Justia Pennsylvania Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue the Supreme Court addressed in these consolidated appeals centered on the extent of the public’s statutory right of access to discrete information about the implementation of the Medical Assistance Program. In 2011, James Eiseman, Jr. and the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia (“Requesters”) tendered requests to the Department of Public Welfare (DPW) seeking records revealing, among other things, the rates that DPW paid to managed care organizations (MCOs) for dental services in the Southeast Zone (the “Capitation Rates”), and the amounts paid by MCOs to provide dental services (the “MCO Rates”). These were submitted per the Right-to-Know Law (RTKL). DPW denied the requests. Pertinent to the Supreme Court’s review of this case, with regard to the MCO Rates, the Department indicated that it had been informed by each of the MCOs that the rates were “trade secrets and/or confidential proprietary information” protected against disclosure. The Department did not deny that it possessed pertinent records; rather, it related that the MCOs had instructed that “DPW is not to disclose” the rates. The Office of Open Records (OOR), however, issued a final determination granting the relevant records requests. Initially, an appeals officer observed that records in the possession of a Commonwealth agency were presumed to be public, unless they qualified for an exemption under the RTKL or other law or are protected by a privilege, judicial order, or decree. In a divided opinion, the Commonwealth Court sustained the portion of the OOR’s determination concerning Capitation Rates, as the members of an en banc panel unanimously agreed that contracts between DPW and the MCOs were financial records under the Law. In the absence of a legislative evaluation, the Supreme Court could not conclude that records which must be submitted to a government agency for approval, were not records “dealing with” the agency’s monetary disbursements and services acquisitions. "[I]f the General Assembly wished for dissemination to be withheld, it would have been a straightforward matter to provide for redaction of trade-secrets information in Section 708(c) of the Law, as was done in relation to eight of the other openness exceptions which are otherwise withheld from financial records." The Court focused upon the conclusion that records which were required to be submitted to and approved by DPW, and which reflected the central means of implementing a core departmental function, were records “dealing with” DPW’s disbursement of public monies and its responsibility to afford access to healthcare services in furtherance of the public interest. The order of the Commonwealth Court holding to the contrary was reversed relative to the MCO Rates, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Dept. of Public Welfare v. Eiseman" on Justia Law

A jury convicted appellant George Hitcho, Jr. of first degree murder for the death of Freemansburg Police Officer Robert Lasso in 2011. At the penalty phase, the jury found one aggravating circumstance and three mitigating circumstances, unanimously determined the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances, and sentenced appellant to death. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found "no basis upon which to upset the death verdict," and affirmed appellant's conviction and sentence. View "Pennsylvania v. Hitcho" on Justia Law

This matter concerned a parcel of commercial/industrial property located in Springettsbury Township, which was owned by appellee Harley-Davidson Motor Company. Approximately 110 acres of the parcel contained buildings and other improvements, and the remaining 119 acres were considered “excess” land. Previously, the United States Navy, from 1941 until 1964, and, later, a private firm, American Machinery and Foundry Company (“AMF”), with whom Harley-Davidson merged in 1969, used the parcel to operate a weapons manufacturing plant and, in the course of their business, buried numerous contaminants (as well as unexploded military ordnance) in the subsurface strata. This use caused significant environmental damage to the property. In 1993, Harley-Davidson repurposed a portion of the site to operate a motorcycle manufacturing plant. In 2003, the Assessment Office of York County notified Harley-Davidson that it intended to increase the parcel’s property tax assessment. Harley-Davidson filed an appeal with the York County Board of Assessment Appeals, which affirmed. Harley-Davidson then filed a de novo appeal with the trial court. Appellant Central York School District (“School District”) intervened, and the parties proceeded to a three-day bench trial to determine the parcel’s assessments for tax years 2004 through 2010, pursuant to the Second Class A and Third Class County Assessment Law. This appeal by allowance before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court involved the proper determination of the fair market value of Harley-Davidson's property for purposes of property tax assessment, including consideration of environmental contamination, remediation, and stigma, as well as the potential for future subdivision of the property. After review, the Supreme Court found: (1) hypothetical ways in which a property could be used by potential buyers are properly considered by an expert in evaluating what a