellant called his father, who called appellant’s wife on a separate phone and relayed appellant’s statements to her, establishing a three-way call on the two phones. Appellant insisted his wife tell the magistrate she would not testify, that she made a mistake, and that she caused her own injuries. If she failed to do so, appellant stated he would go to jail for two years, starve, and lose everything. He also told her that she must comply for the sake of their marriage, which he repeatedly described as “priceless.” Appellant stated that if his wife was charged with making false statements, he would pay her fines. Two days later, she told police she no longer wished to press charges. In light of the phone call, the Commonwealth charged appellant with intimidation of a witness under 18 Pa.C.S. 4952. A jury convicted appellant of simple assault and intimidation of a witness, and the trial court convicted him of harassment. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 33 to 66 months imprisonment. Appellant appealed the Superior Court order affirming his conviction, requesting that the Supreme Court overrule or clarify “Commonwealth v. Brachbill,” (555 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1989)). “‘Brachbill’ did not abolish the Commonwealth’s need to prove intimidation. Whether an offer of a pecuniary or other benefit contains sufficient indicia of intimidation is to be determined by the fact finder and assessed under the totality of the circumstances, cognizant that proof of manifest threats is not required. Insofar as Brachbill is read to mean pecuniary inducement alone will suffice without proof of intimidation, it is disapproved. While understandable, to the extent the Superior Court relied on ‘Brachbill’ to find intimidation is not needed to satisfy a conviction under 18 Pa.C.S. 4952,” the Supreme Court held the court erred. Despite clarifying Brachbill, the Court did not remand to the Superior Court to review the sufficiency of the evidence; as “the jury was properly instructed and found intimidation, additional fact finding is unnecessary.” View "Pennsylvania v. Doughty" on Justia Law

Mid-Atlantic Systems of CPA, Inc. hired Appellee David Socko in March 2007 as a salesperson. Socko executed a two-year employment contract containing a covenant not to compete. In February 2009, Socko resigned from his employment with Mid-Atlantic, but the company rehired him four months later, in June 2009. At his time of rehire, Socko signed a new employment agreement containing another two-year covenant not to compete. While still employed by Mid-Atlantic, in 2010, Socko signed a third, more restrictive “Non-Competition Agreement,” which, by its terms, superseded all prior agreements. Pursuant to the Agreement (at issue in this appeal), Socko was not permitted to compete with Mid-Atlantic for two years after the termination of his employment in any of the locations Mid-Atlantic did business: Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New York, Virginia, and West Virginia. The Agreement also expressly provided for the application of Pennsylvania law, and stated that the parties intended to be “legally bound.” The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s review was one of first impression: whether the enforcement of an employment agreement containing a restrictive covenant not to compete, entered into after the commencement of employment, could be challenged by an employee for a lack of consideration, where the agreement, by its express terms, stated that the parties “intend to be legally bound,” which language implicated the insulating effect of the Uniform Written Obligations Act (“UWOA”). After review, the Supreme Court concluded that an employee was not precluded from challenging such an agreement executed pursuant to the UWOA. View "Socko. v. Mid-Atantic Systems of CPA, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in these cross-appeals by Verizon Telephone Company of Pennsylvania and the Commonwealth was the taxability of Verizon’s gross receipts under the Pennsylvania Gross Receipts Act, for: (1) the installation of private phone lines; (2) the provision of directory assistance services; and (3) certain non-recurring charges levied on its customers for the installation of telephone lines; moves of, and changes to telephone lines and services; and from repairs of telephone lines. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded that revenue derived from all such activities constitutes gross receipts taxable under 72 P.S. 8101(a)(2), and, thus, affirmed the portion of the order of the Commonwealth Court which determined revenue from the first two above-enumerated activities were taxable. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the Commonwealth Court’s order finding revenue from the third activity was not. View "Verizon, PA, Inc. v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

In a discretionary appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed a legislative-process challenge to a 1988 enactment. This issue was raised in the context of a professional negligence lawsuit filed in 2010, asserting causes of action for wrongful birth. Rebecca Sernovitz sought medical care after becoming pregnant. Because she and her husband are both of Ashkenazi Jewish heritage, their child was at increased risk of suffering from a genetic disorder known as familial dysautonomia (“F.D.”). Her treating physicians, negligently misinformed her about the test results, telling her she was not a carrier. Thereafter, Mrs. Sernovitz gave birth to a son, Samuel, who suffered from F.D. and would suffer from the disorder for the rest of his life. Mrs. Sernovitz later learned that both she and her husband were carriers of the mutation. If she had been correctly informed of the results of her test in a timely manner, further testing would have ensued, which would eventually have revealed Samuel’s condition while he was still in utero. Had that occurred, Mrs. Sernovitz would have obtained an abortion. In October 2010, plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. Sernovitz filed an amended complaint against the health-care providers and their employers and corporate parents (“Defendants”), asserting claims for wrongful birth and seeking damages for medical expenses and emotional distress. Although Section 8305(a) of the Judicial Code barred such claims, plaintiffs alleged that Act 47 of 1988 (of which Section 8305 was enacted) was unconstitutional in its entirety on several grounds. In particular, they averred that: the act’s original purpose was changed during its passage through the General Assembly, contrary to Article III, Section 1; it contained more than one subject, in violation of Article III, Section 3; and, in its final form, it was not considered on three days in each House, thus failing to conform with Article III, Section 4. The common pleas court determined that the act complied with Article III, sustained the preliminary objections on the basis that the wrongful-birth claims were barred by Section 8305, and dismissed the amended complaint. A three-judge panel of the Superior Court reversed in a published decision. Having stricken Section 8305, the Superior Court reversed the common pleas court’s order dismissing the amended complaint and remanded for further proceedings. Defendants moved for reconsideration, and appealed to the Supreme Court when their motion was denied. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Superior Court’s decision, reversed, and remanded for reinstatement of the common pleas court’s order dismissing the complaint. View "Sernovitz v. Dershaw" on Justia Law