willing buyer would pay for a property; (2) the potential effect of agreements concerning possible environmental remediation liability and ongoing environmental restrictions and maintenance is a relevant factor that must be taken into account when determining the fair market value of property, and (3) environmental stigma may be relevant to determining fair market value of real estate for tax purposes in appropriate circumstances. The Supreme concluded: (1) the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that the School District’s expert valued the subject property as already subdivided, and, thus, its determination in this regard was reversed; (2) the Commonwealth Court properly concluded that these agreements were not accounted for by the trial court; thus, the Commonwealth Court’s remand was affirmed; and (3) the trial court properly relied upon the School District’s expert’s opinion regarding a 5% environmental stigma devaluation for the property; thus, reversed the Commonwealth Court’s rejection of the trial court’s reliance upon such stigma in its valuation of the property. View "Harley-Davidson v. Central York Sch District et al" on Justia Law

In 2007, Terra Technical Services, LLC subcontracted with River Station Development which in turn entered into a written contract with River Station Land, L.P., the terms of which provided that Terra Technical would perform demolition and debris removal of structures of various types and sizes on a seventy-six acre parcel of land owned by River Station for an agreed upon amount. In 2009, Terra Technical provided formal notice to River Station of its intention to file a mechanics’ lien claim pursuant to 49 P.S. 1501.In 2010, Terra Technical filed seventeen identical mechanics lien against River Station's designated parcels of land, including the buildings and structures thereon, wherein it alleged it had begun the demolition work on the property on July 31, 2007, and completed its contractual duties on December 23, 2008, although it did not receive the full amount of the agreed upon price for its services. Although River Station filed preliminary objections to Terra Technical’s mechanics’ lien claims on January 5, 2011, and Terra Technical filed responses thereto on January 25, 2011, the trial court did not issue a ruling thereon in light of the failure of either party to take the action necessary to bring the preliminary objections before the trial court. In 2012, Terra Technical filed seventeen complaints to obtain judgment on the corresponding mechanics’ lien claims. In this appeal the question this case raised for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Mechanics’ Lien Law required a claimant filing a complaint to enforce a previously filed mechanics’ lien claim to docket such complaint under a term and number separate from that which had been assigned to the mechanics’ lien claim itself. The Supreme Court held that it did not, and accordingly, reversed. View "Terra Technical Services v. River Station Land, L.P." on Justia Law

In this negligence action, appellant Ronald Green, Executor of the Estate of Joseph Fusco, appealed a Superior Court order affirming the trial court’s grant of a nonsuit in favor of Appellees Pennsylvania Hospital (the “Hospital”), Contributors to Pennsylvania Hospital, and several nurses and doctors. Joseph Fusco (“Decedent”) arrived at the emergency department of the Hospital, complaining of shortness of breath, rapid breathing, and wheezing. He was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit (“ICU”) and given medication, which failed to alleviate his symptoms. As a result, Decedent, who suffered from a number of pre-existing conditions, was intubated and placed on a ventilator in order to assist with his breathing. Decedent remained on a ventilator in critical condition for ten days. In an attempt to wean Decedent from the ventilator, a physician at the Hospital performed a tracheotomy. The tracheotomy site had become blocked; re-insertion of the tube went into Decedent's throat causing air outside of his lungs to accumulate and collapse his lungs and trachea. The Decedent was again intubated, this time through his mouth. However, by this time, he suffered cardiac arrest and died. Appellant, as executor of Decedent's estate, brought a negligence action against the Hospital and the nurses and doctors that treated Decedent shortly before his death. When a hospital patient experiences an acute medical emergency, such as that experienced by Decedent in this case, and an attending nurse or other medical staff issues an emergency request or page for additional help, "it is more than reasonable for the patient, who is in the throes of medical distress, to believe that such emergency care is being rendered by the hospital or its agents. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s grant of a nonsuit under Section 1303.516(a) was erroneous in the instant case, and that the question of whether a reasonably prudent person in Decedent’s position would be justified in his belief that the care rendered by Dr. Malaisrie was rendered by her as an agent of the Hospital should have proceeded to the jury." The Supreme Court, therefore, reversed the Superior Court’s decision affirming the trial court’s grant of a nonsuit in favor of the Hospital on this issue, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision to the extent it affirmed the trial court's grant of a nonsuit in favor of one of the nurses. View "Green v. Pennsylvania Hospital" on Justia Law

Appellant Ralph Bailets was employed by the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission from 1998 to 2008. Appellant achieved “outstanding” and “commendable” performance ratings while employed as the Commission’s manager of financial reporting and systems. During this time, appellant frequently complained that he observed improprieties and wasteful practices regarding various matters, including a Commission computer systems contract with Ciber, Inc., EZPass discounts, politically motivated personnel actions, and the use of multiple, unnecessary external investment managers. Appellant’s job title and responsibilities were changed in June, 2008, he was removed from an additional position as assistant secretary-treasurer around the same time, and his employment by the Commission was ultimately terminated in November, 2008. Believing these actions were retaliation for his reports of wrongdoing and waste at the Commission, appellant filed a complaint in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction, alleging a single claim under the Whistleblower Law, against the Commission, Anthony Q. Maun, the Commission’s director of accounting; and Nikolaus H. Grieshaber, the Commission’s chief financial officer (collectively, appellees). In an unreported, single-judge opinion, Senior Judge Friedman held the decision to terminate appellant was “a management discretionary action, motivated by legitimate employer objectives.” The court concluded there were legitimate reasons for firing appellant, and there was nothing in the record establishing the decision makers who terminated his position were even aware of appellant’s reports of alleged wrongdoing and waste; the evidence instead showed 15 positions were eliminated in November, 2008, because of “a poor economy, declining traffic, and necessary expense reductions across the Commission.” After review, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court. The Court found sufficient evidence that appellant made prima face evidence of violations of the Whistleblower law, "which at the very least created issues of material fact to preclude the grant of summary judgment." View "Bailets v. Pa. Turnpike Commission" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to consider whether the Public School Code of 1949 mandated that a school district provide free transportation to a student from two different residences where the student’s parents share physical custody of the student and both parents reside within the school district. The Commonwealth Court held that the Manheim Township School District must provide transportation to both parents’ residences. After review, the Supreme Court agreed that the School District was required to provide free transportation to and from both parents’ residences in this case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court. View "Watts v. Manheim Twp. School District" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the Third Circuit's petition for certification in a defamation case. Robert Schanne taught physics at Lower Merion High School in Ardmore, Pennsylvania. Jenna Addis was his student during her junior and senior years, from 2001 until her graduation in 2003. After Addis graduated, she attended Tulane University in New Orleans. In late November 2010, Addis (then age 26) was visiting Pennsylvania for the Thanksgiving weekend. During her visit, Addis spoke to Susan O'Bannon, a friend who was employed by Lower Merion High School. Addis told O'Bannon that she and Schanne had been romantically involved while Addis was a high school senior and during the summer after she graduated. O'Bannon reported Addis' allegation to school officials. Addis testified in her deposition that she discussed the matter with O'Bannon as a friend and not as an agent of the school. Addis stated, moreover, that she did not intend for O'Bannon to report the information to the school, that she was not aware O'Bannon would feel obligated to make such a report, and that she was surprised to learn that O'Bannon had done so. Based on Addis's statement, school officials provided Schanne with a pre-termination "Loudermill" hearing, and ultimately terminated his employment. Schanne filed a defamation action against Addis pursuant to the federal court's diversity jurisdiction. In his amended complaint, Schanne alleged that his romantic involvement with Addis did not begin until after she graduated from high school, and that any contrary assertions by Addis were false and made with malice due to Addis' jealousy over Schanne's relationship with another woman. Schanne averred that Addis' statements were not judicially privileged because: they were not made during a school board meeting, hearing, or other judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding; no judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding regarding Schanne was "convened or contemplated" at the time Addis made her allegations; and no other privilege applied to the statements. Addis moved for summary judgment which the federal court granted on the basis that all of her assertions were protected by the judicial privilege. On appeal, Schanne argued that Addis's statement to O'Bannon was not made in the regular course of a judicial action, because Addis had gone to O'Bannon as a friend and did not contemplate possible judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. The Third Circuit certified the question of whether, under Pennsylvania law, absolute judicial privilege applied to the allegation made prior to the commencement of any quasi-judicial proceeding and without an intent that the allegation lead to a quasi-judicial proceeding. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that judicial privilege was not limited to statements made in open court, but encompassed pleadings too. "Perhaps the most salient aspect of the issue as framed is that, not only was the allegation made before the commencement of proceedings, it was made 'without an intent that [it] lead to a quasi-judicial proceeding.' [. . .] Where a declarant has no intention of initiating proceedings or otherwise obtaining a remedy, clothing his or her statement with immunity cannot serve this goal. Assuming the declaration is otherwise actionable, then, protecting it under the cloak of the judicial privilege would do little to advance the privilege's objectives, while undermining the plaintiff's right to obtain recompense for any injury to his or her reputation." View "Schanne v. Addis" on Justia Law

On the night of March 9, 2001, appellant Stephen Treiber set fire to his home while his girlfriend, Denise Riddle, and his two-year-old daughter, Jessica, slept inside. As the home burned, appellant and Riddle escaped, but Jessica remained in her crib until firefighters removed her; however, they were unable to revive her. Appellant was charged with criminal homicide, reckless endangerment, and multiple counts of arson. Appellant appealed the denial of collateral relief to his criminal convictions and death sentence pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). Upon careful consideration of appellant's arguments on appeal and the trial court record, the Supreme Court held that the PCRA court's conclusions were "free from legal error" and supported by the record. Therefore, appellant was not entitled to relief. View "Pennsylvania v. Treiber" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to consider an issue of first impression regarding whether an insured forfeits insurance coverage by settling a tort claim without the consent of its insurer, when the insurer defends the insured subject to a reservation of rights, asserting that the claims may not be covered by the policy. In 1994, a class action lawsuit was filed against Appellant-Insureds Babcock & Wilcox Company (B&W) and Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) (collectively, Insureds) brought by plaintiffs claiming to have suffered bodily injury and property damage caused by emissions from nuclear facilities owned by Insureds. Over time, the class action grew to include over 500 named plaintiffs, who lived near the nuclear facilities. Insureds denied that the facilities released any emissions or that the harm suffered by plaintiffs resulted from the facilities. While the underlying tort action was pending in federal court, disputes arose between Insureds and their insurers, Appellees American Nuclear Insurers and Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters (collectively ANI or Insurer). At the outset of the litigation, Insurer acknowledged that it would defend Insureds but contested whether the policy covered aspects of the claims, and thus defended subject to a reservation of rights. While staying various claims for future determination, including the breach of the duty to cooperate claim, the court decided issues regarding the trigger of coverage and held that B&W and ARCO were entitled to separate counsel. During the course of the litigation, Insurer refused consent to any settlement offers presented to it due to its conclusion that the case had a strong likelihood of a defense verdict given the lack of medical and scientific support for plaintiffs’ claims and decisions by the federal trial court regarding procedural and evidentiary issues in the pending retrial, which Insurer viewed as highly favorable to Insureds’ ultimate outcome. After presenting the settlement offers to Insurer and being denied consent, Insureds ARCO and B&W, respectively in 2008 and 2009, settled with the class action plaintiffs for a total of $80 million, which was substantially less than the $320 million of potential coverage. Insureds then sought reimbursement of the settlement amount from Insurer. The Supreme Court found that after an extensive trial where the jury was presented with voluminous evidence relating to the strength of the underlying action and the settlement offer, the jury determined that the settlement was “fair and reasonable from the perspective of a reasonably prudent person in the same position of [Insureds] and in light of the totality of the circumstances,” a standard which the Court adopted as the proper standard to apply in a reservation of rights case where an insured settles following the insurers’ refusal to consent to settlement. The Court concluded that the Superior Court erred by requiring an insured to demonstrate bad faith when the insured accepts a settlement offer in a reservation of rights case. Accordingly, the Superior Court's decision was reversed and the trial court's judgment reinstated. View "Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. American Nuclear Insurers & Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters" on Justia Law